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This study contributes to the literature on the academic profession’s intellectual freedom.  
Drawing significantly on two methodological approaches, comparative case study and grounded 
theory, this dissertation examines three controversies in which government officials challenged 
academic scientists’ federally sponsored research, which had implications for national 
environmental policies.  To structure this examination, I used a two-part framework.  For the first 
part, I investigated the evolving interpretations of events and actors’ interests, which revealed the 
tactics and pressures employed by government officials when challenging the academic 
scientists’ federally sponsored research.  For the second part, I used Freidson’s theory of 
professional dominance to help us understand how and in what ways institutionalized 
arrangements within society supported the academic profession’s autonomy and authority over 
its work.  This analysis identified the means by which the academic scientists in my three cases 
exerted some degree of control over scientific decisions regarding the research assumptions, 
methods, and analyses of their findings.  
The study’s key findings are presented in the form of five research claims: First, the 
government challengers may try – sometimes successfully – to exercise their influence over 
indirect participants in the federally funded research in an attempt to control the dissemination of 
the federally sponsored research findings.  Second, the government challengers, though not 
scientists themselves, relied heavily on their own judgment to declare publicly the kinds of 
  
 
activities that can and cannot count as legitimate scientific research, rather than relying on the 
traditional scientific peer-review process.  Third, academic scientists may involve members of 
the public in the dispute.  When that happens, the public may help decide whether government 
officials or academic scientists are better equipped to address the scientific matters associated 
with the federal policy.  Fourth, academic scientists’ political allies can support academic 
scientists’ efforts to defend their research within the policymakers’ setting.  Fifth, academic 
scientists may assert academic conventions (e.g., peer review) as the standard (or possibly as the 
preferred) practice through which to evaluate science, even when government challengers 
question the validity of those conventions.  Placed in context of the extant literature, these 
claims, taken together, suggest that the government officials tried to take actions that exceed 
their professional competence, specifically as boundary breakers who attempted to infiltrate the 
jurisdictional responsibilities of the academic scientists.  In addition, despite the government 
officials’ attempts to engage in professional boundary-crossing activities, the academic scientists 
asserted institutionalized practices and standards of the profession (e.g., peer review and open 
dialogue) and drew on the assistance of external actors (i.e., members of the public and political 
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CHAPTER I: OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
Introduction 
This study explores what it means for government actors to challenge academic 
scientists’ federally sponsored research and academic scientists to exert control over that 
research.1  Drawing significantly on two methodological approaches, comparative case study and 
grounded theory, this study examines three controversies in which the government challenges 
academic scientists’ federally sponsored, environmental research.  It reveals the government 
actors’ tactics and pressures employed by examining the circumstances and events surrounding 
each government challenge, and it identifies the means by which these academic scientists 
exerted some degree of control over scientific decisions regarding the research assumptions, 
methods, and analyses of their findings.  Further, it evaluates the conceptual framework used in 
this study. 
At the core of this study, I investigate the meaning and application of academic scientists’ 
intellectual freedom as manifested in how they exert control over their research when there are 
government challenges to that research.  As Lewis and Ryan (1976) remind us, “Academic 
objectives cannot be fully attained until interference by individuals, or groups, outside the 
profession is minimized or, in the best of all possible worlds, eliminated” (p. 290).  Inherent in 
the academic profession’s professional liberty is an implied understanding of intellectual 
freedom, which is intended to minimize lay challenges to its research.  Intellectual freedom 
affords members of the academic profession protection to conduct research within their areas of 
expertise with impunity from lay individuals or groups, including government actors who are not 
trained in the particular research area (see generally American Association of University 
                                                 
1 This study examines scientific challenges from public officials who are not specifically trained in academic 
science.  In other words, the study examines lay, government challenges to academic scientists’ research, but for 





Professors, 2001; Berdahl, 1990; Fuchs, 1964; Eisenberg, 1988; Hamilton, 1995; Hofstader, 
1963; Hook, 1970; Metzger, 1987; Metzger, Kadish, DeBardeleben, & Bloustein, 1969; Rabban, 
1990; Slaughter, 1988; van Alstyne, 1972, 1975).2   
In the United States, intellectual freedom derives from both professional and 
constitutional sources of authority.  The professional recognition started in 1915.  The founding 
members of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) issued a document that 
first articulated this professional liberty.  Although the professional doctrine underwent several 
clarifications between 1915 and 1970, the concept has remained fairly consistent since its 
inception: As a professional liberty, intellectual freedom grants professors, including academic 
scientists, the ability to work within their research expertise without any penalties or fear of 
penalties from individuals or groups who are not experts in that area.  In addition, in 1954, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized that intellectual freedom has constitutional protections.  Largely 
derived from the First Amendment, the constitutional protection provides legal recourse to the 
academic profession when a government challenge to a professor’s research becomes an 
unjustified interference with the professor’s work, such as preventing a professor from 
publishing her results, absent either a contractual obligation that permits government control of 
research results or research issues posing a threat to national security.  Based on both 
professional and legal sources, intellectual freedom indicates that professors operate freely to 
“pursue the investigation, research, … and publication of any subject as a matter of professional 
                                                 
2  Although public university administrators may also serve as government actors who interfere with professors’ 
research, the focus of this study rests with government actors outside of the academy who, in their governmental 
role, sponsor or oversee federally sponsored research.  According to those parameters, for purposes of this study, 





interest, without vocational jeopardy or threat of other sanction,” particularly from the 
government (van Alstyne, 1975, p. 71).3 
Moreover, when members of the academic profession reasonably perceive an unjustified, 
government challenge to a professor’s research, the entire academic profession has a professional 
obligation to defend the challenged professor’s intellectual freedom to preserve this liberty for 
the whole profession (AAUP, 2001).  Given the academic profession’s interest in preserving its 
intellectual freedom, this study examines three case studies illustrating government actors’ 
challenges of academic scientists’ federally funded research and explores what it means for 
academic scientists to exert control over that research.   
To further clarify and amplify the basic focus of this research study, this chapter provides 
a brief overview of the key concepts that shape this study.  First, I present the study’s problem.  
That is, since 1945, when the federal government established the national policy to fund 
academic research as a strategy to spur U.S. scientific innovation, it has added significant limits 
to its promise of funding research uninhibited by political influences.  Instead, government actors 
have identified ways to exercise their authority over academic research.  While these actions are 
well documented, government officials have introduced many new pressures and tactics since 
1945.  More important, the extant literature is not well developed in terms of addressing how the 
academic profession exerts control over its research, particularly federally sponsored research.  
The available literature tends to focus more on how the academic profession is largely 
                                                 
3 The academic profession’s liberty to work without undue, lay interferences is more frequently referred to as 
“academic freedom.”  Its aim is to afford the academic profession liberty in the areas of teaching, research, service, 
and organizational governance.  Yet, in the literature, the meaning and application of academic freedom differ 
widely about what professional liberties faculty members have in terms of teaching, service, and organizational 
governance.  In the legal and professional circles, those differences also exist in practice.  However, the concept of 
academic freedom over research contains fewer debates within legal and professional circles and in the literature.  
To distinguish this construct of “academic freedom over research” from other forms of academic freedom, I refer to 






constrained by government actions rather than capable of managing or overcoming the 
government challenge.   Second, the problem presented leads me to this study’s purpose of 
exploring what it means for (a) government actors to challenge academic scientists’ federally 
sponsored research (particularly to investigate whether new or modified challenges are 
presented) and (b) academic scientists to exert control over that research.  Third, in order to 
illuminate ways of understanding the concepts of government challenges and academic 
scientists’ exerting control over their research, I introduce three cases that illustrate government 
challenges involving academic scientists’ federally funded research on environmental issues.  
Fourth, to organize the various concepts that guide this study, I briefly describe the study’s 
conceptual framework, which, in ways different from prior literature, accounts for both the 
government challenges and academic scientists’ responses.  Fifth, connecting the cases with my 
conceptual framework, which helped construct my study, I state the research questions used in 
my initial inquiry to uncover what it means for government actors to challenge academic 
scientists’ federally sponsored research and for academic scientists to exert control over that 
research.  Sixth, clarifying and drawing attention to key terms and phrases used in this study, I 
define them.  Finally, as a roadmap for this nine chapter study, I present its development and 
organization.   
Problem Statement 
The relationship between academic science and the federal government developed 
significantly after 1945.  Immediately following World War II, U.S. policy advisors presented 
concerns about the nation’s ability to protect itself and gain a competitive advantage in the global 
economic market (Smith, 1990).  Addressing these concerns, in 1945, Vannevar Bush of the U.S. 





in his report, Science: The Endless Frontier.  The proposal recommended a plan that would focus 
on expanding the country’s scientific innovation by supporting an uninhibited inquiry into basic 
research.  Basic research refers to the foundational work of science, driven by scientific 
curiosity, not scientific application.  According to Bush (1945/1980), universities were in the 
best position to carry out this proposal because their purpose aligned with the advancement of 
basic research and their organizational culture fostered the pursuit of free inquiry (see also 
Dermeritt, 2000; Graham & Diamond, 2004; Guston & Keniston, 1994; Smith, 1990).  
By all accounts, the federal government and American research universities agreed to 
work together toward this common goal of advancing scientific innovation, and Bush’s report 
established the basic terms and conditions for the parties (Dermeritt, 2000; Geiger, 1997; 
Graham & Diamond, 2004; Guston & Keniston, 1994; Smith, 1990).  Pursuant to the agreement 
between the government and universities, government sponsorship of academic science grew 
substantially (Geiger, 2004; Guston & Keniston, 1994; Kevles, 1977; Smith, 1990).  In 1940, 
federal sponsorship of scientific research at American universities totaled approximately $13 
million (Axt, 1952).  By 1953, that amount had increased to $138 million.  Besides the financial 
support, this relationship between American research universities and government also rested, in 
part, on the assumption that government would defer to academic scientists’ expertise regarding 
scientific decisions connected with their federally sponsored research (see generally, Chomsky, 
Nader, Wallenstein & Lewontin, 1997; Dermeritt, 2000; Guston & Keniston, 1994; Smith, 
1990).  As Bush (1945/1980) described, this relationship between American research universities 
and the federal government was intended to operate with the understanding of “free play of free 
intellects, working on subjects of their own choice, in a manner dictated by their own curiosity 





The government’s promise of “free play of free intellects” quickly became an idealized 
principle.  Soon after the adoption of this science policy initiative, the government took actions 
or adopted policies that placed limits on the principle of “free play of free intellects” when 
national security was at stake. Besides national security as a limiting the principle of “free play 
of free intellects,” around the late 1960s, the government began favoring federally sponsored 
research that met policy priorities and, at times, explicitly conditioned policy goals to research 
awards; examples of this bias can be found into the late 1970s.  Starting around the 1980s, the 
government began establishing additional accountability measures to address scientific 
misconduct with federally sponsored projects, particularly misconduct by academic scientists.  
Although academic scientists and others in the academic community have recognized the need 
for accountability measures as a form of public intervention when illegal activities, such as 
research misconduct with public funds, take place, they also acknowledge that the more stringent 
accountability measures place academic scientists who accept government sponsorship of 
research at odds with the principle of “free play of free intellects.”  In short, over the last 60 
years, the government exerted its authority to protect the public by carefully adding new methods 
of limiting its promise of “free play of free intellects.”   
These government actions, which are well documented, raise concerns about the 
academic profession’s ability to exercise its intellectual freedom.  It is well established that 
intellectual freedom aims to permit the academic profession to “pursue truth unhindered” 
(Pincoffs, 1975, p. viii; see also Berdahl, 1990; Hofstader, 1955; MacIver, 1955; Metzger, 1955, 
1987; Metzger et al., 1969; Rabban, 1990; Slaughter, 1988; van Alstyne, 1972, 1975).  Society 
values intellectual freedom because it promotes a working environment in which the academic 





potentially contributes to scientific innovation.  Despite the purpose and societal benefits of 
intellectual freedom, “[p]ractical problems arise for academics [–] not as much over the abstract 
question of the nature of truth,” but rather over the ways in which academics may exert control 
over research so “they may engage … in pursuit of truth” (Pincoffs, 1975, p. xii).  The extant 
literature offers little guidance. 
Unlike the literature that trails government officials exerting its authority, the literature 
on government challenges to professors’ research often omits or only minimally discusses how 
the academic profession exercises control over its research.  Instead, it typically portrays the 
academic profession as constrained by government controls (see, e.g., Carleton, 1987; Coker, 
1954; Hansen, 1988; MacIver, 1955; Schwab, 1990).  Only a modest collection of literature 
presents an examination of professors’ defenses to government’s challenges (see, e.g., Garrison 
& Kobor, 2002; Gutfeld, 1970; Hamilton, 1995; Lewis, 1988; Lilienfeld, 2002; Ludlum, 1950; 
Schrecker, 1980, 1986).  Within that collection, a small subset of the literature informs readers of 
potentially successful strategies and tactics that the academic profession employed; however, 
these studies contain significant limitations (see, e.g., Garrison & Kobor, 2002; Hamilton, 1995; 
Lilienfeld, 2002).  For example, Garrison and Kobor (2002) and Lilienfeld (2002) were 
conducted as a preliminary analysis to only one situation regarding a controversy over one 
academic publication.  As the authors indicate, more information regarding ways in which the 
academic profession may exercise its intellectual freedom remains to be explored.    
This message of constraint, rather than a focus on ways to exert professional control, is 
also represented in the literature on the academic profession.  Often, this literature expresses 
perceived constraints from outside forces, including government, of the profession’s authority 





concerns over increasing limits on their ability to exercise professional discretion (see, e.g., 
Altbach, 1980, 1997, 2000; Bowen & Schuster, 1986; Cole, 2005; Gutmann, 2005; Newsom & 
Polster, 2001; Rhoades, 1998).  Raising attention about the increasing limits’ leading to an 
overall decline in the state of the profession, the literature on the academic profession has 
invoked harshly critical phrases such as “a crisis of the professoriate” (Altbach, 1980), “a 
national resource imperiled” (Bowen & Schuster, 1986), “uncertainties in the changing academic 
profession” (Massey, 1997), the “crisis in the academy” (Altbach, 1997), and the “war against 
the faculty” (Nelson, 1999).   
The overarching theme of these lines of research is that the academic profession has 
experienced a feeling of professional defeatism when faced with government challenges. The 
literature suggests that the presence of intellectual freedom as a professional liberty is perhaps 
insufficient to defeat government challenges.  While it is possible that intellectual freedom is 
insufficient when facing the interests put forth by the government and that the academic 
profession may be experiencing declines in professional authority and autonomy, the reality is 
that the academic profession maintains some control over its research.  Yet, asserting intellectual 
freedom by itself is not the silver bullet that immediately overcomes a government challenge and 
translates into the academic profession’s taking control of its research.  As Menand (1996) points 
out, intellectual freedom “is not simply a kind of bonus enjoyed by workers within the system, a 
philosophical luxury” (p. 4).  Instead, constant defense of intellectual freedom is required for its 
continued viability as a professional liberty.  Cole (2005) and Gutmann (2005) even remind the 
academic community that challenges to intellectual freedom from outside of the academy are 
likely to persist if the academic profession does not respond with counteractions.  Consistent 





intellectual freedom, members of the profession must protect it (AAUP, 2001).  The problem, 
however, is that defenses to intellectual freedom are not well documented in the literature, and 
that likely contributes to the academic profession’s sense that government constraint over its 
research is simply a part of professional practice.   
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore government challenges and academic scientists’ 
responses to those challenges, so I may introduce a theoretical explanation depicting what it 
means for government actors to challenge academic scientists’ federally sponsored research and 
for academic scientists to exert control over their research.  Since the academic profession’s 
expressions regarding government constraints appear most visibly with federally sponsored 
research, I investigate cases involving government challenges to academic scientists’ federally 
sponsored research.  These expressions of government constraints are not surprising, given the 
government’s evolving definition of “free play of free intellects” for federally sponsored 
research.  However, rather than summarily accepting government constraints as part of the 
practice for the academic profession, I acknowledge that the government maintains some 
authority over its own employees (i.e., federal scientists).  In addition, the government maintains 
some authority over projects it funds – an authority that may manifest itself in government 
challenges to the academic profession’s federally sponsored research.  At the same time, I 
recognize and explore even further that the academic profession, too, maintains some control 
over research projects it conducts – even when the government sponsors the project. 
Because this study involves the government’s challenging academic scientists’ federally 
funded research and academic scientists’ responses to those challenges in order to protect their 





present three cases to illustrate government challenges of academic scientists’ federally funded 
research on environmental issues.   
I draw on environmental issues because this topical area represents a significant body of 
complaints found in the literature where scientists, including academic scientists, have recently 
claimed that government officials challenged their research without sufficient scientific merit 
(see, e.g., Cole, 1983; Greenberg, 2001, 2007; Jasanoff & Martello, 2004; Pielke, 2007; 
Schoenbrod, 2005; Wagner & Steinzor, 2006).  In addition, the basis for several past government 
actions (e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards, Data Access Amendment, Data Quality 
Act) that shaped the relationship between the government and the academic scientific community 
stemmed from environmental research (e.g., CHESS study, Harvard Six Cities study).  While 
examining and analyzing the circumstances and events surrounding government challenges to 
academic scientists’ research on environmental issues, I also review the strategies, tactics, and 
other means that the academic community employed to preserve or defend its intellectual 
freedom.  At the end, this study introduces a theoretical explanation of what it means for 
academic scientists to exert control over research when government officials challenge that 
research.     
The Cases 
To investigate this concept of academic scientists’ exerting control over their research, I 
use three cases with substantially similar characteristics.  Most significantly, these cases involve 
government challenges to academic scientists’ federally sponsored research on environmental 
issues and include the academic scientists’ responses to those challenges.  In addition, the 
researchers in each case are university-based academic scientists in the United States, working 





employees who assert their authority to act on behalf of the public’s welfare, which includes 
actions such as reviewing research, compelling testimony, and requesting documents and other 
related materials regarding a study’s findings.   
The cases also contain some differences.  The most evident difference is that each case 
represents a different environmental issue: sewage sludge, climate change, or salvage logging.  
The principal government actors, who challenge the academic scientists’ federally sponsored 
research, also differ.  In one case, two federal agencies (i.e., the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
[USDA] and the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA]) challenge the academic scientists’ 
research.  In another case, members of Congress are the primary challengers, and in a third case, 
members of Congress and the Bureau of Land Management are the primary challengers.  The 
timing of the controversy also differs.  In two cases, the studies’ dissemination and controversy 
both occurred in the same year – though one study took place in 1997 while the other study was 
released in 2006.  In the third case, the controversy revolved around two connected studies 
released in 1998 and 1999, respectively; however, the heart of the public controversy (i.e., the 
claimed government challenges with academic scientists’ research) did not commence until 
2005.  Despite these differences among the cases, their important similarities make them useful 
in examining how academic scientists experienced government challenges with their research 
and how they exerted some control over scientific decisions regarding the research assumptions, 
methods, and analysis of the findings.  
Sewage Sludge Case 
The first case addresses government challenges with academic scientists’ research on 
sewage sludge safety levels.  According to the EPA’s Criteria for Classification of Solid Waste 





from households and industries that is treated through a sewer treatment plant process (see 40 
C.F.R. § 257.2).  Basically, sewage sludge represents the cumulative materials of treated by-
products from various municipal sewer systems and industrial waste plants.4  These by-products 
include liquids drained, human excrement flushed, and other substances that enter the sewage 
lines.   
A law passed in 1988 phased out the dumping of sewage sludge in oceans.  As an 
alternative depository, a coalition of municipalities, sludge-management companies, and some 
farmers advocated land usage of sewage sludge.  When properly treated, sewage sludge contains 
many beneficial nutrients for farming and landscaping purposes.  Recognizing land usage of 
sewage sludge as a substitute for ocean dumping, the EPA adopted new regulations – frequently 
referred to as “503 rules.”  These regulations created new classifications of selected chemicals, 
metals, and other particles, and they permitted more lax ratios and indicators of microorganisms 
in acceptable levels of sewage sludge. 
With federal and state grant funding, in 1996, a research team of academic scientists 
consisting of Ellen Harrison, Murray McBride, and David Bouldin of Cornell University’s Waste 
Management Institute conducted a study that evaluated the effects of land use of sewage sludge.  
In particular, the team analyzed the impacts of the 503 rules.  In 1997, the research team issued a 
working paper, The Case for Caution: Recommendations for Land Application of Sewage 
Sludges and an Appraisal of the U.S. EPA’s Part 503 Regulations.  The study raised serious 
health and safety concerns over the EPA’s regulations on sewage sludge for land application, and 
it identified 14 problems with the regulations, including assumptions made to construct the 
regulations.  For instance, according to the report’s authors, the regulations do not account for 
                                                 
4 The EPA and the sewer management programs determined an acceptable level of industrial waste that may 
enter the municipal sewage systems.  If these regulations are weakened, there is an increased likelihood of higher 





regional variations in soil quality.  Consequently, the regulatory standards do not factor in those 
differences when conducting risk assessments.  Put simply, the study demonstrated problems 
with the risk-assessment guidelines in the 503 regulations.  To resolve the risk assessments’ 
problems, the study recommended more stringent regulations over sewage sludge and elaborated 
on the potentially severe health risks that might emerge without changes to the regulatory 
language.   
The initial draft of the research paper yielded reactions from state and federal officials.  
To begin, New York State officials and several federal officials from the EPA and USDA issued 
numerous letters and e-mails to the study’s authors, the president of Cornell University, an 
associate dean of Cornell’s College of Agriculture, key policymakers including other staff 
members within the EPA and the USDA, and sludge-management companies.  These state and 
federal officials raised questions about the study authors’ competence and intent.  They 
discredited the authors of the initial draft and criticized the research assumptions, methods, and 
analyses contained in the report.  According to the government officials who authored the 
correspondence, the intent of the letters was to challenge the research’s value to the scientific 
community, because it assertedly contained severely flawed assumptions, methods, and findings.  
Thus, the government officials believed that they acted within their authority to inform various 
parties who had an interest in the study about the problems with the research study.   
In contrast, several observers of the controversy interpreted the government officials’ 
correspondence as aggressive attacks intended to discredit the study without sufficient bases. In 
these observers’ view, these actions unduly interfered with academic scientists’ intellectual 
freedom.  In fact, one of the study’s authors, Ellen Harrison, testified before a U.S. House of 





EPA and USDA have attempted to discredit our science and to ignore the issues we have 
raised. Their responses have mischaracterized our research and have suggested that we 
used methods that are not appropriate to answering the scientific questions we seek to 
address. Some of their assertions about our work (for example that we used metal salts 
and not sludges to study leaching in a greenhouse study) are simply untrue. This was 
especially surprising since the same EPA and USDA staff who made the allegation also 
sat on the advisory board to the project.  
In other words, Harrison believed that the government officials’ tactics to discredit the academic 
scientists’ research went beyond traditional government protocols.  Similarly, academic 
scientists, other environmental scientists, and several policymakers contended that when 
government officials sent correspondence to the president and an associate dean at Cornell 
University in an effort to discredit the academic scientists and their studies, those government 
officials acted inappropriately.  Based on the academic scientists’ interpretations of the events, 
the correspondence inferentially conveyed threats of political retaliation; that is, future 
government grants and contracts could be jeopardized if Cornell University did not intervene and 
assist with damage control (Snyder, 2005).  As Martin (1999) indicates, 
 “If someone disagrees with a scientist’s research conclusion or public statements, an 
accepted method of response is to criticize the argument, for example, by sending a letter 
to the scientist or to a journal.  By contrast, sending a letter of complaint to the scientist’s 
boss or funding body, attacking the scientist’s credibility or right to speak out, would be 
seen by many as an attempt to apply pressure on the scientist rather than address the 





 In short, the government officials’ letters that challenged the study’s research went beyond 
merely raising concerns about the study’s reliability: They were likely intended to cause harm to 
the scientists’ reputations and to call into question their consideration for future funding.  Thus, 
they represented government challenges to the three academic scientists’ research.   
Climate Change Case 
The second case presents a conflict between academic scientists and government officials 
over the highly publicized debate about climate change.  The climate change controversy, 
typically referred to as global warming, revolves around the degree to which anthropogenic 
matter, processes, and effects contribute – if at all – to the increasing emission rates of 
greenhouse gases, which cause global warming.  Stated another way, the debate centers around 
whether humans contribute to and can control the effects of global warming.  Many academic 
scientists have spoken (see, e.g., Bray, 2010; Dessler & Parson, 2010; Rosenzweig, et al., 2008; 
Union of Concerned Scientists, 2010a, 2010b).  An overwhelming number of them publish, 
present, and testify in open forums that anthropogenic contributors account for at least some of 
this global temperature rise.  In other words, they contend that humans are causing and 
generating these greenhouse gas emissions, and these gas emissions are not occurring under 
natural environmental conditions. 
In 2001, the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001) 
examined the Earth’s climate changes and declared the matter of rising temperatures a state of 
international urgency.  According to the IPCC 2001 report, the Earth’s temperature is rising, and 
humans contribute to these rising temperatures.  In support of that proposition, the report cited 
two key studies: a 1998 article in Nature and a 1999 article in Geophysical Research Letters.  





reviewed articles, also known as MBH98 and MBH99, respectively.  In a graphical format, the 
researchers reported in both studies evidence of steady temperature movements throughout the 
1600s and 1700s, but their model displayed a sharp increase in temperature around the mid-
1800s, with continuous rises today.  The line representing temperature on the graph resembled an 
image of a hockey stick.  When controversy arose about the data, the graph that depicts these 
increasing temperatures became known metaphorically as the “hockey stick.” According to the 
hockey stick researchers, population growth and industrialization explained the increases in the 
global temperature.  In other words, humans significantly contributed to the rising global 
temperature.  
Because the studies that created the hockey stick were products of federal grants to 
examine climate change using statistical modeling and the issue linked to public policy matters 
for the nation as well as to international treaties, Congress got involved.  Under congressional 
authority to act on behalf of the public’s welfare, which includes reviewing federally supported 
research and gathering more information on climate change for public policy matters, on June 
23, 2005, U.S. Representative Joe Barton, chair of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and 
Representative Edward Whitfield, chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 
sent letters to the three climate researchers of MBH98 and MBH99, the chair of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the director of the National Science 
Foundation.  Each letter requested multiple pieces of information to be submitted within three 
weeks.  Barton and Whitfield demanded that each of the climate scientists produce a CV, along 
with all articles on climate research and sources of funding, a list of all financial support for all 
research including honoraria, a list of all financial support from federal grants, a document 





research was discovered or first identified, information regarding source codes and release of that 
information, and identification and information regarding requests made for data and responses 
to those requests.  In addition, the congressmen requested that these climate scientists provide a 
detailed response to an article criticizing their work.  The chair of the IPCC and director of NSF 
received similar, very detailed, requests. 
According to Barton and Whitfield, the investigation largely stemmed from concerns 
raised in a February 14, 2005 Wall Street Journal article.  The article reported potential scientific 
problems surrounding the data and the methods used to output the hockey stick graph and the 
accessibility of that data.  Using the information from the article and asserting federal 
accountability measures as reasons to initiate their inquiry, Barton and Whitfield raised five 
potential items of interest about the hockey stick study.  First, two Canadian researchers, Ross 
McKitrick, an economist, and Stephen McIntyre, a minerals consultant who worked in industry, 
questioned the research methods and data used for MBH98 and MBH99.  McIntyre and 
McKitrick asserted that the hockey stick was flawed.  Thus, Barton and Whitfield specifically 
requested Mann, Bradley, and Hughes to comment on McIntyre and McKitrick’s accusations in 
relation to MBH98 and MBH99.  Second, McIntyre and McKitrick had requested the data and 
the source codes to replicate MBH98 and MBH99, but they reported that they could not get the 
information.  Third and related to the last point, the National Science Foundation supported the 
research efforts for MBH98 and MBH99, so Barton and Whitfield followed up on data 
accessibility of federally funded projects and questioned why McIntyre and McKitrick could not 
access the data from the MBH98 and MBH99 studies.  Fourth, if valid questions did exist about 
studies heavily relied on to craft IPCC 2001, that information would raise concerns over the 2001 





Whitfield wanted to explore the validity and reliability of MBH98 and MBH99.  Fifth, at the 
time of Barton and Whitfield’s letter, the IPCC Committee had started work on its 2007 report.  
With notice of potential flaws in the MBH98 and MBH99 studies, Barton and Whitfield’s letter 
to the IPCC Chair would provide adequate notice to the IPCC of possible problems with future 
reliance on MBH98 and MBH99, or at least caution the group before the IPCC decided to cite 
those studies again.  Given these five concerns, as stated in the letters from Barton and Whitfield, 
members of Congress wanted more information about how Michael Mann, Raymond Bradley, 
and Malcolm Hughes had constructed the hockey stick.   
 Although Barton and Whitfield asserted legitimate government reasons for their requests, 
many academic scientists perceived Barton and Whitfield’s actions as unusual requests, because 
the letters demanded materials that would normally not be asked for or needed, such as (a) copies 
of all past research using federal funds, even research unrelated to the controversy and (b) the 
computer code to run the data, which is not necessarily needed for another scientist to replicate 
the data; furthermore, these critics contended, the code would reveal protected intellectual 
property.  According to several academic scientists, not only were the demands extensive, the 
requests for data and documents were very detailed (Monastersky, 2005a, 2005b, 2006).  
Furthermore, the congressmen provided a very short period of time to gather these materials – 
just under three weeks.  Even the critics of the targeted academic scientists wondered if they 
would be able to comply with the directives to produce the massive amount of documentation 
and other supporting materials (Monastersky, 2005a, 2005b, 2006).   
For many academic scientists, the letters signaled a chilling effect on academic research 
that is inconsistent with political agenda.  Based on news reports, many academic scientists and 





silencing, discrediting, and discouraging researchers from entering the global warming debate.  
Some academic scientists referred to the Barton and Whitfield requests as a “‘dubious’ inquiry” 
(Brown, 2005, p. 1) and a form of “harassment” likely intended to silence them (Monastersky, 
2005a, p. A1).  In addition, others remarked that the events were intended as an “intimidation 
tactic” to deter other academic scientists from pursuing this research agenda (Daley, 2006, p. 
A1).   
Salvage Logging Case 
The third case also recounts academic scientists’ reports of government challenges with 
federally sponsored research connected to a proposed policy; however, in terms of a timeline of 
events, the study’s announcement and the policy’s formulation occur in closer proximity than 
occurred in the climate studies controversy.  During the 2005-2006 congressional session, 
Congressmen Greg Walden (R-Ore.) and Brian Baird (D-Wash.) were negotiating language for a 
new House bill, The Forest Emergency Recovery and Research Act.  In an effort to address forest 
recoveries from wildfires, the bill would permit a more aggressive approach to salvage logging 
after wildfires and would relax procedural approvals for logging companies to act.   
After forest fires occur, one forest regeneration approach is post-fire salvage logging.  
Post-fire salvage logging is the practice of cutting down (i.e., “felling”) damaged trees from 
wildfires, then replanting.  Several academic scientists from Oregon State University (OSU) 
supported the bill’s scientific rationale, including the dean of the College of Forestry and several 
professors within the college.  According to these academic scientists, post-fire salvage logging 
serves as an effective forest regeneration approach after wildfires. 
While the House bill was still pending, on January 5, 2006, a controversial study 





forest regeneration in all instances. The researchers (two graduate students, two forest 
researchers, and two professors), who worked on a federal grant study housed at Oregon State 
University, found that post-fire salvage logging actually harms forest regeneration.  Based on 
data collected from a severe wildfire in southwestern Oregon, known as the 2002 Biscuit Fire, 
the researchers compared data from two locations – where salvage logging had and had not taken 
place – and they found that the non-invaded areas displayed greater regenerative signs.  In other 
words, the study’s findings contradicted the public policy rationale for the proposed legislation, 
The Forest Emergency Recovery and Research Act.   
Drawing attention to the study’s impact on assessing a public policy issue, Science, the 
scientific journal that published the study, referred to the proposed legislation, and the online 
version of the article even included links to the bill’s language.  Then, within a month from the 
study’s initial release, on February 1, 2006, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which 
oversaw the research grant funding that supported a series of ecosystem studies at Oregon State 
University including this post-fire salvage logging study, suspended all of OSU’s funds 
connected with the ecosystem project.  According to the BLM, publication of the study’s 
findings violated two grant conditions, so the BLM’s action was justified.  Specifically, the 
federal funding agreement stipulated that “lobbying with appropriated moneys” is forbidden, and 
the researchers must consult the program officer or a Bureau representative before publication.  
The “lobbying” claim is based on the links to the pending bill, The Forest Emergency Recovery 
and Research Act, that accompanied the article in Science.    
Immediately following that action, several events took place in an effort to convince the 
BLM to reinstate the funding.  Oregon State University and the editor of Science each issued 





and Donald Kennedy, then editor of Science, indicated that during the copy-editing process, the 
authors requested removal of the links and any references to the pending bill; nevertheless, the 
publication retained the links to the House bill.  In addition, the BLM, several federal agencies, 
and numerous federal policymakers received a deluge of letters arguing that the suspension of 
funds was inappropriate.  Furthermore, national and regional media reports also criticized the 
BLM’s decision to suspend funding.   
After reviewing the information presented, approximately a week after the suspension, 
the BLM reinstated the grant funding, but its public reason for the grant reinstatement was based 
on evidence that the authors did not lobby and that the authors indicated they were unaware of 
the requirement that they consult BLM prior to publication.  In other words, the BLM 
rationalized that the authors did not knowingly violate any of the grant’s stipulations and had 
acted appropriately, so the BLM could authorize the reinstatement of the grant funds.  According 
to observers who supported the academic scientists, the government actions of funding 
suspension amounted to political pressure.  Although it was certainly within the power of the 
governmental sponsoring organization, as detailed in the contract, to suspend funding for the 
alleged lobbying activity and for publishing results without clearance, funding suspension 
without investigating the situation seemed hasty and beyond normal government practices.  
Furthermore, even though the authors of the study did not initiate the lobbying activities, 
academic scientists have a duty to inform the public about their findings. 
In addition to the BLM funding suspension and reinstatement, there were other 
ramifications for the academic scientists.  Selected members of Congress exercised their 
investigatory powers.  Specifically, Congressmen Walden and Baird, authors of the House bill, 





congressmen invited several academic scientists to testify, in their effort to gather expert 
scientific information on the subject matter.  Supporters of the academic scientists who wrote the 
controversial paper noted the differences in questioning styles used for the advocates of post-fire 
salvage logging and for Dan Donato, the lead author of the study that concluded that post-fire 
salvage logging hinders forest regeneration.  According to observers, Donato experienced 
interrogation-like tactics at the congressional hearing; further, they believe the harsh questioning 
style was intended to silence the academic scientists and discredit their study, and that the 
interrogation method at the congressional hearing exceeded traditional norms when members of 
Congress intend to discover more information about a study.  In short, many members of the 
academic scientific community as well as supporters of the study’s authors expressed concerns 
about the government’s method of dealing with the study and the academic scientists who 
authored it.   
Significance of the Case Representations 
Even though the federal government maintains authority that in certain instances permits 
it to limit academic scientists’ intellectual freedom over research, in order to maintain the 
professional liberty of the scientists, their institutions, and the academic profession, the limits of 
freedom need to be more widely understood. Academic scientists still need (a) more clarity about 
the circumstances and events surrounding government challenges with their research, 
particularly in terms of what the academic scientists experienced, and (b) a better understanding 
of how academic scientists exert control over scientific decisions regarding the research 
assumptions, methods, and analysis of their findings.  The examination of these cases is intended 
to illuminate how academic scientists, who work on federally sponsored research to study 





challenges with their research and respond by exerting control over scientific decisions 
pertaining to their research. 
Conceptual Framework 
In order to conceptualize the problem, in chapters 2 and 3, I review literature from 
several sources to frame my study.  Although I follow the basic structure of prior literature, 
which frames the challenges and then the responses, unlike frameworks used in this literature, I 
suggest one that offers a new way to examine academic scientists’ responses to exert control 
over their research.  I briefly present, below, my conceptual framework as two interconnected 
parts: one part helps understand the government challenges while the other part helps structure 
the examination of the academic profession’s responses so as to illuminate ways in which 
professors exert control over their federally sponsored research.     
Part 1: Government Challenges 
Through my review of the literature on government challenges to professors’ research, I 
identify three distinct frameworks used previously in the literature.  I refer to them as the unified 
interest frame, the competing interests frame, and the evolving interpretations and interests 
frame.  The prior literature does not specifically name the frameworks as I have; however, I 
believe that these identifiers reflect their distinguishing characteristics.  For instance, the unified 
interest frame examines how the academic profession integrates into society and contributes to 
societal goals; the competing interests frame examines how the academic profession handles 
conflict within a divided society; and the evolving interpretations and interests frame examines 
how the academic profession interacts with individuals and groups within society to shape and 
define those experiences as a way to illuminate their interests in the contested matter.  Each 





academic profession within society and the circumstances and events surrounding government 
challenges.  That is, each framework presents a different way to think about these studies on 
government challenges.   
Based on my review of the literature on government challenges (Chapter 2), the evolving 
interpretations and interests frame appears to be the most useful approach to think about the 
circumstances and events surrounding government challenges to academic scientists’ research.  
As I explain in Chapter 2, academic scientific research involves highly complex concepts.  The 
meanings associated with those concepts may evoke different interpretations based on both how 
the information was presented and the person interpreting that information.  The evolving 
interpretations and interests frame presents a way of thinking about how symbols and language, 
including academic scientific messages, impact interpretations along with subsequent 
interactions.  With those insights, I may better understand the government’s actions to determine 
the pressures, tactics, and other means that it employed when challenging the academic 
scientists’ federally sponsored research. 
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the evolving interpretations and interests frame traces the 
meanings and interactions from the standpoint of the various actors involved in a controversy 
about contested meanings from messages or other expressions.  By contrast, the other two 
frameworks focus more on the interrelation of educational institutions, government, and class to 
uncover the circumstances and events surrounding the government challenges. Yet, I believe that 
examining individual and small-group interpretations and interactions to the extent possible from 
my data reveals more insights than would the other frameworks, when the issue revolves around 





The evolving interpretations and interests frame’s ability to examine situations as 
individuals report how they experience them, especially regarding potentially different 
interpretations of academic scientific concepts, serves as the best framework to uncover insights 
about the circumstances and events surrounding government challenges with academic scientists 
in particular.  As I demonstrate in this study, these insights reveal what kind of government 
challenges academic scientists are experiencing, why academic scientists perceive recent 
government actions as beyond the traditional norms of government inquiry, and how academic 
scientists interpret those government actions as well as actions of other interested parties 
involved in the controversy. 
Figure 1.1: Evolving Interpretations & Interests Frame 
 
Source: Author’s depiction of the application of the Evolving Interpretations & Interests Frame 
 
While the evolving interpretations and interests frame reveals more insights about the 
circumstances and events surrounding government challenges with academic scientists’ research, 
those insights respond to only one part of this study’s inquiry (i.e., government challenges to 
academic scientists’ federally sponsored research).  Neither this frame nor the other two 
employed in past literature on government challenges present a framework to examine how the 
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how I expanded my review of literature to find an appropriate framework that would support my 
examination of how academic scientists’ responses to government challenges exert control over 
their research.   
Part 2: Academic Scientists’ Responses  
While the evolving interpretations and interests frame offers insights about government 
challenges, it is less helpful as a conceptual framework in understanding the academic 
profession’s responses that exert control over their federally sponsored research.  As I discuss 
more fully in Chapter 3, the literature on the academic profession’s responses to government 
challenges suggests a more detailed consideration of multiple factors to fully appreciate the 
academic profession’s actions that reflect strategies, tactics, and other means to exert control 
over its federally sponsored research.  Specifically, the literature on the academic profession’s 
responses suggests considering both internal characteristics of the academic profession and 
external factors that influence the profession’s degree of autonomy over research.  The internal 
characteristics identify institutionalized features of the academic profession that contribute to its 
professional autonomy.  The external factors refer to conditions outside of the academic 
profession that influence the profession’s degree of autonomy over research.   
While prior research demonstrates that both the internal characteristics and external 
factors offer a way to understand the academic profession’s responses to government challenges, 
these studies do not fully explore the significance of the internal characteristics of the profession.  
Specifically, past studies have not used a framework that explicitly considers the internal 
characteristics addressing the academic profession’s (a) divisions of labor with project tasks 
related to research (“divisions of labor”) and (b) academic professional training and development 





To address these conceptual omissions, I propose the use of a modified version of Eliot 
Freidson’s theory of professional dominance (2001).  Although Freidson’s theory has never been 
used to study the academic profession, his theory fills in the conceptual gaps found in the extant 
literature.  I do, however, make minor modifications to Freidson’s theory, so it better fits the 
purpose of my study on the academic profession.  The modified version of Freidson’s theory 
considers six internal characteristics of the academic profession and two external factors.   
The internal characteristics are: (1) professional knowledge and skills, (2) divisions of 
labor, (3) labor markets and careers, (4) training programs, (5) ideologies, and (6) professional 
associations (see Figure 1.2).  Professional knowledge and skills are the formal knowledge of the 
profession that rely heavily on mental judgments over technical details, such as the academic 
profession’s application of specific research approaches to gather data for a study.  The divisions 
of labor characteristic considers the jurisdictional boundaries related to occupations working on 
different aspect of a project, such as the academic profession assessing the scientific implications 
of a policy while policymakers draft the legislation.  The labor markets and careers characteristic 
reflects the profession’s authority in society to determine who qualifies for practice and how one 
qualifies; one example is the academic profession’s default standard that the Ph.D. is a 
prerequisite for many college faculty positions.  Training programs, usually graduate schools, are 
the formal educational settings that prepare future professionals and create new knowledge for 
future professional practice (e.g., a new research methodology).  Ideologies reflect the values 
embedded in the profession’s actions, such as the academic profession’s work to advance the 
interest of the public good through education.  Professional associations are the organized units 





The two external factors are bodies of knowledge and the state (see Figure 1.3).  Bodies 
of knowledge represent society’s capacity to recognize the value of a profession’s formal 
knowledge, such as placing market value on research findings.  The state serves as a more 
formalized source; it provides legal authority or protections so the profession can control its 
work, through mechanisms such as the First Amendment. 
According to Freidson (2001), both the internal characteristics and external factors 
construct how a profession is organized to maintain its economic and political position in 
society, which allows it to exert control over its work.  Similarly, the extant literature on the 
academic profession views the internal characteristics and external factors as representing 
elements of an institutionalized arrangement that grants the academic profession autonomy to 
work freely without undue lay interference.  Thus, these internal characteristics and external 
factors present a structured set of elements for me to consider when I try to understand how the 
academic profession’s responses might reflect strategies, tactics, and other means to exert control 
over its federally sponsored research (Figure 1.4). 
Figure 1.2: Internal Characteristics of Professional Control 
 














Figure 1.3: External Factors to Professional Control 
 
Source: Author’s figure based on Freidson’s Theory of Professional Dominance 
 
























































Combining the Evolving Interpretations & Interests Frame and Freidson’s Theory of 
Professional Dominance 
In sum, my conceptual framework incorporates both the evolving interpretations and 
interests frame and a modified version of Freidson’s theory of professional dominance.  I draw 
on the evolving interpretations and interests frame to provide insights about the circumstances 
and events surrounding government challenges to academic scientists’ research.  In particular, 
these insights structure a way to examine the government challenges (including the actors 
involved and methods employed).  Those insights help me understand the pressures, tactics, and 
other means that the government employs to challenge the academic scientists’ federally 
sponsored research.  In addition, I use a modified version of Freidson’s theory of professional 
dominance to examine the academic profession’s responses.  The modified version of Freidson’s 
theory considers the internal characteristics of and external factors relating to the academic 
profession to understand the profession’s strategies, tactics, and the other means it employed 
when government challenges take place.   
Taking these two parts together, I present my study’s overall framework (see Figure 1.5).  
With this overall framework, I strive to understand what it means for academic scientists to exert 





























Source: Author’s figure of the integrated concepts drawn from the Evolving Interpretations & Interests Frame 
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Research Questions  
As the cases illustrate, according to academic scientists, government officials challenged 
academic scientists’ federally sponsored research that involves proposed or existing national 
science policies.  To uncover how academic scientists experience and respond, and ultimately 
exert control, when government officials challenge the academic scientists’ federally funded 
research, this study poses the following questions: 
Overarching Research Question 
How do academic scientists, who are members of a unique but variegated profession, exert some 
degree of control over scientific decisions pertaining to their federally funded research when 
government officials challenges that research? 
Research Sub-questions 
1. Drawing on circumstances and events surrounding several lay challenges to academic 
scientists’ federally funded research,  
a. what kinds of government actors have participated or are now participating in 
activities that challenged academic scientists’ research on sewage sludge, global 
warming, and salvage logging? 
b. what kinds of nongovernmental actors have participated or are now participating 
in activities that challenged academic scientists’ research on sewage sludge, 
global warming, and salvage logging? 
c. what methods (i.e., pressures, tactics, and other means) did government actors 
employ to challenge academic scientists’ research on sewage sludge, global 





d. what methods (i.e., pressures, tactics, and other means) did nongovernmental 
actors employ to challenge academic scientists’ research on sewage sludge, global 
warming, and salvage logging?   
2. Drawing on circumstances and events surrounding several lay challenges to academic 
scientists’ federally funded research,  
a. how did academic scientists, universities, professional associations, and other 
professional bodies in the Academy respond to the lay challenges with academic 
scientists’ research on sewage sludge, global warming and salvage logging? 
b. what range of strategies, tactics, and/or other means did academic scientists, 
universities, professional associations, and other professional bodies employ to 
preserve or defend the profession’s intellectual freedom? 
Definitions 
For purposes of this study, the following terms and phrases are defined as follows: 
Academic profession: The academic profession represents professors, including academic 
scientists, who are employed at American universities.   
Academic scientists: Academic scientists are faculty or researchers who are also scientists.  They 
are employed at American colleges and universities, and they work in the United States.  The 
academic scientists’ principal employer is the university – even if the funds for their salary 
allocations draw heavily from grant money.   
Actors: Actors represent any entity (including individuals, groups, and organizations) that has the 





Federally sponsored research: Federally sponsored research refers to any U.S. federal agency’s 
financial support for a grant research project administered by academic scientists at an 
American college or university, where the research takes place within the United States. 
Government challenges: Government challenges occur when government actors who have no 
scientific expertise in the area contest the scientific merits of a federally sponsored academic 
scientist’s study.  Government actors include individuals, groups, or institutions (such as 
offices, agencies, or branches of government) operating within their professional capacity as 
employees or arms of the federal government of the United States.  
Intellectual Freedom: Intellectual freedom is a subset of academic freedom.  Academic freedom 
is the academic profession’s professional liberty from undue lay interference over matters 
pertaining to teaching, research, service, and organizational governance.  Intellectual freedom 
refers to the academic profession’s liberty from undue lay interference over matters 
pertaining professors’ research. 
Organization of this Study 
This study is divided into nine chapters.  This chapter introduced the research study with 
a discussion that included the research problem, its context, the three cases, the purpose, and its 
significance.  Chapter 2 reviews the pertinent literature on lay, government challenges to 
professors’ research to explore ways to understand the pressures, tactics, and other means that 
government employs to challenge academic scientists’ federally sponsored research.  Chapter 3 
reviews the extant literature on the academic profession’s responses as well as the literature on 
the academic profession and the sociology of the profession to identify a framework that helps 
understand the strategies, tactics, and other means that the academic profession employs to exert 





methodology, the data-collection methods, the data analysis, and elements to ensure research 
trustworthiness.  Chapters 5–7 present the data for each of the case studies.  Chapter 8 constructs 
a cross-case analysis to explore common themes among the cases.  Chapter 9 analyzes the 
study’s findings.  In addition, based on the data and the studied phenomena, it presents 
implications for the conceptual framework and suggests ways to improve the proposed theory.  
Finally, Chapter 9 also explores the study’s implications and significance for academic 






CHAPTER II: CONCEPTUALIZING “GOVERNMENT CHALLENGES TO 
ACADEMIC SCIENTISTS’ FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH” 
Overview 
In Chapter 1, I introduced the purpose of this study: to offer a theoretical explanation 
depicting what it means for government actors to challenge academic scientists’ federally 
sponsored research and for academic scientists to exert control over that research.  In chapters 2 
and 3, I review literature from several sources to develop the framework that guides this study.  
The extant literature on the academic profession’s responses to government challenges 
consistently suggests a two-part framework – one part to explore the government challenges 
(which I discuss in this chapter) and another part to examine the academic profession’s 
responses (see Chapter 3).  Together, these two parts contribute to my study’s overall 
framework, which will help uncover the means by which government actors have challenged 
academic scientists’ federally sponsored research and illuminate what it means for these 
university-based scientists to defend and exert control over that sponsored research. 
Accordingly, this chapter reviews the literature on government challenges to academic 
scientists’ federally sponsored research.  The extant literature on government challenges to 
professors’ research conceptualizes government challenges by uncovering the circumstances and 
events surrounding each challenge.  Specifically, the extant literature applies one of three frames, 
each of which offers different insights about the pressures, tactics, and other means used by 
government actors.  However, before I discuss these three frames, I briefly revisit the science 
policy initiative that paved the way for federal sponsorship of academic research.  This 





relationship between the federal government and academic scientists who participate in the 
federally sponsored research.   
The Social Contract 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, in response to U.S. concerns about the nation’s ability to 
protect itself and gain a competitive advantage in the global economic market, Vannevar Bush of 
the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development issued a policy report, Science: The 
Endless Frontier, which proposed a nationally coordinated science policy.  The 1945 report 
presented a national plan that included universities as a key player to advance American science 
innovation.  Outlining the roles of universities and government, it established the terms and 
conditions of what is often referred to as the social contract between academic science and 
society.  For the academic community, participation was premised on an understanding of 
financial support from the government within a working environment that operated off the 
principle of “free play of free intellects.”   
Financial Support 
Pursuant to the agreement between government and universities, government sponsorship 
of academic science grew substantially (Geiger, 2004; Guston & Keniston, 1994; Kevles, 1977; 
Smith, 1990).  In 1940, federal sponsorship of scientific research at American universities totaled 
approximately $13 million (Axt, 1952).  By 1953, that amount had increased to $138 million.  In 
addition to the financial commitments, starting in 1946, President Truman and Congress moved 
more aggressively on the national science agenda by establishing a federal infrastructure for 
science policy through the creation of multiple offices to manage federally sponsored research 
within the academic scientific community.  For example, in 1946, Congress established the 





arms for the nation – with universities serving as the primary contractor (Rees, 1987).  In that 
same year, the Atomic Energy Commission (currently known as the Department of Energy) also 
established basic research initiatives through universities, and it worked with several universities 
around the country to establish federal labs on college campuses as well as regional labs that 
engaged multiple universities (Buck, 1983; Holl, Hewlett, & Harris, 1997).  In 1950, the federal 
government established the National Science Foundation (NSF) as the national entity largely 
responsible for the management of federal sponsorship of basic research (Lomask, 1976).  In 
short, with the federal infrastructure in place to distribute the funds, colleges and universities had 
access to the federal dollars intended for use to investigate matters of basic research that would 
contribute to society.   
“Free Play of Free Intellects” 
Besides the financial support, this relationship between American research universities 
and government also rested, in part, on the assumption that government would defer to academic 
scientists’ expertise regarding scientific decisions connected with their federally sponsored 
research (see generally, Chomsky et al., 1997; Dermeritt, 2000; Guston & Keniston, 1994; 
Smith, 1990).  As Bush (1945/1980) described, this relationship between American research 
universities and government was intended to operate with the understanding of “free play of free 
intellects, working on subjects of their own choice, in a manner dictated by their own curiosity 
for the explanation of the unknown” (p. 192).  While members of the academic community 
expressed fears that reliance on federal support for research might lead to reduced scientific 
freedoms to carry out their work (see, e.g., Kidd, 1959, 1963; Price, 1954), as a whole, the 
government appeared to afford many academic scientists and universities the ability to conduct 





Nonetheless, over the past 60 years, the government has also taken steps to redefine and 
limit this principle of “free play of free intellects.”  These limitations are outcomes of 
government challenges to the academic profession’s federally funded research.   
Three Frames of Government Challenges 
To explore the emergence of these limitations, in this section I review the extant literature 
and examine the frameworks (i.e., the Unified Interest Frame, Competing Interests Frame, and 
the Evolving Interpretations and Interests Frame) used to uncover the pressures, tactics, and 
other means that government actors have employed to challenge the academic profession’s 
federally sponsored research.     
Unified Interest Frame 
One line of research examining government challenges frames the inquiry in terms of 
how societal institutions and beliefs informed or shaped the actions of the government and the 
academic profession.  These studies have tended to follow or specifically adopt the sociological 
lens referred to as the functionalist perspective.  The functionalist perspective assumes that social 
institutions, such as the academic profession, act to further the goals of society.5  According to 
the functionalist perspective, society consists of interrelated parts that work together as a single 
system to create social order (Merton, 1957a, 1957b; Muller, 1994).  In this system, the 
interrelated parts consist of institutions such as education, business, and government.  Through 
social organizations such as the academic profession, universities, and government agencies, 
these institutions cooperate and seek consensus to further societal priorities.  Similarly, the 
                                                 
5 The literature on government challenges to professors’ research that follows a societal interest frame typically 
adopt a Durkheimian view, a subset of the functionalist perspective of examining society (Rhoades, 2007).  
Although I note this distinction here, for purposes of this discussion, the specific variation of the functionalist 
perspective is not critical.  The reader should simply recognize that researchers have classified this line of research 
as capturing societal priorities, or society’s unified interest, to explain the circumstances and events surrounding 





studies discussed in this section frame matters in terms of actions that further society’s unified 
interest, specifically to inquire about how social institutions, via representative organizations 
such as the academic profession, work together to achieve societal order.  Thus, I refer to this 
line of research as studies taking the Unified Interest Frame.  
Application and Contributions of the Unified Interest Frame 
The literature falling under the unified interest frame often examines government 
challenges during the Cold War, especially the period from the late 1940s through much of the 
1950s.  During this period of American history and amid allegations that some American 
scientists handed critical technologies to the Soviet Union, the public feared the Communist 
ideology and considered members of the Communist party to be a suspect group.  Reflecting this 
societal impression, government actors formed special committees, such as the U.S. House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC), the U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee 
(SISS), and the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI), to interrogate 
individuals suspected of having Communist ties.  This cultural phenomenon, in which 
government efforts sought out and interrogated individuals with Communist connections during 
the 1940s through the 1950s, became known as the McCarthy era, named after Senator Joseph 
McCarthy, the most recognized political figure to lead one of the government committees.  In the 
eyes of many, these committees, along with similar state-level committees during the McCarthy 
era, represented societal interests and championed the efforts to protect the nation from 
Communist subversion.    
Examining the circumstances and events surrounding the government challenges, these 
studies applying the unified interest frame illustrate government pressures placed on the 





This frame illuminates several key findings.  First, these studies reveal how societal priorities 
required the academic profession to support anti-Communist initiatives, even if those initiatives 
contradicted the academic profession’s values and professional liberty.  Based on a historical 
analysis of faculty experiences during the McCarthy era, Schrecker (1986) uncovers evidence 
that the profession failed to respond and assert its rights of intellectual freedom.  Instead, the 
profession furthered societal values by either standing quietly by or remaining silent while 
terminations, interrogations, and blacklisting tactics were used against faculty with alleged 
Communist connections.  According to the government, professors who embraced Communism 
could not exercise unbiased judgment or act within the research or teaching norms of the 
profession, and their ideology was “incompatible with professional obligations” of the academic 
profession (Schrecker, 1986, p. 74).  Examining the consequences, Schrecker (1986) concludes 
that the government challenges weakened the profession’s ability to exercise its intellectual 
freedom.   
Second, through this frame, we learn that government actors took measures that restricted 
hiring of faculty candidates with Communist connections or pressured universities to fire 
professors with Communist connections.  In one instance, even after a faculty committee at 
Rutgers University concluded that faculty members with former Communist affiliations should 
be retained, state and federal officials reminded university trustees that keeping these faculty 
members would tarnish the institution’s reputation and harm the university by jeopardizing 
government financial support – which at the time could have impacted federal sponsorship of 
research and building construction awards in the form of grants and loans.  Rather than subject 
the institution to potential lost opportunities for federal financial support, the trustees overruled 





upon the most coveted prerogative of the academic profession: its right to select its own 
members” (p. 179). 
Similarly, Lewis (1988) examines the phenomenon surrounding the anti-Communist 
movement and its impact on intellectual freedom.  Based on a socio-historical study tracing 
college administrators’ and professors’ reactions to the Communist attacks from 1947 to 1956, 
Lewis observes that legislators acted on behalf of the social order to justify their tactics in 
dealing with Communist professors – even when those tactics challenged professors’ research.  
For example, when legislators interrogated faculty about their possible connections to the 
Communist party, the legislators publicly justified their actions as inquiries into these faculty 
members’ professional competence to perform duties such as academic research.  Yet, the 
government’s interrogations did not truly evaluate any faculty member’s capacity to make 
reasoned inquiries within his or her disciplinary area.  The interrogations simply assumed that 
Communist affiliations made one ineligible to research and teach with independence.  
Furthermore, Lewis (1988) suggests that when the media reported interrogations of an 
institution’s faculty, that publicity harmed the university’s reputation.  According to Lewis, the 
publicity shaped the public’s perception that universities that employed these individuals were 
harboring suspected Communists.  Consequently, to spare the institution negative publicity, 
many college administrators felt compelled to terminate professors under investigation – even 
when these faculty members complied with the government inquiries and reported no 
Communist ties.  That is, the institution sought to separate its affiliation with these faculty 
members.  In large part, both the government and the college administrators acted to align 
institutional values with societal priorities, rather than evaluating the professors based on 





include permitting government to challenge professors’ ability to work, and permitting 
challenges to their research activities. As Lewis (1988) and Schrecker (1980, 1986) illustrate, the 
unified interest frame helps us uncover those circumstances and events surrounding government 
challenges as they further clarify the decision-makers’ actions in relation to societal goals. 
Other studies applying a unified interest framework reveal very similar government 
pressures and tactics to those the academic profession faced in the studies discussed above (see, 
e.g., Eisenberg, 1988; Park, 1986; Shattuck, 1986).  These studies report that societal interests, 
especially in terms of national security, justified certain challenges by government agencies, such 
as reviewing and approving federally funded research prior to publication (i.e., prepublication 
reviews), restricting information access levels of academic researchers on federally funded 
projects, and subjecting academic researchers to inspections of research data and analyses, when 
questions arise about the research integrity.  
Having explained the application and contributions of the unified interest frame, I now 
turn to the unified interest frame’s limitations. 
Limitations of the Unified Interest Frame 
The unified interest frame has several limitations.  First, it tends to omit or downplay 
competing interests that do not serve societal priorities.  As I mentioned in the preceding sub-
section, the unified interest frame, as its primary explanatory value, places emphasis on 
institutions and structures functioning to further societal goals.  Nonetheless, competing interests 
often account for conflict between parties.  Thus, understanding the competing interests may 
clarify or explain the reasoning behind the pressures and tactics employed.  For example, Lewis 
(1988) and Schrecker (1980, 1986), who follow the unified interest frame, conclude that the 





bowed to pressures of eliminating Communist influences.  Yet, the authors also mention that 
many members of the academic profession conceded to the government pressures, not to advance 
societal interests but to manage other concerns.  One of these concerns was the academic 
profession’s ability to control its students.  Subgroups within the academic profession believed 
that supporting the intellectual freedom of alleged Communist faculty demonstrated the 
profession’s general support of radical groups and viewpoints.  Thus, radical student groups such 
as the American Youth for Democracy might perceive the academic profession’s support for 
alleged Communist faculty as implicit support for their campus protests, which at times included 
severe campus disruption.  Accordingly, to avoid that misperception, some members of the 
academic profession wished to distance themselves from radical thought and associations for 
their own interests. 
Overlooking competing interests would present a limitation for my study.  The cases 
presented in this study appear to indicate groups with competing interests that, if explored, might 
illuminate the case controversies between government and the academic profession.  As I 
described in Chapter 1, the cases in this study describe scientific problems that do not always 
reflect a clear scientific consensus.  They involve environmental policy issues of proposed or 
pending legislation that generated debates from multiple actors – including industry, 
environmental groups, legislators, and federal agency officers – about public policies on 
scientific matters.  These cases suggest that competing interests might play a significant part in 
framing the circumstances and events surrounding the challenges.  Therefore, by underscoring 
the presence of competing interests and the various groups’ expressions, the unified interest 
frame might not fully uncover the circumstances and events surrounding government challenges 





the situation, yet these intentions and motives may have significant implications for 
understanding government actions in cases involving government challenges to academic 
scientists’ federally sponsored research.6    
Another limitation of the unified interest frame as a way to conceptualize government 
challenges to academic scientists’ research is its ability to observe individual and small-group 
interactions.  Because the unified interest frame is less concerned with individual and small-
group interactions, it tends to overlook or downplay interactions, perceptions, and decision-
making processes of individuals or narrowly defined groups in society.  Yet, these insights may 
describe and explain how people negotiate and construct meaning to matters related to a complex 
social problem, such as the underlying reasons for government challenges to academic scientists’ 
research (see, e.g., Beauregard, 1988; Gusfield, 1975).  For instance, a section of Beauregard’s 
(1988) book that recounts government challenges to faculty in Ohio during the McCarthy era 
illustrates the significance of micro-level observations.  Beauregard describes how government 
challenges to the academic profession’s work were not only about Communist party affiliations.  
Following the interactions among various actors, he reveals that, in numerous instances, the 
government extended the scope of its investigations when it had concerns about what it deemed 
                                                 
6 Competing interests tend to uncover conflicts, power imbalances, and positions of multiple actors on various 
matters.  Several authors even describe situations in which interest groups, industry representatives, policymakers, 
and academic scientists have, at some point in time, asserted their interests or policy preferences through the use of 
unfounded or inaccurate scientific analyses, and their interests prevailed over societal priorities (see, e.g., Landman, 
Cortese, & Glantz, 2008; Mooney, 2005, 2007; Rosenbaum, 2008).   
For example, Landman, Cortese, and Glantz (2008) disclose the tobacco industry’s strategies to combat the U.S. 
Surgeon General’s 1988 statement regarding the adverse health effects and addictive nature of nicotine.  One 
strategy included employing academics to present a positive campaign about nicotine use without disclosing their 
industry ties to these announcements.  Because the public generally perceives members of the academic profession 
as legitimate informants when it comes to scientific information, the tobacco industry hired them to disseminate 
research and other materials that featured individual and social benefits of nicotine use.  For this situation, the 
societal interest frame might examine how the academic profession addressed those academic researchers’ actions 
that supported the tobacco industry’s goals without full disclosure – since those actions conflict with both the 
academic profession’s and societal values.  Although that analysis is helpful to understand the academic profession’s 
remedies to align with societal values, it omits or minimizes an analysis regarding the power of the tobacco industry, 





as “radical” behavior.  As Beauregard notes, the government did not confine its interpretation of 
radical behavior to include just academic research activities believed to advance the interests of 
the Communist party.  With their authority, some government officials recognized the 
opportunity to investigate other radical behaviors – such as interracial dances and labor union 
activity on college campuses.  Nevertheless, the unified interest frame is less concerned with 
matters at the micro level, so interactions, perceptions, and decision-making processes of 
individuals or narrowly defined groups in society are largely ignored in its discussion about 
circumstances and events surrounding a situation such as government challenges to academic 
scientists’ research. 
 Similarly, the unified interest frame’s lack of attention to micro-level observations 
presents a limitation for examining the cases in my study too.  These cases present conflicts that 
are, at least in part, generated from differing individual and group interpretations regarding the 
meanings about specific academic scientific studies.  For example, in the climate change case, 
the initial summary of facts, which I reported in the previous chapter, raised concerns of possible 
discrepancies with the two federally sponsored academic studies (i.e., “hockey stick” studies).  
The research criticisms sparked several exchanges involving academic scientists, government 
officials, and critics on both sides of the climate change debate.  While the initial preview of the 
case presents only a brief set of facts, data pertaining to the micro-level observations might help 
us to understand the conflict among various groups involved in the case and to fully appreciate 
the means (e.g., pressures and tactics) by which the government challenges academic scientists’ 
federally sponsored research.  However, the unified interest frame does not fully capture these 
micro levels of analysis, and this presents a potential limitation in uncovering the circumstances 





Summary and Conclusion 
In sum, the literature applying a unified interest frame informs readers of how institutions 
and actors advanced societal priorities as the basis to justify the government challenge of the 
academic profession’s federally funded research.  Generally speaking, these studies conclude 
that when matters of national security are at issue, the principle of “free play of free intellects” 
comes with significant limits and, in such circumstances, it is permissible for government to 
challenge the academic profession’s federally sponsored research.  These challenges include 
determining who qualifies to practice in the academic profession, who may participate in certain 
federally sponsored research – such as projects involving governmentally sensitive or classified 
information – and what research materials and findings may be distributed.     
While the literature applying the unified interest frame reveals the means by which 
government actors have challenged the academic profession’s federally funded research, this 
framework has two significant limitations.  It largely downplays or omits (1) discussions 
regarding competing interests and (2) patterns of behavior drawn from individual or small 
groups.  As I illustrated above, these limitations would likely present significant drawbacks to 
my study in terms of uncovering the multiple actors and understanding and appreciating their 
positions and actions in each case dispute.  Thus, in the next section, I consider another frame 
used in the literature to conceptualize government challenges to the academic profession’s 
research.   
Competing Interests Frame 
Another line of research examining government challenges frames the inquiry in terms of 
how structures in society, such as educational level, social prestige, and power, are arranged to 





lens of conflict theory as its framework.  Conflict theory investigates how society benefits groups 
that fall in the dominant class while depriving other groups that fall in subordinate classes.  Most 
often, these studies regarding government challenges of the academic profession’s government-
sponsored research demonstrate how government actions and policies advance the dominant 
class’s interests.  Its significance as a framework is how it examines competing interests and the 
ways they account for the government’s challenge of the academic profession’s federally 
sponsored research.  Thus, I refer to the literature falling under this line of research as the 
competing interests frame. 
Application and Contributions of the Competing Interests Frame 
One strand within this line of research reveals how political priorities limited what 
qualified as “free play” of academic scientists working on federally sponsored research (Beneke, 
1998; Brooks, 1978; Guston & Keniston, 1994; Kash, 1968; Roback, 1968; Salancik & Lamont, 
1975).  According to Guston and Keniston (1994), from around the late 1960s through the late 
1970s, “programmatic directions for research originated not from scientists but from Congress,” 
and these federal priorities did “not necessarily align[] with those of the scientists” (p. 14).  
Although federally funded projects have always maintained the “right to impose conditions upon 
use of funds[] and to stipulate the terms and conditions under which they may be used” (Kidd, 
1963, p. 617), starting around the late 1960s, scientific investigations that met political priorities 
appeared to get more favorable treatment and, at times, advancing political priorities was even a 
condition to federal sponsorship (Brooks, 1978; Geiger, 2004; Kistiakowsky, 1989; Leslie, 
1994).   
For example, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, federal policymakers felt compelled 





(Kistiakowsky, 1989).  Formalizing the policy priority for federally funded academic research, in 
1969, Congress passed the Mansfield Amendment of the Military Reauthorization Act.  The law 
expressly stated that the Department of Defense (DOD) shall not “carry out any research project 
or study unless such project or study has a direct and apparent relationship to a specific military 
function” (10 U.S.C. § 2358(c) [1971]; see also, Bell, 1973; Geiger, 1992).  Similarly, the 
research indicates that during this time period of the late 1960s and early 1970s, government 
funding of environmental matters addressed geophysical topics that served military interests, 
rather than emerging concerns such as environmental hazards (Doel, 2003).  Put simply, some of 
the studies applying the competing interests frame uncover how the political agenda at times 
shapes the programmatic directions of what federally sponsored projects would qualify as “free 
play of free intellects.” 
Another strand of research using the competing interests frame explained more than the 
means for government to challenge the academic profession’s federally sponsored research.  
These studies also revealed the role of the nongovernmental dominant group and its connection 
with the government’s challenges.  These studies illustrate pressures and tactics, often 
highlighting disparities in political and/or economic power among groups and how the dominant 
class drives the policy agenda.  For example, in one case study that addressed state funding of 
academic research, state officials suspended an economics professor, Louis Levine, for nearly 10 
months because Professor Levine’s scholarly writings and publications proposed a new tax 
structure that would adversely impact the mining industry’s profits (Gutfeld, 1970).  The 
controversy arose when, in late 1916, the chancellor of the state university in Montana placed the 
economics professor on a committee to identify new revenue sources for the institution.  While 





calculations: The assessments severely undervalued the mining industry’s tax obligation.  As part 
of his study, Levine devised a new assessment model that would significantly increase the annual 
tax assessments on the mining industry.  Not surprisingly, the mining industry did not respond 
favorably.     
As the dominant group, the mining industry pressured state officials to suppress Levine’s 
study and silence him.  Complying with those pressures, the state engaged in several challenges 
to the professor’s research expertise.  These actions included an investigation regarding the 
professor’s statements, threats of further scrutiny as a strategy to discredit him, and denied access 
to the university press as an outlet to publish his report.  Based on archival data tracing this event 
from 1918 to 1919, the state government took the role of active suppressor of the professor’s 
research expertise.  Interestingly, the role of the principal mining company “was nowhere 
directly demonstrable,” yet as Gutfeld (1970) quotes a secondary source, “‘Everywhere the hand 
of the [mining] [c]ompany left its nebulous mark, but nowhere its fingerprints.’  The vast power 
of the mining interests enabled them to coerce the administration of the state without using 
directly visible marks” (p. 36).  Despite the shadowy proof of the mining industry’s active 
involvement, the competing interests frame still reveals that the circumstances and events 
surrounding government challenges to professors’ research serve the interests of the dominant 
class. 
While business is often represented in the dominant class, the dominant class is not a 
fixed collection of groups.  A group may fall in or out of the dominant class.  The literature on 
government challenges to professors’ research that follows the competing interests frame reveals, 
by examining past events, how a group emerges into social power and into the dominant class.  





driven organizations, and the media) uses coercive tactics to acquire power and control over the 
academic profession or another group as a means to position itself in the dominant class 
(Hamilton, 1995).  After the group thrusts itself into dominance, the new, dominant group uses 
its position to, for instance, initiate government challenges with professors’ research.   
Following the competing interests framework, Hamilton (1995) illustrates the movement 
of a group into the dominant class.  In his study, he concludes that ideological “zealots” trampled 
over professors’ research, often using the government as their agent, in their efforts to reach the 
dominant class.  He argues that about every 15 to 20 years, from 1870 to the early 1990s, a new 
group emerged to suppress professors’ intellectual freedom.  Based on his historical and legal 
analyses, each of the emerging dominant groups espoused fanatical, ideologically based 
viewpoints that ran counter to professional norms of an unbiased and reasoned search for 
knowledge.  In order for the dominant group to maintain its position or gain strength over the 
subordinate group (i.e., professors), the dominant group employed coercive tactics that typically 
involved government challenges to professors’ research. 
Tracing the roles of various powerful groups over time – such as religious 
fundamentalists, capitalist-minded college boards, nationalists who protected sentiments of 
patriotism surrounding World War I, anticommunists before World War II, McCarthyist actors, 
student activists, and radical academic leftists – Hamilton (1995) discusses how each of the 
prevailing groups leveraged its power through coercive tactics such as accusing, labeling, 
investigating, and attacking the academic profession (i.e., the subordinate group) in a manner 
that ostracized some actors and threatened other groups’ positions to emerge as a dominant 
group.  For instance, Hamilton cites examples of the emergence of left-wing radicals as a 





research that might be interpreted as politically incorrect statements, the emerging dominant 
group (i.e., the left-wing radicals) quickly quashed the legitimacy of these professors’ statements 
and framed them as expressions meant to intimidate marginalized classes of people.  
Specifically, the emerging dominant group labeled the subordinate group’s actions as harassment 
and discrimination.   
In one example, a professor’s public comment about an identified ethnic minority group’s 
academic preparation for employment, along with selected articles and expressions that analyzed 
racial differences in educational opportunities, spurred a U.S. Department of Education Office 
for Civil Rights (OCR) investigation that requested all of the professor’s research and writings.  
According to Hamilton (1995), the OCR tried to determine whether the professor’s practices at 
the institution reflected what she had expressed.  If it was found that her practices did reflect 
some of her critical comments about selected ethnic minority groups, she might have violated a 
federal law that prohibited racially discriminatory practices in higher education.  Although the 
OCR investigation found no violation, the investigation and accusations created an environment 
that members of the academic community would perceive as hostile to open dialogue and 
scholarly expression.  Thus, taking the competing interests frame, the circumstances and events 
surrounding government challenges to professors’ research offer insights about how various 
actors employ some dimension of power, in this instance, power exercised through coercive 
tactics. 
More recently, the literature employing a competing interests framework has also 
revealed questionable tactics that pose challenges to the academic profession’s federally funded 
research through seemingly scientific sound practices, particularly through a practice known as 





panel of independent scientists to evaluate relevant studies pertaining to the policy issue, assess 
the state of the science, and advise policymakers about the policy options.  A regulatory peer-
review process has the potential to overcome policymakers’ biases and sort out good and bad 
science.  Nonetheless, as Shapiro and Guston (2007) and others explain, in practice, that is not 
always the case.   
Several studies investigate how government challengers have selectively used federal 
scientists, academic researchers, commissioned groups, lobbyists, industry representatives, and 
other policymakers to help advise them (the government challengers) as policymakers (Ashford, 
1983; Jasanoff, 1985, 2006; Shapiro & Guston, 2007; Steinzor, Wagner, & Shudtz, 2008).  
According to these previous studies, government officials “stacked” review committees (a 
technique called committee stacking), with selective experts who would help the government 
actors fashion a recommendation based on their policy preference.  While the use of experts 
might add credibility to the evaluation process, scientists and other critics of the government 
challengers have questioned the independence of these reviewers and the balanced perspectives 
of committees conducting the reviews (Ashford, 1983; Jasanoff, 1985, 2006; Shapiro & Guston, 
2007; Steinzor, Wagner, & Shudtz, 2008).  Shapiro and Guston (2007) point out that when 
policymakers have significant discretion in selecting the reviewers, peer review stacking may 
occur, which involves the selection of committee members with a particular perspective.  As 
Shapiro and Guston (2007) suggest, peer review stacking would likely lead to biased outcomes, 
such as reaching the conclusions of the government challengers’ policy preferences.   
Furthermore, the literature using the competing interests frame has also explored how 
certain legislation appearing as accountability measures has eased the process for government 





research topics have policy implications (Couzin & Unger, 2006; Wagner, 2005).  The laws 
emerged after successful lobbying efforts by industry representatives who opposed the findings 
of several federally funded academic research studies.  In the late 1990s, federal policymakers 
used the academic research projects at issue to help them determine acceptable pollutant levels, 
which were eventually codified into the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).  The 
adoption of the new standards was expected to cost industry millions of dollars each year to 
reach the phased-in compliance levels (Esworthy & McCarthy, 2006).  Given the change in 
standards and the costs associated with those changes, during the public discussion phase of the 
NAAQS, industry scientists and other scientific evaluators sought to analyze the data from the 
supporting studies.  However, the academic scientists of one the studies initially restricted access 
to the data.  They did so because they wanted to comply with their promise of anonymity for the 
research subjects so as to protect their identities and medical information.  Nevertheless, when 
the academic scientists restricted access to the data, critics of the policy asserted that the 
academic scientists did not want anyone to review the data or replicate the study.  The 
implication was that access to the data would uncover evidence that the academic scientists 
blurred the lines between science assessor and science policy advocate.   
In reaction to the data access problems and upon encouragement from industry 
representatives, the government established additional accountability measures.  Through these 
accountability measures, the federal government intended to address scientific research that lacks 
sufficient scientific support for an advocated policy position (Couzin & Unger, 2006; Mooney, 
2005; Wagner, 2005).  Rallying to the purpose of protecting the public’s interest, Congress 





sponsored research and by establishing a protocol for the public to challenge any scientific 
research used to inform federal policy.   
While these two accountability measures appear on their face to serve the public’s 
interest, they are significant tools for actors other than the government to discount or minimize 
the role of federally funded academic research.  I will first describe each accountability measure, 
and then I will explain how they could potentially block the dissemination of federally funded 
academic research by inviting nongovernmental actors, particularly adversaries of the academic 
research, to participate in the research challenges. 
In 1999, the Data Access Amendment (DAA) to the Freedom of Information Act, also 
known as the Shelby Amendment, mandated accessibility of federally sponsored research data 
that recipients of federal grants maintain (Couzin & Unger, 2006; Wagner, 2005).  This 
provision allows the public to access the data from publicly funded research for independent 
reviews. On its face, this appears to be a law that serves the public’s interest.  For example, under 
the DAA, one beneficial feature is that an independent reviewer may uncover whether severe 
scientific misconduct occurred and/or whether the scientific recommendations reflect undue 
reliance on insufficient evidence, perhaps to advance a policy preference.  Interestingly enough, 
in 2000 – after the passage of the DAA – an independent review supervised by the Health Effects 
Institute concluded that the federally sponsored academic research studies that helped inform 
policymakers to determine the National Ambient Air Quality Standards were sound scientific 
examinations with reasonable conclusions (Krewski et al., 2000).  Despite that, the law is still 
perceived by the public and policymakers as a reaction to academic research used to advocate a 
policy with insufficient data (Hornstein, 2006; Wagner, 2003).7   
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Even though the reanalysis of sponsored research studies vindicated the academic 
scientists of any scientific wrongdoings, in 2001, Congress also enacted the Data Quality Act 
(DQA), which represents another accountability measure.  The DQA requires the establishment 
of uniform guidelines for federal agencies to ensure consistent data evaluation procedures in 
research that federal agencies rely upon to create or influence policy decisions (Couzin & Unger, 
2006; Wagner, 2005).  It also permits anyone to challenge data and request an agency evaluation 
to correct or remove studies used to help craft a policy when disputes exist over the data.  This 
measure could delay important new research and the adoption of related policies, but the extent 
of this accountability measure is best observed when considering the uses of both the DAA and 
DQA.    
Both the DAA and DQA permit actors, other than government, to limit the principle of 
“free play of free intellects.”  These laws used together present significant tools to discount or 
minimize the role of federally funded academic research.  For example, when a party wishes to 
contest federally sponsored academic research that is used to influence or create science policy, 
that party can, pursuant to the DAA, demand release of the federally sponsored data.  The 
interested party may then examine the data with the intent of crafting another study that purports 
to present seemingly contradictory data.  As Hornstein (2006),Wagner (2003, 2005), and Wagner 
and Michaels (2004) suggest, the interested party may use private funds to conduct a study that 
produces the party’s desired results, including data that conflicts with the federally sponsored 
academic research.  Unlike the federally sponsored academic research, the interested party’s 
privately funded research is not subject to scrutiny under the DAA.  Furthermore, it does not 
have to comply with the same levels of scientific rigor, such as peer review, which are standard 
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practices for academic research as well as federally sponsored research.  With conflicting data 
from the interested party’s study, under the DQA, the interested party can then challenge the 
federally sponsored academic research’s data.  That challenge potentially leads to a re-
examination of the academic study and likely requires the study to be temporarily or permanently 
removed from the regulatory, decision-making process.  In the end, it is possible that under these 
accountability measures, the government places greater reliance on the privately funded research 
and affords the scientists of the privately funded project more deference than it does the 
academic scientists engaged in the federally sponsored research (Wagner, 2005; Wagner & 
Michaels, 2004).   
On their face, the DAA and DQA represent accountability measures that potentially offer 
significant contributions to advance the public’s interest.  The laws provide public access to data 
and scrutiny of the study methodology and results.  These laws, however, also present 
opportunities for potential negative effects, such as ignoring the peer-review process and 
allowing different treatment for studies, depending on the funding source.  For academic 
scientists who receive federal funding, these laws create legally justifiable means for actors other 
than the government to limit “free play of free intellects” through serious delays and ad hominem 
attacks. For policymakers, these laws offer greater opportunity to rely on industry research, 
which is not subject to the same levels of scrutiny. 
 In sum, the competing interests frame offers insights about the conflicts in society as 
groups compete to advance their interests but ultimately the dominant group prevails.  This 
section discussed how political priorities, industry interests, and members of the public may 
potentially convince or pressure government officials to challenge the academic profession’s 





Limitations of the Competing Interests Frame 
While the competing interests frame offers a way to examine government challenges to 
professors’ research, it also has two significant limitations.  One limitation is that the competing 
interests frame underscores or ignores the presence of shared societal interests that promote 
social order.  As applied to the literature on government challenges to the academic profession’s 
research, the competing interests frame assumes that institutions within society, including 
universities and government, feed into social arrangements – such as educational attainment and 
social prestige – which are unfairly distributed in society.  The imbalances of these social 
arrangements reflect or exacerbate competing interests and group conflicts.   
Nevertheless, as I discussed earlier and mentioned in the case summaries regarding 
government challenges to academic scientists’ federally sponsored research on environmental 
topics, it is well established that universities and the academic profession act to benefit societal 
interests – particularly when it advances its research in pursuit of the social good (see, e.g., Frank 
& Gabler, 2006; Geiger, 1986).  Furthermore, other social institutions also work with universities 
and the academic profession to further societal interests such as advancing science.  Several past 
studies even examine how universities, business, and government have successfully collaborated 
to advance national science initiatives that serve the public good (see, e.g., Crow & Tucker, 
2001; Etzkowitz, Webster, Gebhardt, & Terra, 2000; Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, & Ziedonis, 
2001).  Similarly, for this study, the competing interests frame’s focus on conflict and competing 
interests may overshadow a general pattern of societal cohesion, such as collective actions that 
further societal interests.  That focus on conflict and competing interests over consensus and 





Besides underscoring shared, societal interests, the competing interests frame has another 
limitation.  Just like the unified interest frame, the competing interests frame places emphasis on 
broad patterns drawn from large social structures and classes of society, to examine group 
conflicts within a divided society.  This framework generally overlooks the individual or small-
group interactions as the source to explain a group’s interests and actions.  Nevertheless, when 
the situation involves highly complex matters such as academic scientific terms and processes, 
this macro lens (i.e., focusing on large social structures rather than individual or small-group 
interactions) may oversimplify what is reported as the circumstances and events surrounding 
government challenges, which in turn potentially limits what the study reveals in terms of 
pressures, tactics, and other means employed.  Kroll (2001) illustrates this limitation in an article 
that examines how individuals and groups construct different meanings about one scientific 
study.  The study that generated these different meanings is Rachel Carson’s 1962 
groundbreaking work on the environmental harms from pesticide use.  The U.S. Department of 
Agriculture challenged Carson’s study and attempted to discredit it.  Kroll traces three media 
forms that told the Rachel Carson story.  Each media form resulted in different public 
impressions about the study and subsequent actions.  Kroll concludes that the contextual 
presentation of the Carson study altered people’s interpretation of the study.  Yet, Kroll’s 
examination required breaking down the actors to smaller groups and tracing their interactions – 
that is, using a micro level of analysis.  
Under the competing interests frame, interpretations and interactions surrounding a social 
conflict are primarily captured from the standpoint of significant social actors, or they are based 
on the relationship among broad social structures and forces in society.  That is, this framework 





frame largely ignores or minimizes the effect of interpretations and interactions from individuals 
or small groups as a way to conceptualize government challenges – which for purposes of this 
study presents a limitation as a lens that would help me understand the circumstances and events 
surrounding government challenges to academic scientists’ research. 
Summary and Conclusion 
In sum, the competing interests framework presents a lens that follows the actions of key 
groups in society confronted with conflict and competing interests.  As the literature illustrates, 
the competing interests frame examines society in terms of social arrangements that foster 
inequality and constraint, and groups in society such as the academic profession and government 
often participate in this societal environment to advance the interests of the dominant group.  
This section informs us of various ways in which government actors have represented or have 
been the dominant group, which led to government challenges of the academic profession’s 
government-sponsored research.  Specifically, we learned that government challenges have 
occurred by (1) setting political priorities that define what areas of research the government will 
financially support, disseminate, and entertain for policy consideration; (2) intimidating or 
weakening the position of marginalized groups; and (3) adopting policies or processes (e.g., 
regulatory peer review and accountability measures) that appear to be credible systems but as 
applied, compromise the scientific review system through committee stacking or inviting 
adversaries to participate in the attacks on federally funded academic research.   
While the studies employing the competing interests framework help illuminate the 
circumstances and events surrounding government challenges to professors’ research and thus 
can contribute to my understanding about the pressures and tactics employed, this framework has 





shared societal interests that promote social order, and it places too much emphasis on broad 
patterns drawn from large social structures and classes of society, rather than capturing the 
nuanced relationships.  As I discussed above, these limitations risk not fully examining the 
relationships between actors and not appreciating the overarching social values that drive certain 
behaviors.  My study’s cases involve the potentially shared interests of serving the public good 
and also involve highly complex matters. Both of these contexts might be oversimplified through 
a framework driven by larger social factors, rather than individual and small-group interactions.  
Given these limitations, I examine the third and final framework used in the literature addressing 
government challenges of the academic profession’s federally sponsored research. 
Evolving Interpretations and Interests Frame 
A third line of research suggests that uncovering the circumstances and events 
surrounding the government challenges is best accomplished by tracing the evolving 
interpretations of key actors’ interactions with others in the controversy. This type of 
examination would reveal the different actors’ interests and prompt a better understanding of 
how the actions led to the pressures, tactics, and other means employed to challenge the 
academic profession’s government-sponsored research (Beauregard, 1988; Garrison & Kobor, 
2002; Gutfeld, 1970; Lilienfeld, 2002).  These studies examine symbols or messages conveyed 
through one-on-one and group interactions to help explain subsequent interactions.  The 
observable interactions ultimately capture the various means by which lay actors challenge the 
academic profession’s research.  While the literature using this framework resembles principles 
of the symbolic interactionism,8 which is one form of sociological inquiry, the literature on 
                                                 
8 Symbolic interactionism is a sociological perspective that views society through interactions that individuals 
and small groups have.  Three premises ground the symbolic interactionist perspective (Blumer, 1969/1986).  First, 
humans act according to the meanings associated with things such as symbols or messages, which may come in the 





government challenges does not identify a name of this framework, but I will refer to it as the 
Evolving Interpretations and Interests Frame. 
Application and Contributions of the Evolving Interpretations and Interests Frame 
To explore the application of the evolving interpretations and interests frame, I discuss 
two key pieces of literature that illustrate the primary features of this framework (Garrison & 
Kobor, 2002; Lilienfeld, 2002).  These two studies, Garrison and Kobor (2002) and Lilienfeld 
(2002), uncover meanings that various individuals and groups use to examine a controversial 
study’s findings about child sexual abuse (hereafter known as the “Rind study”) (see Rind, 
Tromovitch, & Bauserman, 1998).  The controversy revolved around a peer-reviewed article in 
Psychological Bulletin, an American Psychological Association journal.  The authors of the Rind 
study concluded that, based on their meta-analysis of 59 studies with a combined sample size of 
over 15,000 college students, child sexual abuse did not always result in severe harm.  This study 
directly challenged the common assumption that the effects of child sexual abuse included severe 
psychological harm.  In addition, the authors of the Rind study also found that the impacts of 
child sexual abuse were significantly less harmful for male respondents who considered their 
sexual encounters as children to be “consensual” acts (Lilienfeld, 2002).   
While Garrison and Kobor (2002) and Lilienfeld (2002) report that the Rind study 
contains scientifically valuable contributions, the authors of the controversial article used words 
and terms whose meanings lay readers misinterpreted. These differences in meaning served as 
                                                                                                                                                             
exchanges between two parties about the subject matter of the symbols or messages.  Third, through that social 
interaction, an interpretive process illuminates the meaning for the recipient of the symbols or messages.  Simply 
put, this perspective captures how individuals and small groups interpret messages and interact based on those 
interpretations, as a way to conceptualize situations in society such as government challenges to scientists.  While 
aspects of the evolving interpretations and interests frame appear to represent aspects of the symbolic interactionist 
perspective, I acknowledge that the evolving interpretations and interests frame does not carry out this sociological 
perspective in the same depth of inquiry as does symbolic interactionism.  Instead, the guiding principles of 
symbolic interactionism seem to inform or coincidentally reflect many parts of the framing and analysis of studies 





significant barriers to proper understanding and ultimately to the academic profession’s exercise 
of its intellectual freedom.  Garrison and Kobor (2002) and Lilienfeld (2002) suggest that 
legislators, the media, and other individuals interpreted certain words and phrases contained in 
the Rind study differently from what the authors intended, and those different interpretations 
significantly explain the circumstances and events surrounding the controversy, particularly the 
government challenge to the academic research.  For example, the phrase “adult-child sex” in the 
Rind study provoked arguments about the value of this research topic.  The differences in 
meanings become clear when one compares how various actors – the Rind study’s authors, other 
academic-psychologists, members of Congress, representatives from the North American 
Man/Boy Love Association, and the media – used the phrase.   
Garrison and Kobor (2002) and Lilienfeld (2002) illustrate how the framing of individual 
and group interpretations about the Rind study’s findings generated justifications for government 
challenges.  Initially, the Rind study received little attention; however, approximately four 
months after its publication, a nationally syndicated radio host, Dr. Laura, criticized the article’s 
findings on-air numerous times over the course of several months.  Dr. Laura’s lay 
interpretations of the study’s conclusions, that the authors had supposedly found adult-child sex 
to be acceptable, reached the masses.  Then, socially deviant groups such as the North American 
Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA), which promote legalization of adult-child sexual 
encounters, used the Rind study for an unintended purpose: to legitimize their position on 
pedophilia.  These events drew public criticisms about the study from multiple media outlets, 
including radio and television talk shows, blogs, and newspapers.  
As word spread about this study’s conclusions and its uses to advocate illegal and 





authors for releasing the study, called into question the authors’ scientific expertise, and 
expressed their disbelief that such a study could be published.  Although their comments derived 
from lay interpretations of the article, the legislators, as public officials, feared that the study’s 
findings might advocate, or at least have the effect of further legitimizing with other individuals 
and groups as it had with NAMBLA, socially deviant behaviors such as child abuse.  
Recognizing the need for public action, government officials across the country criticized the 
study’s authors for their statements and the APA for publishing the article.  Members of 
Congress even held a press conference condemning the study and insisting that the APA 
denounce the study’s legitimacy as scientific research.  Collectively, the lay interpretations of the 
Rind study, along with other circumstances and events surrounding the study, raised questions 
about both the value of certain academic research and the ability of the academic community to 
self-regulate.   
The academic community responded to these events.  Through public statements and 
letters to state and federal legislators, the APA expressed its support of the study’s scientific 
approach, noted the study’s contribution to the literature (i.e., the study challenged the common 
assumption that the effects of child sexual abuse always result in severe psychological harm later 
in life), and initially defended the process of peer review, by which professionals in the field had 
determined that the article had scientific merit and was worthy of publication.  In addition, 
through academic and public venues, the authors of the Rind study continued to publicly defend 
their article’s methodology, analysis, and conclusions.  Despite these attempts, as public pressure 
to condemn the article grew, state and federal legislators proposed resolutions to reject the 





According to Garrison and Kobor (2002) and Lilienfeld (2002), the legislators proposed 
these resolutions for two reasons.  First, the resolutions were intended to publicly denounce any 
support of child abuse.  The legislators wanted to send a strong message that they did not 
condone what they truly perceived as the study’s findings.  Second, the resolutions were intended 
to indirectly scold the American Psychological Association for its decision to publish this article 
when, as some legislators expressed, its staff likely knew or should have known that the article’s 
findings would cause the public outcry that it did.  In the minds of many legislators, the APA 
should not have printed an article, which, as interpreted, essentially condoned activities that 
would harm minors.  Despite these legislators’ public intentions for supporting the resolutions, 
many in the academic community interpreted the effect of these resolutions, particularly the one 
passed by Congress, with different meanings.  They believed that the resolutions symbolized 
more significant consequences to academic research.  In the opinion of many academics, these 
resolutions would have a “chilling effect on research concerning controversial scientific topics” 
(Lilienfeld, 2002, p. 181).  Yet, as Lilienfeld (2002) notes, at least one member of Congress did 
not realize that members of the academic community would view the Congressional Resolution 
in that manner.  He, like many other legislators, was concerned only about the lay interpretations 
surrounding the Rind study and the APA’s perceived irresponsibility for publishing the article, 
which legislators understood as advocating or at least legitimizing child sexual abuse.   
After several months of public pressure, which was heightened by commentaries from 
members of Congress and the media, the APA changed its position about the article and on its 
peer-review process.  Sensing that the public believed the APA was endorsing the lay 
interpretation of the article (i.e., pedophilia is not harmful in all instances), the Chief Executive 





Tom Delay, who was the House Majority Whip and played a significant role in formulating the 
Congressional Resolution that admonished the Rind study authors and the APA.  In his letter, 
Fowler indicated that the article “included opinions of the authors that are inconsistent with 
APA’s stated and deeply held positions” that sexual relations between children and adults are not 
harmful acts (cited in Lilienfeld, 2002, p. 181).  Furthermore, Fowler intimated that the peer-
review process, which was in place at the time, might have been flawed.  Because the APA has 
always stood against sexual abuse of children, the Rind study’s conclusions should have initiated 
an evaluation “based on its potential for misinforming the public policy process (cited in 
Lilienfeld, 2002, p. 181).  Fowler admitted that this consideration of the study’s impact on the 
public did not occur, but the APA “will do [so] in the future” (cited in Lilienfeld, 2002, p. 181).    
The APA statement spurred on further debate from academics and nonacademic 
psychologists.  These individuals were troubled by the APA’s recanting of support for the Rind 
study and the APA’s public remarks that suggested changes to the journal review process, which 
in their minds might mean changing the peer-review process.  To manage the impressions of 
these academics, the APA attempted to clarify its position.  Tracing evolving interpretations, 
Lilienfeld writes: “In subsequent policy statements, however, the APA made clear that its 
statement should not be construed as implying a policy change in the peer-review process for 
controversial articles.  Instead, journal editors would have the responsibility of alerting the APA 
to articles that might be especially likely to incite controversy so that the APA could adopt a 
more proactive stance with the media, politicians, and others” (Lilienfeld, 2002, p. 181).  
Nevertheless, as Garrison and Kobor and Lilienfeld observe, these academics and nonacademic 
psychologists felt that the APA’s initial statements about the changes to the journal review 





peer-review process would be changed for controversial articles.  The individuals who 
complained to the APA about its proposed change to the review process believed that the APA’s 
initial statements placed the academic peer-review process in a vulnerable state, especially since 
legislators, the media, and other nonscientists might not appreciate the role of peer review, and 
moreover, some of these outside critics thought the process did not work. 
In sum, Garrison and Kobor (2002) and Lilienfeld’s (2002) framework illustrates how (1) 
individuals attach meanings to symbols and messages, (2) meaning making takes place through 
interactions with other actors, and (3) the evolving interpretations and interactions capture the 
circumstances and events surrounding the government challenges to academic scientists’ 
research and elucidate the pressures and tactics that the lay actors employed.   
Limitations of the Evolving Interpretations and Interests Frame 
There are two limitations to the evolving interpretations and interests frame when used to 
uncover circumstances and events surrounding government challenges to academic scientists’ 
research.  In this section, I elaborate on both. 
One limitation of the evolving interpretations and interests frame is that it tends to 
downplay the influences of larger social factors, such as social arrangements (e.g., educational 
attainment and social prestige), institutions (e.g., universities, business, media), and forces (e.g., 
political, economic, or technological).  Minimizing the larger social factors potentially overlooks 
how these social factors contribute to our identification and understanding of the circumstances 
and events surrounding the government challenges.  Several prior studies on government 
challenges to professors’ research illustrate the significance of connecting the various social 
factors with the government challenges as a way to identify and understand the circumstances 





(1980, 1986) investigate the role of social institutions, including universities, government, and 
the academic profession, to help uncover and examine the circumstances and events surrounding 
the government challenges.  They explore how these institutions functioned to advance the 
asserted public interest in eliminating (or at least minimizing) Communist influences within 
American colleges and universities.  Accordingly, they uncover pressures and tactics drawn from 
these social institutions’ functions, particularly those that sought to serve the social good.  
Beneke (1998), Gutfeld (1970), and Hamilton (1995), in their studies about government 
challenges to professors’ research, also explore the influences of larger social factors.  They 
focus on how social arrangements divided groups in society in terms of financial resources and 
political power.  In light of these resource and power differences, they trace the circumstances 
and events surrounding the government challenges to discuss how the groups with limited 
resources and political power, such as the academic profession, behaved in a way that served the 
dominant groups’ interests.   
Another limitation of the evolving interpretations and interests frame is that it relies too 
heavily on subjective interpretations in uncovering the interactions that collectively define the 
situation (i.e., the circumstances and events surrounding government challenges to academic 
scientists’ research).  As I noted earlier, an individual may interpret an encounter or message 
differently from another person who also participates in the encounter or is presented with the 
same messages.  While one of the contributions of this framework is that it captures individual 
interpretations of messages and the interactions that follow, that individualized meaning-making 
process also illuminates a limitation of this framework.  The individualized meaning-making 
process allows an individual to incorporate personal beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions to 





dependent on whose observations a researcher captures.  In other words, the interpretations and 
interactions present highly subjective constructions of reality that depend largely on whose 
viewpoint is taken and what the individual interprets to be the situation, given his beliefs, 
attitudes, and perceptions.   
For instance, Garrison and Kobor (2002) and Lilienfeld (2002) identify multiple realities 
about how others perceived the APA’s role in the Rind study publication.  One interpretation that 
many critics of the Rind study, including politicians and media personalities, outwardly 
expressed was that the APA endorsed the article when it published it.  Another interpretation that 
other critics of the Rind study held was that the APA neglected its responsibility to control 
unethical research projects that its members conduct.  According to these critics, the authors 
should never have explored the issue of harm to children who experience child sexual abuse, 
because children cannot consent to sex and adult sex with children is illegal.  Because of the 
unethical and illegal nature of the subject, these critics believed that as matter of professional 
oversight, the APA should never have published the study.  A third interpretation, which 
reflected the understanding of many academic scientists, is that the APA followed the norms of 
the scientific community, including considering the peer-review process, and that process led to 
peers in the field judging the article as worthy of publication.  As I explained earlier, each 
interpretation led to different interactions, including public objections to the study through 
proposed legislation and published criticisms from other academics who accused the Rind study 
researchers of ethical violations.  That is, the individuals interacted based on their subjective 
interpretations – which in some cases may have been driven by personal beliefs, while in other 
cases, by professional standards.  But, subjectivity helps highlight different understandings of 





Individual interpretations of messages and symbols are inherently subjective.  The 
literature on social cognition identifies several reasons for individual differences with message 
interpretation when individuals encounter (e.g., by oral, written, or other visual cues) the same 
words and symbols.  Since the 1970s, social psychologists, who study social cognition, have 
suggested that individuals may present differing interpretations from others, even when these 
individuals encounter the same language or symbols.  For example, social psychologists 
identified an observable behavior known as the perseverance effect, in which some people hold 
onto beliefs about themselves and their environment even when others discredit those beliefs 
(Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975).  This concept explains how, to use one example, individual 
factors present the possibility that people who hear or experience the same message may 
articulate different interpretations of that message.  Indeed, many other factors influence or shape 
the way people process language and symbols, including what they use to help anchor the 
meaning, which ranges from past events to seemingly similar events that they or another person 
experienced (Pronin, Puccio, & Ross, 2002).  While these anchor points help an individual make 
meaning of the language or symbols, one person’s anchor may be different from another’s, and 
those differences lead to the possibility for a wide range of interpretations of the same language 
or symbols.  Therefore, as a way to uncover the circumstances and events surrounding the 
government challenges to academic scientists’ research, this framework is vulnerable to 
subjective interpretations.   
Summary of the Contributions and Limitations of the Evolving Interpretations and 
Interests Frame 
To summarize, the evolving interpretations and interests frame has several strengths and 





academic scientists’ research.  In terms of this framework’s strengths, there are at least three.  
One contribution is that the evolving interpretations and interests frame recognizes and captures 
human capacity for thought and action.  It does not overlook an individual actor’s purposeful 
interactions as a way to understand the circumstances and events surrounding government 
challenges.  Another contribution of the evolving interpretations and interests frame is that it 
recognizes the significance of language and symbols.  Because individuals interact in a 
purposeful manner, the language and symbols surrounding an incident also represent meaningful 
messages that help uncover the circumstances and events relating to the government challenge.  
A third contribution of the evolving interpretations and interests frame is that it captures the 
ongoing process of interactions.  It operates off the premise that a situation develops over a series 
of interactions.  By tracing these interactions, we can uncover the circumstances and events 
surrounding the government challenge to academic scientists’ research.   
While the evolving interpretations and interests frame presents several conceptual 
strengths as a way to uncover the circumstances and events surrounding the government 
challenge, it also has two limitations.  As a framework that offers a micro level of analysis, it 
relies much more on individual and small-group interpretations and interactions and less on 
larger social factors, such as social structures and institutions.  By downplaying the effect of 
social factors, the evolving interpretations and interests frame largely overlooks key societal 
features, such as how groups behave based on social roles or as a consequence of societal 
conflict.  Further, it relies too heavily on subjective interpretations of reality as a way to 
construct meaning about the role of the academic profession as well as to account for the 
circumstances and events in society, such as government challenges to academic scientists’ 





Despite these limitations, when compared to the societal interest and competing interests 
frameworks, I propose in the next section that the evolving interpretations and interests frame 
still offers the best framework to capture circumstances and events surrounding government 
challenges to academic scientists’ federally sponsored research.   
Proposing the Evolving Interpretations and Interests Frame 
As I indicated earlier, the purpose of this chapter is to establish one part of my study’s 
conceptual framework.  While my overall study explores what it means for government actors to 
challenge academic scientists’ federally sponsored research and academic scientists to exert 
control over that research, in this chapter, I set out to identify a framework to understand the 
circumstances and events surrounding government challenges to academic scientists’ research.  
The circumstances and events lead to uncovering the lay actors’ pressures, tactics, and other 
means employed, which are necessary for me to consider as I conceptualize what it means for 
academic scientists to experience government challenges.   
While any one of these frameworks offers me a way to conceptualize government 
challenges, I searched for the most useful framework for me to investigate a central characteristic 
of my cases: how various individuals construct different understandings about academic 
scientific research that involves highly specialized or complex scientific terms and processes.  As 
I noted earlier, my cases revolve around controversies in which various individuals present 
differing opinions about a federally sponsored academic research project that pertains to an 
environmental policy topic.  Because these academic scientific research projects involve highly 
specialized or complex scientific terms and processes, it is not surprising that the cases illustrate 
conflicts arising from different understandings between and among nonscientists, academic 





interpretations and interactions, which would help me uncover the circumstances and events 
surrounding the government challenges, is by using the evolving interpretations and interests 
frame. 
  The evolving interpretations and interests frame explains the government challenge 
through a series of interpretations and interactions.  Seen within this framework, individuals 
create meanings based on their interpretations of symbols and language, and based on the 
meanings each constructs, each individual interacts with others.  For example, Garrison and 
Kobor (2002) and Lilienfeld (2002) recount how differing interpretations about the Rind study 
publication generated a series of interactions.  In that case, regardless of the Rind study’s 
authors’ stated intentions, several actors (i.e., individuals from the media, Congress, and 
members of the North American Man/Boy Love Association) attached meanings to the article’s 
research approach, findings, and effects on society.  In some instances, even though the article 
contained highly specialized or complex terms and processes, individuals not trained in the 
specialty commented on the study by describing research flaws in terms of design, methods, and 
analysis.  Others who questioned the research approach and findings sought out individuals, 
whom they deemed as credible experts, to evaluate the research in order to address the highly 
specialized or complex terms and processes.  These identified experts, some but not all of whom 
had relevant social and behavioral science training, evaluated the study – typically conveying 
messages to discredit the Rind study authors.  A group of scientists and nonscientists also 
criticized the study for violating research ethics.  In their minds, the specialized or complex 
terms and processes of the study were insignificant, because a study addressing illegal behaviors 





interactions at the micro level constructed the circumstances and events surrounding the 
government challenges to the academic scientists’ research.   
By contrast, the unified interest and competing interests frameworks tend to focus on 
patterns based on broader social factors, such as social structures and institutions, as well as 
social arrangements.  Viewed as offering a macro-level lens to the situation, both the unified 
interest and competing interests frameworks regard arrangements in society, such as economic 
and political mechanisms, as well as social institutions, such as universities and business, as 
shaping the circumstances and events surrounding government challenges to professors’ 
research.9  As indicated earlier, the unified interest frame emphasizes the academic profession’s 
function to further societal goals.  Accordingly, past studies that used a unified interest frame 
conceptualized the role of the academic profession within society in its pursuit of a clearly 
established societal priority, such as ridding society of Communist affiliations.  Using this 
framework, the interpretations of circumstances and events are anchored to societal norms and 
values as well as how the academic profession fits into its setting.  Further, it ignores how the 
individuals who engage in the controversy define the situation.  Likewise, the competing 
interests frame pays attention to broader social arrangements, such as class and educational 
access.  It emphasizes that society is already designed in an unequal environment to benefit the 
dominant group and deprive the subordinate group; therefore, groups such as the academic 
                                                 
9 Here, I cast the distinction between macro and micro levels of analysis as theoretical constructs that rely more 
heavily (i.e., a theoretical focus) on certain social units, rather than conveying “micro-macro extremism” (Ritzer & 
Goodman, 2004, p. 485).  That is, the unified interest and competing interests frames, much like the sociological 
frames of functionalism and conflict theorists, tend to focus on the macro level by examining social institutions and 
structures, rather than placing weight on individual interactions to understand the circumstances and events of each 
case.  By contrast, the evolving interpretations and interests frame, which resembles several aspects of the symbolic 
interactionist perspective, tends to focus on the micro level by examining interactions between and among 
individuals along with the human agency considerations (i.e., individuals having the capacity to act independently to 
understand circumstances and events of each case).  This distinction is not intended to convey micro-macro 
extremism.  None of the frames presented in this study reflect a pure application of social institutions, social 
structures, or individual/small-group interactions as the exclusive examination to determine the circumstances and 





profession and government act to serve the dominant group’s interests.  Under the competing 
interests frame, the interpretations of circumstances and events revolve around the inequalities of 
society and how groups, including the academic profession, advance the goals of the dominant 
group.   
In conclusion, rather than focusing on the social institutions and societal arrangements as 
a way to conceptualize what it means for academic scientists to experience government 
challenges, I propose using the evolving interpretations and interests frame, because it offers me 
an understanding of how individuals and small groups create and influence reality.  This 
framework can help me uncover the circumstances and events associated with individual 
interpretations and interactions that are based on specialized or complex terms drawn from the 
academic research study in question.  By doing so, this framework provides me a way to uncover 
how individuals and small groups interpret language and symbols, such as public statements 
about the controversial research from various individuals, including government officials, the 
media, academic scientists, professional organizations, lobbyists, industry leaders, and interest 
group representatives.  Put simply, as a way to understand the pressures, tactics, and other means 
that government used to challenge academic scientists’ federally sponsored research, the 
evolving interpretations and interests frame offers me the best conceptual approach to uncover 
and examine the circumstances and events surrounding government challenges.  Specifically, it 
details the interactions, especially those deriving from varying interpretations of academic 
scientific concepts, including processes such as peer review.  Given its value as a way to think 






Figure 2.1: Evolving Interpretations & Interests Frame 
 
Source: Author’s depiction of the application of the Evolving Interpretations & Interests Frame 
 
Chapter Summary & Conclusion 
This chapter proposed a way to conceptualize what it means for academic scientists to 
experience government challenges to their federally sponsored research, which represents one 
part of my overall conceptual framework, the other part being how the scientists respond to exert 
control.  I wanted a framework to help me conceptualize what it means for government to 
challenge professors’ research by uncovering the circumstances and events.  Thus, I reviewed 
literature on government challenges to professors’ research, to search for the way that best 
uncovered the circumstances and events surrounding government challenges to academic 
scientists’ research. 
Based on this review, I identified the three frames used in the extant literature (i.e., 
unified interest, competing interests, and evolving interpretations and interests) to uncover the 
circumstances and events surrounding government challenges.  For example, the literature 












determine how it integrated with other social institutions to meet societal interests.  The literature 
following the competing interests frame inquired into the academic profession’s intentions and 
motives to explore how it tried to serve its own interests, as well as the interests of the dominant 
class, in an environment with a societal arrangement that maintained differential resources and 
power.  The literature using the evolving interpretations and interactions frame inquired into the 
various actors’ interactions, and the meanings made by individuals involved in each of the 
encounters, to generate a more general understanding about what happened.  Since each 
framework focused on different aspects of the government challenges to the academic 
profession’s federally funded research, each of them leads a researcher to uncover different 
aspects of the circumstances and events identified – which in turn modifies how one 
conceptualizes the government challenges to professors’ research.  
While each perspective presents a legitimate frame to investigate the circumstances and 
events surrounding government challenges, I conclude that one of the three frames, the evolving 
interpretations and interests frame, offers the most useful way to uncover the circumstances and 
events surrounding government challenges to academic scientists’ research.  The evolving 
interpretations and interests frame offers me a way to examine how individuals interact in society 
when confronted with differing understandings about highly specialized or complex scientific 
terms and processes, which are critical elements of my cases.  Academic scientific concepts often 
evoke different meanings for people in the lay community, and these interpretations may not be 
generated from social institutions working together to further societal priorities or from conflicts 
purposefully intended to serve the interests of a certain group at the expense of another (see, e.g., 
Garrison & Kobor, 2002; Hunt, 1999; Lilienfeld, 2002).  The evolving interpretations and 





examine a situation that is open to the possibility of either consensus or conflict – or perhaps 
something in between consensus and conflict.  That is, the evolving interpretations and interests 
frame captures individual interpretations and interactions to uncover how individuals or small 
groups negotiate their way in society, based on their understanding of the situation – particularly 
one that involves highly specialized or complex scientific terms and processes.  Using this frame 
and viewing these interpretations and interactions that present detailed information drawn from 
various individuals, I will construct the circumstances and events surrounding the situation, 
which in turn will provide me with a way to conceptualize what it means for academic scientists 
to experience government challenges to their research.  I wish to emphasize that my selection of 
this framework does not mean I will ignore social institutions or structures that are at play.  
Instead, I recognize that the evolving interpretations and interests frame provides me guidance in 
examining my data, not a rigid set of rules with which I must comply.  Given these 
considerations, I believe that the evolving interpretations and interests frame responds to one part 
of this study’s research question (i.e., who participates in the circumstances and events 
surrounding the government challenges to academic scientists’ research and how do the various 
individuals, including academic scientists, interact in the situation?) and offers the most inclusive 
examination to address this part of the study. 
Finally, while the evolving interpretations and interests frame offers insights about 
government challenges, it is less helpful as a conceptual framework in understanding the 
academic profession’s responses that exert control over academic scientists’ federally sponsored 
research.  Instead, as I discuss more fully in Chapter 3, the literature on the academic 
profession’s responses to government challenges suggests a more detailed consideration of 





tactics, and other means to exert control over its federally sponsored research.  Thus, I propose 
the use of the evolving interpretations and interests frame to uncover the circumstances and 
events surrounding the government challenges, while in Chapter 3, I propose another part of my 
study’s overall conceptual framework to consider the academic profession’s responses, which 








CHAPTER III: CONCEPTUALIZING “EXERTING CONTROL OVER RESEARCH” 
Overview 
This chapter presents a framework to help us understand the academic profession’s 
responses to government challenges over research that represent strategies, tactics, and other 
means for the academic profession to protect its intellectual freedom.  More specifically, it offers 
a way to conceptualize “exerting control over research” when government challenges take place.  
To explain how I derived at my proposed framework, in this section, I preview the chapter. 
 The literature on the academic profession’s responses to government challenges generally 
suggests a framework that examines both internal characteristics and external factors of the 
academic profession.  The internal characteristics identify institutionalized features of the 
academic profession that contribute to its professional autonomy.  For instance, one internal 
characteristic of the academic profession is its expert knowledge.  It contributes to societal 
recognition that a member of the academic profession has the expertise to carry out a particular 
research project in one’s disciplinary specialty without undue lay interferences.  The external 
factors refer to conditions outside of the academic profession that influence the profession’s 
degree of autonomy over research.  For instance, the courts, as an external entity, have 
recognized a constitutional form of intellectual freedom, which generally protects the academic 
profession from undue government interference over its research, even when the research is 
government-sponsored.  This legal authority represents an external factor.  Both the internal 
characteristics and external factors contribute to the multiple institutionalized arrangements that 
make it possible for the academic profession to maintain autonomy over its work.  Those 
institutionalized sources of autonomy offer various considerations when one examines the 





and external factors likely contribute to our understanding of the academic profession’s 
strategies, tactics, and the other means it employed when government challenges take place.   
While prior research demonstrates that both the internal characteristics and external 
factors offer a way to understand the academic profession’s responses to government challenges, 
these studies do not fully explore the significance of the internal characteristics of the profession.  
Specifically, past studies have not used a framework that explicitly considers the internal 
characteristics addressing the academic profession’s (a) divisions of labor with project tasks 
related to research (“divisions of labor”) and (b) academic professional training and development 
(“professional training”).  As I discuss below, the omission of these characteristics misses other 
sources of institutionalized arrangements through which society has granted the academic 
profession autonomy.  In other words, the omission of these two internal characteristics 
potentially overlooks additional strategies, tactics, and other means for the academic profession 
to protect its intellectual freedom.   
 Rather than ignoring these internal characteristics, I suggest considering them, because 
they may provide additional insights as I explore what it means for the academic profession to 
exert control over its federally sponsored research.  To address these conceptual omissions, in 
this chapter, I review how past studies on the academic profession’s work autonomy have been 
structured.  That literature suggests using frameworks from the sociology of the professions.  
Accordingly, I review the research on the sociology of the professions, which leads me to Eliot 
Freidson’s theory of professional dominance (Freidson, 2001). 
Although Freidson’s theory has never been used to study the academic profession, it fills 
in the conceptual gaps found in the extant literature.  As I explain later in this chapter, Freidson’s 





examination of the academic profession’s responses to government challenges over academic 
scientists’ federally sponsored research – though I make two slight modifications to the theory.  
With these minor modifications, which I explain in greater detail below, Freidson’s theory of 
professional dominance presents a more accurate and comprehensive set of internal 
characteristics of and external factors influencing the academic profession.   
In sum, this chapter discusses several sources of relevant literature.  First, it presents the 
prior frameworks used to study the academic profession’s responses to lay challenges.  That 
literature draws out the conceptual omissions of past frameworks.  Second, to locate a framework 
that considers those conceptual omissions, this chapter also explores the literature on the 
academic profession’s work autonomy and the sociology of the professions.  The purpose of 
those reviews is to identify a framework that both aligns well with the past literature and fills in 
the conceptual gaps.  That review leads me to propose using Freidson’s theory of professional 
dominance, though with slight modifications, as a conceptual framework to guide my 
understanding of the academic profession’s responses to government challenges.  Then, at the 
conclusion of the chapter, I briefly discuss how (a) the evolving interpretations and interests 
frame from Chapter 2, which I use to understand the government challenges, and (b) a modified 
version of Freidson’s theory of professional dominance, which I use to understand the academic 
profession’s responses, work together as the overall conceptual framework of this study.   
Prior Frameworks 
As I indicated earlier, the literature on the academic profession’s responses to 
government challenges typically uses a framework that examines both internal characteristics of 
and external factors influencing the academic profession.  This section reviews the concepts 





examining the external factors.  Following that review, I point out conceptual gaps from the prior 
frameworks, which may lead to overlooking potential strategies, tactics, and other means for the 
academic profession to protect its intellectual freedom.  Now, I begin by discussing the internal 
characteristics identified in the literature on the academic profession’s responses to government 
challenges. 
Internal Characteristics 
The extant literature on the academic profession’s responses applies some mix of four 
possible internal characteristics to frame studies on the academic profession’s responses to 
government challenges to their work.  They are expert knowledge, qualifications for practice, 
professional associations, and professional ethos (see, e.g., Bloom, 1990; Gutfeld, 1970; 
Saltmarsh, 1991).  Discussing two key studies, I illustrate, below, how the consideration of these 
internal characteristics helps one understand how the academic profession’s responses identify 
strategies, tactics, and the other means it employed when government challenges take place. 
Expert Knowledge, Qualifications for Practice, and Professional Associations 
In Chapter 2, I examined a study by Gutfeld (1970).  Here is a brief summary of that 
case: In the early 20th century, the government tried to silence Professor Louis Levine.  Levine, 
an economics professor at the state university in Montana, published a report criticizing the 
state’s tax structure and pointing out the state’s generous tax assessment on the mining industry.  
In reaction to the report, business leaders and government officials quickly attacked Professor 
Levine’s methodology and findings, prevented the publication of his subsequent research, and 
pressured his employer to suspend him.   
Structuring his study on the academic profession’s responses to government challenges, 





knowledge, (2) its qualifications for practice, and (3) its professional associations.  Using this 
framework, he reveals how considering these three internal characteristics helps uncover the 
means by which the academic profession exerted control over its research in this case.  
Specifically, that framework helps reveal how the profession launched three significant 
responses around different forms of professional self-regulation.   
In one form of self-regulation, the academic profession reinforced the notion that expert 
knowledge required qualified individuals to assess the validity of the work.  Accordingly, the 
academic profession sought two Columbia University academics with expertise in economics 
and tax to evaluate Levine’s report.  The economists concluded that Levine’s report was 
professionally sound for publication.  They also noted that their university’s press would even 
consider a manuscript of that quality.  In a second form of self-regulation, the academic 
profession demonstrated its social role as a major participant to determine who could practice, or 
remain in practice, within the profession.  Members of the academic profession served on the 
internal review committee, and they judged whether the employing university proceeded fairly 
when it suspended Levine.  The university committee, which was composed of well-known 
faculty from the institution, concluded that the suspension was inappropriate, and referred to the 
suspension as a “farce,” an “arbitrary … intolerable” act.  The committee believed that the events 
did not provide a valid reason for suspension, and its members pressured the university to 
reinstate Levine.  The third form of self-regulation resembled the second one.  This time, 
however, rather than drawing from faculty inside the university, the reviewing committee 
consisted of faculty from around the United States.  Specifically, the American Association of 





situation and supported reinstatement of Levine.  These three forms of self-regulation eventually 
led to Levine’s reinstatement and back pay to compensate him for the period of suspension.    
Levine’s case demonstrates that expert knowledge, the academic profession’s practice of 
determining who is qualified to be a professor, and the collective action of its professional 
association amounted to self-regulation.  In addition, the Levine case shows how multiple actors 
potentially supported self-regulation in different ways.  Specifically, we learn of three types of 
self-regulatory measures that the academic profession used: peers within the field to evaluate the 
scholarship’s content, peers within the university to evaluate the suspension process, and the 
professional organization as members of the Academy who are not employed at the institution to 
review the process.   
Expert Knowledge, Qualifications for Practice, and Professional Ethos 
Like Gutfeld’s study, Bloom’s research (1990) also explores how “academic institutions 
respond to public crises about the freedom of the intellectual” during times of social conflict (p. 
19).  Bloom, however, considers another internal characteristic, namely its professional ethos, 
which Gutfeld does not explicitly identify.   
In Bloom’s study, the government questioned Professor Bernhard Stern’s fitness as a 
university researcher and teacher.  The case unfolded during the 1940s and 1950s, a time of 
significant social conflict generated from public fears that Communist ideology would influence 
the political-economic structure of the United States.  Between the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the government interrogated Stern about his political associations and activities.  The 
government conducted these inquiries intending to connect Stern to the Communist Party, which, 
at the time, would have constituted unfitness as a university researcher and teacher.  In 1953, at 





beyond.  He remained silent about his associations and activities prior to 1947.  When members 
of the congressional committee probed further, Stern asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.   
To investigate the academic profession’s responses in this case, Bloom (1990) focuses on 
the following internal characteristics of the academic profession: expert knowledge, authority to 
judge who qualifies for practice, and the profession’s ethos.  He examines how these internal 
characteristics contributed to the academic actors’ efforts to exert control over Stern’s 
qualifications to research and teach at the University.  For example, Bloom reveals how Stern’s 
responses to the government interrogations reflected a professional ethos that valued protecting 
the profession’s interests of promoting knowledge over succumbing to political forces.  
Illustrating this point, during the 1953 congressional hearing, Stern responded truthfully about 
his nonparticipation in the Communist Party between 1947 and 1953, and he asserted a Fifth 
Amendment defense of self-incrimination for the period prior to 1947.  Bloom notes that Stern 
upheld his commitment to trustworthiness, which is an understood value within the academic 
profession.  That is, society relies on the honest disclosures of university researchers and 
teachers, so Stern elected to uphold his professional integrity and spoke honestly at the hearing.  
Stern also demonstrably valued the academic norms fostering a professional culture of 
freethinking.  He believed that disclosing names of other academics who had Communist 
affiliations would only fuel the government challenges against the academic profession and stifle 
the profession’s inquiries into controversial topics for fear of reprisal.  Thus, he chose not to 
disclose any names. 
Stern’s unresponsiveness, however, presented a problem for him at the workplace.  Prior 





professional fitness of faculty who refused to testify at government hearings about their political 
associations.  The university administration implemented the policy primarily to handle matters 
that would reflect poorly on the institution’s reputation.  In accordance with that policy, 
Columbia initiated an internal investigation of Stern – an inquiry that stemmed from the 
government challenge.   
Bloom also examines the academic profession’s responses to Stern’s employer’s 
investigation, along with the events following that investigation.  He considers several internal 
characteristics of the academic profession, namely expert knowledge, authority to judge who 
qualifies for practice, and professional ethos.  Using those internal characteristics as part of the 
study’s framework, Bloom uncovers how members of the academic profession responded much 
as Stern himself had.  Specifically, a group of senior faculty at Columbia defended Stern’s 
intellectual freedom, just as Stern had done for others at Columbia and the broader academic 
profession when he did not reveal names of faculty who may have had Community Party 
affiliations.  This professional collegiality took two forms. 
First, rather than placing Stern under a traditional, internal investigation committee, the 
leaders at Columbia conducted their investigation under the auspices of a special review board 
known as the Committee on Conference.  The university established the Committee on 
Conference as an organizational “device to insulate faculty members from attack by groups and 
individuals outside of the University community” (Bloom, 1990, pp. 26-27).  Presumably, the 
committee functioned to review matters that involved a unique understanding about the academic 
profession, which lay observers would not fully appreciate.  In this case, the administrators 
balanced the interests of the public need to investigate the reasons behind Stern’s refusal to 





and teach.  Factoring those two interests, they determined that the Committee on Conference, 
rather than a public forum, was the appropriate venue to hear this case.  
Following the investigation, the Committee on Conference issued its report.  The 
committee found that while Stern had prior affiliations with the Communist Party, he was no 
longer a member of the Communist Party by the time of the government investigation.  Further, 
he had not surrendered his rights to intellectual freedom because of influence from group 
affiliations, did not violate any professional integrity when he failed to fully respond at any of 
the congressional hearings, and was, at the time, an independent, rational thinker.  Given their 
findings, they recommended that the university not discipline Stern, but instead, renew his 
contract.   
Several university trustees expressed concerns about the recommendation.  These 
discussions led to the second response, illustrating again the academic profession’s reciprocated 
collegiality.  Rather than leaving Stern to fend for himself, the university leaders, along with 
senior faculty in Stern’s department, met with the trustees who were uncomfortable with simply 
renewing Stern’s faculty appointment.  At that meeting, the university representatives assured the 
trustees that Stern no longer had Communist affiliations, but they admitted that Stern had 
actively participated in the Communist Party from 1934-1943 and occasionally interacted with 
the Communist Party between 1944 and 1946.10  The university representatives also noted that 
Stern had not distorted information or used his professional position to indoctrinate the scholarly 
community or his students to advance the Communist Party’s agenda.  Further, the 
representatives emphasized that Stern had been a reputable scholar and teacher, who formulated 
professional judgments without external influences.  The trustees accepted the representatives’ 
                                                 






arguments, and, as a compromise, the university representatives modified the investigation report 
to justify the committee’s recommendation that the university renew Stern’s contract. 
In sum, Bloom’s consideration of the profession’s internal characteristics (i.e., expert 
knowledge, authority to judge who qualifies for practice, and the profession’s ethos) reveal 
several key findings in the Stern case.  First, Bloom’s study identifies how the academic 
profession responded in a way that reinforced academic values through efforts that protected 
knowledge creation and promotion rather than a political agenda.  Second, the study 
demonstrates how members of the academic profession responded in a manner that reciprocated 
Stern’s professional collegiality, such as by placing him under a special review committee, 
defending him to the trustees, and modifying the report – which serves as a permanent record or 
artifact about Stern’s employment qualifications.  These findings reflect strategies, tactics, and 
other means that the academic profession employed when a challenge took place.  
Summary of Internal Characteristics 
These two studies illustrate several internal characteristics of the academic profession, 
which are frequently considered in the literature on the academic profession’s responses to 
government challenges (see also Garrison & Kobor, 2002; Hamilton, 1995; Lilienfeld, 2002).  
Specifically, the literature on the academic profession’s responses typically identifies expert 
knowledge, qualifications for practice, professional associations, and professional ethos as 
internal characteristics to consider.   







The literature on the academic profession’s responses also considers social factors 
external to the academic profession (“external factors”) to understand how the academic 
profession strives to exert control over its research (see, e.g., Rabban, 1990; Saltmarsh, 1991).  
These external factors reflect conditions, which are external to the academic profession, that 
influence the profession’s degree of autonomy over its research.  Typically, these studies observe 
how society places value on the academic profession’s research, and that value either establishes 
social support or warrants special government privileges.  Examining two frequently cited 
external factors, this section explores how public literacy and legal authority are considerations 
that help us understand how the academic profession, attempting to exert control over its 
research, might respond and what strategies, tactics, and other means it might employ.   
Public Literacy 
The literature addressing government challenges to the academic profession’s federally 
sponsored research has presented public literacy as a potential factor to help defend the academic 
profession.  One line of research describes this construct of public literacy in terms of how the 
academic profession educated the public about the technical aspects of the research that 
government actors challenged (see, e.g., Bailey, 2002; Garrison & Kobor, 2002; Keller, 1996; 
Saltmarsh, 1991).  For instance, Saltmarsh (1991) examines public literacy as an external factor.  
His study addresses the government challenges and the academic profession’s responses 
surrounding Scott Nearing’s dismissals – first, while a professor at the University of 
Pennsylvania (Penn), then afterward, at the University of Toledo.  Nearing’s research and 
teaching proposed a controversial economic theory, one that neither industry nor government 





pressured Nearing’s employing university to terminate him.  As Saltmarsh shows, Nearing’s 
conflicts with industry, government, and his employing university led to “intellectual repression” 
and “academic asphyxiation.”11  
Nevertheless, by educating the public in meaningful ways (i.e., generating public 
literacy), Nearing gained support from various groups outside of the academic community.  As 
Saltmarsh notes, Nearing advanced his research by creating messages appropriate to his 
audiences (considering their backgrounds, especially in terms of educational level).  In addition, 
he tailored his comments to address social, political, and economic conditions of the time, in 
order to illustrate the value of his research.  Specifically, to address concepts of “new 
economics,” he used street-level language and connected his points to current and more practical 
events, such as business exploitation of child labor, employer dominance in the workplace, social 
stratification, and political power.  By educating the public in a meaningful manner, he managed 
to gain support from local labor unions, the Toledo chapter of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, and other organized groups to rally against the government 
intrusions on his research.  While Nearing never regained employment at Penn or Toledo, he did 
garner some support from members of the public, who understood his economic theory.  That 
support took the form of organizations engaging him in public talks and offering him public 
backing during his brief foray into politics.   
Considering public literacy is particularly useful for my study, too.  Mooney and 
Kirshenbaum (2009) posit that scientific literacy might decrease the likelihood of government 
challenges to scientists’ research.  They contend that if the public had scientific literacy, 
                                                 
11 Nearing is a well-known figure in the American intellectual freedom literature.  In the early 1900s, when his 
terminations occurred, the academic profession sought to establish a professional right from undue lay interference 
on a professor’s teaching and research.  Since his terminations occurred during this movement and represented the 
kinds of lay intrusions that intellectual freedom would have protected, supporters of the professional liberty cited 





scientific researchers could garner support from the public and overcome nonscientifically 
justified government interferences.  Similarly, if I consider the role of public literacy in my 
study, it could help me understand whether academic scientists’ efforts to educate the public on 
their research are equally, more, or less important than the academic scientists’ efforts to address 
the purely scientific tasks.  Stated another way, how should academic scientists balance their 
time between working on the scientific inquiry and providing lay translations about their work?  
That knowledge potentially clarifies for me which responses present more effective strategies, 
tactics, or other means for the academic profession to protect its intellectual freedom. 
Another line of research discusses how professors may draw on the public’s 
understanding of scientific research findings and policy choices when confronted with 
government actors’ challenging the academic profession’s research (Guston & Sarewitz, 2006; 
Jasanoff, 2005; cf. Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2003).  These studies argue that public 
participation generated knowledge regarding the cultural context of the challenged study, 
especially in terms of how members of the public felt the challenged study affected them.  For 
example, when government officials challenged academic scientists’ research sponsored by the 
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences regarding the adverse health effects from an 
area’s pollution levels, the university-based research team worked with the local community to 
help the academic scientists better understand their research findings in terms of how severe the 
health effects were from concentrated air pollutants (Boffey, 1976; Frank, 1983).  Thus, as the 
literature reports, the connection between science and the community offers academic scientists 
an opportunity to learn about the cultural context of their findings, which helps generate 
additional arguments of the study’s value.  Indeed, these arguments contribute to the defenses of 






Numerous works examine another external factor, the academic profession’s reliance on 
legal authority, in attempting to understand how the academic profession might exert control 
over research when government challenges occur (see, e.g., Eisenberg, 1988; Hamilton, 1995; 
Metzger, 1987; O’Neil, 1997; Rabban 1990; van Alstyne, 1972, 1990).  In some professions, 
legal authority consists of state or federal legislation protecting a profession’s practice through 
law, such as by state licensure (e.g., social worker, medical doctor).  In the academic profession, 
the literature frequently suggests that legal authority is manifested in professors’ legal right of 
intellectual freedom, which is derived from the First Amendment.  While not a right limited to 
federally sponsored research, intellectual freedom grants the academic profession autonomy to 
exercise its professional discretion in research without undue government interference.  
For example, in Rabban’s (1990) extensively cited law review article on the 
constitutional recognition of intellectual freedom, he considers how the academic profession uses 
the law as an external source of authority to exert control over its research.  Specifically, even 
when members of the academic profession conduct federally sponsored research within their 
disciplinary specialties and government unduly interferes, Rabban (1990) argues that members of 
the academic profession, while “serving the public’s First Amendment interests in fostering 
critical inquiry and knowledge vital to democracy and civilization,” maintain a special legal 
privilege (p. 254).  That special legal privilege, called intellectual freedom and derived from the 
First Amendment, is what members of the academic profession can assert against the 
government actors.12     
                                                 
12 Rabban actually examines the general principle of academic freedom as a professional liberty over teaching, 
research, service, and organizational governance.  Here, I focus on what I call intellectual freedom, a subset of 
academic freedom, which applies to academic freedom only from undue governmental interference over the 





Rationalizing his argument, Rabban presents a three-part legal analysis.  First, he 
considers the foundational cases of intellectual freedom that eventually led to its legal 
recognition on the basis of First Amendment law.  Second, he demonstrates how the social 
interest in academic work justifies a legal protection – a form of societal privilege.  Third and 
finally, he presents how intellectual freedom as a legal right is consistent with other First 
Amendment principles that protect certain actors who perform their duties with professional 
liberties.  For example, he cites how certain professionals working within a specific institutional 
context and performing “distinctive job functions,” such as legislators during a legislative debate 
and judges during a court proceeding, maintain professional liberties recognized under the First 
Amendment.  These three parts formulate his argument of a constitutional protection that the 
academic profession might invoke when government unduly interferes with a professor’s 
federally sponsored research.   
This article and others like it support the notion that legal authority is an external factor, 
the study of which helps one understand how the profession might exert control when it is 
confronted with government officials’ challenging its federally sponsored research.  That said, I 
did not use this line of research to determine whether the academic profession actually has a 
legal right of intellectual freedom in the three cases presented in this study.  Instead, the literature 
here informs me that legal authority represents an external factor for me to consider in my study.  
                                                                                                                                                             
As I noted in Chapter 1, academic freedom refers to the academic profession’s professional liberty in teaching, 
research, service, and organizational governance.  In the literature, the meaning and application of the term 
academic freedom differ widely when applied to the professional liberties faculty have in terms of teaching, service, 
and organizational governance.  In the legal and professional circles, those differences also exist in practice.  
However, the concept of academic freedom over research contains fewer debates within legal and professional 
circles and in the literature.  To separate this construct of “academic freedom over research” from other forms of 






Summary of External Characteristics 
In this section, I presented consideration of two external factors influencing the academic 
profession to understand how academic scientists respond to government challenges in an 
attempt to exert control over their research.  Public literacy reflects the extent to which the public 
or certain groups can appreciate and support the academic profession’s research.  Legal authority 
represents a more formalized external factor to consider: the extent to which societal privilege 
exists to further the academic profession’s ability to exert control over its federally sponsored 
research.   
Conceptual Omissions 
So far, I have discussed how the extant literature took into account internal characteristics 
and external factors to reveal the academic profession’s strategies, tactics, and the other means it 
employed when the government challenges occurred.  This literature identifies internal 
characteristics, including expert knowledge, qualifications for practice, professional associations, 
and professional ethos.  In addition, the literature identifies social factors external to the 
academic profession, including public literacy and legal authority.   
Figure 3.1: Internal Characteristics & External Factors from the Literature on the 
Academic Profession’s Responses 
 

















While these internal characteristics and external factors offer a sufficient framework for 
this study, the broader literature on the academic profession suggests that additional internal 
characteristics of the profession also reflect institutionalized arrangements that support the 
profession’s autonomy.  For instance, Altbach (1980) notes that the academic profession 
maintains “considerable autonomy in controlling working conditions and time, and can 
collectively make key decisions concerning who is permitted to enter the profession, the 
curriculum, degree requirements and the like” (pp. 10-11).  Similarly, Schuster and Finkelstein 
(2006) report that even though the academic profession may perceive its loss of professional 
control (as evidenced from national data indicating declines over the past 40 years), the 
profession still maintains quite a bit of autonomy over who enters the profession and what the 
future professionals’ graduate education will consist of.   
Researchers on the academic profession point out internal characteristics, such as 
dictating working conditions and deciding who can study and learn the knowledge of the 
practice, as institutionalized arrangements that permit the academic profession to act with 
professional discretion.  Nevertheless, the literature on the academic profession’s responses to 
government challenges does not appear to consider these internal characteristics, which fall into 
two concepts – divisions of labor and professional training.  Therefore, in the next section, I 
review related literature to search for a more comprehensive framework.   
Searching for a More Comprehensive Framework 
Academic Profession’s Work Autonomy 
As I indicated above, the literature on the academic profession alludes to other possible 
internal characteristics that represent institutionalized arrangements granting the profession 





augment my knowledge about the internal characteristics identified from the academic 
profession’s responses literature.   
During my review of the literature, I noticed that some of this literature uses theories 
within the sociology of the professions to examine the relationship between the academic 
profession and its control over its work (see, e.g., Hutcheson, 2000; Parsons & Platt, 1968; 
Rhoades, 1998; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).  This literature largely 
captures how the academic profession has some social capacity to negotiate or exchange its 
services.  For instance, Rhoades (1998) notes that work on a project is typically divided up, and 
the academic profession’s specialized knowledge makes it possible for the profession to 
negotiate jurisdictional boundaries over its specific work tasks, especially when it comes to 
research.  Rhoades uses Abbott’s (1988) theory of the professions to examine these jurisdictional 
boundaries of work.  According to Abbott (1988), disputes about jurisdictional boundaries occur 
between two professions over the type of tasks that each profession performs.  Thus, the theory 
might explain the jurisdictional boundaries over work tasks between tax accountants and lawyers 
in terms of giving tax planning advice (see generally, Dezalay, 1995) or between doctors and 
nurses regarding the jurisdictional boundaries of medical treatment (see, e.g., Allen, 1997).  
Rhoades has adapted the theory to the jurisdictional boundaries of authority between professors 
and administrators regarding which contract terms of work are negotiable under collective 
bargaining agreements.  Examining Abbott’s theory from that context (i.e., professors and 
administrators negotiating terms of work), Rhoades concludes that the conditions for the 
academic profession have changed and that the terms of its work are heavily managed.   
Rhoades’s study also leads me to consider that the academic profession could negotiate 





Consistent with that observation, Lee, Cheslock, Maldonado-Maldonado, and Rhoades (2005) 
indicate that today’s global economy values specialized knowledge, and the academic profession 
has carved out its own area (i.e., exclusive jurisdiction), which yields better returns in the market.  
Similarly, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) highlight how the academic profession maintains some 
social capacity to exchange its services.  In their study, they observe that faculty and other 
academic staff participate in academic capitalist behavior (i.e., use their bodies of knowledge in a 
market-like manner) because that enables them to gather additional resources they can use to 
“protect their autonomy, prestige, and expertise” (p. 179).   
While these studies show that the academic profession has the social capacity to negotiate 
or exchange its services as a means to gain resources, they fall short in that they do not provide a 
comprehensive framework of the internal characteristics and external factors to help 
conceptualize “exerting control” over the profession’s federally sponsored research.  For this 
reason, these works (i.e., Rhoades, 1998; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997) and others that examine the 
relationship between the academic profession and its control over its work (see, e.g., Hutcheson, 
2000; Parsons & Platt, 1968; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004) led me to explore the literature on the 
sociology of the professions.  The purpose of that review was to locate a framework that offers a 
comprehensive list of internal characteristics and external factors to help me understand more 
fully how the academic profession strives to exert control over its federally sponsored research.   
Sociology of the Professions 
One line of research in the sociology of the professions, known as the traits school, 
identifies a series of attributes or traits of the occupation that help distinguish a profession from 
other occupations.  For example, this line of research typically lists knowledge, expertise, 





from members of the profession, and societal recognition of the occupation (see, e.g., Abbott, 
1988; Barber, 1963; Goode, 1957; Greenwood, 1966; Hall, 1968; Johnson, 1972; Larson, 1977; 
MacDonald, 1995); taken together these traits help define and qualify the occupation as a 
profession.  While these traits seem to describe the academic profession, the literature does not 
explain how considering these traits would help one understand how they were linked to the 
academic profession’s capacity to exert control over its federally sponsored research.   
Another line of research, the processual school, presents the process as one in which the 
profession negotiates or exchanges its services with other entities outside of the profession or 
achieves a series of professionalizing events to elevate its status in society (Caplow, 1954; 
Daniels, 1967; Stricker, 1988a, 1988b; Wilensky, 1964).  I find the processual school 
informative.  It traces the process of several professions as they develop social legitimacy, and it 
demonstrates how the professions, including the academic profession, could use their services to 
gain additional resources (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Stricker, 
1988a, 1988b).  The drawback, however, is that this line of research does not specifically 
identify specific internal characteristics of the academic profession to consider.  Instead, it relies 
more heavily on the external factors, or social forces, that often shape and influence the 
profession’s capacity to exert control over its federally sponsored research.  While I plan to 
include the social forces as a consideration, I do not wish to ignore the academic profession’s 
internal characteristics, because they likely contribute to my understanding of the academic 
profession’s responses.   
 In a third line of research, the literature introduces a common theme among the 
professions: power itself.  The power school, as it is commonly called, typically presents 





occupations, autonomy to exercise professional discretion, and economic and social rewards.  In 
addition, the literature under the power school typically explains the relationship between (a) the 
internal characteristics of and external factors influencing the profession and (b) its capacity to 
gain and maintain power in society.    
In particular, Freidson’s theory of professional dominance (2001) describes the social 
organization of a profession that gives it the political and economic support it needs to exert 
control over its work.  That is, it tells me what internal characteristics and external factors to 
consider, so I know what elements make it possible for a profession to have power (i.e. 
dominance over other occupations, autonomy to exercise professional discretion, and economic 
and social rewards).  Given the insights from the power school, notably Freidson’s theory of 
professional dominance, I propose adopting it as my study’s conceptual framework – with two 
minor modifications, which I will discuss below.   
Freidson’s Theory of Professional Dominance 
Though it has not yet been used to study the academic profession, Freidson’s theory of 
professional dominance presents a viable framework to conceptualize how the academic 
profession’s responses to government challenges exert control over academic scientists’ federally 
sponsored research.  To explain its value, in this subsection, I describe Freidson’s theory, 
articulate its significance to my study, and indicate slight modifications that I make so it properly 
accounts for certain aspects of my study. 
Overview of Freidson’s Theory 
As with the literature on the academic profession’s responses, Freidson’s theory 
considers both the internal characteristics of and external factors influencing the profession 





defining components that make it possible for the profession to control its work, include five 
static, interrelated parts.  These components are: (1) professional knowledge and skills, (2) 
divisions of labor, (3) labor markets and careers, (4) training programs, and (5) ideological 
commitment to the profession itself (Freidson, 2001).  Professional knowledge and skills are the 
formal knowledge of the profession that rely heavily on mental judgments over technical details 
such as the academic profession’s application of specific research approaches to gather data for a 
study.  The divisions of labor component considers the jurisdictional boundaries related to 
occupations working on different aspect of a project, such as the academic profession assessing 
the scientific implications of a policy while policymakers draft the legislation.  The labor 
markets and careers component reflects the profession’s authority in society to determine who 
qualifies for practice and how one qualifies; one example is the academic profession’s default 
standard that the Ph.D. is a prerequisite for many college faculty positions.  Training programs, 
usually graduate schools, are the formal educational settings that prepare future professionals and 
create new knowledge for future professional practice (e.g., a new research methodology).  
Ideology reflects the values embedded in the profession’s actions, such as the academic 
profession’s work to advance the interest of the public good through education.     
 In addition to the internal characteristics, Freidson (2001) also identifies several external 
conditions that moderate the extent and nature of a profession’s control over its work.  He 
focuses on two factors, bodies of knowledge and the state.  Freidson describes how bodies of 
knowledge serve as a potential source to generate more resources.  He explains that bodies of 
knowledge have the capacity for society to recognize the value of a profession’s formal 
knowledge and grant resources based on that understanding.  Similarly, the state serves as a 





its work.  He cites government-controlled licensing boards as an illustration of this external 
factor.  
Figure 3.2: Internal Characteristics & External Factors Based on Freidson’s Theory of 
Professional Dominance 
 
According to Freidson (2001), both the internal characteristics and external factors 
construct how a profession is organized in society to maintain its economic and political position 
in society, which allows it to exert control over its work. 
Contributions of Freidson’s Theory 
 Since Freidson’s theory addresses what I set out to investigate (i.e., what it means for 
academic scientists to exert control over their federally sponsored research), I explore how this 
theory helps me understand the academic profession’s responses that represent strategies, tactics, 
and other means used to overcome government challenges.  
Specifically, I discuss how Freidson’s theory offers three significant contributions as a 
framework to examine the academic profession’s responses.   
1. Consistent with the Extant Literature’s Internal Characteristics  
Freidson’s theory is generally consistent with the extant literature’s identified internal 
characteristics that researchers have used to understand how the academic profession exerts 
control over its federally sponsored research when government challenges take place.  Earlier, I 

















professional ethos as conceptual considerations.  Freidson suggests three very similar internal 
characteristics, but he calls them professional knowledge and skills, labor markets and careers, 
and ideology, respectively (see Table 3.1).   
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of Terms Used for Internal Characteristics of the Profession 
Freidson’s theory Academic profession’s responses literature 
Professional Knowledge and Skills Expert Knowledge 
Labor Markets and Careers Qualifications for Practice 
Ideologies Professional Ethos 
 
2. Considers Other Internal Characteristics  
I noted earlier in the chapter that the extant literature on the academic profession’s 
responses tends to overlook the consideration of two internal characteristics of the academic 
profession: divisions of labor and professional training.  Yet, as I describe in greater detail 
below, these two characteristics are important factors that may help us understand how the 
academic profession exerts control over its research.  Freidson, however, does include these two 
internal characteristics.  I explain in some detail why these two internal characteristics are 
important to consider.   
a. Divisions of Labor 
The extant literature does not consider the profession’s “divisions of labor” as an internal 
characteristic that helps one understand how the academic profession might exert control over its 
federally sponsored research.  Freidson, however, includes this characteristic.  According to 
Freidson, the divisions of labor address the organization of professional work, that is, the “way 





(Freidson, 2001, p. 36).  This characteristic is important when we think about how the “human 
division of labor is by its nature socially organized through the exercise of power” (p. 59). 
The divisions of labor represent an institutionalized arrangement by which occupational 
groups maintain jurisdictional boundaries of their work.  That is, divisions of labor identify the 
tasks associated with a project that a particular occupation oversees and executes.  For example, 
as I mentioned in Chapter 1, academic scientists and science policy advisors maintain different 
societal roles over the science policy process.  Academic scientists discover and create new 
scientific knowledge as well as assess policy choices. Science policymakers, such as federal 
legislators, establish policies that advance the nation’s interest in science, particularly in terms of 
funding projects and proposing laws.  In other words, when it comes to the science policy 
process, the divisions of labor establish the role differentiation among occupations that society 
has accepted – and even institutionalized (Smith, 1992).   
Role differentiation is a factor that has been used to support government challenges.  As I 
indicated in Chapter 1, industry scientists, politicians, and several science policy researchers 
have criticized academic scientists for blurring the lines between science assessor and science 
policy advocate (see, e.g., Lackey, 2007; Rosenbaum, 2008; Stine, 2009).  These critics contend 
that academic scientists have, at times, overstepped their boundaries in order to drive (or 
significantly influence) the content or direction of science policies.  Some critics believe that 
academic scientists have no place in the science policy process, even as science policy assessors 
(see, e.g., Pielke, 2007; Primack & von Hippel, 1974).  In the cases they describe government 
officials challenged members of the academic profession for exceeding the jurisdictional 





Division of labor may also present an internal characteristic to consider when trying to 
understand ways through which the academic profession might exert control over its federally 
sponsored research.  For example, going back to the science policy process, Pielke (2007) argues 
that scientists, including those in the academic profession, indeed have a critical role in this 
process.  According to Pielke, academic scientists may properly advocate a science policy when 
science determines the researcher’s position.  He reframes the criticisms to consider the 
academic scientists’ roles in the science policy process as honest brokers.  Piekle suggests that if 
we consider how academic scientists serve society as honest brokers who use science to inform 
policy issues and decisions, then society might understand how academic scientists could 
justifiably advocate specific policy (i.e., the science dictates such a position).  In other words, 
considering the divisions of labor among various occupations (e.g., academic professionals and 
policymakers involved with the science policy process) presents another potential internal factor 
that may help us understand how the academic profession might exert control over its federally 
sponsored research. 
b. Professional Training 
Another gap in the extant literature is that it does not consider the academic profession’s 
role in professional training and development (“professional training”).  However, as Freidson 
(2001) notes, this internal characteristic, is important in order to consider how society grants the 
profession discretion to determine who studies, what they study, and how they study.   
Unlike most professions, the academic profession controls the professional training 
environment for its future professionals.  The profession is thus uniquely situated in society to 
determine who receives professional preparation, what students study, and how they study.  As 





professionals because they have monopolies on advanced degrees and train and credential all 
other professionals” (p. 5).  That is, to a large extent, the academic profession has control over 
establishing the norms of acceptable academic inquiry, identifying appropriate methodologies, 
and determining how future members of the profession will acquire the requisite knowledge and 
skills (Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006).  This control over professional training also carries over as 
an important consideration for understanding how the academic profession might also exert 
control over its federally sponsored research.  For example, through professional training 
programs, the academic profession can advance a specific concept or teach a particular technique 
that becomes normative in the practice of science and influences students and practitioners by 
not legitimizing other concepts and methodologies. 
For my study, the professional training and development is particularly relevant, because 
colleges and universities educate not only the academic scientists whose research government 
sometimes challenges, but they educate the industry scientists and other non-university-based 
scientists.  For these professionals, too, colleges and universities largely determine who studies, 
what they study, and how they study the scientific controversies my research explores.  Thus, I 
recommend considering professional training as an internal characteristic to understand how the 
academic profession might exert control over its federally sponsored research. 
3. Consistent with the Extant Literature’s External Factors  
For the most part, Freidson’s consideration of external conditions aligns with prior 
research on external factors.  As noted earlier in this chapter, the literature on the academic 
profession’s responses to government challenges traces how public literacy and legal authority 





ability to exert control over its federally sponsored research.  Freidson (2001) suggests two 
somewhat similar factors, which he calls “bodies of knowledge” and “the state.” 
Freidson’s “bodies of knowledge” is essentially the same as what I described earlier in 
this chapter as public literacy, an external factor cited in the academic profession’s responses to 
challenges.  According to Freidson, bodies of knowledge represent society’s capacity to 
recognize the value of a profession’s formal knowledge.  Similarly, public literacy refers to the 
public’s comprehension of specialized knowledge that leads it to support the academic 
profession’s research.  I illustrated this latter concept above, when I discussed Scott Nearing’s 
public talks to educate multiple groups about his economic theory.  This response to government 
challenges led several organizations to openly support Nearing’s research and teaching through 
actions such as vocal protests.   
As Freidson emphasizes and we recognize in the Scott Nearing example, bodies of 
knowledge refers to the level of status that the profession attains and the profession’s capacity to 
gain resources through its bodies of knowledge.  This factor is also brought out in the works of 
Sheila Slaughter and colleagues (see, e.g., Silva & Slaughter, 1984; Slaughter, 1988; Slaughter & 
Leslie, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).  Although most of these works do not fall within the 
literature on the academic profession’s responses to government challenges, her research often 
illustrates ways in which professors gain power in the market when they use their bodies of 
knowledge as a valued resource.  For instance, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) observe that faculty 
and other academic staff participate in academic capitalist behavior (i.e., use their bodies of 
knowledge in a market-like manner) because that enables them to gain additional resources so 
they can “protect their autonomy, prestige, and expertise” (p. 179).  In light of this discussion, 





understand what it means for the academic profession to exert control over its federally 
sponsored research.   
Under Freidson’s theory (2001), the state (or governmental body) also serves as an 
external factor (i.e., an outside entity that influences the academic profession’s degree of 
autonomy over research).  Freidson suggests that the degree to which the state takes action to 
advance a profession is highly dependent upon the government’s structure and receptivity to 
establishing policies over a profession, which includes granting or removing privileges to a 
profession, typically through some legal recognition.  For instance, as O’Neil (1997) and Rabban 
(1990) observe, the legal construct of academic freedom presents a legal protection under the 
First Amendment to shield the academic profession from undue lay interferences over its 
research.  The “state” under Freidson’s theory is similar to the external factor of “legal authority” 
within the literature on the academic profession’s responses to challenges.  Both reflect 
formalized controls established through government authority over citizens in its jurisdiction as 
an external factor that potentially grants the academic profession some degree of professional 
autonomy over its research (see Figure 3.4).   
 
Table 3.2: Comparison of Terms Used for External Factors of the Profession 
Freidson’s theory Academic profession’s responses literature 
Bodies of Knowledge Public Literacy 







While Freidson (2001) presents what I consider to be the best theoretical framework for 
this study, I modify his framework in two ways to address concepts specifically identified in my 
study.   
The first modification pertains to how I consider external factors that impede the 
academic profession’s attempt to exert control.  Freidson (2001) indicates that the external 
factors both support and impede the profession’s attempts to exert control over its work.  Rather 
than relying solely on the external factors that Freidson identifies to consider how they impede 
the academic profession’s control over its federally sponsored research, I draw significantly from 
the evolving interpretations and interests frame, which I explained in Chapter 2.  The evolving 
interpretations and interests frame allows me to consider the circumstances and events 
surrounding government challenges, giving me a way to reveal the pressures, tactics, and other 
means that lay actors employ to challenge the academic profession’s research.  That framework 
is therefore valuable in exploring factors that impede on the profession’s control.  However, to 
consider external conditions that support the academic profession, I still intend to explore the 
two factors (i.e., bodies of knowledge and the state) that Freidson identified.  In sum, this minor 
modification is consistent with the literature on government challenges to the academic 
profession’s research as well as with the literature on the academic profession’s responses to 
government challenges. 
 My second modification pertains to the placement of professional associations. Freidson 
(2001) places professional associations as an external condition.  He suggests that professional 
associations have a limited role, and that the role is typically to convince the state to grant 





represent the larger corporate body of the profession.  In that context, he describes occasions 
when professional associations advocate for policies that support the interests of only certain 
segments of the profession and end up compromising the profession’s overall goals and interests.  
Indeed, Freidson’s observations might be true in certain instances.  For example, works by 
Schrecker (1980, 1986) and Lewis (1988) support his treatment of professional associations.  
They uncovered evidence that the academic profession’s associations, most particularly the 
AAUP, did not uniformly defend the profession during the McCarthy era, when government 
officials challenged professors who allegedly were members of the Communist Party (see also 
Hutcheson, 2000).   
I contend, however, that professional associations still reflect a significant internal 
characteristic of the academic profession.  The AAUP is the organizing body that represents the 
academic profession.  It defined the profession’s concept of intellectual freedom (American 
Association of University Professors, 2001).  Today, it investigates claims of intellectual 
freedom, and it defends unjustified violations of a professor’s intellectual freedom (Eisenberg, 
1988; Finkelstein, 1984; Rabban, 1990).  In addition, the AAUP engages in expressions of 
protest through actions, such as censuring and public denouncements, when it finds clear 
evidence of intellectual freedom violations.  Given the significant roles that the AAUP has had in 
developing and protecting the academic profession’s intellectual freedom, it appears more 
appropriate, for this study, to place professional associations as an internal characteristic. 
There is another reason for this study to reject Freidson’s placement of professional 
associations as an external condition.  Freidson’s theory is a general theory of the professions.  
His observations of professional associations and his justifications for placing them as an 





wide range of professions.  Quite possibly, his placement of professional associations as an 
external factor might be more fitting for other professions.  Yet, for the reasons that I described 
above, professional associations within the academic profession more appropriately reflect an 
internal characteristic.   
Illustrating the Framework for the Academic Profession’s Responses  
Integrating my explanations from this section of the chapter, I present a depiction of the 
internal characteristics (Figure 3.3) and external factors (Figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.3: Internal Characteristics of Professional Control  
 
Source: Author’s figure based on Freidson’s Theory of Professional Dominance 
 
Figure 3.4: External Factors to Professional Control 
 



















Chapter Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed a way to frame the academic profession’s responses to 
government challenges.  To develop my study’s conceptual framework, in this chapter, I 
reviewed the literature on the academic profession’s responses to identify the internal 
characteristics and the external factors that consider how the academic profession strives to exert 
control over its federally sponsored research.  Then, after realizing that the literature on the 
academic profession’s responses did not fully consider the possible internal characteristics, I 
reviewed the literature on the academic profession.  That review has led me to survey three 
schools of thought within the sociology of the professions – the traits, processual, and power 
schools.   
From that review, I discovered Freidson’s theory of professional dominance.  Freidson’s 
theory, which falls within the power school, offers several advantages.  It is aligned with the 
literature of the academic profession’s responses in terms of the internal characteristics and 
external factors that it describes.  It also adds two internal characteristics (i.e., divisions of labor 
and professional training), which the literature on the academic profession omits.  Although I 
made two slight modifications to Freidson’s theory, as a whole, it offers the most comprehensive 
set of internal characteristics and external factors to help us understand what it means for the 
academic profession to exert control over its federally sponsored research.   
Now, to present my overall conceptual framework – which includes exploring the 
circumstances and events surrounding government challenges and the internal characteristics and 
external factors associated with the academic profession’s responses, I illustrate, below, (a) the 
evolving interpretations and interests frame and (b) the modified version of Freidson’s theory of 





circumstances and events surrounding government challenges to academic scientists’ federally 
sponsored research.  With that information, I will have a better understanding of the pressures, 
tactics, and other means that challengers – which may include actors other than the government – 
use to contest academic scientists’ federally sponsored research.  In addition, the modified 
version of Freidson’s theory of professional dominance considers the internal characteristics of 
and external factors influencing the academic profession to understand the profession’s 
strategies, tactics, and the other means it employs when the government challenges take place.  
Taking these two parts together, I present my study’s overall framework (see Figure 3.5).  With 
this overall framework, I strive to understand what it means for academic scientists to exert 






























Source: Author’s figure of the integrated concepts drawn from the Evolving Interpretations & Interests Frame 
Freidson’s Theory of Professional Dominance 






























CHAPTER IV: STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
Overview 
The aim of this study is to explore the meaning of a critical concept within the academic 
profession: exerting control over research as a manifestation of the profession’s intellectual 
freedom.  Specifically, I explore what it means for academic scientists to exert control over their 
federally sponsored research when the government as a lay actor challenges that research.  In this 
chapter, I outline my study design and methods, which I anticipate will lead me to better 
understand (a) the pressures, tactics, and other means employed in the government challenges 
and (b) the academic profession’s responses in terms of strategies, tactics, and the other means it 
employs when the government challenges take place.  Elaborating on the qualitative design and 
methods, I present the following: (1) I state my research questions; (2) I present my research 
design and methodology; (3) I describe my data and the data-collection methods; (4) I 
summarize the data-analysis techniques and procedures; (5) I describe my study’s strategies for 
trustworthiness; (6) I review the steps that I took to ensure compliance with ethical standards; 
and (7) I disclose the limitations of this study.   
Conceptual Framework and Research Questions  
The overarching research question for this study asks: How do academic scientists, who 
are members of a unique but variegated profession, exert some degree of control over scientific 
decisions pertaining to their research when government officials challenge that research?  To 
explore this question, I reviewed the literature on government challenges to professors’ research 
(Chapter 2) and the literature on the academic profession’s responses (Chapter 3) as sources to 





As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on government challenges to the academic 
profession’s research suggests that I might consider how individuals and small groups interact in 
society when confronted with different understandings about highly specialized, or complex, 
scientific terms and processes.  By examining the interactions of key actors in the situation, I 
might better understand the circumstances and events surrounding government challenges to 
academic scientists’ federally sponsored research.  After a detailed review of the frames used in 
the extant literature, I proposed using the evolving interpretations and interests frame, because it 
appears to be the most useful lens to address the complex nature of academic science, to uncover 
the different meanings associated with the science, and to trace the interactions among the 
various actors involved in each of these cases (see Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1: Evolving Interpretations & Interests Frame 
 
Source: Author’s depiction 
Then, in Chapter 3, I searched for a way to examine the academic profession’s responses 
to government challenges.  This literature presents various frameworks that consider both 
internal characteristics of the academic profession and external factors that influence the 
profession’s degree of autonomy and authority over its work, especially in terms of its research.  
The frameworks are useful to an extent; nevertheless, as the literature on the academic profession 










government challenges may not fully consider the profession’s internal characteristics.  Most 
notably, these earlier frameworks omit two internal characteristics: (a) divisions of labor, by 
which scientists maintain jurisdictional boundaries over their research and (b) academic 
professional training and development.   
After reviewing several lines of research, I discovered Freidson’s theory of professional 
dominance (Freidson, 2001).  This framework offers three conceptual benefits.  First, it considers 
the internal characteristics and external factors identified in the extant literature on the academic 
profession’s responses.  Second, it includes the two omitted internal characteristics mentioned in 
the literature on the academic profession.  Third, it explains the relationship between the internal 
characteristics and external factors in a more explicit manner than was laid out in previous 
literature.   
Although I did make slight modifications to Freidson’s theory so it addressed specific 
aspects that apply to the academic profession, at the end, this framework presented a more 
comprehensive view of the internal characteristics and external factors.  Specifically, the 
framework considers six internal characteristics that reflect institutionalized arrangements that 
support the profession’s autonomy.  They are: (1) professional knowledge and skills, (2) 
divisions of labor, (3) labor markets and careers, (4) training programs, (5) ideologies, and (6) 
professional associations.  In addition, the framework considers actions derived from two social 
institutions: bodies of knowledge and government.  These institutions serve as external factors 






Below, in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, I depict the internal characteristics and external factors.   
 
Figure 4.2: Internal Characteristics of Professional Control 
 
Source: Author’s figure based on Freidson’s Theory of Professional Dominance 
 
Figure 4.3: External Factors to Professional Control 
 
Source: Author’s figure based on Freidson’s Theory of Professional Dominance 
 
The overall framework for this study examines both the government challenges and the 
academic profession’s responses.  To recap, the evolving interpretations and interests framework 
guides my process of uncovering the circumstances and events surrounding government 


















better understanding of the pressures, tactics, and other means used to challenge the academic 
scientists’ federally sponsored research – which includes identifying the roles of 
nongovernmental actors, who, in my cases, participated actively in each controversy.  In 
addition, the modified version of Freidson’s theory of professional dominance provides a 
structure to understand the academic profession’s strategies, tactics, and the other means it 
employed when the government challenges took place.  Taking these two parts together, I 
present my study’s overall framework (see Figure 4.4).  With this overall framework, I sought to 
understand what it means for academic scientists to exert control over their federally sponsored 





























Source: Author’s figure of the integrated concepts drawn from the Evolving Interpretations & Interests Frame 
Freidson’s Theory of Professional Dominance 






























With the literature offering guidance on the areas of inquiry and the use of my conceptual 
framework as an initial structure to start my inquiry, I pose more specific questions in order to 
contribute to the overarching examination of academic scientists’ exerting some degree of 
control over their research.  My research sub-questions seek to uncover data that reveal patterns 
of human behavior, examining the identities of the lay challengers (i.e., the pressures, tactics, and 
other means that these groups used), and the academic profession’s responses to these pressures 
and tactics.  Specifically, these sub-questions pose the following lines of inquiry: 
1. Drawing on circumstances and events surrounding several lay challenges to academic 
scientists’ federally funded research,  
a. what kinds of government actors have participated or are now participating in 
activities that challenged academic scientists’ research on sewage sludge, global 
warming, and salvage logging? 
b. what kinds of nongovernment actors have participated or are now participating in 
activities that challenged academic scientists’ research on sewage sludge, global 
warming, and salvage logging? 
c. what methods (i.e., pressures, tactics, and other means) did government actors 
employ to challenge academic scientists’ research on sewage sludge, global 
warming, and salvage logging?   
d. what methods (i.e., pressures, tactics, and other means) did nongovernment actors 
employ to challenge academic scientists’ research on sewage sludge, global 
warming, and salvage logging?   
2. Drawing on circumstances and events surrounding several lay challenges to academic 





a. how did academic scientists, universities, professional associations, and other 
professional bodies in the Academy respond to the lay challenges to academic 
scientists’ research on sewage sludge, global warming, and salvage logging? 
b. what range of strategies, tactics, and/or other means did academic scientists, 
universities, professional associations, and other professional bodies employ to 
preserve or defend the profession’s intellectual freedom? 
Collectively, these questions seek to elucidate the meaning of academic scientists’ exerting 
control over their research. In more practical terms, the findings corresponding to these questions 
clarify the parameters of the academic profession’s intellectual freedom. 
Case Selection Criteria 
This study follows the paradigm of a qualitative research design (see, e.g., Hatch, 2002; 
Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Maxwell, 2004).  To theorize this concept of government officials’ 
challenging academic scientists’ federally sponsored research and academic scientists’ exerting 
control over that research, I draw significantly from two methodological approaches, 
comparative case study and grounded theory.  Initially, I present this research project using a 
multiple case approach, also known as a comparative case study.  Here, I describe case study as a 
methodology, including its value to represent concepts and phenomena.  In addition, illustrating 
its value for this study, I discuss the case boundaries and sample-selection criteria of each case 
contained in this research project. 
A case study research design requires the establishment of the case.  A case study 
investigates a single unit, such as an incident, an event, a program, a person, or a particular 
setting.  The case represents the boundaries surrounding the study’s matter.  Earlier, in chapters 1 





instances in which government officials challenged academic scientists’ federally sponsored 
research, along with the academic profession’s responses; however, the cases contain additional 
boundaries that home in on the research focus.  For Stake (1995, 1997, 2005), a case is an 
integrated system with an outline or some set of boundaries.  Similarly, Merriam (1998) 
describes a case “as a thing, a single entity, a unit around which there are boundaries” (p. 27).  
The particulars for each case address the “bounded context,” which eventually contributes to the 
uncovering of the phenomenon (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Merriam, 1998; Yin, 1994).  
Furthermore, as a methodological approach, multiple case studies present “more compelling” 
and “more robust” data when the researcher clarifies the case boundaries and the appropriateness 
of the case selection (Yin, 1994, p. 45).  Therefore, in order to uncover what it means for 
academic scientists to exert control over their research, I identify below additional parameters 
regarding the cases, including what type of government entity, professors, and research 
categories qualify each case that illustrates government challenges to academic scientists’ 
research and the academic profession’s responses to those instances. 
Federal Government Challenges 
To provide consistency among the characteristics of the lay challengers and avoid 
potentially complicated legal matters, this study focuses on the U.S. federal government as the 
primary challenger to academic scientists’ research.  With a boundary that the case context may 
represent only federal actions, the cases will offer some degree of consistency and reduce 
potential conflicts between state and federal priorities and legal interpretations.  For example, 
since intellectual freedom may be protected when government actors infringe on professors’ 
constitutional rights, the boundary to focus on challengers from the federal government generally 





place and cases with state-government challengers were allowed, the controversy might entail 
both the U.S. Constitution and the respective state’s constitution (cf. State of New Jersey v. 
Schmid, 1980).  Therefore, to minimize the legal complications to be attended to, this study 
limits the cases to federal government employees as the acting challengers to academic 
scientists’ federally sponsored research.   
University-based Academic Scientists Who Work for American Universities in the United States  
Although this study is about professors, that class of professionals encompasses a large, 
varied group (Clark, 1987a; Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006).  Therefore, this study examines a 
sub-population of professors, academic scientists, because as a sub-population, they share some 
common characteristics, such as normative practices of scientific research (Anderson, Ronning, 
DeVries, & Martinson, 2010; Merton, 1973).  Furthermore, because some academic scientists are 
not primarily appointed by the university, that status complicates the study and the profession’s 
relationship to the institution.  For instance, many Carnegie-classified “very high research 
activity” universities maintain government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) labs, and the 
academic scientists who work in them typically have the status of affiliated professors to the 
university.  In many instances, the federal government actually employs the academic scientists 
who work at GOCOs, so government challenges to their research would represent acceptable 
employer directives and would not involve intellectual freedom as afforded to professors.  
Therefore, to avoid inclusion of that special class of academic scientists, this study bounds the 
case further to professionals who are university-based academic scientists; that is, the academic 
scientists’ principal employer is the university – even if the funds for their salary allocations 





The final boundary for these professionals is that they are in the United States and 
working for an American university.  Since many academic scientists who are employed at U.S. 
universities also work abroad, this boundary limits the case to situations in which the academic 
scientists work in the United States.  Furthermore, this study is limited to faculty employed by an 
American university, because it simplifies any jurisdictional matters that may exist with the 
federal government as research sponsor. 
Federally Sponsored Research that Addresses a Common Public Policy Issue  
This study also limits the case sample to selected research conditions.  In particular, this 
study selects cases in which the government challenged academic scientists’ federally sponsored 
research addressing a public policy issue that is common among the three cases.  University-
based academic scientists receive funding from multiple sources, including business, nonprofit 
foundations, and government.  By limiting the cases to research projects that received federal 
funding, the funding source remains constant.  In addition, federal government sponsorship 
affords members of Congress and other federal employees greater opportunities to publicly 
question the research, because the federal government is paying for the research.  Since federal 
employees have that wide latitude to debate the merits of research the government has funded, 
this study likely better illustrates how academic scientists exercise control over their federally 
sponsored research.  Equally important, this study focuses on a common public policy issue as a 
thread that keeps the issues topically constant.  Like the funding source, this condition intends to 
hone in on the case context.  By narrowing the case representations to a common public policy 
issue, the study focuses on the overarching phenomenon, rather than other spurious effects from 






I set out to identify three cases to examine.  I needed at least three cases, so I could have 
enough comparison points.  To locate cases meeting my selection criteria, I searched news 
articles from higher education (e.g., The Chronicle of Higher Education, Inside Higher Ed, 
UWIRE), general science news journals (e.g., Science and Nature), and environmental news via 
LexisNexis and E&E Publishing Service.  Because these sources served as leads to identify 
cases, I conducted broad searches using key words that would capture news stories indicating 
government involvement in academic research.   
Each time I located a relevant case, I gathered some preliminary data.  My goal was to 
ensure that sufficient data existed.  To conduct the initial data collection, I relied on the same 
sources that I used to locate the cases.  Once I identified three cases, I stopped the process.   
Through these rounds of case searches, I read more than 3,000 entries of news stories and 
editorials.  Not surprisingly, many of the sources provided unrelated information.  In addition, 
numerous articles led me to possible government challenges, but they did not fit my case 
selection criteria.  For instance, approximately two dozen articles reported on fears that 
government officials might challenge academic researchers who were engaged in federally 
sponsored research, rather than demonstrating or referring to instances of actual challenges.  
Several articles referred to potential cases addressing government challenges of federally 
sponsored academic research, but these incidents did not involve environmental research.  One 
identified a case addressing a state-funded project that government officials in Michigan 
challenged, but as I explained earlier, my case boundaries eliminated challenges primarily 





officials and academic scientists in which strong evidence supported research misconduct.  In 
short, the identification of the three cases required a significant database investigation. 
Summary of Case Selection Criteria 
In sum, the purpose of this study is to examine what it means for government officials to 
challenge academic scientists’ federally funded research and to describe how academic scientists 
react to exert some degree of control over that research.  Absent clearly articulated case 
boundaries, the study might not have analyzed the intended unit of analysis or have contained 
sufficiently robust data to explain the interactions among the variables (Merriam, 1998; Stake, 
1995, 1997; Yin, 1994).  Thus, I defined additional boundaries of the case sample criteria.  
Specifically, the additional case boundaries required the U.S. federal government as the 
challenger of the academic scientists’ research.  The professors involved were to be university-
based, academic scientists in the United States.  At the time of the challenge, they had to be 
working for American universities.  These academic scientists must have received federal 
sponsorship for their challenged research, and their research topic had to address a common 
public policy issue.  After a review of several news sources, I located three cases illustrating that 
conflict-defense interaction, and each case involved an environmental research problem (e.g., 
sewage sludge, climate change, and salvage logging).   
Data & Data-Collection Methods 
To gather data on these three cases, I employed documents as my data source.  The 
qualitative research literature presents a wide range of what constitutes “documents” for 
research.  A narrow conception refers exclusively to written texts (Hodder, 2000; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985).  For example, Lincoln and Guba (1985) categorize documents as written texts used 





permits are not documents, but instead, they are considered records.  A broader recognition of 
what constitutes documents for qualitative research includes all written texts, such as public 
records, news articles, reports, research articles, books, transcripts of hearings, e-mails, blogs, 
letters, and diaries as well as material images such as maps, paintings, photographs, and videos 
(Hookway, 2008; Merriam, 1998; Prior, 2003).  For purposes of this study, I adopted the broader 
definition of documents, which included all written texts and material images.  However, I 
differentiated among the various types of documents and images, and noted several other 
distinguishing characteristics, such as the document’s degree of scientific review (e.g., peer-
reviewed status), source origination (e.g., posted on organization’s Web site with a clear agenda), 
and solicitation status (e.g., a government-commissioned report on an issue or an industry-based 
study). 
More specifically, I used publicly accessible documents as my primary data source.  The 
value of publicly accessible documents is that the data materials are available to members of the 
public.  In contrast, private documents, such as non-distributed diaries, e-mails not available 
under open records laws, documents blocked by confidentiality agreements, and photos not 
posted or referenced through any public source, are not accessible to the public.  Generally 
speaking, publicly accessible documents are readily available through a variety of sources, 
including the Web (e.g., reports, videos), libraries (e.g., articles and books), and special archives 
(e.g., newsletters, newspaper articles).  Such documents sometimes require nominal processing 
and copying fees (e.g., government agency records and materials), but despite the fees, these 





Rationale for the Data Source  
To limit my data source to publicly accessible documents offered two significant 
contributions to support my study’s design and methodology.   
Capturing Societal Positions 
The most important contribution is that, as a data source, they meet the goals of capturing 
societal positions about the respective cases – which is consistent with both the modified version 
of Freidson’s theory and the evolving interpretations and interests frame.  According to Freidson 
(1986, 2001) and other theorists of the professions (see, e.g., MacDonald, 1995; Starr, 1982), 
society plays an integral part in moderating a profession’s ability to exercise its expert judgment 
over work-related tasks.  The literature on the sociology of the professions and on the academic 
profession conveys the underlying concept that societal legitimacy influences the conditions for 
the extent to which the academic profession may exercise its control over work (e.g., the 
autonomy and authority it has to make discretionary decisions about how to conduct its teaching 
and research tasks as manifested through intellectual freedom), or in terms of academic scientists 
in this study, their ability to exert control over research, which includes making scientific 
decisions based on expertise.  The openness of the data to society aligns well with the evolving 
interpretations and interests frame.  As Denzin (2001) notes, the study of interpretations based on 
interactions illustrates the “interrelationships between private lives and public responses to 
personal troubles” (p. 2).  In other words, the public must gain some access to the case 
controversies, so it can determine whether the academic profession receives support through 
societal legitimation.  Since publicly accessible documents sufficiently connect the case 





some knowledge to determine societal legitimacy, I used publicly accessible documents as my 
data source for this study.   
Inherent Benefits of Using Documents 
A second, significant contribution to this study’s design and methodology that accounts 
for the use of publicly accessible documents as my data source relates to the inherent benefits of 
documents (see, e.g., Handy & Ross, 2005).  According to Merriam (1998), the use of documents 
for data sources offers three significant benefits, plus I note a fourth.  First, documents are 
nonreactive.  “[T]hey exist independent of the research agenda; [therefore], they are … 
unaffected by the research process” (Merriam, 1998, p. 126).  That is, the focus of the research 
centers around the reactions and interactions engaged in the study, and not the subject’s reaction 
with the researcher (Lee, 2000).  Second, documents are grounded within the context source.  
That point is particularly important in a research project that employs the evolving 
interpretations and interests frame within a case study.  Both the evolving interpretations and 
interests frame and case study methodology emphasize the relation between the context and 
observation.  Specifically, they emphasize that the properties of the observation include the 
context and the meanings from those experiencing the interaction within that context.  Thus, 
documents, as a means to draw out the context and meanings, support both the methodology and 
a portion of the conceptual framework (specifically, the evolving interpretations and interests 
frame, which is used to draw out the circumstances and events surrounding the government 
challenges).  Third, documents “cost little or nothing and are often easy to obtain” (Merriam, 
1998, p. 127).  Thus, the data sources are accessible, and the study is easy to replicate.   
Finally, a fourth benefit relates to several of Merriam’s points mentioned in the last 





coercion or domination,” documents are more open accounts and tend to capture an accurate and 
realistic view of a situation (Renzetti & Lee, 1993, p. 6).  According to Hodder (2000), several 
studies report that what research participants state versus what they actually do are not always 
the same.  Likewise, Lazarsfeld and Thielens (1958), Lewis (1988), and Schrecker (1980, 1986) 
highlight the distinction between faculty rhetoric and action.  Based on data from the era of the 
anti-Communist movement, these authors note that professors expressed that they would support 
faculty members’ rights to due process, even those faculty who were members of the Communist 
party.  However, the actual practices of the time, traced from historical archives, demonstrate 
that faculty members’ actions did not conform to their earlier reported responses, given in 
surveys and interviews.  In other words, evidence exists about the dissonance between rhetoric 
and reality.  Thus, documents as nonreactive measures have a significant benefit to the data, 
because the observations drawn from that textual analysis tend to represent the true reality over 
many other data sources, particularly self-reported measures such as semi-structured interviews.   
In light of the above reasons, I used publicly accessible documents as my data source for 
this study.  
Data-Collection Process 
Before starting a more systematic data-collection process, I conducted several searches 
using news sources to gather preliminary case information.  These initial searches served four 
purposes.  First, the process of finding initial data gave me a better sense of the type of available 
documents, and it helped me construct a “memo” template of how to analyze my documents.  
Second, through the searches, I drafted a skeletal timeline of events that represented significant 
markers or decision points for each case.  Third, I was able to identify a preliminary list of key 





The initial searches provided me sufficient data to identify the event that initiated the 
controversy, along with evidence that signaled an end of the case, at least in terms of the 
significant interactions regarding the case matter. 
Document Treatment 
Because my data sources were publicly accessible documents, I followed a multi-step 
process to determine the treatment and significance of each document.  I identified the form 
(e.g., newspaper, blog, congressional testimony), purpose (e.g., news reporting, official memo), 
source and author (e.g., news reporter, industry representative, federal scientist), degree of 
content permanency (e.g., user able to delete and modify) and consistency (e.g., fixed with 
identifiable time marker, changes with some identifiable time marking trail, changes without any 
original date/time stamp or marker), and type of review that the document undergoes (e.g., 
journalistic standards, peer reviewed).  In addition, I conducted a document authentication 
process as suggested by several researchers (see, e.g., Lincoln and Guba 1985; Love, 2003; 
Merriam, 1998).  The process included posing questions about the documents, such as, “What is 
the history of the document?” “What guarantee is there that it is what it pretends to be?” and 
“Has it been tampered with or edited?” (see Merriam, 1998, p. 127).   
Having established a protocol about how to determine the treatment of my documents, in 
the next sub-section, I describe my initial organizing principles governing my data-collection 
process.   
Organizing the Data and Constructing a Timeline 
With general background about each case, my systematic data-collection efforts began 
with uncovering the circumstances and events surrounding the government challenges.  As 





understanding the pressures, tactics, and other means used to challenge academic scientists’ 
federally sponsored research and sets the stage for exploring what it means for academic 
scientists to exert control over their research.  Since the data collection was intended to uncover 
the interactions that follow from government challenges and also trace each controversy’s 
historical antecedents, I first asked: “What led up to this government challenge?”  In each 
instance, the initiating case event took place when the federal government challenged the 
academic scientists’ research decision, a decision that required significant scientific expertise.  I 
looked for interactions described in the documents that represented critical facts about the case 
development. I also looked for a way to recognize a conclusion of the case. I concluded the cases 
when I had observable data signaling sufficient evidence of changed events or when several 
sources indicated the case controversy had ended (cf. Wells, Hirshberg, Lipton, & Oakes, 1995).   
For example, in the climate change case, the appropriate period to end the case came 
when multiple sources noted a change in position of several government actors, who participated 
in this initial controversy.  These government actors at a certain point either dropped their 
challenges or refocused their attention on other scientific studies to challenge.  In the salvage 
logging case, members in the specific subfield of the controversial study referred to the case as 
some event in the past simply for historical notation, because the controversy had died or 
subsided significantly.  In the sewage sludge case, reports indicated that another event had 
trumped the investigation about government challenges to the academic scientists’ research, and 
those data points signaled that the case had halted or become overshadowed by another 
intervening event.  In short, my initial construction of the data concentrated on defining key 






Databases and Searchable Resources 
After identifying each case’s temporal parameters (i.e., when the case started and ended), 
I gathered additional information in a more orderly, systematic manner.  I conducted searches on 
LexisNexis Academic through its news database.  In my first round of searches, I imposed no 
date restrictions, to ensure a wide scope of possible data inclusion.  For search terms, I entered 
the last names of each of the academic scientists involved in a case sample.  For instance, for the 
climate change controversy, I entered Mann, Bradley, and Hughes, the three authors of the 
controversial climate change studies.  After reviewing numerous documents, I realized that in 
each case, the first author was consistently referenced as the key person, and at times, the other 
academic scientists who participated in the controversial study were not mentioned.  Thus, I 
modified the search and limited the word searches to the last name of the first author and a short 
phrase to capture the controversial study’s title and the subject matter (e.g., sewage sludge, 
climate change, and salvage logging).  In addition, I searched for variants, but each time I kept 
the last name of the first author and the subject matter in the search terms.   
I conducted these searches through multiple databases within the LexisNexis Academic 
news section, which contains both national and international sources.  The number of sources in 
each category was fairly large, and the international sources, with the exception of those based in 
the United Kingdom, did not contribute to the data.  At times, a U.K. article served as an 
informant that helped me locate U.S. equivalent data or highlighted a point in a U.S.-based 
document, but no U.K. articles presented any new data or leads that I could not retrieve from 





with relatively low value, and the case study dimensions focused on U.S.-based academic 
scientists who work at American universities, I omitted non-U.S. sources.13   
In addition to the databases within LexisNexis Academic’s news section, I searched 
science-specific sources, general news sources that capture events within higher education, and 
broad-based sources that include government events and scientific news.  For instance, within 
LexisNexis Academic, I conducted searches in the scientific materials section, which contains 
139 U.S. sources, including American Journal of Law and Medicine, Modern Healthcare, and 
full-text medical databases that aggregate sources like Public Health Reports.  I also searched the 
LexisNexis Environment database.  Although many of these sources repeat data located in the 
LexisNexis Academic Universe, this database includes non-news sources in case law, 
regulations, and government reports.  Consequently, I believed this database would augment my 
findings from LexisNexis Academic.   
I repeated the initial searches (i.e., last name of the first author and the subject matter) on 
several other general media databases, such as ProQuest (which includes, for example, The 
Chronicle of Higher Education).  In addition, I conducted searches through specialized news 
outlets within higher education, such as InsideHigherEd.com, and I repeated my efforts with 
                                                 
13 By restricting my searches to only articles published within the United States, I eliminated many irrelevant 
articles, and the number of sources became more manageable.  For instance, the newspaper database drew from 
1,343 sources internationally.  With a focus on U.S. newspapers, the population of available sources reduced to 544 
U.S. newspapers.  With a focus on trade association journals, when I eliminated the non-U.S. journals, the numbers 
also declined significantly.  This action reduced the population from 1,144 to 646 sources.  However, not all the 
databases declined so significantly.  For instance, when eliminating newsletters outside of the U.S., that database 
reduced its total number from 828 to 608. 
I used the following LexisNexis Academic Universe databases in the news category: 
a. Newspapers: total of 544 in the database population, including the Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, 
The New York Times, USA Today, and The Wall Street Journal; 
b. Newsletters: total of 608 in the database population, including Environmental Policy Alert, Inside EPA 
Weekly Report, and Water Policy Report; 
c. Web-based publications: total of 56 in the database, including AgWeb.com, CNN.com, USNews.com;  
d. Industry Trade Press: total of 646 in the population, including Environment and Energy Daily, Inside Green 
Business, and Waste Treatment Technology News. 





broad-based scientific magazines of general review and wide circulation:  Science, a news 
magazine published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and Nature.  
Besides the media outlets and academic science journals, I conducted searches through 
additional public forums, including the Internet, and additional specialized databases.  My goal 
here was to ensure inclusion of Web sites and blogs from specialized news outlets, 
environmental interest groups, corporations, faculty groups, scientists, think tanks, research 
centers, and other organized units.  When available, I placed date restrictions, which one can do 
in some search engines – for instance, by using the advanced features on Google. This step 
typically generated more useful documents in a reasonable time period than by combing through 
1,000 links, which I had done during my initial searches.  I also performed searches on the 
Government Printing Office Web site (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/index.html) and the 
THOMAS database through the Library of Congress (http://thomas.loc.gov/) to locate 
congressional reports, bills, records, statements, and committee reports.  I repeated these steps 
through Westlaw and the LexisNexis government databases, particularly the congressional 
sources, so I had additional data-gathering reliability checks.14  Furthermore, as references to 
documents arose, I noted those documents and located them.   
Theoretical Sampling 
Although knowledge of the case initiation and conclusion dates helped me devise the 
temporal account of the academic scientists’ experiences and responses to government 
challenges, the data collected in this fashion was not the only guide to determine sufficiency of 
information.  Since the aim of my study is to explore concepts that offer theoretical 
generalizations about what it means for government officials to challenge academic scientists’ 
federally funded research and for academic scientists to exert control over that research, I 
                                                 





followed the principles of theoretical sampling as applied in grounded theory, so that my data-
collection efforts would sufficiently account for the “relevant concepts and their properties and 
dimensions” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 144).  Following theoretical sampling principles within 
my conceptual framework, my data-collection efforts focused on gathering sufficient data to 
uncover whether and to what extent (a) the evolving interpretations and interests frame captures 
the pressures, tactics, and other means used by lay challengers to the academic scientists’ 
research and (b) the modified version of Freidson’s theory of professional dominance (which 
contains both the internal characteristics of the academic profession and the external factors that 
influence the degree to which the profession has autonomy) account for the strategies, tactics, 
and other means that the academic profession employs to protect its intellectual freedom.  When 
the concepts were sufficiently explained or I reached a point of saturation, I moved forward with 
the data analysis.  As I explain in the next section in greater detail, my steps also dealt with 
treatment of discrepant data and/or alternative explanations of my data until I was able to 
identify a clear data pattern (see, e.g., Binder, 2002).15 
In conclusion, I followed the suggested guidelines established in the qualitative literature 
to adhere to social science norms (see, e.g., Lee, 2000).  After several months of conducting 
online searches using the steps outlined above, I generated and stored 3,245 documents.  The 
length of the documents ranged from one page to 872 pages.  Because my documents included 
non-text-based materials, including pictures and graphs, I also report my document trove in 
terms of the kilobyte (kb) size.  The documents ranged from 9 kb to 150,066 kb.  While I used 
more than 3,000 documents to inform me about the cases, not all documents were equally 
helpful.  I relied more heavily on 149 documents for the sewage sludge case, 411 documents for 
                                                 
15 My data-collection process echoes what Binder (2002) stated: “While I cannot be certain that I exhausted the 
universe of articles … for each challenge using this search method, I am confident that I unearthed the vast majority 





the climate change case, and 246 documents for the salvage logging case.  Many documents 
served as additional support by restating, confirming, or clarifying earlier statements or 
information.  As I explain in the next sub-section, my theoretical sampling is what determined if 
I had sufficient and appropriate data and whether I needed more documented data.  That 
consideration led me to determine that my core data rested in 806 documents. These accounted 
for much of my data reporting of the cases in chapters 5-7.  
Data Analysis: Approach, Techniques, and Procedures 
Since this study explores what it means for government officials to challenge academic 
scientists’ federally funded research and for academic scientists to exert control over their work, 
I strived to connect concepts, including their properties and dimensions, with generalized 
knowledge or what social science researchers often refer to as theoretical generalization (see, 
e.g., Seale, 1999; Shulman, 1997).  My data-analysis approach, techniques, and procedures 
followed a two-stage process.  First, I analyzed each of the cases through a method infusing 
theatrical metaphors to explain the case interactions.  Second, I followed the conventions of a 
comparative case study methodology and the logic used to construct a variant of grounded 
theory, which relies heavily on the data but is also partially guided by an existing theoretical 
framework.  Below, I explain these two parts of my data analysis. 
Individual Case Study Reporting: A Content Analysis with Theatrical Metaphors 
In this first stage of the data analysis, I examined each case of government challenges 
with academic scientists’ research as an initial investigation.  Relying on publicly accessible 
documents as my data source, I inquired into academic scientists’ experiences and interactions 





documents collected in this study, I conducted a content analysis under the conventions of a 
comparative case study methodology.  That is, I analyzed within a case and across cases.   
Content analysis employs a textual translation of the words, phrases, symbols, images, 
and other visual items used in the data.  Consistent with the evolving interpretations and interests 
frame, as a researcher, I interpreted the meanings associated with observed objects.  My 
interpretation of the relationship between the text and its source impacted the meanings 
associated with the documents used as data sources.  In the literature about content analysis as a 
data-analysis approach, a debate exists regarding how researchers should interpret the 
relationship between the text and its source.  Some researchers contend that the text contains an 
objective meaning; therefore, the common understanding of the text speaks for itself (see, e.g., 
Berelson, 1952).  Other specialists in content analysis assert that the analysis cannot separate the 
content and its contextualized source, since the meanings derive from the messenger and the 
parties connected with that message making (see, e.g., Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 2004).16  The 
latter approach to content analysis (i.e., interpreting the contextualized source) reflects this 
study’s evolving interpretations and interests frame to data analysis.  As I mentioned in Chapter 
2, this framework suggests that meanings associated with objects should derive as authentically 
as possible from the parties engaged in the interaction.17  Consistent with that approach to 
content analysis, Krippendorff (2004) states that “[c]ontent analysis is a research technique for 
making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of 
                                                 
16 Holsti (1969) actually moves beyond just connecting the overall context to a more elaborate and rigid schema 
of coding of the textual communication.  His analytic approach requires responding to a series of information about 
the text such as “who,” “what,” “how,” “to whom,” and “why,” with explicit details; however, answers to those 
questions did not always exist from selected data I collected.  Krippendorff’s approach also informed my research 
practices.  Krippendorff’s takes a bit broader and gives the researcher some degree of freedom to determine the 
meanings of the data when a contextual one cannot be drawn for each data point.  In other words, the researcher uses 
her/his “lever” (i.e., researcher-based, informed knowledge) when the context is silent. 
17 I do not use discourse analysis because there are some documents that are clearly not intended for discourse, 
and I am using entirely nonreactive measures, so many of the documents have different purposes than intended. 





their use” (p. 18, emphasis in original).  That is, content analysis relies heavily on the context to 
reveal the meanings and is appropriate “for describing and interpreting the artifacts of a society 
or social group” as is intended in this study design (Marshall & Rossman, 2006, p. 108). 
Since Krippendorff’s approach to content analysis aligns with the evolving interpretations 
and interests frame, I briefly describe Krippendorff’s analytic approach, which I employed for 
my initial round of data analysis.  Krippendorff presents six steps: 
Step 1: Unitizing 
Unitizing refers to the unit of analysis for the data analytics.  It is the unit of 
meaning or those textual expressions that represent a concept or theoretical 
element.  I anticipated that my unit of meaning would initially begin with very 
narrow units, such as a line in a blog entry.  As more data is analyzed, the 
patterns of behavior become easier to recognize and the unit of meaning may 
expand.  
Step 2: Sampling 
Sampling draws a subset of data analysis from the population.  One sampling 
technique of interest is relevance sampling.  Relevance sampling “aims at 
selecting all textual units that contribute to answering given research questions” 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 119).  For purposes of this study, which attempts to 
theorize what it means for academic scientists to exert control over their 
research, I employed a theoretical sampling technique from grounded theory.  
Rather than inspecting all news articles that discuss Congress’s demands for 





representations of various concepts and eliminated articles or excerpts of articles 
that did not add to the analysis. 
Step 3: Recording/Coding 
“Recording takes place when observers, readers, or analysts interpret what they 
see, read, or find then state their experiences in the formal terms of an analysis” 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 126).  In other words, recording involves the initial 
jotting down of notes about the textual organization and meaning.  The 
researcher records a set of relationships and rules that originate from the theory.  
So, recording serves as the starting point, and coding becomes the process of 
actually assigning some meaning to the organized text.  
Step 4: Reducing  
Reducing simply refers to the editing of the data in a more meaningful manner to 
start identifying the phenomena of interest.  Krippendorff (2004) suggests that 
the researcher use the established codes and connect that scheme to scales or 
other categories.  For instance, professional discretion in research approaches 
may be one of the codes for this study.  By reducing, I may take the list of textual 
data under this code and reduce the data into categories, or measures, such as 
high, medium, and low.   
Step 5: Inferences to Contextual Phenomena 
Inferences to contextual phenomena represent the connections between the basic 
textual analyses to the meaning of the text in context.  “It bridges the gap 
between descriptive amounts of texts and what they mean, refer to, entail, 





interest to an analyst” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 85).  This step is the process that 
begins the analytical construction; it supports, modifies, or ignores the existing 
theoretical framework and contributes to the study from the observable 
phenomena.  In addition, Krippendorff notes that the latent meanings oftentimes 
emerge in the inferences stage. 
Step 6: Narrating 
Narrating refers to the data-analysis reporting; it incorporates both the 
description and inferences.  Narrating usually includes a recounting of the steps 
taken, with the inclusion of the coding process and notes about the patterns and 
themes that emerged.  In addition, it responds to the research questions.    
I conducted Steps 1 to 4 (unitizing, sampling, recording/coding, and reducing) with each case; 
then, Steps 5 and 6 (inferring and narrating) occurred initially with each case, followed by a 
collective analysis across the cases.   
In addition, during an initial review of the data, I examined the academic profession’s 
responses using a modified version of Freidson’s theory of professional dominance – as I 
described in Chapter 3.  Content analysis methodologists suggest that the structure of the initial 
analysis depends on whether or not it draws largely from an existing theory (Hesse-Biber & 
Leavy, 2006; Hseih & Shannon, 2005).  The researcher’s decision to analyze the data 
substantially as an outgrowth from existing theory potentially directs or redirects the meanings 
drawn from the data.  According to Hseih and Shannon (2005), a substantial reliance on a theory 
to account for the relationships among concepts guides the first round of coding, whereas a study 
designed absent theory-driven constructs does not start with the same amount of guidance with 





underpinnings represented in my conceptual framework, such as the examination of the internal 
characteristics of the academic profession (i.e., professional knowledge and skills, divisions of 
labor, labor markets and careers, training programs, ideological commitment, and professional 
associations), and the external factors (i.e., bodies of knowledge and the state) as considerations 
to understand what it means for the academic profession to exert control over its federally 
sponsored research.  
 The content analysis led me to focus significantly on each actor’s role in the controversy.  
I divided actors into teams.  For instance, for government officials, I had primary and secondary 
political instigators as well as primary and secondary political allies.  As I explored the actions of 
each team, I noticed that team members were behaving much like actors in a play.  This 
performance effect was not surprising, given the high-profile nature of environmental policies 
and the public scrutiny that government officials endure.  Furthermore, I used publicly accessible 
documents, so actors involved in these three cases would have scripted their statements, staged 
their actions, and taken some matters offstage.  Given the performance of each case, I examined 
my documents with inquiries about (a) the role expectations of the teams, (b) timing of sub-
events, (c) interaction effects, such as whether the events transpired into cooperation or conflict 
between and among teams, (d) event staging, such as whether it took place onstage (e.g., 
congressional hearings) or backstage (e.g., meetings mentioned in a report but never reported in 
any other observable manner), and (e) significance of props such as policy tools and reports, (f) 
effect of scripts (e.g., press releases and memos) as well as improvisational conversations (e.g., 
phone conversations and quick, unplanned exchanges).   
Building off the data analysis, I used a chronology along with a theatrical metaphor to 





helpful when examining politicians’ messages and actions, since they frequently crafted 
language (e.g., sound bites) or behaved in a manner intended to gain support from their 
constituents and other groups.  To reiterate, these considerations did not change my framework; 
however, I was probably more attuned to the significance of certain communications, such as the 
effect that some reports have as policy tools, and this analytic lens led me to dig deeper into 
relations between the government officials and university administrators who had oversight but 
no direct research responsibilities for the challenged study.  Further, it more clearly articulated 
the academic scientists’ efforts to defend their research.   
Cross-Case Analysis: A Modified Grounded Theory 
Although this study presents a theoretical explanation that might generate the “key 
concepts or variables as initial coding categories” (Hseih & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281), I used an 
iterative review of the data, which involved multiple rounds of coding and recoding, to 
illuminate interactions not recognized by the theoretical sources that initially informed my study 
(see, e.g., Neumann, 2006, 2009).  Therefore, for the second stage of my data analysis, I 
conducted additional analyses that required sifting, sorting, coding, and recoding exercises 
beyond the theoretical framework – especially one so conceptually defined as the modified 
version of Freidson’s theory of professional dominance, which I used to understand the academic 
profession’s responses to challenges. 
I followed an analytic approach similar to Neumann’s (2006, 2009).  Like Neumann, I 
too applied key analytic principles of grounded theory, a qualitative methodology that builds 
theory from data, in order to better understand what it means for government officials to 
challenge academic scientists’ federally funded research and for academic scientists to exert 





her understanding about selected themes, but she largely built her explanations regarding the 
relationships among various concepts without an established frame.  For example, Neumann 
(2006) set out to study recently tenured professors’ personal expressions of “love” of their 
scholarly endeavors as articulated under her concept of “passionate thought in scholarship.”  
Initially, drawing from the extant literature, she constructed her analysis of professors’ 
expressions of passionate thought based on their experience, and she articulated frames of 
experience as outgrowths of the professors’ awareness and emotion.  These theoretical 
explanations “shaped and shaded” her understanding of the primary concepts in her study (p. 
385).   
At the same time, she drew heavily from her data.  She coded, bounded, constructed new 
codes, recoded, and rebounded.  Through each iteration, she examined the data to address 
“incongruous and disconfirming signals” and recoded and rebounded until she reconciled the 
data into workable codes; then she crafted her themes accordingly (p. 391).  By moving beyond 
the initial framework and becoming enmeshed in the data, she expanded the scope of what she 
discusses about professors’ experience (i.e., something more than awareness and emotion); she 
explored the idea of “how passionate thought is contextualized in professors’ larger experiences, 
intellectually and emotionally, of their scholarly work and lives” (p. 391).  In the end, she 
recognized that her data revealed a refined theoretical explanation of “passionate thought as a 
distinctively contextualized experience,” and her modified grounded theory approach led her to 
that conclusion (p. 392).    
Like Neumann (2006), I revisited the value of the theoretical explanation to help me 
understand what it means for government officials to challenge academic scientists’ federally 





largely affirmed the proposed theoretical underpinnings (i.e., the modified version of Freidson’s 
theory of professional dominance and the evolving interpretations and interests frame), I kept 
open the possibility that my data might lead me to present an alternative explanation, so I had to 
use the theoretical concepts “lightly.”  Throughout this process, my analysis referred to the 
literature and theoretical explanation in a manner that informed me about the phenomenon that I 
sought to explain.  To stay true to my findings, I was “sensitized” to the relations among 
concepts, yet my knowledge of those relationships also offered me a skeletal structure to 
envision the possible connections without driving or dictating the analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008).   
Using an iterative process, I coded, bounded, recoded, and rebounded until I constructed 
a theory from the data generated.  While taking these steps, I searched for and accounted for 
discrepant data in order to properly craft my circumscribed grounded theory (cf. Popper, 2002).   
Keeping in mind that this analytic process is a fluid one, I was open to what Neumann 
characterizes as an analytic approach that explores “ways to see beyond” the existing theoretical 
concepts.  I allowed the possibility that the data might reveal a refined or significantly different, 
though circumscribed, theoretical explanation about what it means for academic scientists to 
exert control over their research when government challenges take place.  By virtue of this 
analytic approach, I inquired into the usefulness of my conceptual framework, which combines 
the modified version of Freidson’s theory and the evolving interpretations and interests frame, as 
a way to understand academic scientists’ exerting control over their research.  As I explain in 
Chapter 9, my findings did not reveal a substantially different theoretical explanation from 
Freidson’s model of professional dominance; it did, however, lead me to suggest some 





Trustworthiness, Validity, and Reliability 
In qualitative research, to ensure the study’s value, the researcher establishes a set of 
strategies that increase the trustworthiness or authenticity of the research process and product 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  In this subsection, I briefly discuss each of the research standards (i.e. 
credibility, dependability, generalizability, and confirmability) and the strategies that I employed 
to meet those standards.   
Credibility 
Credibility examines the internal validity of the research.  It evaluates whether the 
researcher used appropriate evidence to justify the asserted claims from the study’s findings 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1998; Prior, 2003; Stake, 2005; Yin, 2003).  For this study, I 
examined whether the connection between the observations and phenomenon.  In order to meet 
the credibility standard and reduce error from improper inferences, I followed the procedures of 
triangulation, repeated observations, and disclosure of the researcher’s standpoint (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1998).  In addition, I sought feedback from other researchers to seek 
further insights about my research’s internal validity. 
 Triangulation: This is the “process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, 
verifying the repeatability of an observation interpretation” (Stake, 2005, p. 443).  For 
this study, I used multiple documents from various sources to capture each construct 
(e.g., codes, sub-codes, dimensions, properties).  This approach is also consistent with 
Lewis’s (1988) study on intellectual freedom, as he, too, emphasized the requirement of 






 Repeated Observations: I conducted repeated observations of the same phenomenon, 
which included “gathering data over a period of time in order to increase the validity of 
the findings” (Merriam, 1998, p. 204).  I reviewed the documents multiple times through 
repeated data analysis events to ensure research credibility. 
 Researcher’s Standpoint: Disclosure of the researcher’s standpoint involves the 
clarification of the “researcher’s assumptions, worldview, and theoretical orientation at 
the outset of the study” (Merriam, 1998, p. 205).  This information gives the reader a 
sense of how the researcher constructed the “systematic connections among the 
observable behaviors, speculations, causes, and treatments” (Stake, 1997, p. 408).  
Accordingly, in this chapter, I disclosed my standpoint, such as my assumptions and 
theoretical orientation  In addition, I noted that I am a professor, who strongly believes in 
intellectual freedom to protect professors’ rights over research that is germane to their 
expertise.  Also, I am a lawyer, so I bring my legal lens to the research, when applicable. 
 Other Researchers’ Examination: Merriam (1998) refers to peer examination as a process 
that incorporates the use of colleagues in the discussion of the findings.  For purposes of 
this study, I drew on other researchers’ examinations through several forums, including 
academic colloquia and an advisory council.  These events took place on the campus of a 
university in the Upper Midwest as well as via online conferences (i.e., Skype and 
Google+).  I presented my data and comparative case analyses at three academic 
colloquia (one in-person and two virtual sessions) to receive feedback regarding my data 
analysis and presentation of the findings.  In addition, I established a group of three 





discuss research concepts and data analysis.  I spoke to two members of the council about 
ideas and written statements that eventually led to chapters 5-9.   
Dependability 
Dependability determines the research reliability.  It ensures that “the results are 
consistent with the data collected” (Merriam, 1998, p. 206, emphasis removed; see also Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985; Yin 1994).  Dependability focuses attention on the “extent to which research 
findings can be replicated” (Merriam, 1998, p. 205).  In order to meet the dependability standard 
so replication of the study is possible at some later point in time, I followed Merriam’s (1998) 
suggested steps to disclose the investigator’s position, triangulate the data, and establish an audit 
trail. 
 Investigator’s Position: The investigator’s position reveals the “assumptions and theory 
behind the study” through a discussion about the selection process on the data sources, 
data gathering, and data analysis (Merriam, 1998, p. 206).  This information supports the 
consistency of the findings throughout the research process.  Accordingly, I have detailed 
my assumptions and theories for this study as a means to ensure research dependability.   
 Triangulation: Triangulation (see also, strategies for credibility, above) is the “process of 
using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an 
observation interpretation” (Stake, 2005, p. 443).  This strategy also ensures research 
dependability. 
 Audit Trail: An audit trail offers a descriptive set of notes about the research data-
collection and analysis processes.  Thus, “the investigator must describe in detail how 





throughout the inquiry” (Merriam, 1998, p. 207).  As part of my research process, I 
recorded my steps within four lab books to ensure research dependability. 
Generalizability 
Generalizability refers to external validity of the study.  Because this study accounts for 
the theoretical construction of what it means for government officials to challenge academic 
scientists’ federally funded research and for academic scientists to exert control over their 
research, the generalizability refers to theoretical generalization of the case representations of 
government challenges to academic scientists’ federally sponsored research.  That is, within the 
boundaries of the cases, I asked myself whether my data analysis captures the inferential 
treatment of the conclusions drawn (Shulman 1997).  Although Geertz (1973) contends that 
“theoretical formulations hover so low over the interpretations they govern that they don’t make 
much sense or hold much interest apart from them” (p. 25), nevertheless, other researchers 
suggest that an examination of events or tasks “around common problems or themes” potentially 
characterizes theoretical concepts that generate theory, though perhaps one with contextual 
particularity (Rueschemeyer, 1984, p. 160).  In order to work toward theoretical generalization, I 
used methodology, especially in terms of my data-analysis techniques, largely derived from 
grounded theory.  Accordingly, I followed the principles of theoretical sampling (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008) and I presented multiple cases with relatively detailed descriptions. I wanted to 
present sufficient information to draw out the points of commonality among the cases (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).  These strategies contributed toward my design of a qualitative study that 
presented a theoretical generalization from the cases. 
 Theoretical Sampling: This refers to the collection of data that “will maximize 





variations, and identify relationships between concepts” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 143).  
Consistent with that principle, I collected data until the point of saturation in order to 
articulate properties and dimensions of concepts and explain relationships among the 
concepts, which collectively contribute to our understanding of the refined theory that I 
discuss in Chapter 9.   
 Multiple Cases with Detailed Descriptions: Multiple cases support the refinement of the 
connections among concepts, which reduces the likelihood of odd or outlying events  
affecting the theory construction.  Thus, my case data (chapters 5-7) present rather rich, 
detailed descriptions so that I had in-depth information about the cases to draw inferences 
about the data (Geertz, 1973).  Taking these two study elements (i.e., multiple cases and 
detailed descriptions), Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that generalizability drawn 
from the empirical data likely deals with variations and captures the commonalties in 
order to craft a theory: 
One aim of studying multiple cases is to increase generalizability, reassessing 
yourself that the events and processes in one well-described setting are not wholly 
idiosyncratic.  At a deeper level, the aim is to see processes and outcomes across 
many cases, to understand how they are qualified by local conditions, and thus to 
develop more sophisticated descriptions and more powerful explanations (p. 172).  
In short, my process of presenting three cases with detailed descriptions supported my 
efforts for theoretical generalization. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability refers to the extent that other researchers can confirm or corroborate my 





knowledge to a research project, researchers’ sensitivity to insights added to the study and 
disclosure about what insights contributed to the study provide sufficient information so an 
observer can confirm the findings in light of the researcher’s disclosures.  In order to meet the 
confirmability standard, I disclosed my position within this investigated topic, provided an audit 
trail, searched and accounted for discrepant data, and highlighted the benefits of the study’s data 
sources. 
•    Investigator’s Position: The investigator’s position reveals the “assumptions and theory 
behind the study” through a discussion about the selection process on the data sources, 
data gathering, and data analysis (Merriam, 1998, p. 206).  With this disclosure, others 
may more easily confirm or corroborate my research findings.  While I have already 
presented many of the assumptions and descriptions that crafted my theoretical 
framework to construct this study and the data sources that informed this study, I have 
also described my data gathering and analysis to inform readers of my analytic logic, so 
as to increase confirmability of my conclusions.  
 Audit Trail: An audit trail offers a descriptive set of notes about the research data-
collection and -analysis process.  As mentioned earlier, an audit trail permits another 
researcher to replicate the study to achieve confirmation or corroboration of the study’s 
findings.  Accordingly, I created an audit trail of my research process as a strategy that 
supports data confirmability. 
 Discrepant Data: By searching and accounting for discrepant data, I discovered that 
certain assumptions I made during the process of my data analysis were at times 
incorrect.  As I discussed earlier, I employed a technique that Neumann (2006) used, 





rebounding of my data until I could satisfactorily address the discrepant data.  As Miles 
& Huberman (1994) suggest, these steps contribute to researcher bias reduction and 
support the construction of robust theoretical knowledge that eventually led to my 
refinement of Freidson’s theory of professional dominance. 
 Data Sources: The data sources used in this study were publicly accessible documents.  
This type of data has two benefits for confirmability.  First, the document sources are 
easy to obtain relative to other data sources, so confirmation of findings becomes easier 
than with many other data sources.  Second, documents are nonreactive measures, so they 
are “unaffected by the research process,” since the information on the documents was 
collected for other purposes (Merriam, 1998, p. 126).  Consequently, my review of 
documents offered me a more open review than would be possible with other data 







Table 4.1: Trustworthiness Standards and Strategies Employed 
TRUSTWORTHINESS 
STANDARD 









Whether appropriate evidence 
exists to justify the asserted 
claims from the study’s 
findings 
 
 Triangulation  
 Repeated Observations 
 Researcher’s Standpoint 









Whether the study’s results 
are consistent with the data 
and capable of replication  
 
 Investigator’s Position  
 Triangulation 








Whether the study’s findings 
apply to concepts that 
generate or refine theory 
 
 Theoretical Sampling  










Whether the study’s results 
can be confirmed or 
corroborated by others 
 
 Investigator’s Position 
 Audit Trail 
 Search and Account for 
Discrepant Data 





To construct and carry out a study that met ethical standards, I disclosed the process 
followed to ensure compliance and proper disclosures pursuant to the Institutional Review 
Boards at two universities.  In addition, I described how the use of publicly accessible documents 





Compliance and Disclosures 
Throughout the data-collection and -analysis process, I complied with the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) policies at two educational institutions.  Because I am a doctoral student at 
Teachers College, Columbia University, I completed the documents and comply with the IRB 
process at Teachers College.  In addition, although I do not conduct this study within my 
capacity as a faculty member at the University of North Dakota, to avoid any question about my 
role and the capacity under which I conducted the research, I complied with the IRB standards at 
the University of North Dakota.  Also, to avoid any suggestion of impropriety or conflicts of 
interest, I disclose that I do not have a direct interest in any of these case studies.  But because, 
indirectly, every person has some interest in this research study, I disclose here that during the 
time of this study, I was not and have not engaged directly in work related to the national 
policies or research agenda for sewage sludge, climate change, or salvage logging.   
Furthermore, during the period of this study, other than conversations that helped 
interpret my data, in order to reduce bias about matters related to the environmental topics and 
issues pertaining to the research process, I limited my discussions with others on topics related to 
sewage sludge, climate change, and salvage logging.  In addition, to ensure data integrity and 
authenticity, I archived the data: one hardcopy and one electronic copy of each of the documents 
retrieved.  Furthermore, pursuant to my assurances of data trustworthiness, I documented my 
research trail within four lab books. This step served as my research audit trail. 
Publicly Accessible Documents 
Because the case boundaries for this study (i.e., university-based academic scientists who 
are employed by American universities, working in the United States, and receiving federal 





case controversies over research within environmental policies) limit potential subjects and 
institutions as available sources for information, I relied exclusively on publicly accessible 
documents; any other data-collection method might have made subjects susceptible to 
employment retaliation or other forms of scrutiny.  To avoid possible ethical dilemmas 
potentially associated with the identification of the actors and institutions, I intentionally used 
publicly accessible documents to represent my data sources.  Similarly, the public nature of the 
data, which identifies the actors and institutions as well as their interactions, was the basis for 
this study’s research questions, design, and methodology.  Such openness avoided the use of 
voluntary subjects and any potential harm to them. 
In addition, as I noted earlier in the discussion of the data sources, documents are 
nonreactive data, so documents reduced the potential for ethical dilemmas associated with the 
identification of the actors and institutions.  Documents do not require direct contact with human 
subjects in investigations, as interviews do.  Instead, they are created for purposes other than the 
research presented.  In contrast, reactive data-collection methods could bring selected actors or 
institutions to harm by jeopardizing future funding.  Consequently, since reactive data-collection 
methods could serve as obtrusive forms, informants who experienced the case interactions 
described in this study might well elect not to participate.  To avoid these potential barriers to 
data, this study used documents.   
My limitation of sources to publicly accessible documents potentially overcomes many 
questions of ethics.  As the phrase indicates, publicly accessible documents are not personal, 
private items, which, depending on the data-collection approach, might raise questions of 





through public acquisition, such as Internet postings of news reports, blogs, and web page 
document depositories.   
Limitations of the Study 
The study’s questions, design, methodology, methods, and analysis as well as the 
literature reviewed support each other and meet the purpose of the study – to explore what it 
means for government actors to challenge academic scientists’ federally sponsored research and 
for academic scientists to exert control over their research.  Despite the study’s construction, 
there is one identifiable limitation to this study: This study relied exclusively on documents.  
Several research methodology texts explicitly indicate or suggest that documents should not 
serve as the exclusive form of data collection (see, e.g., Hatch, 2002; Hodder, 2000; Merriam, 
1998; Russell & Kovacs, 2003; Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, Sechrest, & Grove, 1981).  
Although earlier I justified the rationale behind the study’s exclusive use of documents as data 
sources, here, I present the four potential drawbacks to the use of documents as exclusive data 
for the study. 
First, documents are nonreactive. This has benefits, but there are also drawbacks.  As a 
researcher, I was unable to directly ask how the actors or those representing social institutions 
made meaning of the interactions.  Second, because I do not have reactive informants, I also 
could not ask for leads to other data sources.  Thus, my snowball sampling for data sources 
depends entirely on other documented sources.  Third, some of the events and interactions could 
not be captured in a documented form.  Although advancements in technology have increased 
instances of recording of events and communications, there may be selected interactions that are 
not captured on any documents.  Fourth, by exclusively using publicly accessible documents, my 





other non-publicly accessible materials, that could have contributed to the refinement or 
generation of a theory to represent these cases.    
Despite these drawbacks, I wish to emphasize that publicly accessible documents as 
exclusive data sources also respond to society’s need for information about the cases to 
determine societal legitimation (see Rationale for the Data Source, in this chapter).  Furthermore, 
in terms of data integrity, documents are nonreactive, grounded within the context source, 
accessible, and easy to replicate.  These factors support the strength of this study’s capacity to 
construct a theoretical generalization capable of withstanding public scrutiny.  Thus, although 
publicly accessible documents come with some study limitations, as a whole, the benefits of 
using publicly accessible documents outweighed the drawbacks.  Nevertheless, I disclose the 







CHAPTER V: THE SEWAGE SLUDGE CASE 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the sewage sludge case.  First, I provide a brief 
overview of the science and the public policy debate about land-applied sewage sludge.  I also 
introduce an academic scientists’ government-sponsored study that raises concerns about the 
science policy.  Second, I describe several challenges to the academic scientists’ government-
sponsored research.  Examining the circumstances and events surrounding these challenges, I 
capture the interactions among individuals and groups involved to explain the actors’ reported 
perceptions and interests.  Third, I present my data on the strategies that academic scientists and 
their supporters employed.  I explain, below, how these strategies helped the challenged 
researchers exert control over their government-sponsored work.  Specifically, drawing on my 
theoretical framework in Chapter 3, I examine the internal characteristics of and external factors 
influencing the academic profession to help us understand how certain responses from supporters 
of the challenged research aided the academic scientists of the contested study.  Fourth, I 
summarize the key findings.  
The Science, the Public Policy Debate, and the Study 
The Science Policy  
Since 1993, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has permitted the use of 
certain grades of sewage sludge for agricultural or consumer usage.18  According to the EPA, 
sewage sludge, also known as a biosolid, is “solid, semisolid, or liquid residue generated” from 
                                                 
18 The EPA identifies two types of sewage sludge – Class A and Class B.  Generally speaking, Class A sludge 
involves the most thorough wastewater treatment processing and usually originates from nonindustrial, municipal 
sources.  By contrast, Class B sludge accepts significantly higher levels of pathogens and heavy metals that could be 
dangerous if ingested.  Because Class B sludge may not be handled by humans without proper equipment and taking 
other steps to minimize human contact, the EPA prohibits its use for agricultural or consumer usage.   
In this case, the controversy involved both Class A and Class B sludges; however, the most severe adverse 





households and industries that is treated through a sewer treatment plant process.19  Basically, 
sewage sludge represents the cumulative materials of treated by-products from various municipal 
sewer systems and industrial waste plants.20  These by-products include liquids drained, human 
excrement flushed, and other substances that enter the sewage lines.   
In the United States, land application of sewage sludge became more prominent after 
Congress passed the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988, a law that phased out sewage sludge 
dumping in oceans by 1992.  As an alternative to dumping in the ocean, a coalition consisting of 
several municipalities, wastewater treatment plants, sludge-management companies, and farmers 
advocated land usage of sewage sludge.  When the sludge is properly treated, the science is quite 
clear: Sewage sludge contains many beneficial nutrients for farming and landscaping purposes.  
Recognizing land usage of sewage sludge as a substitute for ocean dumping, the EPA adopted 
new regulations – frequently referred to as “503 rules.”  These regulations spelled out what 
chemicals, metals, and other particles would be treated and tested to determine acceptability of 
the processed sludge.  However, some environmental groups, citizen groups, farmers, academic 
scientists, and even federal scientists objected to the use of the treated sludge.  Many of them 
believed that the federal standards failed to protect the public from harmful metals and 
pathogens.  According to sludge opponents, the federal regulations maintained ratios that were 
too lax and permitted microorganisms (including harmful pathogens) in sewage sludge.21 
                                                 
19 Clean Water Act Regulations – Criteria for Classification of Solid Waste Disposal Facilities and Practices, 40 
C.F.R. § 257.2 (2010). 
20 The EPA and the sewer-management programs determined an acceptable level of industrial waste that may 
enter the municipal sewage systems.  
21 See, e.g., Carlisle, J. K., & Centrone, M. J. (2001, Jan. 28) EPA may be killer agency, some say. Charleston 
Gazette, 1C).  John Carlisle and Michael Centrone, two environmental policy analysts, reported that the EPA had 
been defending its rules without sufficient scientific support.  They suggested that political interests trumped citizen 
health interests.  Based on their observations, “Americans have long been forced to pay a high price for EPA’s 
bureaucratic arrogance and scientific ineptitude in the form of lost economic opportunity and costly regulations” and 





The Controversial Science 
Starting in 1994, critics of the 503 rules raised even more questions about the adverse 
health effects of land-applied sewage sludge.  Two well-publicized events seemingly escalated 
the public concerns.  First, in 1994, an 11-year-old boy, Tony Behun, died, and his family 
claimed that Tony’s exposure to sewage sludge contributed to his illness and led to his death.22  
About a week before his death, Behun rode his dirt bike around a field blanketed with sewage 
sludge in Osceola Mills, Pennsylvania.  Later that evening, he became ill with a fever and lesions 
formed on his arm.  Several days later, he went into a coma.  Then, about a week later, he died.   
In 1995, similar symptoms were reported.  That illness also led to death, but this time, it 
took place in Greenland, New Hampshire.  In that same year, approximately 650 tons of sewage 
sludge covered one area of the town.  The Greenland sludge surrounded the Conner family 
home.  Several months later, residents of the town, including Shayne Conner, a 26-year-old, 
complained of physical reactions to the sludge.  Shayne reported severe, adverse physical 
reactions, including vomiting, fever, and distressed lungs.  Several weeks after the symptoms 
emerged, Shayne died in his sleep.  His family claimed that the sewage sludge killed him or 
alternatively contributed to his death.   
For both the Tony Behun and Shayne Conner cases, the media reported that the autopsy 
investigations concluded that there was no linkage between sewage sludge and each individual’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also, Snyder, D., & Kunkle, F. (2001, Aug. 1). Health fears over sludge spur quest for controls: EPA stand 
challenged after suspicious deaths. Washington Post, B1. 
22 See, e.g.,USA Today Staff (1999, Oct. 7). Faced with evidence of health threat, EPA looks the other way. 
USA Today, 18A; Gibb, T. (2000, Jun. 11). People are asking why a boy died after riding his bike over some sludge: 
A terrible waste gets long look. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, A1; Tuohy, J. (2000, Jul. 13). 2 mothers, 2 deaths, too 
many questions: Sickness was in the air, but officials wouldn’t blame sludge. USA Today, 13D; Rutter, J. (2000, 
Dec. 3). A debate: is sludge fertilizer or poison? Sunday News (Lancaster, Pa.), A12; Snyder, D., & Kunkle, F. 
(2001, Aug. 1). Health fears over sludge spur quest for controls: EPA stand challenged after suspicious deaths. 





complications leading to death.23  Despite these findings, the deaths of Tony Behun and Shayne 
Conner still worried many people who lived in communities with land-applied sewage sludge 
and communities that contemplated such use.24  Many in these communities attributed these 
deaths to Tony and Shayne’s exposure to the nearby sludge.25  They also asked for an EPA 
investigation, but based on news reports, the EPA initially just stood behind its rules and was 
slow to act.26 
Conflict Between the Federally Sponsored Study & the Science Policy 
In 1996, with federal and state grant funding, Ellen Harrison, Murray McBride, and 
David Bouldin of the Cornell Waste Management Institute (“CWMI”) conducted a study that 
evaluated the human health effects from land-applied sewage sludge.27  Specifically, the CWMI 
research team analyzed the impacts of the EPA’s risk-assessment procedures (i.e., the 503 rules).  
The CWMI research, which is at the center of this controversy, appeared in three different forms, 
but each paper was essentially the same. 
                                                 
23 Gibb, 2000; Rutter, 2000; Snyder & Kunkle, 2001; USA Today Staff, 1999; Tuohy, 2000. 
24 Gibb, 2000; Rutter, 2000; Snyder & Kunkle, 2001; USA Today Staff, 1999; Tuohy, 2000. 
25 Shayne Conner’s mother sued the company that applied the Greenland sludge.  In 2002, Synagro 
Technologies, the company that acquired the organization responsible for applying the sludge in Greenland, settled 
with Shayne’s mother.  While a legal settlement does not necessarily mean fault, the settlement likely demonstrated 
Synargo’s evaluation of the odds that it would lose the case.  Agreeing with what many others thought, David 
Lewis, a former EPA scientist, said: “Synagro obviously avoided a lawsuit that they must have felt they stood a 
reasonable chance of losing, or else they wouldn’t have settled the case.” (Truini, 2002) 
Truini, J. (2002, Jan. 21). Synagro, family reach deal on biosolids suit. Waste News, 5; See also,Anonymous 
(2002, Jan. 8). Synagro announces favorable settlement of New Hampshire litigation. Business Wire, paragraphs 1-
10.. 
26 USA Today Staff (1999, Oct. 7). Faced with evidence of health threat, EPA looks the other way USA Today, 
18A (“these deaths call for an aggressive investigation … [but] the Environmental Protection Agency has been 
circling the wagons.”); Tuohy, J. (2000, Jul. 13). 2 mothers, 2 deaths, too many questions: Sickness was in the air, 
but officials wouldn’t blame sludge. USA Today, 13D (According to this USA Today article, Shayne Conner’s mom 
commented that the “Environmental Protection Agency made a mistake with its sludge program and doesn’t know 
how to back away without admitting culpability”); Snyder, D., & Kunkle, F. (2001, Aug. 1). Health fears over 
sludge spur quest for controls: EPA stand challenged after suspicious deaths. Washington Post, B1 (According to the 
Washington Post article, “the EPA remains largely unconvinced that ‘biosolids’ cause health problems.”) 






First, in March 1997, an early version of the CWMI study appeared as a draft paper, Land 
Application of Sewage Sludges: Recommendations and Appraisal of the US EPA’s Part 503 
Sludge Rules.28  That initial report included a scientific safety assessment about the federal 503 
rules and included recommendations for increased public protections for the New York State 
sludge rules.  Second, in August 1997, the CWMI scientists issued a working paper, The Case 
for Caution: Recommendations for Land Application of Sewage Sludges and an Appraisal of the 
U.S. EPA’s Part 503 Regulations (“Case for Caution”).  That paper raised more concerns about 
the 503 rules and proposed stricter standards, which aligned with standards in several European 
countries.  Third, the CWMI researchers published their Case for Caution paper in a peer-
reviewed journal, International Journal of Environment & Pollution, with the title, “Land 
Application of Sewage Sludges: An Appraisal of the U.S. Regulations.”29  For all three papers, 
the CWMI scientists examined the scientific implications of the EPA’s regulations (though the 
final two papers contained slightly more detail and an international comparison of sludge 
regulations, noting that other countries have adopted stringent guidelines). 
Each of the papers essentially restated the same findings.  In these papers, the CWMI 
scientists alleged that serious health and safety concerns existed, given the current EPA 
regulations on land-applied sewage sludge.  The papers identified and discussed what the authors 
believed to be 14 problems with the regulations, including assumptions made to construct the 
regulations.  For instance, according to the CWMI scientists, the regulations did not account for 
regional variations in soil quality.  Consequently, the regulatory standards did not factor those 
differences in when conducting risk assessments, which meant that some soil could have had 
                                                 
28 Harrison, E. Z., McBride, M., & Bouldin, D. (1997, Mar. 21).  Land application of sewage sludges: The case 
for caution – recommendations and appraisal of the US EPA’s part 503 sludge rules. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Waste 
Management Institute. 
29 Harrison, E. Z., McBride, M., & Bouldin, D. (1999). Land application of sewage sludges: An appraisal of the 





concentrated levels of metals or other harmful substances.  Further, the CWMI scientists 
contended that the regulations failed to examine many metals and pathogens, which were 
possibly overlooked in 1993 or did not exist as prominently in 1993.  The CWMI scientists also 
warned that the regulations had not properly considered harm caused from more indirect human 
contact.  In particular, the regulations did not adequately consider adverse health impacts from 
(a) certain agricultural land applications, (b) infected sources caused by events such as water 
runoff, and (c) ingestion of harmful materials from other sources, such as grazing animals.  
Given these possible risks, the CWMI researchers recommended numerous policy changes, 
including higher cutoff levels for acceptable substances in the sludge, consideration of additional 
metals and other by-products for soil testing, and more stringent oversight and enforcement 
practices of sewage-sludge application.  
Interactions Surrounding the Challenges 
The Cornell Waste Management Institute (“CWMI”) papers generated a lot of attention 
among academic scientists, state and federal policymakers, municipality administrators, 
environmental groups, wastewater treatment industry representatives, and citizen groups 
concerned about sludge application.  While no one ever demonstrated that the CWMI scientists 
engaged in scientific misconduct, such as data fabrication, manipulation, or suppression, many 
individuals and groups questioned the study’s methodology and analyses as well as speculating 
that the researchers might have been interested in advancing a policy that the science did not 
justify.  Given these concerns, critics of the CWMI research dismissed the study as not credible 
or sufficiently flawed.  Thus, in their minds, the CWMI research had little or no value.   
In this section, I focus on the significant challenges to the CWMI research.  These 





and supporters of the CWMI scientists interacted in a sufficiently meaningful way to explain the 
situation.  Like a play, the interactions surrounding the challenges appeared in Acts.  In this 
metaphorical play, there are two Acts.  In Act 1, I recount events involving several governmental 
actors (i.e., federal agency administrators and scientists) as the initiators of the challenges.  In 
Act 2, I describe events in which a state government agency and a corporate entity took two 
separate actions to challenge the CWMI scientists.  When viewed as a whole, these two Acts 
dramatize fully the storyline about the multistage challenges to the CWMI scientists’ 
government-sponsored research. 
Act 1: Government Challenges 
Act 1 introduces several governmental actors who led the challenge against the CWMI 
scientists.  They also happened to be the same government officials who had oversight of the 503 
rules and/or helped craft the original regulations.  As I present below, these governmental actors 
employed a multi-step challenge, hoping that the CWMI’s governmentally funded research 
would go away.        
Scene 1:     
Scene 1 opens in 1997.  In late March of that year, the CWMI scientists, Ellen Harrison, 
Murray McBride, and David Bouldin, completed the first paper criticizing the EPA’s 503 
regulations.30  Immediately following the release of that paper, Harrison sent a copy of it and 
another paper to David Sterman, the deputy commissioner of the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation (“NYSDEC”).  Harrison conveyed to Sterman that the papers 
explained the scientific reasoning behind the CWMI scientists’ recommendation that NYSDEC 
                                                 
30 CWMI (1997). Why Cornell recommends: Regarding land application of sewage sludge is more conservative 
than EPA. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University; see also an accompanying paper, Cornell Cooperative Extension (1997). 
Land application of sewage sludges, in Cornell recommends for integrated field crop management (pp. 20-24). 





should adopt higher standards for what qualifies as acceptable sewage-sludge application, 
particularly for agricultural purposes.  In April 1997, Sterman forwarded the materials to Robert 
Perciasepe, the assistant administrator for the EPA’s Office of Water.  In his letter, Sterman 
questioned the science policy implications and requested assistance from the EPA to defend the 
federal regulatory standards, because that response would also determine the sufficiency of the 
state standards.31   
Sterman’s correspondence to Perciasepe led to a chain of letters from the EPA and the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) in which the federal agencies contested many of 
CWMI’s scientific observations.32  These federal actors also claimed that the CWMI’s 
recommendations failed to assert sufficient scientific evidence to justify any changes to the 
federal or state regulations.  For example, Alan Rubin, one of the original authors of the 503 
rules, sent a letter to Sterman and copied two other government officials and Ellen Harrison of 
CWMI.  Rubin’s letter criticized the CWMI paper.  According to Rubin, the CWMI scientists 
made many assertions and recommendations to the effect that “no scientific basis” could support 
the need for the proposed guidelines.33  In addition, Rubin suggested that the CWMI scientists 
examined the wrong issue.  Rubin recommended that the CWMI scientists should explore the 
health impacts of animal manure products, not sewage sludge.    
                                                 
31 Sterman, D. (1997, Apr. 14), [Letter to Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator of the EPA]. 
32 See, e.g., Sterman, D. (1997, Apr. 14), [Letter to Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator of the EPA]; 
Rubin, A. (1997, May, 9), [Letter from Alan Rubin, EPA Sr. Scientist, to David Sterman, Deputy Commissioner of 
the NYSDEC]; Perciasepe, R. (1997, Jul. 24), [Letter to Richard Rominger, Deputy Secretary of Agriculture]; 
Rominger, R. E. (1997, Oct. 3), [Letter to Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator of the EPA]. 
These correspondences referred to communications involving federal scientists Rufus Chaney of the USDA and 
John Walker of the EPA.  Both Chaney and Walker participated in crafting the original 503 regulations, and the 
correspondences referred to both these individuals as actors involved in discounting the CWMI research.  ` 
See also, Anonymous (1997, Dec.). Neither scientific facts nor meeting can bring biosolids comfort to Cornell 
Institute. Biocycle,38(12), 10-12.(The article states: “Walker’s memo was accompanied by several letters from Bob 
Perciasepe … written in response to questions about the scientific basis for the EPA Part 503 regulation concerning 
biosolids use”). 





Like Rubin’s letter, the other correspondences followed the same pattern of discrediting 
and distracting.  That is, several government actors initiated a series of communications to start a 
collective campaign to discredit the CWMI study.  In addition, the correspondences served as an 
opportunity for these government actors to distract observers about the CWMI scientists’ 
reported concerns by directing these observers to other science policy matters (i.e., use of animal 
manure).  While these letters reflected the initial challenges against the CWMI scientists, in 
Scene 2, a federal administrator, who was responsible for the 503 rules, introduced a third step to 
the challenge. 
Scene 2:  
In Scene 2, which begins in July 1997, besides discrediting and distracting observers 
about the issues raised in the CWMI research, Robert Perciasepe of the EPA sent his objections 
about the study to two Cornell administrators.  Perciasepe wrote in July 1997 to David Sterman 
of the NYSDEC to express the EPA’s position about CWMI’s first paper.34  The four-page letter 
conveyed three clear messages.  First, throughout the letter, Perciasepe criticized the CWMI 
paper for containing many “scientific inaccuracies.” 35  According to Perciasepe, the paper 
presented several data source misstatements, failed to consider special land conditions, and 
asserted recommendations without scientific support.  He framed the CWMI’s paper as the 
academic scientists’ attempt to unnecessarily alarm the public about a scientifically safe practice.  
In nearly every paragraph of the letter, Perciasepe also characterized the CWMI 
recommendations as “unnecessarily over-restrictive regulatory policies.”36  He did mention, 
however, that if the state chose to adopt more restrictive policies, then “the State should indicate 
                                                 
34 Perciasepe, R. (1997, Jul. 24, 1997), [Letter from Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator of the EPA, to 
David Sterman, Deputy Commissioner of the NYSDEC]. 
35 Perciasepe, Jul. 24, 1997, paragraph 2. 





that their [sic] regulatory decision is policy-based rather than science-based.”37  Put simply, 
Perciasepe clearly conveyed his beliefs about the CWMI paper and attempted to discredit the 
paper as a policy-advocacy piece that contained inadequate scientific justifications for the 
authors’ findings and recommendations.   
Second, Perciasepe contended that the CWMI scientists placed “undue focus on 
biosolids” as a health concern.38  He claimed that the CWMI’s research “divert[ed] attention 
from problems that [were] occurring … from the use of animal manures and other agricultural 
inputs,” which academic scientists had not fully examined.39  However, the CWMI scientists 
along with David Lewis, a scientist for the EPA, and several grass-roots organizations opposing 
sludge application, disagreed with Perciasepe’s characterization of the CWMI scientists’ 
research contribution.40  They interpreted Perciasepe’s comment about the animal manure issue 
as an attempt to distract sewage sludge critics.   
Third, Perciasepe sought assistance from others who might have influence over the 
CWMI researchers.  As one might expect, Perciasepe sent copies of the letters to individuals who 
were directly connected with the CWMI study, such as Ellen Harrison, one of the CWMI 
authors, and Richard Rominger, the Deputy Secretary of the USDA, since the study addressed 
                                                 
37 Perciasepe, Jul. 24, 1997, paragraph 10. 
38 Perciasepe, Jul. 24, 1997, paragraph 9. 
39 Perciasepe, Jul. 24, 1997, paragraph 9. 
40 See, e.g., Parnell, K. H. (2001). Toxic sludge in our communities: Threatening public health and our 
farmlands. Portland, ME: Toxics Action Center.   
Also, the National Sludge Alliance issued more than 20 short papers referred to as “National Sludge Alliance 
Fact Sheets” that also question the EPA’s position and support the CWMI scientists’ research contribution.  
Furthermore, throughout this time (i.e., the late 1990s to the early 2000s, EPA scientist David Lewis participated in 
research projects examining the adverse health effects of sewage sludge and supporting the CWMI research.  In 
2001, Lewis filed a federal whistleblower claim against the EPA for allegedly silencing him and other federal 
scientists.  According to Lewis, the EPA covered up the scientific evidence demonstrating adverse health effects 
from sludge.  The EPA settled with Lewis for the sum of $205,000.  In 2003, the EPA fired Lewis.     
See, e.g., Lewis, D. L., Gattie, D. K., Novak, M. E., Sanchez, S., & Pumphrey, C. (2002, Jun.). Interactions of 
pathogens and irritant chemicals in land-applied sewage sludges (biosolids). BMC Public Health, 2(11), 1-8; Lewis, 
D. L., & Gattie, D. K. (2002, Jul. 1). Pathogen risks from applying sewage sludge to land. Environmental Science & 





land-applied sludge for agricultural uses.  However, Perciasepe also sent his letter to two 
administrators at Cornell, University President Hunter Rawlings III and Ronnie Coffman, the 
Director of Research and Associate Dean of the College of Agriculture.  The CWMI researchers 
and several observers supporting the CWMI paper suspected that involving the two Cornell 
administrators reflected Perciasepe’s attempt to encourage these university administrators to 
assist with silencing the CWMI researchers.41  Brian Martin, a professor of social sciences at the 
University of Wollongong (Australia) who studied political dissent and scientific suppression, 
commented that:  
 If someone disagrees with a scientist’s research conclusion or public statements, an 
accepted method of response is to criticize the argument, for example, by sending a letter 
to the scientist or to a journal.  By contrast, sending a letter of complaint to the scientist’s 
boss or funding body, attacking the scientist’s credibility or right to speak out, would be 
seen by many as an attempt to apply pressure on the scientist rather than address the 
issues under dispute.42 
Similarly, other observers believed that Perciasepe’s actions sent an implicit message that the 
CWMI researchers harmed Cornell University’s reputation through their allegedly poor research 
and that the institution’s future federal grant awards might be jeopardized if the institution 
continued to disseminate this research.  While Perciasepe never revealed his reason for sending 
                                                 
41 Michael Vatalaro of the Environment News Service, an international news wire service, characterized 
Perciasepe’s letter as an effort to “denounc[e] the science in the Cornell paper to both the New York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation and the President of Cornell University” (Vatalaro, 2000, paragraph 
16). 
Vatalaro, M., (2000, Mar. 22). EPA intimidates sludge critics, Congress told. Environment News Service. 
http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2000/2000-03-22-03.asp  
42 Martin, B. (1999). Suppression of dissent in science. In W. R. Freudenburg & T. I. K. Youn (Eds.). Research 





the two administrators a copy of those letters, many observers interpreted the action as an 
attempt to silence the CWMI scientists on matters about the 503 rules.43 
Perciasepe’s letter represented a symbolic government challenge rather than one that 
actually yielded significant negative consequences for the CWMI researchers. The Cornell 
administrators and federal agency officials appear to have taken no action in response to 
Perciasepe’s July 1997 letter.  The CWMI scientists continued their work.  In August 1997, the 
CWMI scientists released their second paper, Case for Caution.  Rather than suppressing the 
second paper, Cornell issued a press release.  The press release headline read, “EPA rules for 
land application of sewage sludge are too lax.”  In addition, the university highlighted the CWMI 
scientists’ research in the Cornell Chronicle, an internal news service for the university 
community.44  Also, in September 1997, Ellen Harrison sent Robert Perciasepe a copy of the 
Case for Caution paper.45  In Harrison’s cover letter, she acknowledged that the EPA Office of 
Water did “not agree with many of [the CWMI researchers’] arguments and conclusions,” but 
she offered to engage in “continued dialogue” with his staff – if that would help each side 
understand the other’s position and scientific questions.46   
On October 31, 1997, Perciasepe sent Harrison a letter challenging CWMI second paper, 
Case for Caution.47  Perciasepe responded in a manner that suggested he was more interested in 
closing the discussion than engaging in an open dialogue.  As in his July 1997 letter, Perciasepe 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., EPA’s Sludge Rule: Closed Minds or Open Debate?: Hearing before the House Committee on 
Science, 106th Cong. at 179 (2000) (Testimony of Ellen Harrison); Mar. 22, 2000: Vatalaro, M. (2000, Mar. 22). 
EPA intimidates sludge critics, Congress told. Environment News Service. http://www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/mar2000/2000-03-22-03.asp 
44 Press Release: EPA rules for land application of sewage sludge are too lax; Oct. 23, 1997: Segelken, R. 
(1997, Oct. 23). CU Waste Management Institute’s report calls for more EPA restrictions. Cornell Chronicle, article 
#24.  
45 Harrison, E. Z. (1997, Sept. 19), [Letter from Ellen Z. Harrison, Director of CWMI, to Robert Perciasepe, 
Assistant Administrator of the EPA]. 
46 Harrison, Sept. 19, 1997, paragraph 2. 
47 Perciasepe, R. (1997, Oct. 31), [Letter from Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator of the EPA, to Ellen 





repeated his actions to challenge the new CWMI paper.  First, he criticized the CWMI research 
as a flawed study with many misstatements.  Among his allegations, Perciasepe wrote that the 
CWMI paper erroneously asserted that the 503 rules failed to consider “safety and uncertainty 
factors.”48  He also believed that the paper inappropriately “implie[d] that a 1 in 10,000 cancer 
risk [was] dangerous, that soil ingestion factors considered in the risk assessment may be too 
low, and that plant uptake coefficients and dietary evaluations” were misstated.49  According to 
Perciasepe, the CWMI scientists presented their data and recommendations without sufficient 
scientific support.  Second, Perciasepe suggested that the CWMI scientists had examined the 
wrong issue.  He considered the CWMI scientists’ research insignificant because he concluded 
the science already determined “low risks associated with land application of biosolids.”50  
Perciasepe advised that the CWMI drop this inquiry, and instead, explore another related, but 
important, issue.  Specifically, he cited a lack of research about “the human health and 
environmental impacts of animal manures and other agriculturally recyclable by-products,” not 
sewage sludge.51  Besides redirecting the CWMI scientists to a different research topic, 
Perciasepe advised the CWMI scientists to “undertake a more holistic problem-solving approach 
in the management and utilization of nutrients and residuals in agriculture.”52  His comment 
appeared as a subtle criticism that the CWMI research failed to address an issue in an appropriate 
systemic manner – a necessary approach for science policy decisions.  Finally, just as with his 
July 1997 letter, Perciasepe also notified the Cornell University President, Hunter Rawlings III, 
and Ronnie Coffman, the Director of Research and Associate Dean of Cornell’s College of 
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Agriculture.  That is, Perciasepe once again alerted actors who could influence or exercise 
organizational authority over the CWMI scientists.   
Act 1 Summary 
Act 1 presented certain government actors (i.e., various EPA and USDA administrators 
and scientists who had oversight of the 503 rules and/or helped craft the original regulations) 
taking steps to close the conversation about the CWMI scientists’ concerns about the 503 rules.  I 
presented the actors’ use of three tactical steps to carry out this strategy.  In Scene 1, they 
attempted to discredit the academic scientists’ research and distract observers by leading them to 
another science policy matter.  Then, in Scene 2, they repeated the first two steps and added a 
third.  In that third step, a government official alerted actors who had influence over the CWMI 
scientists that the government agencies disapproved of the CWMI scientists’ research; this, I 
suggest, was an attempt to silence the CWMI scientists through other actors.  While none of the 
government’s tactics actually stopped the CWMI scientists from disseminating their research, the 
challengers still employed pressures and tactics intending to quiet the debate.   
Act 2: Third-Party Reviewers 
In Act 2, I introduce two new actors to this play.  These actors are organizations, one 
public and one private.  As we will learn, they have no official responsibility in overseeing or 
writing the EPA’s 503 rules challenged by Cornell Waste Management Institute (“CWMI”) 
research.  By some accounts, they appear as neutral parties who can comment on the CWMI 





Scene 1:     
In November 1997, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 
(“NYSDEC”) issued a technical report criticizing the Case for Caution paper.53  A technical 
report usually evaluates the scientific assumptions, methods (including data sources), analyses, 
and conclusions.  However, rather than conducting an independent review, NYSDEC’s technical 
report largely reiterated statements made earlier by several federal administrators and scientists, 
such as Rufus Chaney, Robert Perciasepe, Alan Rubin, and John Walker.  These individuals had 
oversight of the 503 sludge rules and/or helped write the rules back in 1993.  NYSDEC justified 
why it contacted both the EPA and USDA for research information and adopted much of what 
the federal agencies had already stated.  According to the NYSDEC, because it “did not 
participate in the risk assessment process,” its responses were “based on information from [the 
EPA and USDA] concerning the risk assessment.”54   
According to several observers who supported the CWMI scientists, the NYSDEC’s use 
of these federal actors to argue against the CWMI research did not actually represent an external 
review of the sludge policies.  Caroline Snyder, professor emerita of science, technology, and 
society at the Rochester Institute of Technology and vocal opponent of sludge application, 
painted a slightly different picture.55  In an article that she published in the International Journal 
of Occupational and Environmental Health, a peer-reviewed journal, she described the New 
York state agency as having “worked closely with Alan Rubin, John Walker, EPA’s Assistant 
Administrator, and Rufus Chaney of USDA, on a response to the Cornell paper.”   
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Reflecting back on these close working relationships, Ellen Harrison, the lead author of 
the challenged CWMI study, even referred to these government tactics as simply ignoring the 
federal actors’ biases.56  David Snyder and Fredrick Kunkle of the Washington Post quoted 
Harrison explaining her observation.  According to Harrison, “[w]hen a regulatory agency 
becomes a promoter of something, it makes it difficult for them to be objective.”57  Nonetheless, 
several trade organizations, such as the Mid-Atlantic Biosolids Association and New England 
Biosolids and Residuals, viewed the report as another data source with a seemingly independent 
scientific review by these state regulators.  Yet, for the CWMI scientists and their supporters, the 
NYSDEC’s report simply reiterated the federal agencies’ biases and served as another document 
contesting the CWMI research.  Viewed another way, the report appeared as a third-party review 
for others to cite as evidence that the CWMI scientists disseminated flawed research. 
Scene 2:     
Leaping forward, Scene 2 took place primarily between 2001 and 2002.  In 2001, 
Synagro Technologies, Inc., the largest sewage recycler in the United States, hired CPF 
Associates, Inc. (“CPF”), a science research and consulting firm with a specialty in 
environmental science.  Synagro commissioned CPF to review the CWMI paper, Case for 
Caution.  Based on that review, CPF identified two “significant deficiencies.”58  First, CPF 
raised questions about the CWMI’s efforts to overcome research bias.  Illustrating possible 
                                                 
56 Ellen Harrison also mentioned in several other settings, including her congressional testimony and several 
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of biosolids activities. Washington, D.C: Author. 
 57 Snyder, D., & Kunkle, F. (2001, Aug. 1). Health fears over sludge spur quest for controls: EPA stand 
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problems with research bias, CPF asserted that the CWMI paper (a) had not undergone peer 
review, (b) had relied on selected scientific literature (or sections of papers) that favored the 
CWMI arguments and appeared to have omitted those that presented unfavorable data, and (c) 
had failed to follow certain scientific protocols, such as presenting calculations, data, and source 
of research funding.  According to CPF, the alleged evidence of research bias violated “generally 
accepted standards for publication of scientific research.”59 
For the second significant deficiency, CPF alleged that “most of the scientific 
conclusions [in the CWMI paper] … [were] erroneous and/or misleading.”60  CPF claimed that 
the CWMI scientists made errors by improperly comparing metal concentrations in different 
settings, mistakenly referencing regulatory standards or criteria, and incorrectly describing 
environmental risk assessments.  Given these assertions of “scientific errors and disregard for 
standard scientific principles,” the report concluded that “the Cornell document is fatally 
flawed.”61   
In light of the negative review, it was not surprising that Synagro approved the release of 
the CPF findings.  In February 2002, CPF issued its report and presented its findings at the 
annual meeting for the New York Water Environment Association, a wastewater industry-
friendly environment.  The CWMI researchers and other observers, such as the National Sludge 
Alliance, questioned the objectivity of CPF.  Although CPF considered itself an independent 
researcher and disclosed its connection with Synagro, not everyone perceived the arrangement as 
one without pressures or influences over its evaluation of the CWMI study.62  Ironically, the CPF 
review team even noted in its report that disclosure of funding sources alerts the reader to 
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possible influences from the funding source (this, in connection with questioning the funding 
sources of the CWMI study).  Indeed, for the CWMI authors and some of their supporters, the 
CPF contract with Synagro presented a possible conflict.63  In their response, the CWMI authors, 
for their part, insinuated the possibility that Synagro, as the CPF funding source, might have 
presented a skewed perspective. They emphasized that “[s]tudies have shown that research 
findings are strongly influenced by the source of funding for that work.”64   
Although the level of Synagro’s influence (other than paying for the report) was not clear 
from the available data, what was clear from this scene was that the CPF report served as another 
challenge against the CWMI scientists’ research.  Several critics viewed the report as a third-
party scientific evaluation intended to discredit the CWMI research.65 
Act 2 Summary & Conclusion 
Act 2 discusses two technical reports used to challenge the CWMI research, one from a 
state environmental agency and another from a private environmental-science consulting firm.  
Both reports criticized the CWMI research for lacking scientific support, relying on flawed 
assumptions, and following allegedly incorrect protocols.  Yet, as several CWMI supporters 
pointed out, these reports might have been influenced by actors with an interest in the outcome.  
The state report largely repeated the statements from the federal agencies that adopted and 
oversaw the controversial regulations, and Synagro Technologies, Inc., a significant corporate 
entity in the sludge business, hired the private environmental-science consulting firm to write its 
report.  Regardless of whether the influences on NYSDEC and CPF actually took place, these 
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technical reports still served as additional challenges to the CWMI research.   Some critics of the 
CWMI research, such as sludge trade organizations, sludge companies, and municipalities, 
viewed these two reports as additional evidence to overcome the CWMI research, while 
supporters of the CWMI study questioned whether these technical reports actually represented 
impartial scientific reviews.  Put simply, these reports became the policy tools to discount the 
CWMI research.   
Summary of Challenges 
The circumstances and events surrounding the challenges highlighted a common theme: 
The challengers intended observers to discount the CWMI scientists’ concerns about the 503 
rules.   
In Act 1, federal administrators and scientists, who oversaw and/or wrote the 503 rules, 
employed a three-step approach to challenge the CWMI’s government-sponsored research.  
These actors (a) engaged in a collective campaign to discredit the CWMI research, (b) proposed 
an alternative research topic to distract observers from the sludge issue, and (c) alerted other 
individuals, who at the time had influence over the CWMI scientists, about the federal agencies’ 
concerns with the CWMI research, possibly hoping to effect the silencing of the researchers.   
In Act 2, two organizations created seemingly independent reports, which served as 
policy tools to essentially discount CWMI’s research.  As noted earlier, the NYSDEC and CPF, 
an environmental consulting hired by Synagro, issued separate technical reports to challenge the 
CWMI research.  Even though these reports essentially restated many of the same messages as 
the federal agency memos, critics of the CWMI research identified these reports as additional, 
independent studies that concluded the CWMI study contained serious scientific flaws.  Several 





The CWMI scientists and their supporters did not sit idly during the challenges from the 
federal actors and the third-party scientific reviewers.  As I discuss below, the CWMI scientists 
and their supporters responded to each significant challenge in hopes of defending the research. 
The CWMI scientists also took steps so they could exert control over their government-
sponsored research.   
Responses to the Challenges 
Responding to the challenges, the CWMI scientists and their supporters employed three 
primary strategies to defend the research and exert control over it.  Following my conceptual 
framework (Chapter 3), in this section, I show that these three strategies relied heavily on (a) 
internal characteristics, (b) external factors, and (c) both internal and external factors of the 
academic profession.  Further, I demonstrate how these three types of strategies made it possible 
for the CWMI scientists to exert control over their governmentally sponsored research. 
Internal Characteristics 
One strategy relied on internal characteristics of the academic profession.  The CWMI 
scientists used academic traditions as behavioral guides to address the government challenges.  
The CWMI scientists and their supporters rolled out this strategy in two parts.  First, the CWMI 
scientists articulated certain academic traditions as guidelines for practice or rules to follow.  
Second, the CWMI scientists, their supporters, and other observers appear to have adopted the 
academic traditions as behavioral “guides” or “rules” to address the contested research.  As I 
demonstrate below, these guides afforded the CWMI scientists control over their research by 
shifting the rules of engagement from government policies and statements that challenged the 
CWMI research to certain academic traditions that favored research independence, a continuing 





Articulating Academic Traditions as Behavioral Guides  
 The CWMI scientists declared that certain academic traditions should guide the actors’ 
behaviors in addressing this controversy.  One of these occasions took place in late summer 1997 
(i.e., immediately following the release of the Case for Caution).  In a letter to Robert Perciasepe 
of the EPA, the CWMI scientists explicitly requested an open dialogue between them and the 
government agencies standing behind the 503 rules.  On behalf of the CWMI scientists, Ellen 
Harrison offered to engage in “future discussions” with the EPA to address differences in their 
perspectives, particularly in terms of their research assumptions and methodology.66  For the 
CWMI scientists, an open dialogue reflected the exercise of two internal characteristics of the 
academic profession as means to leverage control over the situation.   
First, the CWMI scientists intended the dialogues as equivalents to academic forums in 
which they could exercise their professional knowledge and skills to guide the discussion.  On 
behalf of the CWMI scientists, Harrison wrote Robert Perciasepe that: “We believe that open 
debate is useful and hope that the spirit of our future interactions will be based on that 
premise.”67  Harrison also offered a suggestion on what to investigate.  She suggested that the 
CWMI and the federal agencies start by examining their differences, especially in terms of the 
“appropriate uptake coefficients, leaching and groundwater impacts, [and] dietary 
assumptions.”68   Some observers and the CWMI scientists believed that clarifying these terms 
and the study methodology would allow the CWMI scientists an opportunity to publicly justify 
their work as well-reasoned and appropriate steps.69 
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Second, the CWMI scientists adopted an academic view that as academic scientists, they 
would serve society through their research.  They outlined a division of labor in which academic 
scientists and policymakers work as complementary actors supporting each other in the solution, 
rather than competing over who gets jurisdiction over the matter.  As noted above in the 
Interactions Surrounding the Challenges section, Robert Perciasepe and other government 
challengers criticized the CWMI scientists for trying to set regulatory standards, a responsibility 
that fell within the policymakers’ professional jurisdiction.70  However, academic scientists also 
have a responsibility to expand the scientific knowledge about matters such as chemical and 
metal reactions and impacts to human health.   
Relying on the academic tradition of service, the CWMI scientists and their supporters 
tried to redefine the roles of academic scientists in science policy.71  While they discussed the 
divisions of labor concept in terms of how each actor conducted his or her tasks in distinct ways 
and often with different perspectives, they also asserted that each actor is charged with the social 
responsibility to propose solutions to the science policy issue (i.e., whether the 503 rules 
adequately protected individuals from adverse health effects when exposed to the sludge).  
Articulating this academic tradition of service, the CWMI scientists suggested that this redefined 
                                                                                                                                                             
researchers, don’t discredit them. Cornell Chronicle.  Retrieved from 
http://www.news.cornell.edu/chronicle/00/4.6.00/Harrison-EPA.html; Anonymous (2003, Aug. 18), Suspect 
science: Potential risks of sludge and EPA policies are cause for concern. Sarasota Herald-Tribune, A8; Snyder, C. 
(2005). The dirty work of promoting “recycling” of America’s sewage sludge. International Journal of 
Occupational and Environmental Health, 11(4), 415-427.  See also, National Sludge Alliance Fact Sheets. 
70 According to the governmental challengers, the CWMI scientists overstepped their boundaries by promoting 
policy advocacy, not science.  This claim rested in large part on the governmental challengers’ belief that the CWMI 
scientists argued for regulatory changes allegedly based on nearly nonexistent probabilities that harm would arise 
from sewage sludge application.   
71 For example, assistant professor of agronomy Richard Stehouwer (1999), in Land application of sewage 
sludge in Pennsylvania: What is sewage sludge and what can be done with it? (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University), suggested that the CWMI scientists contributed to the education of landowners and policymakers 
through their service in sludge research.  Similarly, Professors Krogmann, Gibson, and Chess (2001) of Rutgers 
University conducted a study that concluded that university extension services significantly contributed to the 
understanding of surveyed farmers regarding the science sludge policy as well as the science of sludge. Krogmann, 
U., Gibson, G., & Chess, C. (2001). Land application of sewage sludge: Perceptions of New Jersey vegetable 





division of labor serve as the working conditions for the academic scientists and the 
policymakers.72  Accordingly, the CWMI scientists and their supporters advocated for a division 
of labor in which both groups would work together.  Further, as the CWMI materials indicated 
and Ellen Harrison stated on numerous occasions, the CWMI service commitment was 
particularly important for Cornell University as a land grant university.73  The CWMI scientists 
felt an obligation to inform policymakers when a policy presented actual or potential harms to 
New York citizens.   
To summarize, in this section, we observed how the CWMI scientists established several 
academic traditions as behavioral guides (or academic rules) for addressing the contested 
research.  In the next section, I present the actions that followed these academic rules.   
Using Academic Rules  
In this section, the application of academic traditions as behavioral guides in addressing 
the controversial research becomes more noticeable.  Many observers of the controversy, 
including federal scientists, academic scientists, citizens who complained about sludge 
application, and wastewater treatment staff, followed these academic norms to guide their actions 
or influence their thoughts when responding to the situation.  For example, when Perciasepe of 
the EPA challenged the CWMI scientists and notified two Cornell administrators (i.e., the 
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university president and one of the associate deans),74 the records at Cornell indicate no 
administrative action was taken to investigate or silence the CWMI scientists.  On the contrary, 
several reports show that Cornell administrators respected the CWMI scientists’ practice of 
research independence from sources that might have undue influence over their results.75   
Under Freidson’s concept of ideology, a professional’s independence from external 
sources reflects an internal characteristic of a profession to exercise control over its work.  Here, 
the CWMI supporters generally upheld the academic tradition of research independence from 
undue influence and afforded the CWMI scientists their ability to continue their research and to 
disseminate their work products.  In March 2000, Ellen Harrison even testified at a congressional 
hearing that “we were confident that academic freedom and integrity would protect us from any 
recriminations at the University, which they did.”76   
  While academics, such as the CWMI scientists and the Cornell administrators, respected 
the academic traditions, the federal actors who challenged the CWMI research rarely did.  
Despite their non-adherence to academic norms, some observers still perceived academic 
traditions as the designated rules of engagement for these federal actors to use.  For example, 
when several government actors (e.g., Robert Perciasepe of the EPA, David Sterman of the 
NYSDEC) failed to comply with the academic norms, some of these observers raised questions 
about the federal actors’ intentions.77  They wondered whether the federal actors who challenged 
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the CWMI research acted in the best interests of the public.  According to Sheila Cherry, reporter 
for a politically conservative newspaper, citizens exposed to the sludge believed that “the EPA 
has gotten behind a sludge program allegedly to protect the environment and, when people began 
to sicken and die, became as intransigent as any other accused polluter.78  
By contrast, some observers, particularly academic scientists, perceived the CWMI 
scientists’ compliance with the academic rules as evidence of their good faith efforts to move 
along the conversation in a structured manner.79  These events represented the CWMI scientists’ 
efforts to advance the academic profession’s ideology of an open exchange along with their 
ability to exercise their professional knowledge and skills.  Furthermore, asserting the academic 
traditions of open dialogue, the CWMI scientists tried to reverse the effect of the government 
actors’ attempts to close off debate.80  The CWMI scientists defended and disseminated their 
controversial research even as they kept working.  For example, using traditional academic 
                                                                                                                                                             
that time period (i.e., the “best professional judgment”).  Nevertheless, he indicated that a re-evaluation of the 503 
rules was required as the EPA had not conducted a review since before 1993.  
Evanylo, G. K. (1999). Agricultural land application of Biosolids in Virginia: Risks and concerns (Report 452-
304). Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Cooperative Extension, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. 
In addition, two academic scientists at the College of William & Mary’s Virginia Institute of Marine Science, 
Robert Hale and Mark La Guardia, conducted a study on chemicals and metals present in sewage sludge.  
Supporting the CWMI research, they found high concentrations of harmful materials in the sludge and suggested 
that the U.S. needed to adopt tougher standards, just as the CWMI scientists had recommended.  In their article, 
Hale and La Guardia (1999) reported that “[n]o U.S. regulations exist limiting organic pollutant burdens. The 
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Nonetheless, they pointed out, the EPA had not acted on the CWMI recommendations even after the CWMI 
scientists pointed out that the U.S. has very lenient standards when compared with many European countries.  
Hale, R., & La Guardia, M. J. (1999). Have risks associated with the presence of synthetic organic contaminants 
in land-applied sewage sludges been adequately assessed? New Solutions 12(4), 371-386. 
78 Cherry, S. R. (2000, May 15). Toxic waste used as fertilizer. Insight on the News 16(18), 16-18, 39.  N.B. 
Inside on the News is now known as Insight. 
79 Snyder (2005) explained how sludge critics and academic scientists interpreted the academic traditions of 
peer review and open access as reflecting the good faith efforts of the CWMI scientists to provide sound scientific 
research.  
Snyder, C. (2005). The dirty work of promoting “recycling” of America’s sewage sludge. International Journal 
of Occupational and Environmental Health, 11(4), 415-427. 
80 For example, Robert Perciasepe of the EPA sent letters that conveyed that the sludge science was clear and 
not open for further discussion.   
See, e.g., Perciasepe, R. (1997, May 21), [Letter from Robert Perciasepe, Assistant Administrator of the EPA, to 
David Sterman, Deputy Commissioner of the NYSDEC]; Perciasepe, R. (1997, Oct. 31), [Letter from Robert 





means to report their research findings, in 1999, the CWMI researchers published their third 
paper examining the scientific effects of sewage sludge and criticizing the 503 rules.  That paper, 
which was essentially identical to the Case for Caution, appeared in the International Journal of 
Environment and Pollution, a peer-reviewed journal. 81  Publication in a peer-reviewed journal 
was a further effort to gain academic recognition.  It also helped the CWMI scientists gain more 
scientific credibility among academic scientists and with some state and local policymakers.82  
Specifically, as states and municipalities debated changing their policies and/or practices 
regarding the use of land-applied sewage sludge, several policymakers and opponents to sewage 
sludge use cited the peer-reviewed publication as an expert analysis.83    
The CWMI researchers also used their affiliation with the agricultural extension services 
at Cornell to disseminate their work.  As a land grant university, Cornell’s mission includes a 
public service commitment to the agricultural community within New York State.  The CWMI 
scientists reported that they had a social responsibility to assist “farmers, policymakers and 
citizens by performing relevant research and publication of results in peer-review journals, as 
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82 For example, according to John Lucas, a reporter for the Evansville Courier & Press (Evansville, IN), 
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well as through outreach” about agricultural issues such as the possible effects of sewage sludge 
on farm lands.84  However, the CWMI scientists viewed their services to the university extension  
as more than an exercise of their professional expertise.  They also described their extension 
services work much like a training program for the agricultural community and policymakers.   
As a training program, the CWMI delivered professional-development seminars, 
disseminated educational booklets and papers, and contributed new knowledge to farmers and 
policymakers about their respective practice areas of farming and policymaking.  Uta Krogmann, 
Virginia Gibson, and Caron Chess – three academic scientists at Rutgers University – also 
viewed the strategy of training end users about the scientific implications of sludge as a useful 
way for farmers to learn about the benefits and drawbacks of the substance.85  They investigated 
New Jersey vegetable farmers’ understanding about sludge, and among the authors’ findings, 
they identified university extension services as significant information sources for these 
farmers.86 
In sum, many supporters of the CWMI research, along with other observers, came to 
believe that the academic traditions of open debate were the best way to address the research 
controversy.  In other words, this strategy shifted the rules of engagement from government 
policies and statements that challenged the CWMI research to certain academic traditions that 
favored research independence, a continuing dialogue about the CWMI’s concerns, and 
academic scientists’ participation in science policy. 
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The CWMI scientists and their supporters also relied heavily on external factors 
influencing the academic profession, such as individuals and venues that fall outside of the 
Academy.  In particular, the CWMI scientists and their supporters relied on political forums and 
other mechanisms that influence the public or aid them in understanding the science.  These 
actions helped the CWMI scientists gain control over their governmentally funded research. 
Raising Another Academic Voice 
Even though the EPA and USDA officials tried to close the conversation about the 
CWMI research, the CWMI scientists managed to gain access to political forums, such as 
congressional, state, and county hearings, as a means to have a voice in the sludge debate.  More 
significantly, the CWMI scientists used these forums (a) to inform the public about the 
challengers’ tactics of discrediting their sludge research and (b) to disseminate and defend their 
work.  Illustrating this strategy, I draw attention to a U.S. House of Representatives Committee 
on Science hearing, the EPA’s Sludge Rule: Closed Minds or Open Debate?  The House hearing 
investigated citizen reports that the EPA tried to silence critics of the 503 rules.87  According to 
Congressman James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Wisconsin, Republican), the chair of the House 
Committee on Science, the purpose of the hearing was to determine “whether the EPA in its 
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management of the Part 503 Sludge Rule … [failed] to foster sound science with an open 
exchange of ideas.”88 
In the fall of 1999, during the preparatory stages of the hearing, the CWMI scientists 
worked with a political ally, Congressman Sherwood Boehlert (New York, Republican), to gain 
access to this political venue.  As Congressman Boehlert stated at the House hearing, he worked 
with CWMI scientist Ellen Harrison to get her a witness slot.89  Boehlert felt strongly that the 
academic scientists’ perspective needed to be heard, specifically so Harrison, on behalf of the 
CWMI scientists, could “air their legitimate concerns about how [the] EPA has responded to 
criticism of its sludge rule.”90   
At the hearing, Harrison provided examples of how the EPA had attempted to discredit 
the CWMI research.  For example, she testified that the EPA “mischaracterized our research and 
… suggested that we used methods that [were] not appropriate to answering the scientific 
questions we [sought] to address.  Some of [the EPA’s] assertions about our work (for example 
that we used metal salts and not sludges to study leaching in a greenhouse study) [were] simply 
untrue.”91  According to Harrison, the EPA’s challenging of the CWMI’s research methods “was 
particularly surprising” because the EPA office, which had been the party most critical of the 
CWMI research, had a representative on this research project’s advisory board.  Harrison noted 
that the representative even “knew the research methods being used.”92  In another example, 
Harrison pointed out that the government challengers characterized the CWMI research as 
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overstating the sewage sludge impacts to groundwater.  Yet, according to Harrison, “in fact and 
ironically, EPA and New York State’s own cleanup guidelines for hazardous waste sites 
suggest[ed] that groundwater concerns may require significantly more stringent standards for 
acceptable soil levels of contaminants than those allowed under the sludge rules, an 
inconsistency brought about by the fact that different parts of the agency did those different risk 
assessments and wrote those rules.”93   
Harrison’s testimony afforded the CWMI scientists a voice in a major public forum.  At 
this hearing, she contested several of the EPA’s claims and demonstrated how the EPA had 
attempted to discredit the CWMI study.94  Further, she presented parts of her research for the 
public to hear.  In some cases, certain members of the public reasserted these arguments to raise 
concerns about the 503 rules and to battle municipalities that intended to apply sludge in the 
complaining parties’ cities.95 
Academic Research Affirmed and Public Rallying 
Around the same time frame as the events surrounding the House hearing (i.e., late 1990s 
and early 2000s), several environmental groups issued reports disputing the safety of sewage 
sludge. 96  Supporting their claim, the groups cited to the CWMI research as one of the primary 
academic studies presenting an independent examination of the 503 rules.  Despite these 
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assertions, the EPA’s Office of Water continued to refute claims that the 503 rules were not 
sufficient protections; in addition, the office reiterated that the CWMI research was scientifically 
flawed.  Then, coincidentally, the EPA and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
started receiving a series of reports that staff at wastewater treatment facilities and citizens who 
lived nearby recently applied sludge had encountered a variety of suspicious health reactions, 
including headaches, skin ulcers, nausea, vomiting, nosebleeds, and respiratory problems.97  
Those health incident reports, which took place from 1998 to 2000, led to two investigations: one 
by the EPA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and another by the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).98 
 In 2000, the EPA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued an internal investigation 
questioning the sufficiency of the EPA’s oversight measures to protect the public from harmful 
sewage sludge.99  The EPA OIG found that sewage sludge may actually contain “toxic pollutants 
and disease-causing organisms.”100  The EPA reiterated that the “EPA cannot assure the public 
that current [sewage sludge] land application practices are protective of human health and the 
environment.”101  Echoing the exact issue that the CWMI scientists had raised, the EPA OIG 
questioned whether the EPA’s Office of Water, which oversaw the sludge policy, maintained 
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sufficient oversight mechanisms to protect the public from undetected, yet harmful, sewage 
sludge.102   
The NIOSH report also echoed significant concerns about the 503 rules.  That 
investigation began after the CDC had received numerous complaints of wastewater treatment 
worker illnesses.  In August 2000, after having conducted inspections of several wastewater 
treatment facilities, NIOSH determined that additional protective measures for individuals 
working in waste treatment plants to process Class B sludge, the more potent sludge for 
commercial application, were essential.103   
In light of the 2000 OIG and 2000 NIOSH reports, the EPA faced increasing public 
pressure to investigate concerns about the adequacy of the 503 rules.  In September 2000, the 
EPA issued a task order to the National Research Council (NRC).104  In late 2000, the NRC 
solicited feedback for recommendations of scientists to add on its panel.  CWMI and its 
researchers overwhelmingly dominated the list of recommendations.105  Of the ten letters 
recommending an individual or institution with the appropriate expertise, six of them identified 
CWMI or specifically one of the Case for Caution researchers.  Five of the letters specifically 
mentioned Ellen Harrison.  Three also identified Dr. David Lewis, a researcher at the University 
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of Georgia and former EPA scientist, who also publicly supported the CWMI research.  Beyond 
Harrison and Lewis, no other individual or institution received more than one recommendation.   
Based on comments from the public, the justifications for supporting Harrison’s 
recommendation emphasized her expertise, her ability to “represent the public interest,”106 and 
her reputation as a “qualified independent scientist.”107  These descriptors captured the impact of 
the CWMI scientists’ efforts to engage the public and win broad recognition as experts in the 
field.  In early 2001, the NRC appointed Ellen Harrison to the panel as one of the 16 scientists, 
who included other representatives from academia as well as industry and state agency sludge 
administrators.     
The EPA limited the scope of the NRC examination to just a few issues.108  Accordingly, 
the panel had a very specific focus, although the agency acknowledged that “some readers” 
might have expected the report “to cover all aspects of biosolids and determine whether EPA 
should continue to promote its use.”109  Even with the limited scope of review, the NRC 
generally concluded that the 503 risk-assessment standards required a significant update to 
account for newer science.  For instance, the NRC team reported that the EPA had not conducted 
a “substantial reassessment … to determine whether the chemical or pathogen standards 
promulgated in 1993 [were] supported by current scientific data and risk-assessment methods”110  
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These statements generally supported the CWMI scientists’ findings and recommendations that 
the 503 rules were outdated and did not assess the effects of certain metals and pathogens.  For 
example, Sections 1.3, 7.11, and 7.12 of the CWMI scientists’ 1999 paper outlined several 
related arguments about the inadequacy of the containment standards and the assessment of 
pathogen risks, which the NRC also mentioned.111  Further, the NRC observed that the EPA did 
not have “an adequate program to ensure compliance with the biosolids regulations and has not 
documented the effectiveness of its prescribed management practices.”112  Likewise, in Section 
7.13 of the 1999 paper, the CWMI scientists dedicated a section to arguing that the EPA 
maintained “inadequate enforcement and oversight.”113   
While the NRC report raised many of the same concerns that the CWMI scientists had, 
the NRC team did not advocate standards as strict as what the CWMI scientists had 
recommended.  Nevertheless, placing Harrison on the NRC panel gave the CWMI scientists an 
opportunity to assert their findings and recommendations as well as openly defend their science 
before the other 15 experts.  Indeed, the common thread throughout this overarching strategy has 
been the CWMI scientists’ actions to leverage support from actors external to the academic 
profession.  These external actors, particularly a political ally who placed Harrison on a 
congressional witness list and public supporters who recommended Harrison to the NRC panel, 
made it possible for Harrison to disseminate and defend the CWMI research in two public 
settings of the national sludge policy debate.   
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Both Internal Characteristics & External Factors 
There was another strategy.  I refer back to events that started in Act 2, Scene 2 when 
sludge recycler Synagro Technologies hired CPF Associates, an environmental consulting firm, 
to review and ultimately challenge the Case for Caution.114  Several months after CPF issued its 
report, the CWMI scientists responded to the CPF Associates review by reversing the challenge.  
That is, the CWMI scientists took the challenger’s questions or allegedly discrediting evidence 
and turned them back on the challenger.  Below, I explain how this strategy relied on two 
internal characteristics of the academic profession (i.e., professional ideology and knowledge and 
skills) and one external factor (i.e., public understanding/interpretation), with the effect of 
helping the CWMI scientists exert control over their research.  
Changing Places: From the Party Being Challenged to the Role of Challenger 
In the opening section of the CWMI scientists’ response to the CPF report, the academic 
scientists drew boundaries around the matters they would address in the report, just as the 
government challengers had done earlier when they contested the CWMI papers.  The CWMI 
scientists justified their actions, stating “a detailed rebuttal” would not “help to further the 
science or quiet the debate.”115  Accordingly, the CWMI scientists issued a limited response to 
the CPF report.  The CWMI scientists only addressed matters about which they believed CPF 
had made inconsistent or erroneous statements.   
For example, to weaken the credibility of the CWMI research, CPF had claimed that the 
CWMI scientists failed to comply with a basic academic norm of disclosing research funding 
sources.  In response, the CWMI scientists disclosed their government sources.  Additionally, the 
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CWMI scientists acknowledged that “[s]tudies have shown that research findings are strongly 
influenced by the source of the funding for that work.”116  Characterizing their government 
sponsors as neutral parties to the research, the CWMI scientists reported that their financial 
streams had derived from no sources “with a financial stake in their work or from any private 
sector source.”117  In other words, they demonstrated a professional ideology of research 
independence.  But the CWMI scientists claimed that CPF could not claim research 
independence under this same standard (i.e., using no private sector funding source that might 
compromise objectivity).  Drawing on public interpretations and understandings, the CWMI 
scientists emphasized that “readers should have information about the source of funding.”118  
Contrasting their financial sources with CPF’s financial source, the CWMI scientists pointed out 
that CPF Associates had acted “at the request of Synagro Technologies, Inc., a firm whose 
business includes the land application of sewage sludges.”119  Though the CWMI scientists never 
explicitly stated that Synagro actually influenced the CPF report, their message did the job of 
conveying that CPF might have been influenced to meet the interests of its sponsor, a corporate 
entity with direct financial ties to the sewage sludge industry.     
The CWMI scientists took the same approach to address CPF’s challenges about the Case 
for Caution’s scientific content.  CPF had reported scientific errors in the CWMI scientists’ 
research methods and data treatment.120  Relying on the academic scientists’ professional 
knowledge and skills, the CWMI scientists offered their rationale for their methods and data 
treatment.  For instance, the CPF Associates report alleged that the CWMI scientists had used the 
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incorrect soil ingestion rate.121  The CWMI scientists explained that “calculations of the 
concentration of contaminants … rely on both concentration of contaminants in the sludge and 
the amount of sludge applied.”122  Another discrepancy concerned the application rate.  The 
CWMI scientists noted that in its report CPF Associates had relied on a measure of three 
tons/acre.123  However, the CWMI scientists indicated that the EPA used a rate of ten tons/acre to 
determine risk assessments of land application for agricultural purposes.124  The CWMI scientists 
contended that their experience in New York State supported the calculation of “10 tons/acre [as] 
a reasonable figure” to determine soil concentrations of contaminants.125  After explaining the 
different scientific assumptions that the CWMI scientists and CPF Associates had used, the 
CWMI scientists reframed the controversy to draw on public interpretation of which 
measurement to rely upon – the one used by CWMI or the one used by CPF.  The CWMI 
scientists suggested that “… an important reason there is disagreement about the US EPA 503 
rules is the debate about what constitutes an acceptable risk.  What level of crop yield reduction 
is considered acceptable, for example?  How many additional cases of human disease are 
acceptable?”126  Further, they pointed out that certain federal policymakers, industry 
representatives, and some academic scientists cannot agree on how “to deal with [scientific] 
uncertainty.”127  However, the CWMI scientists reported that they relied on their past experience 
to construct “a very cautious approach,” better than the one their challengers used.128  Thus, these 
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events once again demonstrated the CWMI scientists’ efforts to turn the tables to raise concerns 
about CPF Associates’ evaluation of risk and uncertainty.   
This strategy offered two significant benefits to the CWMI scientists.  First, for some 
members of the public, the CWMI scientists’ response made it easier to discount the CPF report 
and consider the findings and recommendations contained in the CWMI paper.  For example, in 
2002 and 2003, the Center for Progressive Regulation and the Sierra Club both highlighted the 
value of Ellen Harrison’s expertise and the problems associated with the industry-funded 
statements.129  In 2005, Caroline Snyder, professor emerita of science, technology, and society at 
the Rochester Institute of Technology and vocal opponent of sludge application, published a 
paper in the International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health characterizing 
CPF as biased and CWMI as the scientific voice of sludge.  In that publication, Snyder referred 
to CPF as “a group of sludge-friendly scientists [hired] to attack” the CWMI’s Case for Caution, 
a paper that she described as a “comprehensive science-based critique of the 503 rule[s].”130  
 Second, the CWMI scientists’ response directed observers to review the NRC report, 
which was issued on July 2, 2002 (i.e., approximately six weeks after the CPF report became 
public).  The CWMI scientists even stated, “Rather than rehash [the risk-assessment] arguments 
here, we urge all interested persons to refer to the National Research Council report on 
biosolids….”131  Following the NRC report’s publication, members of the media and other 
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commentators also linked the CWMI papers with the NRC recommendations raising concerns 
about the adequacy of the 503 rules to protect the public.132   
Summary of Responses 
Drawing on my theoretical framework, which I summarized in Chapter 3, I examined the 
data and revealed that the CWMI scientists and their supporters employed three principal 
strategies.  First, relying on the internal characteristics of the academic profession, the CWMI 
scientists identified academic rules as the basis for determining how actors in the controversy 
should behave.  Symbolically, the adoption of these academic norms reflected a shift in the rules 
of engagement from government policies to academic traditions as the behavioral guide to 
address science policy matters.   
Second, the CWMI scientists and their supporters relied on external factors influencing 
the academic profession to give themselves, via Ellen Harrison, a voice in two important areas.  
First, they worked with a political ally so Harrison could participate in a congressional 
investigation regarding questions about certain EPA officials’ behaviors toward sludge 
opponents.  Besides disclosing the governmental pressures to silence the CWMI scientists, 
Harrison’s testimony provided another public venue for the CWMI scientists to defend and 
disseminate their research.   
 Finally, for the third strategy, the CWMI scientists reversed the positions of the 
challenger to the party being challenged.  Most notably, when CPF Associates challenged the 
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CWMI scientists’ Case for Caution paper, the CWMI scientists responded to several of the CPF 
claims, then turned the question (or a reframed version of the question) back to CPF in a manner 
that raised concerns about the CPF review. 
 In short, the CWMI scientists and their supporters employed three strategies – using 
academic norms as the rules of engagement, gaining a public stage from which to comment on 
political behavior and the scientific assessment of sludge, and reversing the positions of the 
challenger and the party being challenged – as ways to defend the CWMI’s government-
sponsored research and exert control over it.  
Summary & Conclusion 
In this chapter, I explored the challenges to a government-sponsored research study and 
the strategies that helped the authors of the challenged study exert control over it and fend off 
attacks.  In this case, the contested study, a state- and federally sponsored research project (i.e., 
Cornell Waste Management Institute [CWMI] research) questioned the sufficiency of the 503 
sludge rules.  According to the CWMI scientists, the 503 rules failed to take into account many 
metals, chemicals, and pathogens that presented potential harm to individuals exposed to the 
sludge.  Consequently, the CWMI scientists proposed a more stringent risk-assessment standard 
and called for improved government oversight of the sludge application. 
Several policymakers at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not welcome the CWMI research findings or 
recommendations.  Besides disagreeing with the CWMI research, these government actors, as 
well as other actors, challenged the CWMI study.  Reconstructing the interactions among the 
primary actors in the conflict as a dramatic play, I recounted the circumstances and events 





In Act 1, several EPA and USDA administrators and scientists who had oversight and/or helped 
write the 503 rules challenged the CWMI scientists.  These federal actors constructed a 
collective campaign to discredit the CWMI research, distract observers from the sludge issue by 
raising another waste management topic to explore, and to alert individuals, who at the time had 
influence over the CWMI scientists, about the government’s concerns with that study.  In Act 2, 
the challengers shifted to non-federal actors, specifically, the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC), CPF Associates, and Synagro Technologies.  Both the 
NYSDEC and CPF Associates performed reviews of the CWMI scientists’ Case for Caution 
paper and each issued a technical report.  In 1997, the NYSDEC report basically relied on many 
of the scientific challengers that the EPA and USDA had mentioned earlier.  CPF Associates 
conducted a more thorough review; however, as the CWMI scientists pointed out, Synagro 
Technologies, the leading U.S. sewage recycler, paid CPF to conduct the study, so observers 
questioned the report’s credibility.  Moreover, the CWMI scientists highlighted several problems 
with that report (i.e., several omissions, misstatements, and mischaracterizations).  Even though 
one of these reports largely repeated earlier federal documents and another report was 
commissioned by a sludge company and contained several errors, for some sludge proponents, 
these two technical reports still served as additional scientific sources to challenge the CWMI 
research.    
The CWMI scientists and their supporters responded to these challenges.  Drawing on my 
theoretical framework (see Chapter 3), I grouped the responses in three categories: (a) actions 
that relied heavily on the internal characteristics of the academic profession, (b) actions relying 





internal and external factors.  Framing the actions into these three groups, the data revealed that 
the CWMI scientists and their supporters employed three principal strategies.     
Under the internal characteristics frame, the CWMI scientists adopted several academic 
traditions as the rules or behavioral guides to address the contested research.  These individuals 
turned to the academic traditions, not government policies and practices, as normative responses 
to make science policy decisions.  Referring to these academic rules, numerous observers, 
especially many CWMI supporters, interpreted certain federal officials’ actions as being 
inconsistent with the established academic rules, and thus, counter to openness and research 
independence.  By contrast, these observers viewed the CWMI scientists’ actions as being 
consistent with several academic traditions – and thus, open to examination for data quality and 
control checks – as well as advancing other behaviors to achieve research independence.   
Under the external factors frame, the CWMI scientists and their supporters established a 
strategy of obtaining a voice for Ellen Harrison, who spoke on behalf of the CWMI scientists, in 
two important settings.  In the first setting, the CWMI scientists worked with a political ally, so 
Harrison would receive an invitation to testify in a congressional investigation regarding the 
EPA’s attempts to silence sludge opponents.  By testifying at that hearing, Harrison had an 
opportunity to describe the EPA’s pressures and tactics and to present information supporting the 
study’s claims.  Likewise, in the second setting, a group of CWMI supporters recommended 
Harrison for appointment to the NRC panel.  That venue also gave Harrison a chance to defend 
the CWMI research and persuade the panel that several of the CWMI findings and 
recommendations should be included in the NRC report.  Although, from the data it was not 
clear to what extent Harrison had to persuade the panel about the value of the CWMI research 





similar to those in the CWMI research.  For example, both the CWMI scientists’ paper and the 
NRC report recommended (a) updating the 503 assessment approaches to include additional 
chemicals, metals, and pathogens to test and (b) adopting more stringent oversight and 
enforcement practices.  
 When combining both the internal and external factors influencing the academic 
profession, a third strategy emerged.  The CWMI scientists reframed questions and accusations 
that one challenger used on the academic scientists and reversed the questions or accusations 
onto the challenger.  In essence, the position of the challenger changed to the position of the 
party being challenged.  For some observers, this strategy raised concerns about the scientific 
accuracy and sufficiency of the original challenger’s claims and positioned the CWMI research 
as more credible than the CPF report.  
 In closing, I note that this chapter captured the primary conflicts between the government 
actors and the CWMI scientists from 1997 to 2002.  The sludge controversy did continue beyond 
2002, but these challenges-responses were rather minor relative to the 1997-2002 time frame.  
Although the conflicts between the government actors and the CWMI scientists subsided by 
2002, the challenges between EPA administrators and EPA scientists continued.  In fact, in 2010, 
the EPA and Dr. David Lewis, a former EPA scientist, were still in litigation over his 2003 
termination.133    
  
                                                 
133 In his suit, Lewis contended that the EPA terminated him for blowing the whistle on the agency when he 







Table 5.1: Acronyms for the Sewage Sludge Case 
 
CWMI = Cornell Waste Management Institute 
EPA = [U.S.] Environmental Protection Agency 
NIOSH = National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
NRC = National Research Council 
NYSDEC = New York State Department of Environmental Conservation  
OIG = Office of the Inspector General 







Table 5.2: Timeline of Relevant Actions and Events in the Sewage Sludge Case 
DATE ACTION/EVENT
1993 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgates 503 rules. 
Mar. 21, 1997 Cornell Waste Management Institute (CWMI) sends papers to New 
York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC). 
Apr. 14, 1997  David Sterman of NYSDEC contacts Robert Perciasepe of the EPA 
for assistance on responding to CWMI papers. 
Apr. to Dec. 1997 NYSDEC works with the EPA and U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) administrators and scientists to work on a response to 
Cornell. 
Jul. 24, 1997 Robert Perciasepe responds to David Sterman. Perciasepe carbon 
copies several people, including Ellen Harrison of CWMI, the Cornell 
University president, and an associate dean at Cornell.  
Aug. 1997 CWMI issues the Case for Caution.  
 
Sept. 19, 1997 Ellen Harrison sends a copy of the Case for Caution to Robert 
Perciasepe of the EPA. 
Oct. 31, 1997 Robert Perciasepe responds to Ellen Harrison.  Again, Perciasepe 
carbon copies several people, including the Cornell University 
president and an associate dean at Cornell. 
Nov. 1997 NYSDEC issues its technical report of the Case for Caution.  
1999 CWMI scientists publish the Case for Caution under a different title in 
the International Journal of Environment & Pollution. 
Mar. 20, 2000  U.S. House Committee on Science Hearing, Sludge Rule: Closed 
Minds or Open Debate? 
Mar. 2000 
 
EPA’s Office of Inspector General issues report, which is critical of 
the 503 rules. 
Jul. 2000 CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) issues report that additional safety precautions are needed to 
handle sludge. 
Sept. 2000 EPA issues a task order to conduct a National Research Council 
(NRC) review of the 503 rules. 
Late 2000 to Feb. 
2001 
NRC solicits recommendations for additional panelists, and Ellen 
Harrison is subsequently appointed to NRC panel. 
Feb. 3, 2002 CPF Associates, Inc. issues its review of the Case for Caution 
May 20, 2002 CWMI scientists respond to CPF Associates’ report. 






CHAPTER VI: THE CLIMATE CHANGE CASE 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I present my findings of the climate change case.  To help us understand 
the environmental issues of this case, I first provide context about the science behind the climate 
change controversy and federally sponsored academic research that governmental actors publicly 
challenged.  Second, I identify and describe the tactics and pressures that the challengers 
employed.  This discussion elucidates the circumstances and events surrounding the challenge.  
In addition, I capture the interactions among individuals and groups involved to explain the 
actors’ reported perceptions and interests in the scientific dispute.  Third, I discuss the strategies 
and tactics that the academic profession used in defense of its intellectual freedom.  Drawing on 
my theoretical framework (see Chapter 3), I examine the internal characteristics and external 
factors common in the academic profession to help show how certain responses from members 
of the profession and other allies aided the researchers of the challenged study.  I explain how 
these strategies and tactics helped the challenged researchers exert control over their federally 
sponsored work.  Fourth, I summarize the key findings. 
The Science and the Policy Debate 
Policymakers and scientists generally accept the notion that the Earth’s temperature has 
experienced periods of warming over the past 100 years.134  What remains a debatable issue 
among policymakers and scientists is whether human actions contributed to this global 
warming.135  In more scientific terms, the global warming debate may be framed as:  Do 
                                                 
134 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007).  Climate change 2007: Synthesis report.  New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. 
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135 See, e.g., Nisbet, M. C., & Myers, T. (2007).  Twenty years of public opinion about global warming.  Public 





anthropogenic matter, processes, and effects contribute to the increasing emission rates of 
greenhouse gases, which become trapped in the Earth’s atmosphere, causing temperature 
increases?  On one side of the debate, policymakers and scientists have contended that the 
Earth’s rising temperature reflects an ecological cycle.136  They believe that natural radiative 
forcings such as volcanic eruptions are alone causing the increases in temperature.  On the other 
side of the debate, a different group of policymakers and scientists have argued that besides the 
natural radiative forcings, anthropogenic radiative forcings such as carbon dioxide emissions 
and fluorocarbons trapped in the atmosphere are producing heat.137   
Each scientific position presents a potentially different plan of action.  If the former 
science prevails, policymakers can do nothing or adopt policy choices that would not harm the 
environment yet reduce the warming trend.138  If the latter science prevails, policymakers and 
scientists have a social obligation to identify mitigation efforts that would reduce human 
activities that emit heat-trapped greenhouse gases.  If humans are contributing to global 
warming, the consequences of not acting may severely harm the ecosystem.  Many scientists 
believe that the unnatural warming will eventually lead to significant ice melts in mountain 
glaciers and Arctic seas.  If they are right, the melting will raise sea levels and contribute to 
greater precipitation.  Furthermore, the unnatural warming will alter the ecosystem in other ways, 
such as by compromising the viability of certain animals and plants.   
                                                 
136 See, e.g., Gilchrest, 2004, p. H808; Inhofe, 2006, pp. S10012-10015. 
Science investigates human contribution to climate change, U.S. House of Representatives, Proceedings and 
Debates (108th Cong., 2nd Sess.), 149 Cong. Rec. S10012- S10022 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2004, p. H808). Statement of 
Representative Wayne T. Gilchrest. 
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S10012- S10015 (daily ed. Jul. 28., 2003). Statement of Senator James Inhofe. 
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To date, no scientific study presents findings that prove beyond all doubt that 
anthropogenic radiative forcings contribute to global warming.  However, a number of studies 
suggest that human influences may indeed play a role.  Since 1990, the United Nations 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has issued assessment reports updating 
policymakers and other interested parties about the state of climate change research.  These 
assessments have changed significantly from report to report as paleoclimate science improves. 
In 2001, while U.S. legislators were debating the adoption of policies to curb emissions 
of greenhouse gases, the IPCC issued its Third Assessment Report on the global warming 
concern (“IPCC 2001”).  It concluded that the science presented stronger evidence than reported 
in the Second Assessment Report that humans likely do contribute to global warming.  In support 
of that proposition, the report’s chapter addressing observed climate change cited more than 500 
studies.  One particular study, Michael E. Mann, Raymond S. Bradley, and Malcolm K. 
Hughes’s 1999 article in Geophysical Research Letters,139 stood out for readers, among them 
policymakers, scientists, academics, members of the media, and environmental interest groups.  
An accompanying graph depicted a sharp increase in global temperatures after the 
industrialization era.  As David Appell, a journalist, noted, the graph became an “iconic symbol 
of humanity’s contribution to global warming” and a controversial image for policymakers, 
scientists, and other individuals, who did not attribute global warming to human causes.140 
The Federally Sponsored Study 
Funded through a National Science Foundation grant, Michael E. Mann, Raymond S. 
Bradley, and Malcolm K. Hughes (“MBH”) reconstructed temperature records back to the year 
1000 A.D.  In their 1999 peer-reviewed article (“MBH99”), the three academic scientists 
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examined climate variations in the Northern Hemisphere from 1000 to 1998 A.D., estimating the 
temperatures before 1850 using data proxies from nature-based recordings such as tree rings, ice 
cores, and coral.141  Earlier climate research had also used proxies, but MBH99 and one of the 
authors’ earlier studies, known as MBH98,142 were the first comprehensive studies to use 
multiproxies of nature-based temperature recordings to model the temperature levels for such a 
long period of time (i.e., nearly 1000 years).     
MBH’s temperature reconstructions displayed a pattern, which caught international 
attention and the interest of the IPCC 2001 authors.  The MBH99 data showed evidence of 
steady temperature increases from 1000 to just before the 1900s.  Around the turn of the 20th 
century, their data displayed a sharp increase in temperature, and from that point continuous rises 
until 1998.  According to the authors, the natural forcings could not fully account for the 
significant increase in temperature.  They posited that industrialization and other human 
activities likely explained the rise in temperature beyond what could be attributed to the natural 
forcings. 
The authors charted the data in a graphical format.  The graph’s line, a fairly straight line 
with a slight curve and then a dramatic spike upward, resembled an image of a hockey stick.143  
The graph appeared in one of the IPCC 2001 report’s chapters and in an abridged version of the 
report, which was targeted at policymakers.  The eye-catching and easy to understand illustration 
of anthropogenic global warming became the center of a series of challenges against its authors.   
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Interactions Surrounding the Challenges 
Many policymakers, scientists, lobbyists, and others interested in the global warming 
debate in some way challenged Michael E. Mann, Raymond S. Bradley, and Malcolm K. Hughes 
and their 1998 and 1999 federally sponsored research.  However, it is outside the scope of this 
paper to detail each interaction and list all the actors.  Instead, I draw attention only to the 
challenges that capture the primary actors and interactions involved in this case study. 
As in a play, the challenges appear in Acts.  In this metaphorical play, there are four Acts.  
In Act 1, I recount a series of events in which two individuals, Stephen McIntyre and Ross 
McKitrick (“M&M”), use their background in statistics and mathematics to challenge MBH’s 
research.  This Act uncovers how M&M’s criticisms increasingly captured the attention of the 
scientific community and other members of the public.  In Act 2 we see how several government 
actors used M&M’s criticisms as the primary basis to challenge MBH’s research, and how 
several scientific organizations, climate scientists, and political allies protested the government 
challenge.  In Act 3, I reveal steps that these governmental challengers took to build a case 
against MBH.  In addition, I report an action that political allies of MBH took to investigate the 
contested scientific studies.  In Act 4, I highlight the interactions of a congressional hearing, 
which essentially repeated the challengers’ primary arguments to discredit MBH98 and MBH99 
as well as the supporters’ primary arguments to defend those studies.    
Act 1: Scientific Audits 
Taking place between 2003 and 2005, Act 1 lays the evidentiary foundation for the 
government challenges that eventually occur in Act 2.  Specifically, Act 1 recounts a series of 
events in which M&M allegedly uncover several problems with MBH98 and MBH99.  As M&M 





journals, mass media, and interest groups that have been known to cast doubt on human-induced 
global warming.   
Scene 1:  
Scene 1 opens in 2003.  In that year, Stephen McIntyre, a retired minerals consultant, and 
Ross McKitrick, an economics professor at the University of Guelph, Ontario, began 
collaborating to examine the MBH temperature reconstructions.  In April 2003, after 
experiencing problems retrieving the MBH98 and MBH99 data, McIntyre corresponded with 
Michael Mann, the M in MBH, requesting access to the MBH temperature-reconstruction 
data.144  A chain of e-mails ensued.145  When McIntyre e-mailed Mann in September 2003 and 
posed questions about missing data and the data analysis approach, Mann replied by explaining 
the data treatment and noting the location of the requested data.  He also added, “Owing to 
numerous demands on my time, I will not be able to respond to further inquiries.  Other 
researchers have successfully implemented our methodology based on the information provided 
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in our articles.”146  M&M interpreted these events as Mann closing access to the raw data and the 
algorithm that reconstructed the temperatures. 
Even with most of the raw data, M&M still could not replicate the study as they 
understood it, especially without the algorithm.  The study replication problems concerned 
M&M.  In an interview with USA Today, McKitrick criticized Mann for not giving him and 
McIntyre all the raw data and the algorithm to reconstruct the data.  He argued that “[i]f a study 
is going to be the basis for a major policy decision, then the original data must be disseminated 
and the results have to be reproducible.”147 Accordingly, between 2003 and 2004, M&M sought 
scientific support to audit MBH’s research.   
In M&M’s first challenge of MBH’s hockey stick within the scientific community, they 
published problems that they allegedly encountered with the MBH98 data, the scientists’ 
methodological approach, and MBH’s analysis.  Their paper appeared in the November 2003 
issue of Energy & Environment (“M&M03”).148  The paper’s primary finding was that the 
“particular ‘hockey stick’ shape derived by MBH98 is primarily an artefact of poor data handling 
and use of obsolete proxy records.”149  M&M reportedly observed several problems with the data 
used, including “collation errors, unjustified truncation or extrapolation of source data, obsolete 
data, incorrect principal components calculations, [and] geographical mislocations.”150  Based on 
their analysis, the Northern Hemisphere’s temperatures during the 20th century were 
“unexceptional compared to the preceding centuries.”151  That finding conflicted with MBH’s 
principal argument.  That is, MBH claimed that the 20th century had been warming and the 1990s 
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constituted the warmest decade in 600 years.  Nonetheless, M&M contended that “the extent of 
errors and defects in the MBH98 data means that the indexes computed from it are unreliable and 
cannot be used for comparisons between the current climate and that of past centuries.”152  M&M 
concluded that MBH’s evidence could not support claims that “temperatures in the latter half of 
the 20th century were unprecedented,” and “even the warmer intervals in the reconstruction pale 
in comparison with mid-to-late 20th-century temperatures” or that the 1990s was “likely the 
warmest decade.”153  
Having reported numerous errors with the MBH research in a peer-reviewed journal, 
M&M moved forward with their second challenge of MBH’s research to members of the 
scientific community.  In an effort to access all the raw data and the accompanying algorithm, 
M&M filed a “materials complaint” to the MBH98 journal publisher, Nature.154  As a condition 
of publication, Nature requires that its authors make their data available.  That editorial policy 
furthers both goals of scientific communalism and study replication.  In the complaint, M&M 
described how unhelpful they felt Mann was to their efforts of replicating MBH98.  M&M 
asserted that “[w]e have been systematically and deliberately stymied by Professor Mann on the 
most elementary requests: a proper listing of his data series and the exact computational 
procedures used.”155  Besides allegations that Mann withheld information, M&M raised concerns 
about data discrepancies.  For instance, the number of proxies reported in the article was 
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154 McIntyre, S., & McKitrick, R. (2003, Nov. 17), [Letter from Stephen McIntyre & Ross McKitrick, Editor of 
Nature].  Archived at http://www.uoguelph.ca/~rmckitri/research/fallupdate04/MM.MC.Nov03.pdf (McIntyre and 
McKitrick request additional information about MBH98 data, so they can replicate the study). 





different from what Michael Mann’s Web site indicated as the number of proxies used to 
reconstruct temperatures for the MBH98 article.   
After the Nature editor sent the MBH98 authors a copy of the materials complaint, MBH 
reviewed the data and the publication.  Through their review, they discovered that certain data 
had been “either mistakenly included in the Supplementary Information, or mistakenly left 
out.”156  In July 2004, the authors corrected the MBH98 supplementary information in a 
corrigendum statement, which, like an errata statement, serves as a correction to the original 
publication.  While the corrected data presented more accurate information so other academic 
scientists could replicate the MBH98 study, the MBH98 authors also noted that they believed 
“[n]one of these errors affect our previously published results.”157  
Scene 2:  
In the opening of Scene 2, M&M continue to inform the scientific community about 
alleged problems with MBH’s research.  They apply various techniques to demonstrate possible 
statistical flaws and defects with the proxy data, and they publish their works through two 
scientific venues.  
In early January 2005, M&M published a follow-up paper in Energy & Environment 
(“M&M05a”).158  Then, in mid-January 2005, Geophysical Research Letters, the same academic 
journal that printed MBH99, accepted M&M’s article and placed an early version of that paper in 
its online forum.  Known as M&M05b, the article reported alleged statistical errors in the MBH 
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studies.159  In that article, M&M concluded that the MBH method “when tested on persistent red 
noise [i.e., random data], nearly always produces a hockey stick” shape in M&M’s 
reconstruction of the data.   
Although M&M reported very similar findings in prior presentations and even in their 
2003 and 2005 publication in Energy & Environment, the media took notice of M&M’s 
criticisms after the Geophysical Research Letters publication.  According to journalist Marcel 
Crok of the National Post, one of Canada’s leading newspapers, M&M’s research had not gained 
much attention prior to January 2005 because he believed “none of McIntyre and McKitrick’s 
findings had [previously appeared in] major scientific journals.”160  This publication placed 
M&M in a different sphere.  Now M&M’s perspectives on the climate change research of MBH 
was reaching the general public.   
In February 2005, the front page of The Wall Street Journal reported M&M’s concerns 
about the hockey stick study.  The news article conveyed many of the main findings from 
M&M’s Geophysical Research Letters publication, but did it in lay terms.  For instance, the 
article reported McIntyre’s finding that “Dr.  Mann’s mathematical technique in drawing the 
graph is prone to generating hockey-stick shapes even when applied to random data.”161  It also 
reported that M&M had previously found errors with MBH98.162  When M&M exposed the 
problems to the journal Nature, “Dr.  Mann and his two co-authors had to publish a partial 
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correction.”163  In addition, The Wall Street Journal article indicated that M&M had been trying 
to access other MBH raw data and the computer code, but Mann had refused to provide that 
information.   
In another illustration of the increasingly public nature of the engagement, various 
organizations invited M&M to speak about their research findings challenging MBH’s hockey 
stick.  For example, one of M&M’s presentations took place at the George C. Marshall Institute’s 
Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy in May 2005.164  In their presentation, 
M&M conveyed three major points:   
First, M&M heavily criticized MBH’s statistical procedures, alleging, for instance, that 
MBH had used the wrong statistical significance measure.165  M&M also claimed that MBH 
performed another statistical procedure, known as the principal components analysis,166 in the 
wrong manner, and those mistakes caused the conflicting statistical significance errors.  Put 
simply, M&M alleged that MBH’s statistical procedure and their approach to confirming the 
accuracy of the statistical procedure presented were scientifically flawed. 
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Second, M&M believed that MBH used bad data.  They pointed to MBH’s overemphasis 
on certain temperature proxies, such as the bristlecone pine data from California.  According to 
M&M, the data had been derived from researchers who even commented that the data did not 
represent an accurate “temperature signal,” and M&M suspected that the proxy did not “match 
local temperature records.”167  Based on M&M’s review of the literature and other sources, 
bristlecone pine data were “the least qualified to represent temperature[, yet those] data end up 
getting most of the weight and drive[ing] the results in the hockey stick graph.”168   
 Third, and possibly the most interesting observation, was M&M’s assertion that “the 
studies and the [bristlecone pine] proxy data are not independent, as any ordinary person would 
understand the word independent.”169  M&M contended that “some of the most often cited” 
studies using bristlecone pine proxies for temperature reconstructions derived from a small circle 
of academic scientists.  M&M observed that the authors’ names rotate, so “Briffa et al. is not a 
different set of authors than Jones et al.[,] and Mann et al. is not different than Jones and 
Mann.”170  M&M posited: 
So the question then would be, if there is a problem with bristlecone pines and 
bristlecone pines are in eight of the ten other studies [supporting the conclusion of 
increased temperatures during the 20th century], is the “active ingredient” of each 
of these hockey sticks the same thing?  Can each of these other papers survive a 
sensitivity study to bristlecone pines possibly being non-climatic?171 
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M&M suggested that the small network of people in the climate science field colluded to achieve 
their desired results.  That is, Mann and researchers affiliated with Mann compromised their 
research objectivity and independence.  McKitrick also made a similar assertion about the close-
knit climate community in a presentation at the April 2005 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
conference.  In that talk, McKitrick stated, “Group efforts are always at risk of self-selection and 
groupthink,” and therefore, the climate community might suffer from that closed-minded 
environment.172 
In sum, during this scene, M&M captured a wider audience to whom they could 
disseminate their messages.  They moved beyond addressing members of the scientific 
community who would read their documents.  In this scene, they captured international attention 
from mass media interviews and invitations to speak at association and government meetings.  
These venues gave them an opportunity to convey the problems that they allegedly found with 
MBH’s research, such as the use of flawed statistical procedures and application of bad data.  In 
addition, M&M used these venues to speculate about the possible reasons why the climate 
community had not been receptive to M&M’s scientific audits: They argued that the close-knit 
community of climate researchers furthers a groupthink mentality, so, generally speaking, the 
community has not been receptive to opposing views.  
As I will illustrate in the following Acts of this metaphorical play, challengers of MBH 
used M&M’s arguments (i.e., flawed statistical procedures, bad data, limited data access, and 
closed networks) as their justifications to question, and at times attempts to discredit, MBH98 
and MBH99.  The significance of these events in Act 1, then, is that M&M laid the evidentiary 
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foundation for other actors, including government officials and scientists, to contest MBH’s two 
federally sponsored research studies.   
Act 2: Congressional Inquiry 
In Act 2, I present the initial government challenges to MBH’s 1998 and 1999 federally 
sponsored research studies.  In this Act, I illustrate several instances in which government 
officials used M&M’s claims from Act 1 as the basis for a congressional investigation.  In 
addition, I report how certain observers, both scientific associations and federal policymakers, 
perceived those allegations as unjustified attempts at publicly discrediting MBH’s work.       
Scene 1: 
This scene opens during the summer of 2005.  Upon learning about McIntyre and 
McKitrick’s (“M&M”) criticisms of the hockey stick study and the problems they had with 
accessing the data, two members of Congress initiated an investigation.  Because federal grants 
from the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) sponsored the hockey stick research and the two 
studies’ findings linked to a significant public policy issue, Congress had authority over the 
matter.  That is, Congress has authority to act on behalf of the public’s welfare.  This authority 
includes reviewing federally supported research and gathering more information on public policy 
issues, such as climate change.   
Exercising that authority, on June 23, 2005, U.S. Representative Joe Barton (Texas, 
Republican), chair of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Representative Ed Whitfield 
(Kentucky, Republican), chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, sent letters 
to the three climate researchers of the hockey stick study – Michael E. Mann, Raymond S. 





Climate Change (“IPCC”), and the director of NSF.173  They noted that a congressional review 
would take place “because the dispute surrounding these studies [i.e., MBH98 and MBH99] 
bears directly on important questions about federally funded work upon which climate studies 
rely and the quality and transparency of analyses used to support the IPCC assessment 
process.”174 
Congressmen Barton and Whitfield relied heavily on M&M’s public criticisms of MBH’s 
research as the basis for this inquiry.  For instance, in each of the June 23, 2005, letters, the 
Congressmen specifically mentioned The Wall Street Journal as one of the sources for their 
actions.  They referenced the article that reported M&M’s discovery of MBH’s alleged statistical 
errors, data reliability problems, and refusal to disclose certain data and codes.  Barton and 
Whitfield wrote: “Questions have been raised, according to a February 14, 2005 article in The 
Wall Street Journal, about the significance of methodological flaws and data errors in studies by 
Dr. Mann and co-authors of the historical record of temperatures and climate change.”175   
Congressmen Barton and Whitfield also referred to M&M’s publications as scientific 
justifications to question MBH’s research.176  Noting the significance of these competing studies, 
Barton and Whitfield wrote:  
[R]ecent peer-reviewed articles in Science, Geophysical Research Letters, and 
Energy & Environment [question] the results of [MBH’s] work.  As these 
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researchers find, based on the available information, the conclusions concerning 
temperature histories – and hence whether warming in the 20th century is actually 
unprecedented – cannot be supported by the Mann et al. studies[, which were 
cited in the 2001 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Third 
Assessment Report].177 
In addition, Barton and Whitfield conveyed concerns about MBH’s data transparency and 
access.  They specifically noted M&M’s complaints about this matter.  The Congressmen wrote: 
[R]esearchers have failed to replicate the [MBH] findings…, in part because of 
problems with the underlying data and the calculations used to reach the 
conclusions.  Questions have also been raised concerning the sharing and 
dissemination of the data and methods used to perform the studies.  For example, 
according to the January 2005 Energy & Environment, the information necessary 
to replicate the analyses in the studies has not been made fully available to 
researchers upon request.178 
Emphasizing the significance of replication in the scientific process, they added to their inquiry: 
“Given the questions reported about data access surrounding these studies, we also seek to learn 
whether obligations concerning the sharing of information developed or disseminated with 
federal support have been appropriately met.”179 
 The June 23rd letters also demanded professional and financial records.  For instance, 
Barton and Whitfield asked each of the climate scientists to produce a CV, along with a list of all 
articles on climate research and sources of funding, a list of all financial support for all research 
including honoraria, a list of all financial support from federal grants, locations identified for all 
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data archives, including where and when information related to research was discovered or first 
identified, information regarding source codes, information regarding requests made for data and 
responses to those requests, and information regarding a response to a particular article in 
relation to past studies conducted.  The chair of the IPCC and director of NSF received similar, 
very detailed requests.  The letters requested that each recipient of the letter submit his materials 
to the congressional committee by July 11, 2005, which gave each individual less than three 
weeks to respond to those detailed requests.   
Scene 2: 
Public reactions to Congressmen Barton and Whitfield’s letters differed.  Many critics of 
human-induced global warming appeared to support Barton and Whitfield’s investigation.180  
Capturing this general sentiment, Steven Milloy, a science policy journalist and adjunct scholar 
at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, who frequently contests assertions that global warming 
can be human induced, wrote an editorial for FoxNews.com to argue that Barton and Whitfield’s 
June 2005 congressional inquiry was nothing more than gathering additional information about a 
science policy matter.  Milloy commented that “a scientist’s refusal to provide colleagues with 
his data and methodology is suspicious.”181  Milloy also suggested that the circumstances would 
have been very different if the congressmen had issued subpoenas.  According to Milloy, 
congressional subpoenas would have clearly signaled an investigation for possible wrongdoing, 
whereas this inquiry represented requests for information about the science.  Myron Ebell, 
director of global warming and international environmental policy for the Competitive Enterprise 
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Institute,182 argued that “scientists … have vested interests” in certain activities.183  He pointed 
out that “just in terms of federal funding for climate research,” it reached “over $2 billion a 
year.”184  In his opinion, that funding generates “self-interested motives that [the public] could be 
suspicious of.”185  Given the environment, Ebell speculated that the scientific community has 
failed to critically evaluate the climate change research.  He suggested that many scientists 
“joined … the global warming bandwagon” without questioning it.  He supported the Barton-
Whitfield investigation as a formal inquiry about the research.186  Indeed, Larry Neal, a 
spokesperson for the House Energy and Commerce Committee, described the congressional 
inquiry as “[s]eeking scientific truth,” though he did apologize if “our little request for data has 
given [some scientists] a chill.”187 
By contrast, numerous supporters of MBH vocally opposed Barton and Whitfield’s 
inquiry.  Some of the MBH supporters suggested that Barton and Whitfield intended to raise 
questions of scientific misconduct.  For instance, Alan Leshner, the CEO of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, wrote: “[R]ather than simply expressing interest 
[about the research and] asking for a hearing …, [Barton and Whitfield] went and, with a highly 
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accusatory tone … asked some very, very detailed questions with a short turnaround.”188  In 
addition, numerous MBH supporters argued that scientific assessments belonged with scientists, 
not politicians.  For instance, speaking on behalf of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 
which includes the National Research Council, NAS President Ralph Cicerone wrote to 
Representative Barton advising that a “Congressional investigation, based on the authority of the 
House Commerce Committee is probably not the best way to resolve a scientific issue, and a 
focus on individual scientists can be intimidating.”189  Cicerone offered his organization’s 
services to conduct a thorough scientific review.  Further, “If the House Commerce Committee 
would like to have additional information regarding the state of scientific knowledge in the area 
of research being conducted by Drs. Mann, Hughes, and Bradley, the National Academy of 
Sciences would be willing to create an independent expert panel (according to our standard 
rigorous study process) to assess the state of scientific knowledge in this area, or perhaps one of 
the professional scientific societies could take on this task for you.”190 
Several federal policymakers also conveyed their disapproval of the Barton and Whitfield 
investigation.191  For instance, on July 1, 2005, Representative Henry Waxman (California, 
Democrat), a senior member of Congress and a member of the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, accused Barton of acting in a manner that did “not appear to be a serious attempt to 
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understand the science of global warming.”192  Instead, he suggested that “[s]ome might interpret 
[Barton’s requests] as a transparent effort to bully and harass climate change experts who have 
reached conclusions with which you disagree.”193  U.S. Representative Sherwood Boehlert (New 
York, Republican) strongly suggested that Barton and Whitfield commission the National 
Research Council to assess MBH’s research.   
These interactions between the government challengers and MBH supporters serve as a 
prelude to Act 3, in which each side initiated a separate independent review of MBH’s 1998 and 
1999 federally sponsored research.  Finally, it should be noted that during Scene 2, while various 
parties vociferously objected to Barton and Whitfield’s inquiry, Mann, Bradley, and Hughes as 
well as the National Science Foundation submitted the materials that Barton and Whitfield 
requested.194  
Act 3: Two Reviews 
In the opening of Act 3, Congressmen Barton and Whitfield commission a team of 
statisticians to examine MBH98 and MBH99, and separately, Boehlert commissions another 
group of scientists to review the MBH studies.  This Act describes interactions leading up to and 
the issuance of the two scientific reviews.  In addition, in this Act, I present each review team’s 
findings, which in many respects, reflect significantly different conclusions.   
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In September 2005, Joe Barton’s office commissions a team of academic statisticians to 
review the statistics behind the hockey stick.195  Edward J. Wegman of George Mason University 
chaired the committee, which included David W. Scott of Rice University and Yasmin H. Said of 
Johns Hopkins University (“Wegman team”).  The Wegman team had a very narrow focus.  The 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce “staff asked for advice as to the validity of the 
complaints of McIntyre and McKitrick … and related implications” based on the team’s 
assessment of M&M’s claims.196  As Yasmin Said observed, “None of our team had any real 
expertise in paleoclimate reconstruction.”197  That said, she believed that the scope of the project 
fell within their expertise because they “were arguably pretty good statisticians.”198   
The Wegman team functioned publicly as unbiased referees.  For example, to avoid 
criticism, the Wegman team conducted its study without compensation.199  Yet, behind the 
scenes, Peter Spencer, the energy committee aide to Barton, served as the lead source to direct 
the investigation.  Spencer sent them a “daunting amount of material” to review within a nine-
month span.200  According to Said, Spencer also communicated that the Committee on Oversight 
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and Investigations wanted to better understand the criticisms about Mann and his associates’ 
work.  Therefore, as part of the review, the committee directed Wegman’s team to examine 
reasons why earlier reports claiming statistical concerns about the hockey stick study were not 
“taken seriously within the climate change community.”201  
Between October 2005 and June 2006, the Wegman team conducted the review using the 
materials presented and referring to other sources that the team gathered.  Although the report 
did not undergo a formal peer- review process, the Wegman team did send off drafts of the report 
for comments to an undisclosed number of reviewers who were fellow statisticians within 
Wegman’s professional networks.202 
Simultaneous with the Wegman review, another team of scientists also assessed the MBH 
research.  Those events also started in the fall 2005, when Representative Boehlert learned that 
Barton and Whitfield had commissioned the Wegman team rather than working with the 
congressionally established scientific assessment group, the National Research Council 
(“NRC”).  In light of that news, Boehlert decided to contract the NRC.  Justifying the need for 
the NRC review, David Goldston, the House Science Committee’s Chief of Staff, stated: “It 
appeared that the issue was not going to go away by itself.  We thought this was an appropriate 
way to get an assessment of the science.”203  In January 2006, the NRC accepted the 
congressional request and proceeded with its study.  Among its directives,  
[T]he committee will describe and assess the state of scientific efforts to 
reconstruct surface temperature records for the Earth over approximately the past 
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2,000 years.  The committee will summarize current scientific information on the 
temperature record for the past two millennia, describe the main areas of 
uncertainty and how significant they are, describe the principal methodologies 
used and any problems with these approaches, and explain how central the debate 
over the paleoclimate temperature record is to the state of scientific knowledge on 
global climate change.204 
The NRC committee, which was formally titled the Committee on Surface Temperature 
Reconstructions for the Last 2,000 Years, consisted of 12 independent reviewers with scientific 
expertise on the subject matter.  The NRC specifically diversifies committees, so it draws on 
multiple perspectives to address the questions posed.  The committee included scientists with 
specialties both in climatology and statistics.  Yasmin Said, an author of the Wegman report, 
referred to the two statisticians on the NRC committee as “well respected” academics in the 
field.205  In addition, the NRC committee members had different perspectives on whether and to 
what extent human-induced global warming was taking place.   
Between January and June 2006, the committee reviewed volumes of scientific papers 
and peer comments.  In addition, in March 2006, it interviewed 11 individuals, who had 
researched in this area, including Steven McIntyre and Ross McKitrick (i.e., M&M) as well as 
Michael Mann and Malcolm Hughes of MBH.  Based on these interviews, various research 
studies, and other relevant sources, the NRC committee wrote an initial draft report.  An external 
review panel consisting of experts who had not participated in the initial steps of the NRC 
process reviewed the draft report and provided feedback to the committee.  The committee then 
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determined if any of the external review panel’s comments warranted changing the document 
and completed the final version of the report. 
Scene 2: 
On June 22, 2006, the National Research Council issued its report, which evaluated both 
the state of paleoclimate science on surface temperature reconstructions and MBH’s research, 
focusing particular attention on the accuracy of MBH98 and MBH99.  At the press conference 
announcing the NRC findings, the committee chair, Gerald North, Distinguished Professor of 
Meteorology and Oceanography and holder of the Harold J. Haynes Endowed Chair in 
Geosciences at Texas A&M University, informed the audience:  
There is sufficient evidence from tree rings, boreholes, retreating glaciers, and 
other “proxies” of past surface temperatures to say with a high level of confidence 
that the last few decades of the 20th century were warmer than any comparable 
period in the last 400 years.206    
MBH98 and MBH99 argued that, at the time of the study, the last few decades of the 20th 
century were warmer than any other period within the past 600 years and 1,000 years, 
respectively.  The NRC report could not validate those findings with high degrees of certainty.  
Instead, the report indicated:  
Based on the analyses presented in the original papers by Mann et al. and this 
newer supporting evidence, the committee finds it plausible that the Northern 
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Hemisphere was warmer during the last few decades of the 20th century than 
during any comparable period over the preceding millennium.207  
The report proceeded to explain the committee’s hesitation to affirm MBH’s temperature 
claims for periods prior to A.D. 1600.  According to the committee, “substantial uncertainties 
currently present in the quantitative assessment of large-scale surface temperature changes prior 
to about A.D. 1600 lower our confidence in [MBH’s] conclusion”208 that “the 1990s [were] 
likely the warmest decade, and 1998 the warmest year, in at least” the 1,000 years prior to the 
1990s.209  The report’s authors determined that these uncertainties derived from the imprecision 
of selected proxy data for selected time periods.210  Since the NRC committee observed some 
uncertainty, Gerald North explained that it could not support MBH’s claim about the last 
millennium using language that would attach some level of predictability.  Given the uncertainty, 
he described the findings prior to the year 1600 as “plausible.”  At a congressional hearing, 
which took place a month after the NRC issued the report, North clarified that “what we mean[t] 
by plausible [was] there just [didn’t] seem to be any counter information.”211  Thus, MBH’s 
claim about the last millennium was “a reasonable thing” to conclude (i.e., plausible but not 
certain).212 
The NRC committee indicated that its findings did not discount MBH’s claims.  In fact, 
the NRC’s high confidence in the data between the 1600s and 1990s and reduced confidence in 
the data prior to 1600 generally aligned with MBH’s works.  MBH98 and MBH99 included 
statistical error bars to represent the authors’ level of confidence in their data.  These error bars 
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reported patterns consistent with the NRC findings.  That is, MBH displayed error bars that 
“were relatively small” from 1600 to the 1990s, indicating a high level of confidence; the error 
bars increased for the period between 1000 and 1600, and again increased for the period prior to 
A.D. 1000.213  Thus, both the NRC report and the two MBH studies acknowledged problems 
with precision when researchers plotted proxy temperatures for earlier time periods; however, 
the NRC committee believed that MBH’s “uncertainties of the published reconstructions [were] 
underestimated.”214 
 The NRC committee did raise a significant concern about the MBH statistical 
methodology.  The committee observed some statistical weaknesses with that methodology.  
Most notably, it recognized M&M’s assertions that MBH did not properly recalibrate or 
normalize each of the variables over the entire time period.  MBH calibrated the data to the time 
period when temperature measures were based on more reliable instruments, not the periods 
relying heavily on the proxies.  However, that approach could have influenced the “principal 
components [calculations] in unanticipated ways.”215  That is, the NRC committee believed that 
MBH’s procedures could perform at a “suboptimal” level.216  Further, while the committee 
acknowledged MBH’s use of a validation metric in both studies, it referred to that statistical 
check as a minimum requirement.217  The committee questioned “whether any single statistic can 
provide a definitive indication of the uncertainty inherent in the reconstruction” and 
recommended the inclusion of other validation metrics.218   
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Despite these concerns, the NRC committee determined that the approach used by MBH 
did not lead to any significant problems with the data outputs.  In support of the committee’s 
conclusion, the NRC report noted that other reconstruction studies, which used the preferred 
statistical methodologies, reported outputs that were “qualitatively similar to the original curves 
presented by Mann et al.”219  For example, in 2006, Eugene R. Wahl and Caspar M. Ammann 
constructed their own code to replicate MBH’s statistical methodology.220  Unlike MBH, 
however, they recalibrated the MBH data for the whole time period, which happens to be 
consistent with the NRC statistical perspective.  Wahl and Ammann concluded that decentering 
or recalibrating the data did not result in significantly different output.  In fact, the NRC 
committee reported   
… an array of evidence that includes both additional large-scale surface 
temperature reconstructions and pronounced changes in a variety of local proxy 
indicators, such as melting on icecaps and the retreat of glaciers around the world, 
which in many cases appear to be unprecedented during at least the last 2,000 
years.221  
Thus, while statisticians would “not recommend” MBH’s methodology, their methodological 
approach did “not appear to unduly influence reconstructions of hemispheric mean 
temperature[,]” as subsequent studies appear to validate MBH’s findings.222 
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The NRC committee also acknowledged MBH’s significant contributions to the field.  As 
the NRC committee pointed out, MBH98 represented the “first systematic, statistically based 
synthesis of multiple climate proxies.”223  According to the NRC, MBH’s early research 
represented the first “large-scale surface temperature reconstructions … to include explicit 
statistical error bars to properly indicate the statistical confidence that they had with their 
findings.”224  In addition, the committee observed that “despite [some of the data] limitations, the 
… efforts to reconstruct temperature histories for broad geographic regions using multiproxy 
methods [served] an important contribution to climate research and that these large-scale surface 
temperature reconstructions contain[ed] meaningful climatic signals.”225   
Generally speaking, the NRC findings led to two opinions.  Challengers of the MBH 
research argued that the NRC report offered another objective source to point out problems with 
MBH98 and MBH99 and discredit these studies.  Supporters of the MBH research put forward a 
different perspective.  They contended that the NRC report substantially affirmed the MBH 
studies, and they highlighted the various other studies that corroborated MBH’s findings of 
human-induced global warming. 
Scene 3: 
Besides the NRC report, the challengers also asserted that the conclusions of another 
scientific review showed the MBH research to be flawed, and therefore MBH should be 
discounted.  On July 14, 2006, several weeks after the release of the NRC report, the statisticians 
(i.e., the Wegman team), whom Representatives Barton and Whitfield had commissioned, 
announced their findings.226 Unlike the NRC report, the Wegman report, officially known as the 
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Ad Hoc Committee Report on the “Hockey Stick” Global Climate Reconstruction, in no respect 
indicated that MBH98 or MBH99 had any scientific value.  Instead, the Wegman team described 
these publications as “somewhat obscure and incomplete,” and the “criticisms of MM03/05a/05b 
to be valid and compelling.”227  Given that statement, it is not surprising that the Wegman team 
listed only flaws with MBH’s research and reiterated many of M&M’s challenges of the MBH 
studies.  In this Scene, I briefly describe the Wegman team’s three principal complaints and 
connect them to instances where M&M reported the same criticisms. 
For the first major complaint, the Wegman team identified several problems with MBH’s 
data and statistical methodology.  Just as M&M had faulted MBH in their two 2005 
publications,228 the Wegman team criticized MBH for using proxies that sometimes result in 
inaccurate temperature replacements.  In addition, the team claimed that MBH’s research 
consisted of data-treatment errors, leading to numerous statistical mistakes.  Explaining its 
concerns, the Wegman team wrote: 
The controversy of Mann’s methods lies in that the proxies are centered on the 
mean of the period 1902-1995, rather than on the whole time period.  … The net 
effect of this decentering using the proxy data in MBH98 and MBH99 is to 
produce a “hockey stick” shape.  Centering the mean is a critical factor in using 
the principal component methodology properly.229  
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In other words, the team found that the MBH authors did not calibrate the proxy data to the 
whole time period, when “[n]ormally, one would try to select a calibration dataset that is 
representative of the entire dataset.”230  According to the Wegman team, this allegedly incorrect 
selection of calibrated proxy data “leads to a misuse in principal component analysis,” the 
statistical methodology used.231  Furthermore, repeating the steps that M&M performed, the 
Wegman team observed that the algorithm used in MBH98 “will reproduce any desired shape, 
depending on what shape exists in the proxies.”232  Thus, based on the data reconstruction using 
M&M’s work, the Wegman team concluded that the MBH temperature reconstructions were 
severely flawed.   
For the second major complaint, the Wegman team expressed concerns about data 
accessibility of the MBH studies, especially in light of the public visibility of the research.  The 
Wegman team indicated that MBH failed to disclose enough information for M&M to reproduce 
selected portions of their work.  The team also encountered limited data.  It reported: “[W]e did 
not find adequate material to reproduce the MBH98 materials,” even after reviewing multiple 
sources.233  Further, when MBH had shared data, the Wegman team, like M&M, described those 
occurrences as “haphazard and often grudgingly done.”234  The report’s authors emphasized that 
scientific norms include the practice of communalism, which establishes a professional 
expectation that scientists share their data for reproduction and further development of the 
scientific concept to create independent verifications.  Nonetheless, the Wegman team indicated 
                                                 
230 Wegman, Scott, & Said, 2006, p. 4. 
231 Wegman, Scott, & Said, 2006, p. 4. 
232 Wegman, Scott, & Said, 2006, p. 36. 
233 Wegman, Scott, & Said, 2006, p. 29. 





that the data access problems and arrangements of the data had the result that “independent 
verification [was] impossible” without significant guessing and reworking of the data.235     
The Wegman team’s third major complaint raised a concern about the paleoclimatic 
community’s reliance on the MBH temperature-reconstruction studies.  The team claimed that 
the paleoclimatic community is so close-knit that these researchers cannot objectively evaluate 
the studies in this area.  The basis for the Wegman team’s claim derived from a statistical 
analysis known as social network analysis, which involved examining the relationship among the 
temperature-reconstruction authors.  The Wegman team posited that “if there is a tight 
relationship among the authors and there are not a large number of individual[s] engaged in a 
particular topic area, then one may suspect that the peer-review process does not fully vet papers 
before they are published.”236  The presumption is that tight relationships in a small field likely 
demonstrate “very sympathetic referees,” especially since the odds are high that these “referees 
may have co-authored other papers with a given author” who is under review.237 
 When the Wegman team conducted the network analysis using Michael Mann as the 
network center, the data identified strong ties between Mann and cliques of paleoclimatic 
scientists who examine temperature reconstructions.  These linkages demonstrated that Mann 
worked or was closely connected with cliques whose members published most of the articles on 
temperature reconstructions.  Given these strong ties, the Wegman team also analyzed the 
relationships between various temperature proxies and papers published.  The analysis 
demonstrated that paleoclimatic researchers often relied on the same set of proxies that led to 
temperature reconstructions.  Given the dependence on the same proxies, the Wegman team 
commented that “[i]t is not surprising that the papers [published in the area] would obtain similar 
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results” about temperature changes over time.238  According to the Wegman team, the network 
analysis of the shared proxies suggested that “the ‘independent reconstructions’ are not as 
independent as one might guess.”239  Further, the team observed that “the paleoclimatology 
community has not recognized the validity of the MM05 papers and has tended to dismiss 
[McIntyre and McKitrick’s] results as being developed by biased amateurs.”240  Wegman’s team 
attributed the “closed networks with many redundant ties” as the primary reason for the 
paleoclimatic community to discount M&M’s research and “rall[y] around the MBH98/99 
position.”241 
This third criticism, postulating that possible biases might have occurred based on social 
networks, had been raised by M&M in a talk at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
conference in April 2005 and at the Marshall Institute seminar in May 2005.  In each of those 
forums, which I discussed in Act 1, Scene 3, M&M suggested that the tight-knit nature of the 
climate studies community possibly explained (1) acceptance of MBH’s data and methodology 
without criticisms and (2) the general rejection of M&M’s criticisms of MBH’s research in that 
field.  While neither M&M nor the Wegman team presented concrete evidence of actual biases 
resulting from these networks, in Act 4, I will highlight instances in which several government 
challengers of the MBH research revisited this matter to question the trustworthiness of the peer-
review process.   
 In short, the MBH challengers treated the two scientific reviews, the NRC’s and the 
Wegman team’s, as reports concluding that MBH’s studies were flawed.  For example, McIntyre 
testified at the congressional hearing that he interpreted both reports as concluding “no 
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confidence could be placed on reconstructions prior to 1600 and that Mann’s statistical methods 
were unsatisfactory.”242  
Scene 4: 
On July 19 and 27, 2006, the government challenges to MBH’s federally sponsored 
research continued with a formal hearing before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations.243  The witnesses included Michael Mann and nine individuals, 
who had participated in the review of the MBH studies, such as Edward Wegman, author of the 
Wegman report, Gerald North, chair of the NRC committee, and Stephen McIntyre, the 
individual who had been auditing Michael Mann’s work.244  Unlike past challenges, this 
interaction consisted of arguments from both sides of the debate.  For members of Congress, 
each side generally reflected the party line – Republicans as the government challengers and 
Democrats as the MBH supporters.245  
For the most part, the two-day hearing repeated the challengers’ arguments in Acts 1-3 as 
well as the responses of MBH and their supporters, which I will address more fully in the next 
section.  That is, the hearing presented three disputes between the challengers and supporters of 
the MBH study regarding (1) the true purpose of the hearing, (2) the accuracy and effect of the 
MBH data and statistics, and (3) the potential bias from the peer-review process.  Rather than 
repeat the key actors’ arguments and counterarguments, which appear in other parts of this 
chapter, I will only highlight the data revealing new insights or clarification about actors’ 
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interpretation of events.  Specifically, I will present the challenges regarding the sufficiency of 
the peer-review process.  
During the hearing, actors on both sides debated the Wegman hypothesis about whether 
the climate science community favored certain scientists’ work and closed off access for others.  
In addition, Edward Wegman, Stephen McIntyre, Joe Barton, and Ed Whitfield called into 
question the objectivity of the peer-review process and raised concerns about the trustworthiness 
of research thus reviewed when policymakers rely on these studies to make laws.  But the events 
revealed differing expectations of the peer-review process.  Before I present the challengers’ 
claims about the problems with the peer-review process, I briefly explain the approaches of the 
different types of review processes addressed in this case study in Table 6-1. 
 
Table 6.1: Differences in Peer-Review Processes 
 
SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL’S PEER-REVIEW PROCESS 
One form of peer review determines the acceptance of an article for publication.  Ralph Cicerone, the 
President of the National Academy of Sciences, described how the traditional peer-review process for scientific 
journals involves several steps.  In a written statement to the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, he explained: 
 Each scientific journal has its own policies for peer review, but there are some standard features 
among them.  Generally, submitted manuscripts are assigned to an editor who has expertise on the 
general topic.  These editors conduct a first level review of the manuscript to determine if it meets 
basic criteria for publication in the journal (e.g., length, appropriateness of subject matter, etc.).  
Some manuscripts are rejected outright at this stage.   
If a manuscript is considered suitable for the journal, it will be sent out for peer review.  
Usually, two or more reviewers are chosen by the editor.  In some cases, the journal may ask the 





associate editor will make the ultimate decision.  Reviewers are typically asked to submit 
comments on the manuscript and to make a recommendation on its suitability for publication in 
the journal.  Once the reviewers’ comments have been submitted, the editor decides whether to 
accept the manuscript for publication (perhaps with some minor revisions), ask the author(s) to 
make significant revisions and submit the paper for re-review (in which case the process is 
repeated), or reject the paper.  In the case that two reviewers disagree about the suitability of a 
manuscript for publication, the editor may solicit an additional tie-breaking review or ask the 
author(s) to prepare a rebuttal to the critical reviews.  Usually all of the review comments are 
shared with the author(s), regardless of the decision to publish, but the identity of the reviewers is 
kept anonymous throughout the process, even after publication, unless a reviewer specifically 
request[s] for their anonymity to be waived.246 
 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL’S PEER-REVIEW PROCESS 
The National Research Council assesses the research for a given scientific topic.  It selects a panel of 
typically 12 independent reviewers with scientific expertise on the project topic.  The panel constructs its initial draft 
report based on interviews of other scientific experts on the matter, reviews scientific papers directly related to the 
topic, and examines other sources deemed relevant to understanding the scientific topic.   
The initial draft undergoes a series of reviews before the NRC publicly announces its findings.  Ralph 
Cicerone, the NAS president, described this process specifically in terms of the NRC report that assessed MBH98 
and MBH99.  He indicated that a “Report Review Committee (RRC), [which consists] of approximately 30 
members of the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine,” 
oversaw the outside review process, which involved selecting independent reviewers to comment on the initial 
draft.247  Cicerone explained:  
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The Board on Atmosphere Sciences and Climate, in consultation with the RRC, appointed a group of 13 
independent reviewers with a broad range of expertise and diverse perspectives on the issues addressed in 
the report. … Reviewers were asked to provide written comments on any and all aspects of the draft report, 
including the accuracy of the committee’s analysis and the responsiveness of the committee to its charge.  
[Then, the NRC committee, which authored the report was] required to respond in writing to every review 
comment, revising the report where appropriate.  These responses were evaluated by a review monitor 
appointed by the RRC and by a review coordinator appointed by the NRC Division on Earth and Life 
Studies.  The report was not released until after the review monitor, the review coordinator, and all 
members of the authoring committee approved the revised draft.  Once the review process was successfully 
completed, no changes (other than minor editorial corrections) were made to the approved text.248   
Thus, the NRC report undergoes several rounds of reviews, including by a group of experts, who review and write 
the report. Various reviewers, along with staff, coordinate an external review process.  
 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE’S PEER-REVIEW PROCESS 
The IPCC assessment reports involve multiple phases.249  In the first phase, a body consisting of the IPCC 
Secretariat, the task force members (i.e., the group that coordinates the entire report), government representatives, 
and other participating organizations identify international experts in various specialties, such as scientists who 
study observed climate variability, radiative forcing of climate change, model evaluation, and physical climate 
processes and feedbacks.  A different panel of scientists addresses each major topic, and the IPCC allocates each 
panel of experts a specific chapter in the report.   
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During this initial phase, the Task Force selects lead authors and coordinating lead authors.  The IPCC2001 
panel that reviewed MBH98 and MBH99, Chapter 2: Observed Climate Variability and Change, consisted of ten 
lead authors, two of whom served as coordinating lead authors, 140 contributing authors (including Raymond 
Bradley and Malcolm Hughes of MBH), and two review authors/editors.  Coordinating lead authors are responsible 
for the entire chapter while the lead authors take responsible for a designated section within the chapter.  With the 
lead authors, the contributing authors participate in the assessment and review of the literature.   
The second phase is much longer and involves two rounds of reviews.  Thomas Karl, Director of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Climatic Data Center, was one of the coordinating 
lead authors for the IPCC2001 chapter that cited to MBH’s studies.  He described his experience during the second 
phase.  
[E]ach of the lead authors are asked to assess the published literature up until a certain time after 
which no more new material can be considered and what lead authors do is take a look at that 
material and try to write up their consistencies among what has been published, inconsistencies, 
what is available today compared to what was available during either the previous IPCC report or 
previous to that.250  
Because the IPCC process involves international experts within a specialized area and the report is an 
assessment of the best scientific knowledge in that area, the authors of a given chapter are likely to have written 
some of the studies that the panel assesses.  The IPCC process includes many authors who may participate in the 
assessment.  In addition, after a chapter is written, the review editors help identify international expert reviewers, 
who “comment on the accuracy and completeness” of the chapter.251  These individuals are external to the process 
and do not serve as an author to that particular IPCC report.  As Karl explained, the chapters “are subjected to 
international review.”252  Then, the chapter’s authors make changes as needed.  After the first round of reviews, 
another round of reviews calls on international experts and government officials from IPCC member nations to 
comment on the initial draft.  Karl noted the exhaustiveness of this second review process, pointing out that 
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“[a]nyone and everybody is open to review [the] report and the process takes place over several years.”253  After the 
second round of reviews, the authors prepare the final document. 
For the third and final phase, the working group for that assessment establishes a special team to create a 
Summary for Policymakers (SPM) report.  That team typically consists of lead authors from the respective chapters 
to contribute to the SPM.  Before that document is distributed, government officials review that report.  Then, upon 
approval, the working group and the IPCC leadership review all the documents one last time before publication.   
 
 Stephen McIntyre of M&M criticized the peer-review processes.  During the July 2006 
congressional hearing, he conveyed in more explicit terms his position about the level of review 
that should have taken place for studies used to inform policymakers.  He continued to advocate 
for an audit of each study, but this time, he outlined what he meant.  He indicated that “peer 
review as practiced by academic journals is not an audit but something much more limited” and 
is insufficient to review studies that impact national policy.254  He also distinguished the NRC 
report from the Wegman report.  He characterized the NRC report as simply a “literature review” 
and the NRC committee “did not attempt to replicate or audit these other studies” it reviewed.255  
By contrast, he recognized the Wegman report as something useful because it engaged in 
“independent testing … [about] whether Mann’s method was biased towards producing hockey 
stick-shaped series,” which he considered to be a proper scientific audit. 256   
Similarly, challengers of the MBH research also raised objectivity concerns with the 
IPCC assessment process.  According to Joe Barton, the IPCC assessment process is “not 
independent or impartial.”257  Barton believed that if scientists can participate in an assessment 
of their own work, then the process cannot be independent or impartial.  The Wegman team 
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agreed.  They recommended that authors of assessment reports “should not be the same people as 
those that constructed the academic papers,” which the report cites.258  They suggested that 
scientific experts, who contribute new knowledge to the field and then participate in an 
assessment that includes their research, compromise the objectivity of that assessment report.  
Thus, they argued that these studies should be discounted from the policy arena, and others that 
successfully withstand an audit substituted. 
As I discuss in the next section, the supporters of the MBH research defended the peer-
review process and continued to clarify the different forms of peer review and the processes 
involved for each review format.  They sought to explain how the challengers’ description of the 
process did not fully appreciate the extent of the review process for journal articles or scientific 
assessments. 
Finally, while the congressional hearing highlighted the differences between the two 
sides, there was one matter in which the participants reached consensus.   Both the MBH 
research challengers and its supporters did agree that the scientific community and government 
should establish a uniform system for data sharing.  Among the recommendations, scientists and 
government officials suggested creating national depositories to house the raw data.  Since the 
conflict between the two groups was based in part on allegations that MBH had not shared their 
data, this recommendation would presumably alleviate future conflicts about this issue.   
Summary of the Challenges 
 In this section, I examined the interactions surrounding the challenges to MBH’s 
research.  The challenges began in 2003 with a series of events in which two scientists, who had 
a mathematics and statistics background, questioned the MBH98 and MBH99 data and 
methodology that created the hockey stick graph.  They identified possible problems with those 
                                                 





studies and conveyed their messages first to the scientific community, then to the general public.  
Their concerns eventually captured the attention of Representatives Barton and Whitfield, who 
initiated an investigation.   
The congressmen’s inquiry arguably inferred that MBH had conducted questionable 
scientific work, possibly to achieve their intended findings that humans significantly contribute 
to global warming.  To uncover the science behind the MBH hockey stick, the MBH challengers 
commissioned a study specifically to examine concerns about MBH’s data treatment and 
statistical approach as well as to investigate possible reasons that the climate research 
community was not very receptive to M&M’s findings.  At the same time, supporters of MBH 
commissioned another group of scientists to evaluate the MBH research.  At the end, in a 
congressional hearing, the two groups debated and argued for each side, largely repeating earlier 
arguments.  Thus, throughout the three Acts, the challengers sought to discredit the MBH 
research, and MBH and their supporters responded in various ways to fend off those who 
questioned the science.   
In the next section, I elaborate further on ways that MBH and their supporters took action 
to defend MBH’s federally sponsored research.    
Responses to the Challenges 
In this section, I detail how various actors who supported Michael E. Mann, Raymond S. 
Bradley, and Malcolm K. Hughes (“MBH”) employed three significant strategies, so MBH could 
exert control over their federally sponsored research.  Consistent with the conceptual framework 
discussed more fully in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I divide the discussion of these strategies 
into actions that relied more heavily on (a) internal characteristics, (b) external factors, and (c) 






One of the strategies that MBH and numerous academic scientists who supported their 
research employed was the use of established academic norms as the “rules” for scientific 
reviews.  I present, below, two illustrations – one involving requests to follow academic norms 
for the scientific review process and another demonstrating how academic norms led to content 
clarifications of non-climate scientists’ interpretations of MBH’s research.      
Campaigning for Scientific Processes 
When several actors in Washington began to meddle in what had been a fight between 
scientists, MBH supporters, such as scientific associations and climate scientists, participated in 
a letter-writing campaign to publicly express their objections to the Barton-Whitfield June 2005 
inquiry.  Their letters conveyed their concerns with the congressmen’s choice of a political, 
rather than a scientific, venue to assess the contested research.  For instance, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) CEO Alan Leshner expressed to the 
congressmen concerns about using a congressional subcommittee as a forum to evaluate 
scientific studies.  Speaking on behalf of his organization, he indicated: “While we fully 
understand that the policy-making functions of the Congress require integrating the best 
available understanding of relevant science with other considerations, we think it would be 
unfortunate if Congress tried to become a participant in the scientific peer review process 
itself.”259 As stated earlier in Act 2, Scene 2, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) president, 
Ralph Cicerone, conveyed a similar message, and he offered the services of his organization to 
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create an independent expert panel … [review] to assess the state of scientific knowledge” on the 
contested subject matter.260 
Many of the scientists and scientific organizations that supported MBH also characterized 
the letters that the Barton committee sent Mann and others as unfounded accusations of 
wrongdoing rather than an attempt to learn about concerns that others had expressed regarding 
MBH’s research.261  Speaking on behalf of the AAAS, Leshner commented that scientists around 
the world interpreted the tone of the letters as “a hostile inquisition as opposed to a reasonable 
inquiry into the kinds of findings that might be relevant to the decisions policy-makers have to 
make.”262   
 Congressmen Barton and Whitfield received similar messages from the Association of 
American Geographers,263 American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society,264 
and a group of 20 U.S. scientists, who claimed to have “expertise relevant to the understanding 
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of Earth’s changing climate.”265  In addition, 30 scientific and engineering research and 
education organizations, such as the American Astronomical Society, Association of American 
Universities, Ecological Society of America, National Council for Science and the Environment, 
and the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research, also issued a single letter criticizing 
Barton and Whitfield’s investigation and expressing support of MBH’s research.266   
In several ways, these letters helped further academic rules as the normative behavior to 
address scientific debates.  First, the letters demonstrated the involvement of professional 
associations.  These official societies and other groups of scientists formed a coalition to protest 
the government challengers’ actions.  Their numbers and collective expertise represented a 
significant force for observers, such as the media and politicians, to take into account.267 While 
the letters did not stop Barton and Whitfield from pursuing the investigation, they placed the 
congressmen on notice that these professional associations and groups of scientists disapproved 
of the inquiry and were carefully watching the government challengers’ next moves.   
Second, the letters sent a clear message that many academic scientists stood behind the 
professional ideology that scientific assessments occur without political influence.  For instance, 
the 20 U.S. scientists who claimed to have “expertise relevant to the understanding of Earth’s 
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changing climate” believed that Barton and Whitfield’s political pressure “risk[ed] 
compromising the independence of scientific opinion that is vital to the preeminence of 
American science as well as to the flow of objective advice to the government.”268  Furthermore, 
several of the professional association letters, such as the joint letter by the presidents of the 
American Geophysical Union and American Meteorological Society, interpreted the 
congressional inquiry as “an attack on particular scientific results” that countered certain 
government officials’ desired policy outcomes.”269  These scientific leaders warned that the 
“prospect for scientists of defending unpopular results in a political arena rather than before their 
‘peers’ in the literature has the potential to undermine the scientific process and, if persistent, to 
produce tainted results.”270   
Emphasizing the divisions of labor between policymakers and scientists as a third point 
to affirm the academic rules, these scientific organizations reminded the congressmen and others 
who were observing these exchanges that scientists and policymakers have two separate roles in 
society.  Scientists conduct the research and policymakers create policies after weighing the 
findings of scientific research and other public policy concerns.  Accordingly, they asked that 
“Congress respect this time-tested process of scientific quality control” and not interfere with the 
scientific process. 
Exercising Subject Matter Expertise 
Another strategy that MBH and their supporters employed was demonstrating the 
significance of subject matter experts to conduct studies in a highly technical sub-field.  
Specifically, on several occasions, MBH and their supporters had to clarify misunderstandings 
that M&M and the Wegman team had about data treatment and terminology.  These 
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clarifications rested largely on matters unique to the climate research community.  For instance, 
Jay Gulledge, an environmental scientist and senior research fellow for the Pew Center for 
Climate Change, testified at the July 2006 congressional hearing that the Wegman report failed 
to address some of Mann’s claims that “McIntyre and McKitrick didn’t apply [Mann’s] method 
correctly.”271  Gulledge asserted that “[i]f those criticisms are being used to question the work 
then that has to be examined.”272  Yet, according to Gulledge, the Wegman team failed to 
examine the “[c]orroborating evidence.”273  Gulledge was referring to Eugene Wahl and Caspar 
Ammann’s 2006 research project, in which they constructed their own code to replicate MBH’s 
statistical methodology and recalibrated the MBH data.274  They concluded that the decentering 
did not significantly change the output.  They found that the “overall trajectory and conclusions 
of MBH are completely unaffected by this result.”275 
McIntyre admittedly dismissed the so-called corroborating evidence because Wahl and 
Ammann thought “certain steps [were] fine, we [didn’t].”276  According to McIntyre’s testimony 
at the July 2006 congressional hearing, Wahl and Ammann “have in my opinion not carefully 
considered the implication of bristlecones” as a data proxy.277  McIntyre used the NRC report as 
his primary basis to discount the bristlecones, which he believed represented bad temperature 
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proxies.  According to McIntyre’s testimony, the NRC panel agreed with his position that “strip 
bark bristlecones should be avoided in temperature reconstructions.”278  Given the proxy’s 
alleged reliability problem, McIntyre removed the bristlecone data.  Using MBH’s approach, 
McIntyre’s output graph no longer had the hockey stick shape.  According to McIntyre, “the 
hockey stick shape is dependent on” the bristlecones.279  
Nonetheless, at that same congressional hearing, the chair of the NRC committee, Gerald 
North, refuted McIntyre’s interpretation of the NRC report.  Using his professional knowledge 
and skills in this scientific specialty, he explained that “there is a carbon dioxide fertilization 
effect in some trees, but not in all the places where the samples used in the Mann et al. studies 
were taken.”280  The NRC report elucidates the bristlecone controversy:  Data derived from strip-
bark samples are not always useful as temperature proxies because the increase of carbon dioxide 
weakens their utility to reconstruct temperatures accurately.  Since atmospheric carbon dioxide 
concentrations increased significantly after 1850, “other studies [appropriately] … rely on 
[bristlecone] strip-bark pine records only … to infer past temperatures prior to 1850.”281  In other 
words, the NRC report did not recommend a wholesale removal of the bristlecone proxy, as 
McIntyre had argued.  Furthermore, MBH’s data did not include all the samples subject to the 
carbon dioxide fertilization effect.  Thus, for the MBH research, bristlecone proxies were not 
necessarily a problem. 
 These differences demonstrated how professional knowledge and skills differ widely 
within the general classification of scientists.  Given these differences, scientists working on an 
interdisciplinary project should consider the divisions of labor among the researchers.  
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Accordingly, while the Wegman team repeatedly argued that statisticians should be included in 
statistically driven temperature reconstructions as the experts for the statistical methodology and 
analysis, McIntyre’s misunderstanding illustrated the need for climate researchers to participate 
in the assessments of climate research involving proxies.   
Besides data treatment differences, misunderstandings also arose about scientific 
language.  While the government challengers relied on the criticisms of M&M and Wegman 
about MBH’s alleged lack of understanding of scientific language as further justification to 
discredit MBH’s research, MBH and their supporters explained how the misunderstanding 
actually rested with M&M and Wegman, not MBH.  For example, when Wegman stated that he 
was particularly troubled by some of the words and phrases that MBH used, such as “statistical 
skill,” Mann explained that the term is used in the American Meteorological Society, which 
“considers it such an important term in the context of statistical weather forecasting 
verification.”282  Using the American Meteorological Society definition, Mann read into the 
Congressional Record that statistical skill is a “statistical evaluation of the accuracy of forecasts 
or the effectiveness of detection techniques.”283  Emphasizing the term’s basic application in 
meteorology, Mann explained that the “skill score is useful for evaluating predictions of 
temperatures, pressures, et cetera, et cetera, so I was very surprised by that statement.”284  In 
short, Mann’s response to Wegman’s discounting of specialized language illustrates the value of 
expertise and the exercise of professional knowledge and skills that may be unique to certain 
scientific disciplines, such as climate scientists.      
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Actors outside of the academic community, who had legal authority and public influence, 
helped MBH exert control over their research.  MBH and their supporters came to rely heavily 
on political allies to reframe the government challengers’ actions, so observers would discount 
the challenges as political interferences, not public scrutiny of questionable research.  In 
addition, MBH and their supporters publicly disseminated scientific findings that essentially 
validated MBH’s research and countered the challengers’ claims.   
Gaining Support from Political Allies 
Several political allies supported MBH.285  One of these allies, U.S. Representative 
Sherwood Boehlert (New York, Republican), drew the most media attention because of his party 
affiliation, strong language opposing the Barton-Whitfield inquiry, and recommendation to use a 
recognized scientific assessment process known as the National Research Council.  On July 14, 
2005, Boehlert wrote to fellow Republicans Barton and Whitfield to express his “strenuous 
objections” to what he viewed as their “misguided and illegitimate investigation” into MBH’s 
research.286  Boehlert argued that Barton’s Committee on Energy and Commerce lacked 
jurisdiction over this matter.  According to Boehlert, “Both the National Science Foundation 
[“NSF”] and climate change research are under the purview of the House Committee on 
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Science.”287  At the time, Boehlert chaired the House Committee on Science, and he believed 
that the matter fell within his committee’s jurisdiction.  While Boehlert’s jurisdictional claim 
failed, it demonstrated the efforts of political allies to identify means within their legal authority 
that could be used to help MBH.   
Further, while Boehlert noted that the first issue might not stop the investigation, he 
wrote that his main concern was Barton and Whitfield’s use of a political forum rather than a 
scientific one to investigate this matter.  Boehlert pointed out that Barton and Whitfield opted not 
to follow traditional processes to “understand scientific disputes that impinge on public 
policy.”288  According to Boehlert, Congress typically holds “hearings with a balanced set of 
witnesses, briefings with scientists, and requests for reviews by the National Academy of 
Sciences or other experts.”289  Boehlert accused Barton of taking a “decidedly different approach 
– one that breaks precedent and raises the specter of politicians opening investigations against 
any scientist who reaches a conclusion that makes the political elite uncomfortable.” 290  Boehlert 
also highlighted how MBH complied with the NSF guidelines on data sharing and participated in 
debates within the scientific community.  Thus, he professed not to understand why Barton had 
requested the investigation.  According to Boehlert, “[t]he investigation is not needed to gain 
access to data.  The investigation is not needed to get balanced information on a scientific debate.  
The investigation is not needed to prompt scientific discussion of an important issue.”291  Instead, 
Boehlert characterized the purpose of Barton’s investigation as actions “to intimidate scientists 
                                                 
287 Boehlert, 2005, paragraph 2. 
288 Boehlert, 2005, paragraph 4. 
289 Boehlert, 2005. 
290 Boehlert, 2005, paragraph 5. 





rather than learn from them, and to substitute Congressional political review for scientific peer 
review.”292   
In short, Boehlert’s and other political allies’ statements reframed Barton and Whitfield’s 
investigation.  While Barton’s aides had previously described their inquiry as an “honest effort to 
learn about climate change,”293 the political allies of MBH framed the inquiry as Barton-
Whitfield’s bullying and intimidation tactics to silence MBH and scientific work on human-
induced global warming.294  Thus, the political allies informed the public of what they believed 
was taking place: unjustified congressional challenges of MBH’s research masked as sincere 
attempts to investigate the studies. 
Similarly, at the Barton-Whitfield hearing in July 2006, Democrats who sat on the 
subcommittee framed the hearing as a disingenuous attempt to examine the science behind 
global warming.  Several of the subcommittee Democrats characterized this hearing as yet 
another example of federal actors’ intervening or downplaying harms to the environment.  
Representative Tammy Baldwin (Wisconsin, Democrat) described several instances in which the 
Republican presidential administration allegedly altered government documents to minimize 
what government scientists were terming the effects of global warming.295  She described how 
“[i]n 2003, the EPA was ordered by the White House to delete critical sections relating to 
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climate change from its report on the environment.”296  She also noted that “[i]n 2005, the White 
House insisted upon weakening language relating to the impact of global climate change in a 
document that served as the basis of negotiations during the G8 Summit.” 297  Baldwin posited 
that this hearing appeared to reflect a continued pattern of political interference, led by the 
presidential administration, in which government actors censor “sound science … in order to 
maintain a political agenda.”298   
 Representative Jay Inslee (Washington, Democrat) believed that Congressmen Barton 
and Whitfield sought to replicate the tobacco industry’s strategy of sowing doubt about the 
science rather than actually examining the science.299  Inslee displayed a slide with the message 
“Our Product is Doubt!” and a tobacco industry ad stating, “Not one single case of throat 
irritation due to smoking Camels!”300  Inslee reported scientific findings that excessive release of 
CO2 in the atmosphere had already contributed to “acidifying the oceans,” which had in turn 
disrupted the ecosystem’s food chain.301  Inslee believed that Congress had misdirected its 
attention.  “[I]nstead of really engaging Congressional talent in figuring out how to deal with this 
problem, we try to poke little pinholes in one particular statistical conclusion of one particular 
study where the overwhelming evidence is that we have to act to deal with this global 
challenge.”302  Inslee suggested that this tactic reflected one used in the past as stated, “[W]e 
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need to deal with technology rather than statistical recreations of the tobacco industry’s effort to 
create doubt.”303    
In sum, MBH political allies such as Baldwin and Inslee reframed the Barton-Whitfield 
inquiry as a forum for behaviors that resembled past instances of government interference in 
scientific work.  They pointed out that the Barton-Whitfield investigation represented efforts to 
censor research, create doubt, and dismiss studies that ran counter to the challengers’ political 
interests – all tactics of a distasteful past.  To avoid repeating the past, the MBH political allies 
sought to inform the public of these alleged political interferences, which were disguised as 
inquiries into MBH’s 1998 and 1999 research studies. 
Disseminating Climate Science to the Public  
Throughout the controversy, MBH and several of their supporters actively participated in 
venues where they might engage the broader audience of environmentalists, policymakers, 
media, scientists, and other observers.304  Notably, in December 2004, one group of climate 
scientists, including Michael Mann and Ray Bradley of MBH, established a blog, 
www.RealClimate.org.305  These scientists used the blog to comment on opposing research, 
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clarify their research, and highlight supporting research.  According to Mann, the purpose of the 
blog was “to provide a rapid response to developing stories and provide the scientific context 
that’s often missing in the media coverage.”306  Mann commented, “We’re not circumventing the 
peer-review process, as some have claimed, we’re simply trying to provide the context of what 
existing peer-reviewed science has to say about certain issues.”307   
Mann believed that the blog helped support the three scientists’ work.  As evidence, he 
indicated that because of the blog, “[w]e’ve received good media coverage, and have had over 
200,000 visitors [between December 2004 and April 2005].”308  That led him to conclude that 
the blog seemed “to be serving the purpose that we intended, which is to provide a resource for 
people looking for an honest broker for stories like the hockey stick attacks and State of Fear, 
both of which are riddled with fallacies.”309 
Now that I have demonstrated how political allies reframed the challenges and MBH and 
their supporters disseminated information in a light favorable to MBH, in the next subsection, I 
discuss how climate scientists and the science itself played a role in MBH’s ability to exert 
control over their research.   
Both Internal Characteristics and External Factors 
MBH and their supporters relied on the science as a strategy to address the challenges 
and to enable MBH to exert control over their federally funded research.  This reliance on the 
science drew on both internal characteristics and external factors of the academic profession, 
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specifically, the profession’s exercise of professional knowledge and skills (an internal 
characteristic) and its reliance on bodies of knowledge (an independent external factor).   
First, in defending the hockey stick research, MBH, along with several climate scientists, 
used their professional knowledge and skills to explain the data and the data treatment to 
overcome critics’ complaints about their alleged errors.  Two studies illustrate this claim.  In 
2005, Scott Rutherford, then a marine research scientist at the University of Rhode Island’s 
Graduate School of Oceanography, along with six other authors including MBH, cowrote an 
article that examined the effects of different methodologies on temperature reconstructions.310  
They compared reconstructions, including MBH98, to determine the effects of the various 
methods.  They concluded that the “proxy-based temperature reconstructions are robust with 
respect to a wide array of alternative statistical approaches,” thus validating MBH’s claims of 
“exceptional late-twentieth century warmth in the context of the period since A.D. 1400 (in 
warm, cold, and annual temperatures).”311  In addition, Eugene Wahl and Caspar Ammann’s 
2006 research project also replicated MBH’s statistical methodology, but they went further than 
Rutherford, recalibrating the data over the entire period.312  They found essentially the same 
results.  As they described it, their output data showed “hardly any effect on the ‘hockey stick’ 
shape of the original MBH reconstruction, at most adding a small ‘knob’ to the ‘stick’ in the 
early 15th century.”313  Thus, they argued that there was “no evidence for removing the MBH 
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Northern Hemisphere temperature reconstruction from the list of important climate 
reconstructions of the past six centuries, on the basis of alleged ‘flaws’ in its use of proxy data or 
underlying methodology.”314   
Relying on the science, which this dissertation’s theoretical framework places under 
bodies of knowledge, these two studies scientifically verify the legitimacy of MBH’s research.  In 
fact, these studies were cited in subsequent discussions in the National Research Council report 
and in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 2007 report (“IPCC2007”) as reliable 
indicators of the current state of climate change.315  For example, in Chapter 6 of the IPCC2007 
report (i.e., the Fourth Assessment Report), the paleoclimate chapter authors even noted, in a 
scientific manner, the problems with M&M’s reconstruction and the significance of the Wahl 
and Ammann (2007) article in understanding the temperature reconstruction procedures:  
McIntyre and McKitrick (2003) reported that they were unable to replicate the 
results of Mann et al. (1998).  Wahl and Ammann (2007) showed that this was a 
consequence of differences in the way McIntyre and McKitrick (2003) had 
implemented the method of Mann et al. (1998) and that the original reconstruction 
could be closely duplicated using the original proxy data.316   
Thus, the interaction between applying professional knowledge and skills and the bodies of 
knowledge that emerge from the uncontrolled outcome of science largely supported MBH’s 
research. 
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In addition, the academic profession and other supporters used the NRC report as further 
scientific evidence to validate the MBH research.317 As discussed earlier, the NRC committee 
concluded “with a high level of confidence that global mean surface temperature was higher 
during the last few decades of the 20th century than during any comparable period.”318  The 
bodies of knowledge could not fully support MBH’s claim that the 1990s were the warmest 
decade within the prior 2,000 years; however, the NRC chair, Gerald North, explained that the 
MBH assertion was plausible, though the MBH evidence and subsequent studies failed to 
support that claim with a high degree of certainty.    
Further, while both sides agreed that MBH employed statistical procedures that would 
raise concerns of statisticians, the two sides disagreed about the effect of the statistical 
procedures.  Wegman indicated that the statistical errors showed reliance on an incorrect 
methodology.  In his testimony, he expressed that “if something is wrong with this piece of 
work, it ought to be discarded as a policy tool.”319  The NRC committee chair, Gerald  North, 
cast the statistical procedures as suboptimal in his professional opinion, but he believed that 
MBH’s claims had some merit.  North testified that “the criticisms don’t mean that the MBH 
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from these earlier periods presented reliability problems, yet they made clear that “[d]espite these limitations, the 
committee finds that efforts to reconstruct temperature histories for broad geographic regions using multiproxy 
methods are an important contribution to climate research and that these large-scale surface temperature 
reconstructions contain meaningful climatic signals” (NRC, 2006, p. 3). 
318 NRC, 2006, p. 3. 
National Research Council (2006).  Surface temperature reconstructions for the last 2,000 years.  Washington, 
D.C.: The National Academies Press. 
319 Wegman, 2006, p. 91. 
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claims were wrong.  They just mean that the MBH claims are not convincing by themselves.”320  
He explained that the MBH claims should be viewed as a piece of a larger body of knowledge, 
“[s]o if you pull together other information, then that does change the view a bit[,]” as one 
recognizes how research builds and continuously adds more knowledge about a subject matter.321  
He warned the congressional subcommittee and other members of the audience “to be careful 
here and not throw the baby out with the water,” inasmuch as MBH’s research (i.e., MBH98 and 
MBH99), though not perfectly executed, had been largely confirmed through subsequent 
studies.322  Thomas Crowley, the Nicholas Professor of Earth Systems Science at Duke 
University, and Hans von Storch, the Director of the Institute for Coastal Research at the GKSS 
Research Centre323 in Geesthacht, Germany, also testified that the effect of MBH’s statistical 
procedural choices had little effect on the outcome.324  Thus, North opined that “while the 
techniques used in the original Mann et al. papers may have been slightly flawed, the work was 
the first of its kind and deserves considerable credit for moving the field of paleoclimate research 
forward[,]” especially since “the main conclusions of the Mann et al. studies have been 
supported by subsequent research.”325 
                                                 
320 North, 2006, 60. 
Questions Surrounding the “Hockey Stick” Temperature Studies: Implications for Climate Change 
Assessments: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong. at 60 (2nd Sess.) (Testimony of Gerald North, p. 60). 
321 North, 2006, 60. 
322 North, 2006, 62. 
323 The GKSS Research Centre is a nonprofit, independent research organization funded by the German 
Hermann von Helmholtz Association.  Although it is not housed within a university, it operates much like a German 
university research center. 
324 Crowley, 2006, pp. 136-137; von Storch, 2006, p. 213. 
Questions Surrounding the “Hockey Stick” Temperature Studies: Implications for Climate Change 
Assessments: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong. at 136-137 (2nd Sess.) (2006) (Testimony of Thomas 
Crowley, the Nicholas Professor of Earth Systems Science at Duke University). 
Questions Surrounding the “Hockey Stick” Temperature Studies: Implications for Climate Change 
Assessments: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong. at 213 (2nd Sess.) (2006) (Testimony of Hans von Storch, 
the Director of the Institute for Coastal Research at the GKSS Research Centre). 





Summary of the Responses 
MBH and their supporters employed three principal strategies.  First, drawing on the 
internal characteristics of the academic profession, they asserted academic norms to guide the 
process and content of the scientific reviews.  Second, they also counted on political allies and 
information dissemination methods, such as blogs, to frame the situation in a negative manner 
for the challengers and a positive manner for MBH.  Third, MBH and their supporters used the 
science, which integrated the profession’s exercise of professional knowledge and skills (an 
internal characteristic) and the bodies of knowledge (an independent external factor) as a strategy 
to help MBH exert control over their research.  By relying on these strategies that drew from the 
internal and external characteristics of the academic profession, MBH was able to exert control 
over its research and to maintain its intellectual freedom. 
Summary & Conclusions 
In this chapter, I explored the challenges to two federally funded research studies and the 
strategic responses that aided the authors in exerting control over their research.  The controversy 
originated from a 2001 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) report.  The IPCC 
report concluded that humans were significantly contributing to rising global temperatures.  
Among its evidence, the report inserted a prominently displayed graph of temperature increases, 
which resembled the shape of a hockey stick.  The graph was connected to two federally 
sponsored research studies published in 1998 and 1999 by Michael E. Mann, Raymond S. 
Bradley, and Malcolm K. Hughes (“MBH”).326  The distinctive look of the graph became the 
iconic representation of this claim, though many skeptics of global warming questioned its 
accuracy.   
                                                 





 Reconstructing the interactions among the primary actors in the conflict as a dramatic 
play, I recounted the circumstances and events surrounding the challenges to the studies.  
Initially, Stephen McIntyre and Ross McKitrick (“M&M”), two scientists with backgrounds in 
mathematics and statistics, presented a series of challenges to MBH’s research.  They claimed 
that MBH had problems with data treatment and statistical methodology.  They also accused 
MBH of not providing them access to the data and of possibly participating in a closed network 
that continued to use unverified data and shun outsiders who questioned their works.   
Congressmen Barton and Whitfield then took several steps to challenge MBH’s research, 
resting their inquiry on the evidentiary foundation of M&M’s scientific criticisms and those two 
scientists’ contentions of related problems.  They initiated a government investigation requesting 
volumes of data within a short period of time.  They coordinated the inquiry rather than turning 
the matter over to scientists or using other academic mechanisms.  They commissioned a small 
team of statisticians, instead of tasking other full-service scientific entities with a broader range 
of skills, such as the National Research Council, to inquire into the controversy.  Then, finally, 
they called for a congressional hearing to further contest the MBH studies and other scientists’ 
arguments that had been made in MBH’s defense.   
In response to the challenges, MBH and their supporters employed three significant 
strategies, which emerged when I applied a modified version of Freidson’s model of the 
profession.  Drawing on the model, I divided the responses of MBH and their supporters into 
events that relied heavily on (a) internal characteristics, (b) external factors, and (c) both internal 
characteristics and external factors of the academic profession.  That led me to uncover several 





Under the internal characteristics frame, MBH and their supporters called on academic 
norms to guide the process and content of the scientific reviews.  Professional associations and 
groups of scientists participated in a letter-writing campaign to object to the political review in 
lieu of a scientific review.  Further, climate scientists, including MBH, highlighted the 
significance of the academic norms regarding professional expertise and divisions of labor.  They 
demonstrated how scientists who had challenged their studies had problems with interpretation 
or application of highly technical language used within the climate research community, because 
they lacked expertise in this area of the profession.  Under the external factors frame, MBH and 
their supporters relied on individuals and groups outside of the academic profession for 
assistance in communicating their positions.  In particular, MBH and their supporters counted on 
political allies and information dissemination methods such as blogs to frame the challenges in a 
negative manner and to present MBH and their supporters in a positive manner.  Other actions 
combining internal and external factors of the academic profession and using the science and 
professional expertise also served as strategies that helped MBH exert control over their 
research.  Under this frame, scientists demonstrate the value that derives when knowledge builds 
on the research of others, and MBH did just that.  They initiated one of the first large-scale 
multiproxy studies, and their conclusions were largely confirmed from many studies that 
followed. 
Finally, I comment on two other observations and tie them back to my theoretical 
framework.  First, this chapter demonstrated how politicians challenged and supported the MBH 
research.  Second, I also showed how media reports of the controversy had mixed effects.  I 
noted instances in which the media negatively spun the situation for MBH as well as instances 





consistent with my theoretical framework, which is a modified version of Freidson’s theory of 
the professions.  The framework suggests that external factors, such as individuals with legal 
authority and sources for public dissemination of information, can moderate, positively and 
negatively, the extent to which a profession can exert control over its work.  Thus, while we 
recognize the contributions of internal characteristics, external factors, and the blend of both 
internal characteristics and external factors to help the academic scientists exert control over 
their research, we acknowledge that the external factors also have the capacity to limit or even 
eliminate the extent and nature in which the academic scientists can actually exercise their 
intellectual freedom.  
 
 
Table 6.2: Acronyms for the Climate Change Case 
 
IPCC = Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
M&M = Stephen McIntyre and Ross McKitrick 
MBH = Michael E. Mann, Raymond S. Bradley, and Malcolm K. Hughes 
NAS = National Academy of Sciences 
NRC = National Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences 








Table 6.3: Timeline of Relevant Actions and Events in the Climate Change Case 
DATE ACTION/EVENT 
1995-2006 Prior to the hockey stick hearing, the House Energy & Commerce Committee holds only 
one other hearing about climate change.  
Apr. 23, 1998 Michael E. Mann, Raymond S. Bradley, and Malcolm K. Hughes publish an article in 
Nature (“MBH98”).  The National Science Foundation (“NSF”) sponsored the study. 
Mar. 15, 1999 The same scientists, “MBH,” publish an article in Geophysical Research Letters 
(“MBH99”).  The article contains the hockey stick graph. NSF sponsored the study. 
2001 The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) issues its Third 
Assessment Report (“IPCC2001”).  Among its citations supporting human-induced global 
warming, it includes MBH98 and MBH99 as well as prominently displaying the hockey 
stick graph. 
2003 Stephen McIntyre and Ross McKitrick (“M&M”) begin their audit of MBH98 and 
MBH99. 
Apr.-Sept. 2003 M&M request multiple data; Mann and associates reply. 
Sept. 25, 2003 After numerous e-mail exchanges, Mann informs McIntyre that he is unable to respond to 
future requests. 
Nov. 17, 2003 M&M submit materials complaint to Nature regarding errors in MBH98. 
Jul. 1, 2004 MBH correct MBH98 with a corrigendum statement. 
Dec. 2004 Several climate scientists, including Michael Mann and Ray Bradley (i.e., M and B of 
MBH), launch Realclimate blog. 
Jan. 2005 M&M publish two articles – one in Energy & Environment (M&M05a) and another in 
Geophysical Research Letters (M&M05b).  
Jan. 31, 2005 M&M along with others launch Climateaudit blog. 
Feb. 14, 2005 A Wall Street Journal article highlights M&M’s criticisms about MBH’s research and 
problems gaining access to the data.  
Mar.-May 2005 M&M continue to present their criticisms of MBH’s research.  They also raise questions 
about the independence of peer reviewers and the closed-network environment of the 
climate science community. 
Jun. 23, 2005 U.S. Representatives Joe Barton and Ed Whitfield send letters to MBH, the IPCC chair, 
and the NSF director.  The letters request various documents regarding the challenged 
research as well as other past studies and materials.  
Jul. 1-23, 2005 Several U.S. Representatives serving on the House Energy & Commerce Committee write 
to Barton and Whitfield to condemn their actions as political meddling in matters requiring 
scientific expertise. 
Jul. 13-Aug. 25, 
2005 
Several professional associations representing climate scientists, such as the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, American Meteorological Society, American 
Geophysical Union, and numerous climate scientists write letters to Barton and Whitfield 
to express concerns about the MBH investigation.   
Jul. 14, 2005 U.S. Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert writes to his fellow Republicans, Barton and 
Whitfield, to express his concerns about the investigation.  He recommends the National 
Research Council (“NRC”) as appropriate experts to evaluate the science, rather than 
members of Congress.  
Sept. 2005 Barton and Whitfield commission the Wegman team to evaluate MBH’s research. 
Nov. 2005 Boehlert commissions the NRC to evaluate MBH’s research. 
Jun. 22, 2006 NRC releases its report.  The committee concludes that an “array of evidence” supports 
MBH’s claims. 
Jul. 14, 2006 Wegman team issues its report.  The Wegman team focuses on the multiple problems with 
the MBH research. 
Jul. 19, 2006 House Energy and Commerce’s Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  conducts 
the first day of the Questions Surrounding the “Hockey Stick” Temperature Studies: 
Implications for Climate Change Assessments hearing. 
Jul. 26, 2006 The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations holds its second (and last) day of the 
Questions Surrounding the “Hockey Stick” Temperature Studies: Implications for Climate 





Sept. 4, 2006 Democrats on the House Energy and Commerce Committee use Republican quotes to 
request a hearing on climate change. 
Oct. 30, 2006 Economist Nicholas Stern issues the Stern Review shifting the debate toward economic 
issues of climate change. 
Feb. 2, 2007 The first of several reports of the IPCC Fourth Assessment (IPCC2007) becomes available 






CHAPTER VII: THE SALVAGE LOGGING CASE 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the salvage logging case, the third and final case of 
this project.  First, I provide a brief overview of the science and the public policy debate about 
salvage logging.  I also introduce the academic scientists’ federally sponsored study, which 
several groups challenged.  Second, I describe the challenges that several groups raised about the 
study at issue and against its researchers.  Highlighting the circumstances and events surrounding 
the challenge, I capture the interactions among individuals and groups involved to explain the 
actors’ reported perceptions and interests.  Third, I present my data on the strategies that 
academic scientists who supported the challenged study employed.  I explain, below, how these 
strategies helped the challenged researchers exert control over their federally sponsored work.  
Specifically, drawing on my theoretical framework (Chapter 3), I examine the internal 
characteristics of and external factors influencing the academic profession to help us understand 
how certain responses from members of the academic profession and their allies aided the 
researchers of the contested study.  Fourth, I summarize the key findings.  
The Science, the Public Policy Debate, and the Study 
The Controversial Science 
Post-fire salvage logging is the practice of cutting down (i.e., “felling”) trees from areas 
severely burnt by wildfires, then replanting trees and other vegetation species that had been 
present prior to the fire.  It is a controversial post-fire forest-recovery approach.  Many academic 
scientists, environmental advocacy groups, foresters, and citizens in the Northwest region of the 
United States have debated whether salvage logging helps or does more harm to the environment 





Opponents of salvage logging, especially environmental groups such as Save America’s 
Forests, Sequoia Forest Keeper, and the Sierra Club, have argued that this forest-recovery 
approach oftentimes harms the fire-damaged forest even more.  They claim that salvage logging 
disrupts the area and places ecological stresses on the land.  For instance, when the timber 
companies enter the land, they typically pave a path in previously roadless areas so their large 
equipment can enter.  Their presence also harms the ground seedlings so they cannot grow 
naturally.  In addition, as Robert Beschta, a professor emeritus in forest ecosystems at Oregon 
State University, and his coauthors have noted, several academic scientists have observed that 
“the removal of standing and downed large wood may eliminate important structural components 
for the recovery of terrestrial and aquatic systems.”327  In particular, the elimination of the trees 
alters the wildlife habitat.  Further, salvage logging opponents have cited examples in which 
timber companies logged an area, but either the federal government or the contracted party failed 
to reforest the area and clean up the logging slash. 
Supporters of salvage logging present a very different view of this post-fire forest-
recovery approach.  They suggest that salvage logging restores the land more efficiently and 
addresses harms that arise from the so-called natural alternatives, which advocate for little to no 
human intervention.  Sarah Gilman of the High Country News, an eco-friendly newspaper based 
in the Northwest region of the United States, captured the often-cited distinctions between 
salvage logging and the natural approaches to forest recovery.328  Gilman quoted John Fertig, a 
forester for the land impacted by the 2002 Biscuit Fire in southern Oregon and northern 
California, explaining that “natural regeneration is unpredictable and could take up to 200 years.  
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Active salvage, replanting and thinning can speed up the process to 150 years.”329  In addition, 
Gilman and others have reported that many foresters and timber industry representatives, along 
with some academic scientists have claimed that natural forest recovery efforts actually 
contribute more harm than salvage logging does when it comes to wildlife and plant regeneration 
goals.  According to this perspective, the natural approaches often lead to the entry of new 
insects seeking the charred areas.  The insects also stunt and at times prevent tree and vegetation 
growth.  Also, the natural approaches often leave behind shrubs and other fire-fueling materials, 
which have contributed to subsequent forest fires. 
These debates tend to generate strong feelings for individuals on each side of the issue.  
Describing these emotionally driven debates, Melissa Block of National Public Radio reported 
that “[i]n some parts of the American West, you can start a bar fight by mentioning [the] forestry 
practice called salvage logging.”330    
The Science Policy  
In July 2002, one of the worst forest fires in U.S. history damaged nearly half of the 
Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest, or approximately 500,000 acres of federal forestlands in 
southern Oregon and the northern portions of California.  Known as the Biscuit Fire, this forest 
fire took approximately five months to contain, with suppression costs calculated as totaling 
around $153 million.331  During the fire containment period in late 2002, the U.S. Forest Service 
recommended immediate recovery efforts to regenerate the forest.  Its most controversial 
                                                 
329 Gilman, 2006, p. 3.  
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Nielsen. Washington, D.C.: National Public Radio. 
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recommendation was proposing post-fire salvage logging, an approach that the Forest Service 
argued was the most practical and scientifically sound. 
Initially, in the early part of 2003, the Forest Service planned on sales of 372 million 
board feet, but it revisited that idea after the release of a July 2003 report.332  Commissioned to 
examine the salvage logging capacity over time, John Sessions, a senior academic scientist at 
Oregon State University’s College of Forestry, and his team of researchers concluded that as 
much as “2.0 billion board feet … [was] economically salvageable.”333  Thus, the report (i.e., the 
Sessions Report) calculated logging potential to be more than 537% of the initial Forest Service 
estimates.  The Sessions Report also noted that delays in logging would only reduce logging 
production potential, because delays would increase the number of trees deemed unsalvageable 
because of rotting.  In turn, reductions in logging would decrease revenue predictions and 
possibly harm the reinvestment potential of the burnt forest.  The Sessions Report advocated for 
immediate and aggressive actions, including helicopter logging, to avoid the time and energy 
needed to pave roads and overcome other logistical hurdles.334    
The Sessions Report sparked even more debate and angered opponents of salvage 
logging.335  Eventually, the opponents escalated their protest activities through sit-ins that 
barricaded the logging equipment pathway, along with hunger strikes to express their willingness 
to take extreme measures.  In addition, opponents sought several injunctions to stop the 
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logging.336  While the court cases generally permitted the logging to continue, the legal decisions 
rested on the sufficiency and compliance of the environmental assessments, the environmental 
impact reports, and the approved Biscuit Fire Recovery Project statements.   
Several members of Congress observed that existing federal laws and regulations made 
the reporting and approval processes for salvage logging much too cumbersome.  Consequently, 
during the 2005-2006 congressional session, several members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives proposed a new bill to streamline this process.  Congressman Greg Walden 
(Oregon, Republican) principally authored this new House bill, The Forest Emergency Recovery 
and Research Act (“FERRA”).337  The bill would relax procedural approvals for forest recovery 
efforts, including salvage logging.   
Conflict Between the Federally Sponsored Study & the Science Policy 
In 2003, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) awarded a three-year grant totaling 
$307,000 to Oregon State University (“OSU”).338  The Co-Principal Investigators (“Co-PIs”), W. 
Douglas Robinson, J. Boone Kauffman, and Beverly Law, were academic scientists employed at 
OSU’s College of Forestry (“CoF”).  To assist in the research, the Co-PIs added another CoF 
academic scientist, John Campbell, and two CoF graduate students, Dan Donato and Joe 
Fontaine.  The team started the research soon after the grant award.  The research project was to 
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examine the effects of grass seeding and salvage logging within a section of the Siskiyou 
National Forest in southwestern Oregon.  This project location represented a portion of the land 
struck by the Biscuit Fire.   
On January 5, 2006, Science, one of the leading journals for academic scientists, 
published the team’s initial study findings on its online forum, Science Express.  The study, 
which identified Dan Donato as its lead author, reported that post-fire salvage logging actually 
harmed forest regeneration.  Using data collected from the area burned by the Biscuit Fire, the 
researchers compared land conditions from two locations – where salvage logging had and had 
not taken place.  Based on this data, the non-invaded areas displayed greater regenerative signs.  
Given that difference between the main effect and control group, the Donato team concluded: 
“Our data show that postfire logging, by removing naturally seeded conifers and increasing 
surface fuel loads, can be counterproductive to goals of forest regeneration and fuel 
reduction.”339   
The Donato team findings became the center of this case controversy.  First, the findings 
debunked the “widely held and commonly cited … view that postfire (salvage) logging 
diminishes fire risk via fuel reduction, and that forests will not adequately regenerate without 
intervention that includes logging and planting.”340  Second, many interpreted the findings to be 
in direct conflict with Congressman Walden’s proposed legislation.  In fact, given the study’s 
findings, a Science staff member posted a reference to Walden’s FERRA bill beside the online 
article.  When the Donato team discovered that editorial addition referencing the bill, the team 
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asked for its removal.  The Science staff agreed to remove any mention of the FERRA bill in the 
print version of the article, which would appear later that month.  Unfortunately for the Donato 
team, the political damage had already been done.  Numerous supporters of FERRA either saw 
or heard about the study’s placement beside information referencing the bill, and that placement 
gave the appearance that the study findings directly contradicted the public policy rationale 
justifying FERRA.  Not surprisingly, that led to an uproar within the communities representing 
federal policy, academic science, the timber industry, and forestry along with several challenges 
against the Donato team and its study.  These critics challenged the Donato study and attempted 
to challenge the authors for their alleged scientific errors, omission of specific environmental 
factors for the area examined, and perceived political motives to block the FERRA bill from 
passing.    
Interactions Surrounding the Challenges 
To describe these challenges and the circumstances and events surrounding them, I 
present the interactions among the key actors.  Indeed, many policymakers, foresters, 
environmental groups, and timber industry representatives in some way challenged the Donato 
team and its study.  However, rather than detailing each interaction and listing all the actors, in 
this section, I focus on what I consider to be the significant challenges to the Donato study.  That 
is, I draw attention only to the challenges that capture the primary actors and interactions 
involved in this case study.  Like a play, the challenges appear in Acts.  In this metaphorical 
play, there are two Acts.  In Act 1, I describe how several academic scientists initiated the 
challenges against the authors of the contested federally sponsored research.  This Act also 
reveals that these academic challengers worked behind the scenes with other influential actors.  





authors of the contested federally sponsored research.  Together, these two Acts dramatize the 
multistage challenges against the Donato team and its federally sponsored research. 
Act 1: Academic Scientists Lay the Groundwork 
  In Act 1, I draw attention to several academic scientists, who were the primary initiators 
of the Donato study challenges.  To present the challenges, I divide the events into two major 
scenes.  In Act 1, Scene 1, I introduce the CoF dean, Hal Salwasser, as the primary challenger.  
Salwasser attempted to minimize the study’s role in policymaking.  As I discuss in Scene 1, he 
described the Donato study as a small research project that was insufficient to fully address the 
different policy options.  He had hoped that framing the study in this manner would not harm 
Congressman Walden’s FERRA bill.  In Act 1, Scene 2, I spotlight other CoF academic 
scientists, along with several U.S. Forest Service staff, who took a larger role in discrediting the 
Donato study.  Scene 2 describes how this group made scientific and practice-based claims to 
challenge the Donato study.  Throughout the explanation of both scenes, I also identify various 
nonacademic actors, who actively opposed and challenged the Donato study.  As I will explain, 
however, these actors appeared as supporting cast to the academic challengers.   
 Now that I have provided a basic foundation for Act 1, I begin my data review with the 
first significant attempts to challenge the Donato study.   
Scene 1:  
Scene 1 captures irregularities in behavior that portend much more significant 
circumstances and events that would occur as challenges to the Donato study.341  To begin, the 
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Donato study received little praise from several senior members of the CoF.342  As noted earlier, 
an academic research team’s publication in Science represents one of the most distinguished 
scholarly achievements.343  In most cases, an academic unit would recognize the publication in 
Science by one of its research teams, since that is a highly visible and respectable journal.  In this 
case, however, the CoF dean issued a memo to the college faculty and staff on January 11, 2006, 
within a week of the Science Express publication, whose message some recipients interpreted as 
an effort to downplay the Donato study.344   
According to the dean, his memo attempted to “contextualize the [Donato] study” so the 
CoF community would understand how the study fit into the larger body of literature.345  His 
memo contained three primary messages.  First, he cautioned how the public might misinterpret 
the study’s significance.  He wrote:  
Occasionally preliminary results or research results from a single study relevant to 
a controversial, highly visible issue become general public knowledge before the 
                                                                                                                                                             
H.R. 4200 – The Forest Emergency Recovery and Research Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Forestry, 
Conservation and Rural Revitalization of the House Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 109th Cong. 
at 24-27 (2006) (Testimony of Oregon State Senators Charlie Ringo); see also Skidmore, S. (2006, Apr. 10). 
Lawmakers look at OSU timber ties. The Daily Barometer, p. 1.  The Daily Barometer is the Oregon State 
University campus newspaper; Anonymous (2006, Apr. 7). Oregon lawmakers to scrutinize OSU’s industry ties. 
Greenwire, 10(9), p. 1 
342 See, e.g., , D. (2006, Jan. 13). Oregon State dean criticizes conclusions from Biscuit Fire report. . Energy & 
Environment Daily, 10(9). Retrieved from Greenwire (Oregon State dean discounts the value of the study and did 
not recognize the researchers’ accomplishment of being published in Science.); Milstein, M. (2006, Jan. 20, 2006). 
Logging study sets off own firestorm. Oregonian, 1 (“A contingent of professors at Oregon State University’s 
College of Forestry want the nation’s top scientific journal to withhold a study by an OSU graduate student who 
found that forests best recover from wildfires when they are not logged and left alone” (Milstein, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 
1)). 
343 Salwasser later recognized the accomplishment.  He wrote: “Few faculty, let alone graduate students, get 
their work published in this prestigious journal” (Jan. 26, 2006, paragraph 3). 
344 As I elaborate later in this section and later in this chapter, Oregon state legislators uncovered e-mails about 
Salwasser’s deliberate actions to downplay the Donato study.  Reporting on the Donato study controversy, Kera 
Abraham (2006) described the dean’s action as follows:  “Rather than congratulating his student on publication in 
the nation’s most rigorous science journal, Salwasser turned his attention to ‘damage contract’” because the article 
did not support the timber industry’s interests (Abraham , 2006, p. 15). Abraham, K. (2006, Apr. 13).  The battle of 
Biscuit. Eugene Weekly, 25(5), 14-16. 
345 Salwasser, Jan. 11, 2006, paragraph2. 





complete scientific process is through. This can intensify public discussion and 
positioning before adequate scientific debate and further research can confirm, 
modify, disprove or place the results in the appropriate context.346   
Second, he suggested that the Donato study might not adequately address this politically charged 
topic, because the findings were too premature to make any policy conclusions.  He referred to 
the study as a “single-study, short-term research,” and he advised that academic scientists needed 
to explore this issue further so the scientific debate could take place with the “full body of 
pertinent knowledge.”347  Third, given the need for additional research, Salwasser directed 
readers’ attention to two pending bills that could financially support these future research efforts.  
He wrote: “Only long-term, well designed, replicated field studies, such as … the post-fire 
research called for in Rep. Greg Walden’s Forest Ecosystem Recovery and Research Act 
(FERRA) and Sen. Gordon Smith’s Forests for Future Generations Act, will ultimately resolve 
the scientific issues.”348   
While the dean characterized his intentions as a message to contextualize the Donato 
study, not everyone viewed the memo as simply an exercise in providing context.  Some 
academic scientists, including faculty and graduate students at OSU, and numerous media 
outlets, such as Environment & Energy Daily, Eugene Weekly, The Oregonian, and Science, 
criticized the dean’s action of issuing the memo as an attempt to undermine the contributions of 
the study.  According to a faculty review committee that investigated this incident and the others 
related to this controversy, a group of graduate students responded to the context memo by 
writing the dean to express their concerns about the CoF’s possible conflicts of interest.  The 
graduate students’ letter referred to “public perceptions of bias toward the timber industry and 
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federal agencies, lack of support for graduate students conducting research on controversial or 
policy-relevant topics, abuse of power, and the politicization of science.”349  Furthermore, the 
review committee observed that junior faculty feared what would happen to them if their 
research presented views contrary to the timber industry’s interests.  Other Donato supporters 
also questioned whether Salwasser’s memo was intended to serve as a political endorsement of 
the pending legislation.  For example, Susan Ash of the Audubon Society of Portland contested 
the issuance of the memo, suggesting it was Salwasser’s attempt at lobbying for the two pending 
bills.350 
These Donato team supporters pointed out that the dean’s message focused on the study’s 
limits, with references to the Donato study as a “single-study, short-term research,” while an 
informed scientific debate – per the dean’s memo – requires the “full body of pertinent 
knowledge.”351  Thomas Hinckley, professor of forest resources and former interim dean for the 
School of Forest Resources at the University of Washington, conveyed his opposition to 
Salwasser’s letter.  He e-mailed Salwasser stating, “I am ashamed and embarrassed by the 
content and wording of your memo.”352  Further, several senior CoF faculty noted that the dean 
had never contextualized other CoF studies – particularly in a manner that speaks to a study’s 
limitations.353  Additionally, many who criticized the dean for his memo observed his failure to 
recognize the research team’s accomplishment of publishing in one of the highly regarded 
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scientific journals.  According to these critics, that academic achievement would have typically 
yielded praise rather than criticism.354   
Salwasser acknowledged that his January 11, 2006 memo was not well received within 
the CoF community.  He stated: “I wrote a context piece that was interpreted by some as not 
being supportive of the scientists who published the article.”355  However, he indicated: “I 
support the freedom of all our faculty, students and staff to pursue their scholarly or scientific 
work.”356   
Despite Salwasser’s statements, numerous individuals who disapproved of the dean’s 
memo speculated on the reasons behind the dean’s attempts to minimize the policy effect of the 
Donato study.  Some of them believed that the CoF constituents played a significant role in 
pressuring the dean to issue the memo.  For example, Eleanor Vandergrift, an alumna and 
academic scientist who supported the Donato team, expressed her outrage at her alma mater for 
acting on behalf of the politicians and timber industry.357  She wrote, “It is appalling that political 
advocacy” plays a role in the CoF actions.”358  She criticized the CoF for supporting “studies that 
only show[ed] … increased logging is the best outcome after wildfire … when the research data 
does not agree with the sale of board feet and income to the college.”359  Michael Milstein, a 
journalist for The Oregonian, asked Salwasser about the CoF’s industry ties.  Speculating about 
the connections, after having interviewed several individuals about the dean’s memo, Milstein 
wrote:  
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The question came up [in my interviews] about the legacy of the College’s 
relationship to the timber industry.  Clearly you must be responsive to private 
forestry, since it contributes to funding.  I sense that was what you were trying to 
do in your memo – addressing the flak.  Has that relationship influenced what 
happened here?360  
Salwasser responded, “We were very much concerned with reaction of [the] forest scientific 
community as industry and agencies.”361  However, he never indicated that they influenced his 
action to write the memo.  Nonetheless, between January and March 2006, the dean’s critics 
speculated that the dean likely felt pressured to downplay the effect of the Donato study because 
these constituents had some interest in the salvage logging process (e.g., timber industry).  As 
initial support of the critics’ hypothesis, Salwasser even recalled in a National Public Radio 
interview that “as soon as the press picked up the [Donato] article and it started showing up in 
the papers I had alums, people in forest agencies and people in the forest industry, and even 
some other scientists sending me e-mails saying now what’s going on here and why didn’t you 
guys stop the publication and all this.”362   
However, in April 2006, the dean’s critics had more concrete evidence of their beliefs 
when Oregon State Senator Charlie Ringo obtained Salwasser’s e-mails through a public records 
request.363  Among Salwasser’s disclosed e-mail messages, the records showed that he consulted 
advocates of FERRA, which included certain senior faculty at OSU’s CoF, timber industry 
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representatives, and forest service staff in order to strategize on how to “do damage control.”364  
These e-mails represented Salwasser’s efforts to minimize the influence of the Donato study on 
forest policy and manage the rising discontent of CoF constituents who believed that the Donato 
study harmed their interests.365  Reporters for national outlets and various critics of the dean’s 
memo also suggested that the CoF had a financial interest in downplaying the Donato study and 
supporting salvage logging efforts.366  These reporters and critics noted that Oregon had a timber 
tax, which at the time generated about 10% of the CoF’s annual revenues.367  Their contention 
was that if FERRA passed, an aggressive logging process would likely occur, and that would 
generate significantly more revenue for OSU’s CoF.  In short, the dean’s memo represented an 
initial challenge against the Donato team.  Notably, the challenge highlighted conflicts within the 
academic scientific community.  It also spurred involvement from supporting actors, who were 
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not academic scientists.  The dean coordinated with these supporting cast members – which 
included forest professionals, representatives of the timber industry, and others who had an 
interest in passing FERRA – to help manage the damage-control efforts necessitated by the 
Donato study’s publication.   
Scene 2:  
While some critics of the dean’s memo believed that he acted inappropriately and 
overstepped his boundaries, another group of academic scientists, foresters, and others felt that 
Dean Salwasser did not act forcefully enough in discounting the Donato study.  Dissatisfied with 
the dean’s handling of the study, many of these objectors to the Donato study sought other means 
to challenge it.  Most notably, a group of dissenters, referred to as the Gang of Nine (“GoN”), 
challenged the study and its researchers in a more visible and controversial manner.  The GoN 
explicitly discredited the study.  In addition, since the print version of Science is the more widely 
disseminated forum, the GoN attempted to delay that publication until the dissenting group could 
find more concrete evidence to support its position that the Donato study was flawed and 
unworthy of publication.     
This challenge became apparent on January 17, 2006, when the group consisting of nine 
scientists, including senior faculty from the OSU CoF and staff from the Forest Service, formally 
expressed their concerns about the Donato study.368  On that date, the GoN issued a letter to 
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Donald Kennedy, the editor of Science.  The GoN outlined what they viewed as clear problems 
with the study, and questioned how the article ever passed peer review.  In their introductory 
paragraph, the GoN highlighted four overarching problems with the Donato study.  They stated 
that the Donato article did “not adequately define the environmental setting,” drew “sweeping 
inferences the statistical design (a case study) and data do not support,” contributed “no new 
science,” and presented forest “management actions out of context.”369  Drawing on their 
professional expertise, they expressed the opinion that these deficiencies required immediate 
action.  Their solution: “We respectfully request that you delay publication until the 
environmental setting of the study is better defined and the inferences can be supported by data. 
Alternatively, we ask that you include our stated concerns in a letter accompanying 
publication.”370   
Absent evidence of scientific misconduct, the traditional protocols for determining 
publication of an academic article involve peer review.  Typically, two experts review the paper 
and judge whether it is worthy of publication.  According to Donald Kennedy, the editor, Science 
followed that protocol with the Donato study, and the two reviewers found no notable problems 
with the paper.  In fact, they recommended the article for publication, and Science accepts less 
than 8% of originally submitted manuscripts.  The GoN asserted that an academic journal, 
especially one of the caliber of Science, should not have printed what the GoN alleged to be a 
flawed study.  In their minds, this article’s recommendation for publication demonstrated that 
“the peer review process failed as a quality control measure.”371  Addressing that viewpoint, 
Kennedy expressed his trust in the process and stated that he would not allow the GoN to “pre-
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empt” or “censor” the print publication of the Donato study.372  Others agreed with that decision.  
For instance, Kathleen Dean Moore, an OSU distinguished professor of philosophy who teaches 
environmental ethics, expressed dismay about attempts to censor research.  In an interview with 
The Oregonian, she stated: “It’s about hearing all the voices so we can learn from them.”373  
Robert Buckman, OSU professor emeritus of forestry, also agreed that the publication should 
continue through the established peer-review process, yet he did not believe that the paper was 
that impressive.  In an interview published in The Scientist, he stated, “If Science had known the 
context issues adequately, that paper would have been a lot less attractive,” but he disagreed with 
any decision to “delay publication of the paper.”374  Further, other academic scientists in forestry 
research agreed with the Science editor’s decision to publish the article. David Epstein reported 
in Inside Higher Education, an online newspaper geared toward higher-education faculty and 
staff, that Grame Berlyn, editor of the Journal of Sustainable Forestry and professor of anatomy 
and physiology of trees at Yale University, if he had had Kennedy’s choice to make would have 
likely kept the publication as scheduled under the circumstances presented.375  Epstein quoted 
Berlyn stating, “if there’s nothing erroneous, I wouldn’t keep it out.”376 
Many academic scientists believed that the GoN’s action reflected an unusual request.  
Beverly Law, a professor of forest science at OSU and one of the authors of the Donato study, 
was surprised by the action of her colleagues.  In an interview with National Public Radio, she 
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stated, “In my career I’ve never seen anyone try to delay a publication in Science.”377  Other 
members of the academic community, including academic scientists within the forestry field, felt 
that the GoN took inappropriate steps in expressing their concerns about the Donato study.  For 
example, James Karr, a professor of fisheries and biology at the University of Washington, told a 
newspaper reporter that he was “appalled at the way” the GoN addressed the scientific dispute.378  
Admittedly, Karr opposed salvage logging, so his position was not aligned with the GoN.  
Putting aside that difference, Karr contended that the letter harmed the scientific community.  
His belief was that the letter had “a chilling effect on other OSU researchers” who might have 
expressed an opposing view to positions held by powerful interests, but now feared doing so.379  
Karr’s statement resonated with other observers, such as the OSU provost, Sabah Randhawa, 
who also believed that the GoN’s letter to Kennedy, whether intentionally or not, conveyed to 
graduate students and junior faculty that senior faculty members may exercise some authority, 
including attempts to quash research that contradicts their position.  Pinpointing an underlying 
problem within the CoF as well as at many other universities, the provost stated at the February 
2006 Faculty Senate meeting that he had concerns over the imbalance of power that the GoN’s 
actions displayed.380  He explained, “It’s important that those in positions of power don’t misuse 
their rank, intimidating faculty or students with less power.”381 
Donald Kennedy, along with many academic scientists, viewed the differences between 
the GoN and the Donato team as part of an academic debate.  Kennedy and other Donato 
supporters recommended that academic scientists use scholarly journals as venues to express 
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differing research perspectives and approaches, so others could be informed about the debate as 
well as participate.382  Kennedy even agreed to print the various perspectives of this debate in an 
upcoming issue of Science.  
 While the GoN unsuccessfully attempted to delay the Donato study publication, its 
efforts drew attention to the controversy: that senior professors at OSU’s CoF and forest service 
staff had concerns about the scientific integrity of the Donato study.  Many individuals and 
groups opposing the Donato study asserted the GoN’s specific claims of alleged scientific errors 
as their scientific basis to discredit the study.  For instance, when corresponding to Dean 
Salwasser, Mike Cloughesy, the Director of Forestry for the Oregon Forest Industry Council 
(OFCI), affirmed the GoN’s reasoning and noted his strategy for dealing with the situation.  He 
wrote, “I want to stress that to OFRI Speakers Bureau audiences the issue has been what is the 
proper forestry response to wildfire, not the academic freedom issue.”383  Similarly, other 
publications and public venues such as blogs also reiterated the GoN criticisms about the data 
sources and approaches.384  Equally important, they cited the GoN’s letter requesting the 
publication delay to demonstrate that these senior professors and forest service staff (i.e., the 
GoN) thought the Donato team’s scientific errors were severe, and thus unacceptable, absent 
further scientific commentary.   
 Combining the effects of the dean’s context memo and the GoN’s letter, we witness most 
significantly that it was the academic scientific community who were the critical actors to 
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initially challenge the Donato study.  These challengers laid the scientific foundation to 
scrutinize the Donato study.  In Act 2, we observe how several federal actors build on the efforts 
of the dean, GoN, and their supporting cast and also challenge the Donato team.   
Act 2: Government Challenges 
Act 2 opens in February 2006 during a period in which the Republican Party leads both 
the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government and vocally supports salvage 
logging policies.385  Furthering those interests, two separate government entities orchestrate 
challenges against the Donato team, and their actions raise questions of whether the 
governmental actors are properly asserting government protocols or politics.  Joining the timber 
industry and its trade organization representatives, the academic scientists who opposed the 
Donato study now take a backstage role regarding the challenges. 
Scene 1:  
In Act 2, Scene 1, a group of challengers to the Donato study made another academically 
unorthodox move: They convinced the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) project inspector to 
place a stop-work order on the federal grant that funded the Donato study.  That led to the 
BLM’s issuing a grant suspension for the final year of funding, essentially refusing payment of 
approximately $93,000.   
In the letter to OSU explaining reasons for the grant suspension, the BLM identified three 
actions that violated terms of the grant provisions.  First, the BLM claimed that one of OSU’s 
acts violated two agreements associated with the grant funding.  The BLM indicated that OSU 
placed references to a pending bill, The Forest Emergency Recovery and Research Act, next to 
the Donato study in an attempt to influence readers.  Describing the action, the BLM stated:     
                                                 






Original abstract published on Science Express website posted on or about 
January 5, 2006, states “Legislation currently pending in U.S. Congress, HR 
4200, would expedite postfire logging projects, citing reforestation and fuel 
reduction among its goals. To help inform the dialogue…”386 
According to the BLM, reference to the bill violated two grant provisions, which 
explicitly prohibited using federal funds for lobbying or related activities.  Second, the 
BLM contended that OSU violated the grant provision that required consultation with 
the agency prior to publication.  The letter indicated:   
The Bureau Assistance Officer is unaware of the efforts made by OSU to consult 
with Bureau representatives (including the Project Inspector or the Assistance 
Representative) prior to publishing results relating to the subject task order. 
Third, the BLM observed that the unauthorized publication materials failed to include a 
mandated disclaimer per one of the grant provisions, which stated: “[A]ll information 
submitted for publication or other public releases of information regarding this project 
shall carry a disclaimer.”  
According to the BLM, these grant violations justified the bureau’s action of suspending 
OSU’s funding.  Even though the BLM had suspended the funding, it gave OSU an opportunity 
to respond, in case the federal agency had inadvertently misinterpreted any of the events. 
A few days after the suspension and before OSU responded, the media publicized the 
BLM’s action.  According to the news reports, various individuals perceived the BLM’s grant 
suspension as a retaliatory action for presenting research that conflicted with the federal 
government’s policies.  On February 7, 2006, Jeff Barnard of the Associated Press reported that 
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Erik Berg, the director of the Joint Fire Science Program, the federal interagency unit that helps 
administer funding for research projects such as the Donato study, considered the suspension 
highly unusual.  Further, Berg indicated that he had “never heard of this kind of inquiry before 
into research funded by [that particular] federal program.”387 
While it is possible that the BLM had never faced a question of a grant recipient’s 
allegedly using its federal funds for lobbying purposes, many critics of the BLM action 
speculated that the agency might not have taken this action if the Donato study findings had 
supported the pending FERRA bill.  According to an Associated Press news clip, Andy Stahl, the 
director of the Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics, an environmental group 
based in Eugene, Oregon, believed that the BLM intentionally suspended the grant because of 
the Donato team’s findings.  He added: “If BLM can point to a single other instance where it has 
suspended scientific research because of alleged illegal lobbying, I’ll eat my hat.”388  However, 
based on the available data, neither the BLM nor anyone else ever identified a prior incident in 
which it suspended a grant award for a similar situation.   
Besides academic scientists’ and environmentalists’ raising questions about the BLM’s 
grant suspension, several government actors were also unconvinced that the BLM suspended the 
grant solely on the basis of the grant contract terms.  On several occasions, U.S. Representative 
David Wu (Oregon, Democrat) characterized the BLM suspension as having a “chilling effect” 
on federally sponsored academic research that conflicted with a government policy.389  
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Representative Jay Inslee (Washington, Democrat) feared the same, and he called for an 
investigation.  On February 7, 2006, he issued a letter to Earl Devaney, the Department of 
Interior’s inspector general, to investigate whether the BLM retaliated against the Donato team 
because its federally sponsored research conflicted with the Republican presidential 
administration’s policies.390   
Immediately following the Inslee statement, Congressman Walden had concerns that the 
BLM’s grant suspension might be viewed by some as retaliation, because the research came 
down on the wrong side of his pending bill, so he took two steps to distance himself from what 
critics claimed to be federal interference with academic freedom and acts of political censorship.  
First, he disavowed any connection.  He stated in a subcommittee meeting that he did not support 
the BLM’s decision to suspend the funds.  Second, on February 8, 2006, he, along with 
Congressman Brian Baird (Washington, Democrat), another cosponsor of the FERRA bill, wrote 
to Kathleen Clarke, the BLM Director, asking for reinstatement of the grant funds.391  The 
congressmen stated: “We understand the position in which the BLM has been placed by recent 
events. However, it is important that post-catastrophic research continue to be carried out in an 
open, non-politicized manner.”392  They opined that the suspension of funds might lead observers 
to think “that the agency is only politicizing [the issue even] further,” which would leave “the 
impression of scientific censorship by the BLM.”393 Given the false impression they felt was 
being created regarding the reasons for the withdrawal of grant funding to OSU, they 
recommended that Clarke’s agency reinstate the grant funds to the university.   
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 On that same date, Peggy Lowry, the director and institutional authorizing official within 
OSU’s Office of Sponsored Programs and Research Compliance, replied to the BLM suspension 
letter.394  Lowery presented explanations of how OSU generally complied with the grant 
provisions.  For instance, to address the allegations of lobbying, Lowry recounted the exchange 
between the Donato team and the staff at Science.  Lowry admitted that the “language was 
included in the manuscript initially submitted to Science for review for the sole purpose of 
highlighting the relevance and timeliness of the research, not to influence legislation.”395  She 
disclaimed any intent by the researchers to lobby: “The authors never intended to promote public 
support or opposition to pending legislation or to influence a member of Congress or 
governmental official to support or oppose legislation, but rather only to note the timeliness of 
the research.”396  Further, the tracing of events revealed that Science posted the links even after 
the parties agreed to remove references to the bill.  Lowry described these events as well as other 
sources of miscommunication and suggested that is where the BLM’s belief of contractual 
violations originated.  With the exception of neglecting to place a disclaimer on the article, 
Lowry asserted that OSU had been in full compliance with the grant provisions.   
Immediately following receipt of the OSU letter, the BLM reinstated the grant funding.  
Michael Milstein, a journalist for The Oregonian, reported that the BLM faced “mounting 
pressure and criticism” to return the funds, so it did “within a few hours” of OSU’s response.”397  
The BLM, however, characterized the events as complying with its interpretation of the grant 
terms.398  According to a BLM press release, “OSU … adequately addressed BLM concerns 
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regarding administrative aspects of the agreement and task order.”399  Despite the agency’s 
statement, many observers of the Donato study controversy believed that the letter from 
Congressmen Walden and Baird likely played a larger role and ultimately convinced BLM staff 
to restore the grant funds to OSU.  Dave Skinner, a writer for the industry-friendly magazine 
Evergreen, also described the sequence of events.400  Based on data he gathered, he too 
concluded that the money was quickly restored “after high-level communications between lead 
HR-4200 sponsor Congressman Greg Walden and BLM Director Kathleen Clarke.”401   
In sum, despite the reinstatement of the grant funding, according to many supporters of 
the Donato study, the BLM’s suspension represented an irregular governmental action arising 
out of a government challenge of the Donato study.  Further, this scene revealed a conflict 
between two federal entities striving to achieve their goals.  Although both the BLM (via the 
presidential administration) and Congressmen Walden and Baird had salvage logging as a 
political agenda item, Walden preferred to separate himself from the impression of any 
politically motivated retaliation – which the BLM’s grant suspension appeared to be – so he 
sought scientific arguments to further his policy interest.  In Scene 2, we learn that Congressman 
Walden reasserted the interests of FERRA through a special hearing that appeared to correct the 
effect of the BLM’s challenge.  In addition, the data reveals a seemingly orchestrated effort by 
Walden and Baird to discredit the Donato study through a congressional hearing in which actors 
tried to assert grant procedures and scientific justifications rather than political motivations.  
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Scene 2:  
In Act 2, Scene 2, I present an account showing how Congressman Walden’s next set of 
actions establish another venue for governmental actors to challenge the Donato study.  But this 
time, the events occur in a seemingly well-coordinated manner in terms of (a) the actions that 
explained the justification for the congressional hearing and (b) the roles that Walden and Baird 
each had at the congressional hearing.   
On February 8, 2006, the same date as the BLM reinstatement of funds, Walden 
announced that he and the House Natural Resources Committee Chair, Richard Pombo 
(California, Republican) had agreed to hold a House Forestry Panel hearing about the Donato 
study.  He indicated that Representative Tom Udall (New Mexico, Democrat) had initiated the 
request, and he was carrying out that request.  According to the House press release, 
Congressman Walden felt that Congress needed to gather more information about forest 
treatment after fires.   
Several observers of the Donato controversy, including members of the media and 
various bloggers, noted that Walden’s scheduling of this special hearing represented a turn of 
events.  Explaining the need for the hearing, Dan Berman, a reporter for Environment and 
Energy Daily, quoted Walden explaining: “As a result of our prior hearings, it became obvious 
that there is a need for additional research on how best to manage our forests after catastrophic 
events.”402  That quote is derived from a February 8, 2006 statement.  Yet, as Berman wrote: 
“The decision was a reversal of Walden’s stance two weeks ago” when Walden asserted that the 
Donato study added nothing to science knowledge about forest recovery following major fires.403  
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In late January 2006, when Udall first requested the hearing, Walden stated, “There wasn’t 
anything new” in the Donato study.404  He criticized the study and added: “My opinion is you 
need to look at a broader timeframe than a couple of years … and what happened if you get in 
right away as our bill envisions.”405  Walden also expressed less patience with the scientific 
process.  He thought that “[s]cientists are going to debate and disagree” but as a policymaker, he 
would still “need to make a decision.”406  Despite Walden’s public position in late January 2006, 
on February 8, 2006, he decided to hold a hearing, so the House Committee held a field hearing 
in Medford, Oregon, on February 24, 2006.    
As the events unfolded, critics of Walden, particularly those opposing FERRA, began to 
assert that Walden likely intended to use this February 24th hearing to position his policy in a 
positive light and challenge the Donato study as a poor scientific project.  Numerous media 
reports, including pieces in the Washington Post, Oregonian, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, and 
Chronicle of Higher Education, portrayed this field hearing as a coordinated attempt to discredit 
the Donato study.407  While Walden and Baird conveyed a uniform message that they believed 
the Donato team was more concerned about policy advocacy than science, the media outlets 
reported that each of the congressmen also appeared to have a specific role in challenging the 
Donato team and its study.408   
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At the February 24, 2006 hearing, Donato and four witnesses, including academic 
scientists and forestry professionals, testified at the first half of the hearing.  It became clear that 
Walden’s role was to inquire about the Donato team’s actions, which appeared to have violated 
the federal grant protocols, including provisions within the federal research grant contract.  
During the questioning period, Congressman Walden focused on putting science and 
policymaking questions to the panelists, except for Donato.  At this stage of the hearing, Walden 
asked the other witnesses one question: “[H]ow important is timing in post-fire treatments?”409  
After each of them responded, he directed his attention to Donato, stating, “I have a couple of 
questions obviously for you.”410  
  Walden did not ask Donato science-based questions; he posed questions and comments 
only about whether the Donato team had followed correct grant-funding protocols.  For example, 
Walden asked: “In terms of the protocols [pause] In terms of the protocols you were required to 
follow, were you supposed to – did you have a [BLM] project investigator that you were 
supposed to report to prior to submission to any publication of your work?”411  Donato replied 
that the communication standards were not clear, but he did, in December 2005, a month prior to 
the publication, communicate with Project Investigator Tom Sensenig.   
Following that comment, the exchange between Walden and Donato might be viewed as 
Walden’s cross-examination of Donato – with the intent to question the veracity of Donato’s 
comments.   
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Mr. WALDEN. So and was that the December meeting that Mr. Sensenig asked 
you to attend? 
Mr. DONATO. Yes. 
Mr. WALDEN. And in that meeting you told him you’d submitted the science. 
Mr. DONATO. That we were submitting a paper, yes. 
Mr. WALDEN. You did? Because he has an e-mail that we have in our record 
that doesn’t indicate that at all. It’s a much different version. Have you seen that 
e-mail? 
Mr. DONATO. No, I’m afraid I haven’t. 
Mr. WALDEN. All right. There’s an e-mail from Tom Sensenig, the principal 
investigator and project inspector to the contracting officer, Mr. Shapiro, which 
… indicates that he called the meeting with you in early December to prepare for 
a conference. Scheduled a meeting for December 15th in Corvallis. And he says, 
and I quote here: ‘‘Despite having already prepared and submitted their paper to 
Science, Dan did not offer any information regarding the other authors’ 
involvement or the fact that they had submitted a paper for publication.’’ 
Mr. DONATO. This really harkens to just a miscommunication as to the level of 
consultation required. This is an issue that has been resolved between the 
university and the agency as a miscommunication. It really was.412 
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Many observers in the media and bloggers supporting the Donato team viewed Walden’s 
role in the hearing as the one who established that the Donato team had circumvented the BLM 
channels.  They also believed that Baird’s contrasting role was to challenge Donato on the 
science and to raise concerns about the study’s scientific integrity.   
Baird, a former college psychology professor, has a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and 
previously taught statistics.  He used his educational training and experiences to guide him 
through the Donato questioning.  Like Walden, he presented straightforward inquiries to all the 
other witnesses.  For instance, he asked all the witnesses about the value of the bill’s inclusion of 
setting up work plans for logging activities.  In addition, he asked one witness whether 
“preeminent scientific journals” would require demonstrating the data with certain statistical 
steps.  For two other witnesses, he solicited opinions about the sufficiency of the research on 
salvage logging.  Collectively, Baird’s questions and comments amounted to approximately 67 
transcript lines for those four witnesses.  By contrast, Baird’s questions and comments amounted 
to 180 transcript lines for Donato, but more significantly, Baird’s tone changed when he went 
from questioning experts to questioning an academic scientist with allegations of research 
misconduct.   
Baird forewarned Donato: “So if I ask you tough questions, I’m not picking on you. This 
is how science works.  It’s worked for thousands of years this way.”413  He did, however, start 
his questioning of Donato as a rather professional exchange.  He raised concerns about the study, 
in a seeming attempt to distinguish it from the proposed legislation.  “I never saw you say that 
had the logging commenced prior to the two-year time allowed under the Biscuit Fire, the 
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mortality of seedlings would have been substantially different.”414  According to Baird, that 
represented a significant omission.  He argued that: “I think you needed to say it because the 
entire purpose of our legislation is to allow folks to go in while the existing wood has more value 
and before you got seedlings coming up. … Did I miss something or did you address that.”415  
Donato explained: “Our goal in the paper was to present the numbers and present the dates and 
not make management recommendations.  We just wanted to present the data.”416 
Baird’s perceptions about the Donato team’s intent became clear when he expressed, on 
multiple occasions, that he was unconvinced that Donato responded honestly.  In three instances, 
Baird referred to Donato’s statements as “disingenuous,” and he asserted that the Donato study 
contained “value-laden statements” – likely to imply that the Donato team sought to advance a 
policy direction without sufficient science to support that position. 
 Further, he criticized the statistical analysis as inaccurate.  Addressing his point, he said 
to Donato: “You have chosen a methodology for analysis and data report that is subject to 
significant misinterpretation. And this is not, my friend, a subtle academic issue; this is a matter 
of important policy decisions.”417  Then, a back-and-forth over the statistical approach ensued: 
Mr. DONATO. Can I also point out the statistical test that I used, which is the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test, which is used on before/after data for each plot, … 
completely takes care of this problem, 100 percent. 
Mr. BAIRD. No, it doesn’t. 
Mr. DONATO. Yes, it does. 
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Mr. BAIRD. It does not. It does not deal with the magnitude. I’m sorry. With 
respect, it doesn’t. It does not deal with the absolute magnitude of the difference. 
It rank orders the variables or the plots on which ones are different. It rank orders 
the magnitude, but it doesn’t tell the absolute magnitude. It just doesn’t. 
Mr. DONATO. The median is a measure of central tendency of all nine plots 
beforehand and all nine plots after. 
Mr. BAIRD. No, it’s not. 
Mr. DONATO. Yes, it is. 
Mr. BAIRD. It is not. 
Mr. DONATO. Yes, it is. I disagree.418  
 
This part of the questioning involved Donato trying to explain the team’s reasoning behind 
certain data analyses and Baird relying on his educational training and experience to argue that 
the Donato team erred in its analyses.   
 The media and some observers of the hearing, especially those sympathetic to the Donato 
team and those against the FERRA bill, characterized Donato’s experience as unfair 
interrogation in which the Congressmen “grilled” him about the controversial study.419  For 
instance, Blaine Harden, a journalist with The Washington Post, referred to Donato’s role as the 
“principal punching bag” in an effort to discredit the study.420  Les AuCoin, a retired Democratic 
Congressman representing Oregon, perceived the hearing as an event that “bordered on a star 
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chamber attack” to question Donato’s research integrity.421  According to AuCoin, an important 
lesson he gained from observing the hearing is that “in today’s [political] climate, if a scientist 
follows his findings to wherever they lead, he risks sticking his neck into a congressional 
noose.”422  
Many proponents of the FERRA bill, who also tended to represent the group supporting 
challenges to the Donato study, offered a different view of the hearing.  They believed that 
Congressmen Baird and Walden questioned Donato to uncover the scientific problems 
surrounding the study.  For example, David Reinhard, a conservative commentator for several 
papers in the Northwest region, interpreted the Walden and Baird investigation as a necessary 
forum to learn about the poor research of the Donato study.423  Many proponents of the FERRA 
bill also noted that at the time of the hearing, the Donato team still had not released the raw data 
to Baird, as he had requested.  Inferentially, they conveyed their underlying suspicion that the 
Donato team withheld the data so no one could replicate the study, which might have revealed 
errors or uncovered evidence of scientific misconduct.  Thus, based on this camp’s perspective, 
any grilling or punching that allegedly occurred took place to examine the science.   
Finally, the field hearing disclosed another noteworthy theme that did not seem to appear 
in other publicly accessible documents.  On several occasions during the hearing, Congressmen 
Walden and Baird, along with Rich Drehobl, a retired BLM field manager who testified at the 
field hearing, blamed the Donato team for the framing of media messages to the public and held 
the researchers accountable for how the public used that information.  For example, Baird stated:  
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Rightly or wrongly, intentionally or unintentionally, largely based solely on the title of 
your article and then what the press made of it subsequently, this study is becoming as if 
it were the total body of literature about post-fire logging.  And people show up at 
townhalls with how could you dare put forward this bill when science has proven this.424 
Similarly, Walden noted, “it really raises questions about this issue that is so much in the 
press.”425  He believed that “every one of us here has weighed in to defend academic freedom, 
but we also have an obligation to make sure that the contractual obligations that you and your 
colleagues are involved in are met.”426  Drehobl expressed his frustration with the media’s 
coverage of the Donato study challenges: “And I’ve been following the news media blitz with all 
this controversy that’s going on and BLM ... But the notion in the media that the BLM is stifling 
academic freedom is absolutely false.”427  He explained, “Academic freedom does not apply to 
intentionally misleading or publishing disingenuous or politically motivated science that’s 
funded by taxpayers.”428 
 In sum, the field hearing reflected the second significant government challenge against 
the Donato team and its research.  Opponents of the Donato study interpreted the events as 
governmental actors investigating a poorly constructed scientific study. By contrast, supporters 
of the Donato study viewed the actions as government’s attack on Donato and the team’s study.  
The circumstances and events surrounding the field hearing reveal a well-orchestrated, 
multilayer challenge.  First, Walden accused the Donato team of violating the grant provisions, 
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particularly the terms concerning the BLM clearance.  Walden insinuated that the researchers 
avoided the BLM project investigator to evade scientific scrutiny from a seasoned forestry 
researcher-practitioner.  Second, Baird asserted that the Donato team used incorrect scientific 
methods and analyses.  In making those assertions he raised concerns about the scientific 
integrity of the research.  Third, Walden, Baird, and Drehobl blamed the Donato team for the 
media’s purportedly incorrect messages.  They suggested that the Donato team might have 
strategically used the media to advance the researchers’ allegedly flawed study.  Walden, Baird, 
and Drehobl each represented a layer of the challenge, and collectively, they attempted to 
orchestrate a common message: The Donato study reflected a poor scientific project, in which 
the researchers, rather than setting out to conduct sound science, likely intended to use their 
published work to advocate for a certain policy position.  Put simply, through multiple layers of 
questioning the scientific soundness of this study, the House Forestry Panel hearing intended to 
discredit the Donato study.  
 Summary of Challenges 
To present the challenges, I described a series of interactions involving the primary 
actors.  In Act 1, I highlighted the CoF dean’s actions to minimize the Donato study.  In addition, 
I reported that the GoN took stronger steps to discredit the Donato study; it tried to delay the 
Donato study’s print publication and used this group’s influence as seasoned researchers and 
practitioners in the field to discredit it.  In Act 1, I also noted actors who were involved in 
activities behind the stage.  These individuals included policymakers supporting FERRA and 
industry representatives.  In Act 2, I introduced governmental actors who also challenged the 
Donato study and its researchers.  In the first scene of Act 2, I traced events surrounding an 





irregular move, the BLM suspended grant funding, based on allegations that the Donato team 
violated terms of the grant contracts.  Most significantly, the BLM claimed that the Donato team 
lobbied against a proposed House bill.  Concerned that observers might perceive the grant 
suspension as academic censorship and/or retaliation, the author of that bill, Congressman Greg 
Walden, along with Congressman Brian Baird, requested the reinstatement of the funds.  The 
BLM complied.  Then, Walden created another opportunity to challenge the Donato study.  He 
decided to hold a congressional field hearing.  According to some observers, that hearing 
amounted to a well-orchestrated event to publicly challenge the study. A graduate student, Dan 
Donato, one of the contested study’s authors, was at the center of their target.  Collectively, these 
events, which I depicted as a two-act play, dramatized the multistage challenges against the 
Donato team and its federally sponsored research. 
Responses to the Challenges 
In this section, I detail how academic scientists who supported the Donato team 
employed three significant strategies, so the Donato team could exert control over its research.  
Consistent with the conceptual framework discussed more fully in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, 
I divide the strategies into actions that relied more heavily on (a) internal characteristics, (b) 
external factors, and (c) both internal characteristics of and external factors influencing the 
academic profession.   
Internal Characteristics 
One of the strategies that academic scientists supporting the Donato team employed 
involved using traditions of the academic profession to establish “rules” of the professional 
interaction.  These academic rules drew on internal characteristics of the academic profession to 





strategy of academic rules, I describe, below, two responses of academic scientists who 
supported the Donato team.   
Academic Censure 
On several occasions, supporters of the Donato study publicly admonished the GoN for 
their attempts to attack the Donato study.  For example, on February 8, 2006, University Provost 
Sabah Randhawa and Faculty Senate President Bill Boggess, two OSU campus leaders, issued a 
joint letter to the university community rebuking the CoF professors who were signatories to the 
GoN letter.429  According to the provost and faculty senate president, when the GoN “disagreed 
with the study’s conclusions,” their actions represented an “inappropriate … request to delay 
publication.”430  Affirming the protocols within academic science, the provost and faculty senate 
president stated that “[d]ifferences of perspectives drive the scientific inquiry process. These 
should not only be encouraged, but fostered in our academic community.”431  Further, the 
provost and faculty senate president made clear that academic organizations such as OSU 
operate with a “culture of open query and expression, where diversity of opinions is valued and 
individuals are free to express themselves without the fear of censorship.”432  
Similarly, on February 9, 2006, the OSU Faculty Senate unanimously passed a resolution 
that excerpted sections of the faculty handbook’s statements on academic freedom as a 
professional code of conduct.433  In addition, the resolution expressed public disapproval of the 
GoN’s efforts to delay the publication of the Donato study, with the last paragraph of the 
resolution stating: 
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The Faculty Senate of Oregon State University stands resolved that the actions 
taken by faculty members of this university that attempted to interfere with the 
publication of … Donato, et al.’s research in Science violated both the spirit and 
the letter of the “Statement of Faculty Responsibilities.”434  
These public statements sent a uniform message, which the final paragraph of the joint letter 
from the provost and the faculty senate president captures quite clearly.  These vocal supporters 
of the Donato research team intended to “reaffirm [their] commitment to academic freedom, 
professional responsibility, and the scientific method” – which included voicing in a public 
manner their opposition to the GoN’s letter as being not acceptable then or in the future.”435 
 These forms of academic censure for the opposing group conveyed a professional 
ideology of research’s independence from undue influence.  The statements repeatedly 
reaffirmed the academic values of open inquiry and scientific review.  The academic censuring 
also identified roles of various individuals when academic scientists challenge their colleagues’ 
federally sponsored research.  Examining these roles in terms of divisions of labor, these senior 
leaders (i.e., the provost and faculty senate president) and the faculty representative body within 
OSU served as academic enforcers who guarded against inappropriate use of power within their 
system (or in this case, their university).  That the senior leaders took on this role would allow 
the Donato team to focus on its research, not enforcing violations of professional conduct.  
Furthermore, under the labor markets and careers factor, which in Freidson’s model reflects a 
profession’s ability to dictate who can enter and work in the profession, the academic censure 
sent a message that academic groups cannot inappropriately exercise their power within the 
profession nor can they change the rules of the academic profession on how to debate an 
                                                 
434 OSU Faculty Senate, 2006. 





academic matter.  Finally, the statements of academic censure might at first appear to be blanket 
condemnations of the OSU faculty members within the GoN; however, that is not the case.  
Although the censuring shone attention on these OSU faculty members for using their power 
inappropriately when they attempted to stop the dissemination of the Donato study, the academic 
censure statements allowed that the OSU faculty members within the GoN could use their 
professional knowledge and skills to contest the research in a more open environment (i.e., an 
environment that follows the traditions of the academic profession).    
 While academic censuring represents one dimension of the academic rules, in the next 
subsection, I describe another dimension – the committee review process. 
Committee Review & Policy Development 
 Supporters of the Donato study also pushed for an internal review of the professional 
work environment at the OSU CoF.436  While the institution reaffirmed its concern for principles 
of free inquiry through the academic censure, not everyone supporting the Donato team had 
confidence that the CoF organizational climate fostered the same ideals.  Illustrating this 
viewpoint, which many of the Donato team supporters held, the provost suggested that the 
GoN’s actions might have reflected power imbalances within the CoF.  He stated, “It’s important 
that those in positions of power don’t misuse their rank, intimidating faculty or students with less 
power.”437  Based on an interview with the provost, Mary Ann Albright, a writer for the 
Corvallis Gazette-Times, the local paper for the OSU community, wrote that the provost believed 
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there would be “a need to look at the hierarchy inherent in the university structure” in order to 
propose solutions to avoid future misuse of professional authority.438  
In an effort to find a resolution to the internal conflicts, several OSU administrators and 
faculty encouraged Dean Salwasser to establish a committee to investigate the working climate 
and make recommendations to improve the environment.  He acted on those suggestions, and on 
February 10, 2006, he officially announced the establishment of the CoF internal review team, 
the Committee on Academic Freedom and Responsibility (CAFR).439  According to minutes of 
the CoF Executive Committee, the new committee’s charge was to recommend a plan of action 
addressing “how to lead the College through a conversation about what academic freedom and 
core values of the College mean” to members of the CoF community.440   
The establishment of CAFR represented an important strategy for supporters of the 
Donato study.  It engaged nearly the entire CoF community (i.e., faculty, staff, and graduate 
students) to voice their perspectives about the organizational climate.  Initially, CAFR held open 
meetings for members of the CoF community to express their opinions on how to advance the 
principles of academic freedom and the CoF’s core values.  While CAFR and the CoF Executive 
Committee minutes reported that the attendance met their expectations, some members of the 
CoF community, particularly junior faculty and graduate students, told CAFR members that they 
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“felt reluctant to speak” openly.441  Rather than exclude the very individuals who might have 
sensed the power differential, CAFR took active steps to gather feedback beyond the open 
forums, such as collecting data from e-mail and verbal communications.  Furthermore, CAFR 
commissioned another unit within the university to administer an anonymous survey to obtain 
the CoF community’s perceptions and attitudes about the college’s culture and climate in terms 
of its leadership, protections for research independence, and professional behavior.  In addition, 
in May and June 2006, it presented preliminary drafts of its reports to obtain community 
feedback about the findings and recommendations.  Through this complex data-collection 
process, CAFR intended to propose new or revised policies and practices that welcomed multiple 
perspectives and maintained the value of free inquiry. 
Indeed, CAFR’s work led to several noticeable changes in the CoF.  First, to advance the 
professional ideology of capturing a diverse, learned perspective, the CoF adopted several new 
policies.442  For the Forest Research Laboratory (FRL) Advisory Committee, the CoF added 
“two fully vested members-at-large” with the express intent of broadening the “perspectives 
represented on the College’s primary decision making body.”443  In the fall of 2006, the dean 
initiated attempts to diversify the perspectives of the FRL.  The FRL Advisory Committee is a 
statutorily defined committee that requires representation from the CoF, state and federal 
agencies, and alumni.  It has served as the external advisory board for the CoF, but according to 
CoF meeting minutes and a statement from the dean, it has had significant representation from 
individuals who adhere to the human-intervention perspective in forestry, particularly individuals 
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from the timber industry.444  As an initial step to diversify the external advisory committee’s 
perspective, Dean Salwasser appointed an individual who embraced a naturalistic approach to 
forestry with an ecosystem lens, and the dean promised to consider other appointments of 
individuals with a naturalistic approach when an opening, which is not pre-designated by 
statutory mandate, became available.445  Further, the dean established the College Advisory 
Council, consisting of representatives from various groups within the CoF, to give input to the 
college leadership.446   
Second, CAFR’s work led to changes in the training and development of new and future 
members of the academic profession.  Within research methods courses, the CoF integrated 
lessons on research independence from inappropriate influences, especially from industry, 
government, and even other academic scientists.447  The dean also exposed a group of graduate 
students to policymaking to advance an open dialogue.  The dean asked the Graduate Student 
Council (GSC) to develop CoF’s policies and practices that dealt with the CoF responses to 
conflicts arising from presentations of controversial scientific issues.448  That led to the GSC and 
the dean’s office crafting policies and sponsoring forums on advancing a collegial debate.  
Besides professional development for the graduate students, the dean appointed the associate 
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dean for academic affairs with the express responsibility of faculty mentoring and advancing the 
culture of research independence.   
In sum, the internal review and its adopted policies established several similar messages 
as a form of academic censure to help the Donato team exert control over its federally sponsored 
research.  It espoused the professional ideology of research independence as a priority at OSU.  
Also, it reiterated that both the academic challengers and the challenged academic scientists had 
opportunities to exercise their professional knowledge and skills.  However, unlike the academic 
censure, the internal review and its adopted policies presented several distinct contributions to 
aid the Donato team.  Under the internal review, the division of labor relied more on peers, not 
those who held a special formal authority, such as the title of provost or faculty senate president.  
CAFR also focused on the involvement of the entire community to give feedback, not just 
representative bodies.  The internal review also created forums for graduate students.  As a 
training program for future professionals, the involvement of graduate students reflected a 
significant factor to support the Donato team and future graduate students who engage in 
research about controversial issues.  For instance, since two of the authors, including the lead 
author of the Donato study, were graduate students, the internal review process and subsequent 
policies conveyed a message that the college intended to protect graduate students as well as 
faculty.  In addition, based on CAFR’s recommendations, the CoF adopted a training program to 
inform graduate students about academic freedom and related professional responsibilities.  In 
sum, the internal review and its adopted policies moved beyond just admonishing academic 
violators for undue research interference, it collected data to evaluate the college’s work 
environment, isolated several identifiable problems, and implemented new and revised policies 





team as well as addressing future problems that might arise when academic scientists at OSU do 
research on a controversial issue.     
External Factors 
In this subsection, I examine how the supporters of the Donato study relied on external 
factors, such as actors outside of the academic community who held legal authority and public 
influence.  In particular, I describe how supporters of the Donato study relied heavily on political 
allies to overcome some of the challenges facing the Donato team.  In brief, the supporters would 
first inform the political allies about the contested matter.  Then, the political allies would use 
government venues and channels to reveal what the supporters believed were unfair challenges 
to the Donato study and its authors.  Each of these instances of political support contributed in 
some way so that the Donato team could exert control over its federally sponsored research.  I 
address below, more specifically, how the involvement of the political allies led to (a) the 
reinstatement of the BLM grant, (b) a congressional forum to reaffirm the Donato study findings 
and conclusions, and (c) disclosure of the challengers’ interests.  
Questioning Intentions 
Political allies of the Donato team relied on the media and general public to question the 
intentions of the BLM.  When Congressmen Jay Inslee and David Wu learned about the BLM 
grant suspension, they quickly drew attention to this government action on the House floor and 
captured the media’s attention.  The congressmen framed the BLM grant suspension as another 
example of an allegedly larger pattern of federal censorship over federally funded scientific 
research.449  Escalating the matter, Congressman Inslee also contacted Earl Denavey, the 
Department of Interior’s inspector general to investigate the BLM’s decision as a possible 
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financial retaliation.  Put simply, the political allies painted the picture of a political agenda 
driving the actions.    
Supporters of the Donato team suggested that the political showcasing of this matter, 
which led to public awareness, played a large role in the BLM’s decision to return the funds.  As 
Andy Stahl, the director of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics, characterized 
the events to one reporter, “The key to effective censorship is to make sure no one’s looking, and 
this time everyone was watching.”450  Stahl and other Donato supporters believed that too many 
public observers were following the Donato study controversy, and that foiled the BLM’s act of 
financial retaliation.  Further, as mentioned earlier, Congressmen Walden and Baird feared that 
Inslee’s public display of the problem might have connected the suspension to FERRA.  
Concerned about those negative impressions, Walden and Baird, who objected to the science 
behind the Donato study, nevertheless benevolently requested that the BLM reinstate the funds.  
In short, the attention drawn to this issue from political allies of the Donato study led to BLM’s 
reinstatement of the grant funding.    
Balancing the Perspectives 
Political allies of the Donato team balanced the research perspectives by giving academic 
scientists who sided with the Donato study a voice on the congressional floor.  In March 2006, 
Congressman Tom Udall (New Mexico, Democrat) held another special hearing on the Donato 
study to gather more information.451  Udall felt that Congressman Walden’s special hearing in 
February 2006 presented a heavily weighted perspective in favor of salvage logging.  Udall’s 
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panel consisted of five academic scientists, whom reporters characterized as leading scholars in 
forest science, who did not have a salvage logging agenda.452  Each of these academic scientists 
had previously taken an ecosystem perspective, which tended to rely more on natural 
approaches.  In their testimony, they suggested that salvage logging might present a viable 
approach for forest recovery under certain conditions.  But, drawing on their expertise, they felt 
that salvage logging would create significant land disturbances to ecologically sensitive areas 
such as the one the Donato team studied.  They also reiterated that past scientific research had 
supported their conclusions and the Donato team’s research too.  Many media outlets (e.g., The 
Chronicle of Higher Education, The Oregonian, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, The Washington 
Post) along with supporters of the Donato study used the testimony in further support of 
arguments stating that Congressman Walden’s hearing presented a favorable picture of salvage 
logging, ignored the larger body of research, and unfairly discounted the Donato study.453 
Possible Conflicts of Interest  
According to numerous blogs, news coverage quotes, and editorials, many Oregon 
citizens had long suspected that the CoF responded favorably to timber industry needs.  
Previously, these expressions relied heavily on conjecture or mere speculation.  However, the 
controversy surrounding the Donato study gave political allies of the Donato team an opportunity 
to investigate the possible ties between the CoF and the timber industry.   
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The investigation started after the CoF dean issued his memo (which had the effect of 
minimizing the Donato study) and the Gang of Nine tried to discredit and delay the study’s 
publication.  During the spring of 2006, Oregon State Senator Charlie Ringo, a supporter of the 
Donato study, initiated a public records request of the CoF dean’s e-mails involving 
communications about the Donato team’s Science article.454  The retrieved e-mails revealed that 
various members of the CoF acted in ways to advance the timber industry’s interests.  For 
example, prior to the dean’s issuance of his January 11, 2006 memo to “contextualize” the 
Donato study, he circulated drafts of his memo, requesting feedback on how to frame his 
statements.  Rather than seeking feedback from both sides of the issue, the dean contacted only 
individuals who opposed the study.  His e-mail distribution included two members of the Gang 
of Nine, John Sessions and Mike Newton, as well as Chris West of the American Forest 
Resource Council (AFRC), an advocacy group for the timber industry, and Rita Neznek, 
governmental affairs manager for the Society of American Foresters, a group that strongly 
advocated for salvage logging as an approach to forest recovery after wildfires.455  Several e-mail 
exchanges among members of the GoN, the dean, representatives of industry, and other 
proponents in the salvage logging debate also referred to the e-mailed individuals’ actions to 
discredit the Donato study and to participate in “damage control.”456 
As Senator Ringo stated in an April 2006 Oregon legislative session and expressly 
testified before the U.S. Senate in August 2006, the e-mails demonstrated a “very close 
coordination with industry representatives and government officials to put the right spin on this 
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[study] so that it would not have an inconvenient impact for this legislation.”457  It is very 
possible that the dean, Gang of Nine, timber industry, and proponents of the FERRA legislation 
relied on sound science to determine their position.  Nonetheless, their actions appear to present 
a coordinated effort to challenge a study by closing the debate rather than fully exploring the 
science behind the study.  Observers, particularly supporters of the Donato study, emphasized 
this perception and noted that some of the Donato challengers, particularly the dean and Gang of 
Nine, might not have spoken in a disinterested manner.  The supporters, instead, characterized 
these challengers as acting in a way that unfairly objected to the Donato study because the 
challengers wanted to advance the goals of salvage logging. 
Put simply, the investigation by the Donato study’s political allies weakened the 
credibility of the challengers and concomitantly strengthened the credibility of the Donato team. 
Collective Impact 
In sum, each of the three events (i.e., reinstatement of the BLM grant funding; the 
congressional forum reaffirming the Donato study findings and conclusions; disclosure of the 
challengers’ interests) raised questions about the interests and credibility of the lay governmental 
actors who challenged the Donato study.  In addition, collectively, these events demonstrated the 
challengers’ policy preference for salvage logging even if that support meant employing irregular 
measures or using one-sided perspectives to discredit a federally funded academic research study 
despite insufficient evidence of sloppy scientific work or other sorts of wrongdoing.   
Both Internal Characteristics & External Factors 
Supporters of the Donato study combined both the internal characteristics of and external 
factors influencing the academic profession as a strategy to address the challenges and to enable 
the Donato team to exert control over federally funded research.  Under this strategy, supporters 
                                                 





of the Donato study relied heavily on the science – both the profession’s exercise of professional 
knowledge and skills (an internal characteristic) and the bodies of knowledge (an independent 
external factor).   
First, in various news reports and other publicly accessible sources – including Donato’s 
testimony at the February 24, 2006 field hearing, the Donato team stood behind its research as 
being scientifically sound.  The team emphasized its exercise of professional knowledge and 
skills, such as its rationale behind the statistical approach and the data sites used.  The team also 
explained what it believed was the study’s contribution within the scope of the larger body of 
literature on post-fire forest-recovery approaches to overcome assertions from critics that the 
study was an outlier with little to no scientific support in the academic and forest industry 
communities.  Second, other academic scientists reviewed the literature on post-fire forest-
recovery approaches and concluded that the Donato study findings reflected scientific 
consistency.  Drawing on the external factor of bodies of knowledge, these other academic 
scientists publicly supported the Donato team’s findings.  For example, a group of 169 academic 
scientists, who researched forest recovery-related issues from a variety of environmental 
specialties, such as biology, forest science, fire ecology, and geography, also concluded that 
salvage logging “actually slow[ed] the natural recovery of forests and of streams and creatures 
within them,” presented increased forest fire risks, and failed to offer economic benefits.458  They 
wrote a letter to Congress to express their opposition to salvage logging and their support for the 
Donato study.459  Third, other forms of this particular external factor, bodies of knowledge, 
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bolstered the Donato study’s credibility after the Donato controversy subsided.  These 
subsequent studies, which were published in selective academic journals, also presented similar 
findings about the effects of natural seedling growth after a wildfire.460  Thus, these studies 
provided some confirmatory evidence that the Donato study represented sound research.  Indeed, 
this strategy of relying on the science convinced many academic scientists, forestry 
professionals, and policymakers that the Donato research team had conducted a defensible study 
(though not necessarily a study without flaws and/or contestable research perspectives).   
Summary of Responses 
 The academic scientists who supported the Donato team and its study employed three 
principal strategies.  First, drawing on the internal characteristics of the academic profession, 
these academic scientists used the “gameplay” of the academic profession, turning academic 
rules into a strategy.  Second, these academic scientists relied heavily on political allies as an 
external factor to overcome some of the challenges facing the Donato team.  Third, these 
academic scientists used the study’s science, which integrated the profession’s exercise of 
professional knowledge and skills (an internal characteristic) and the bodies of knowledge (an 
independent external factor) as a strategy for the Donato team.  These three overarching 
strategies demonstrate how structuring into workable actions the internal characteristics of and 
external factors influencing the academic profession helped the Donato team exert control over 
its federally funded research. 
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Summary & Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented the challenges to a federally funded research study and the 
strategic responses that helped the academic scientists who wrote the contested study to exert 
control over it.  The contested study, a federally sponsored research project referred to as the 
Donato study, questioned the effectiveness of salvage logging as a forest-recovery approach to 
certain landscapes harmed by the Biscuit Fire.  According to critics of salvage logging, the 
Donato study contradicted the policy rationale of a proposed bill, the Forest Ecosystem Recovery 
and Research Act (FERRA), which provided for an expedited review process for salvage logging 
projects.   
Reconstructing the interactions among the primary actors of the conflict like a dramatic 
play, I recounted the circumstances and events surrounding the release of the study and the 
multistage set of challenges that followed.  At first, members of the academic community and a 
few forest service staff initiated the challenges.  Events revealed that these challengers had some 
connection to the timber industry and policymakers, but they acted primarily as backstage crew 
and at times in a supporting-cast role.  Later, several governmental actors entered the stage, and 
they challenged the Donato team and its research through a grant suspension and a field hearing.  
From the perspective of the Donato team supporters, the government actions reflected a targeted 
attack on one of the study’s authors, Dan Donato, who was a graduate student and one of the 
most junior academic scientists on the Donato team.   
In response to those challenges, academic scientists who supported the Donato team 
employed three significant strategies, which emerged when applying a modified version of 
Freidson’s model of the profession.  Following that model as my conceptual framework, I 





characteristics of the academic profession, (b) external factors influencing the academic 
profession, and (c) both internal and external factors of the academic profession.  That led me to 
uncover several strategies that the Donato team supporters used.   
Under the internal characteristics frame, the academic scientists supporting the Donato 
team asserted traditional academic “rules” for professional interaction.  Initially, they used 
academic censure as a way to admonish the Gang of Nine and set the tone that they would stand 
behind the Donato team.  Next, they pushed for the creation of an academic committee to 
investigate the conflicts and develop new internal policies and practices.  The new policies and 
practices started to alter the organizational culture of Oregon State University’ College of 
Forestry.  It made efforts to balance the power between senior and junior faculty, gave the 
graduate students a voice, emphasized being open to different perspectives – especially drawing 
in the more natural ecology perspective – and vocalized a conscious effort to advance the goals 
of free inquiry in research (i.e., avoid actions that might be considered to show undue research 
interference). 
Under the external factors frame, the supporters of the Donato study relied on actors 
outside of the academic community who held legal authority and public influence to help the 
Donato team exert control over its federally sponsored research.  Typically, the events involved 
supporters of the Donato team connecting with political allies and informing them of the 
challenges.  Following an event of that type, the political allies used public venues to call public 
attention to the situation and protest the challengers’ actions.  Public outcry would ensue and 
demand corrective action.  Based on this series of actions, the Donato political allies managed to 





conclusions, and weaken the challengers’ public standing by disclosing their intentions, which 
appeared to conflict with the public’s interests. 
 When combining both the internal and external factors of the academic profession, 
actions using the science and professional expertise of the Donato research supporters and the 
Donato team itself emerged as a significant strategy to help the Donato team exert control over 
its federally sponsored research.  Drawing from their science and professional expertise, many 
academic scientists, forestry professionals, and policymakers became convinced that the Donato 
research team had conducted a nearly defensible study – at least one credible enough to stand for 
the general proposition that natural regrowth of forests presents a viable approach to forest 
recovery. 
One final observation: In this chapter, I captured the mixed effects of federal actors and 
members of the media.  I demonstrated how governmental actors were both challengers and 
supporters.  Similarly, I illustrated how the challengers used the media against the Donato team 
and helped publicize irregular challenges to garner support for the Donato team.  These data 
remind us that neither federal policymakers nor members of the media reflect monolithic groups.  
Further, these data draw us back to my theoretical framework, which is a modified version of 
Freidson’s theory of the professions.  The framework indicates that external factors, such as 
individuals with legal authority (i.e., federal policymakers) and sources for public dissemination 
of information (i.e., media) can moderate, positively and negatively, the extent to which a 
profession can exert control over its work.  Put simply, the Responses to the Challenges section 
showed how the internal characteristics, external factors, and the blend of both internal 





their research.  Further, we recognize that the external factors also have the capacity to limit or 
even eliminate that ability of academic scientists to control their research.    
In the next chapter, I present my cross-case analysis of the sewage sludge, climate 








Table 7.1: Acronyms for the Salvage Logging Case 
 
CAFR = Committee on Academic Freedom and Responsibility 
CoF = College of Forestry 
Co-PIs = Co-Principal Investigators 
FERRA = Forest Emergency Recovery and Research Act 
GoN = Gang of Nine 
GSC = Graduate Student Council 








Table 7.2: Timeline of Relevant Actions and Events in the Salvage Logging Case 
DATE ACTION/EVENT 
Jul.–Dec. 2002 Biscuit Fire burns approximately 500,000 acres of the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest. 
Jul. 2003 
 
Sessions Report advocates for immediate and aggressive actions to avoid the time and energy 
needed to pave roads and overcome other logistical hurdles. 
Sept. 2003 
 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) awards a three-year grant totaling $307,000 to Oregon 
State University (OSU).   




Congressman Greg Walden (Oregon, Republican) is principal author of House bill, the Forest 
Emergency Recovery and Research Act (FERRA).  The bill would relax procedural approvals 
for forest-recovery efforts including salvage logging. 
Jan. 5, 2006 
 
Science Express releases the Donato study, “Post-Wildfire Logging Hinders Regeneration and 
Increases Fire Risk,” through its online edition. 
Jan. 11, 2006 Hal Salwasser, Dean, OSU College of Forestry, distributes memo to “contextualize” the 
Donato study. 
Jan. 17, 2006 Gang of  Nine writes Science editor to discredit study and delay its publication in print edition. 
Jan. 20, 2006 Science publishes the Donato article in its print edition. 
Feb. 1, 2006 BLM suspends Donato research grant. 
Feb. 5, 2006 BLM issues letter to OSU asking about the grant activity. 
Feb. 7, 2006  U.S. Representative Jay Inslee (Washington, Democrat) sends letter to Department of Interior 
Inspector General Earl Devaney requesting he investigate grant suspension. 
Feb. 8, 2006 Congressmen Greg Walden and Brian Baird ask BLM Director Kathleen Clarke to reinstate 
Donato research funding. 
Feb. 8, 2006 Oregon State University responds to BLM inquiry. 
Feb. 8, 2006 BLM reinstates grant funds. 
Feb. 8, 2006 U.S. Representative Walden agrees to conduct field hearing based on a January 2006 request 
from U.S. Representative Tom Udall (New Mexico, Democrat). 
Feb. 8, 2006 University Provost Sabah Randhawa and Faculty Senate President Bill Boggess issue joint 
letter to the university community rebuking the College of Forestry professors who 
participated in the Gang of Nine letter. 
Feb. 9, 2006 Faculty Senate unanimously passes a resolution affirming academic freedom for Donato team 
and admonishing the College of Forestry professors who participated in the Gang of Nine 
letter. 
Feb. 10, 2006 Hal Salwasser announces the establishment of the College of Forestry’s Committee on 
Academic Freedom and Responsibility to investigate the working climate and make 
recommendations to improve that environment. 
Feb. 24, 2006 House Forestry Panel conducts a field hearing about the Donato study. 
Mar. 14, 2006 169 academic scientists, who research forest recovery-related issues, write to members of 
Congress in support of the Donato study findings. 
Apr. 2006 Oregon State Senator Charlie Ringo releases Dean Hal Salwasser’s e-mails involving 
communications about the Donato team’s Science article.  E-mails demonstrate the college’s 
connection with industry and trade groups advocating for the FERRA bill. 
Jul. 25, 2006 Committee on Academic Freedom and Responsibility issues its report findings, including 
commitments that the dean will make to further the goals of academic freedom. 
Aug. 2006 Oregon State Senator Charlie Ringo testifies before the U.S. Senate about the College of 
Forestry’s spin on the Donato study. 
2006-2007 
 
From the spring 2006 term through the fall 2007 term, the College of Forestry takes steps to 








CHAPTER VIII: GOVERNMENT CHALLENGES & THE ACADEMIC 
PROFESSION’S REPONSES: PRESENTATION OF THE FINDINGS  
 
Introduction 
At the beginning of this dissertation, I stated that the purpose of my study was to 
investigate what it means (a) for government actors to challenge academic scientists’ federally 
sponsored research and (b) for academic scientists to exert control over that research.  I reviewed 
the existing literature on these subjects in chapters 2 and 3, respectively, and identified gaps in 
that literature.   
For example, the literature I review in Chapter 2 suggests that government efforts to alter, 
discredit, or suppress the findings of federally funded research are often driven by the policy 
preferences and political agendas of those in power.  It also appears that such efforts rest on 
evidence and assumptions that are generated through governmental fact-finding methods (e.g., 
public hearings) and political interactions rather than through the peer-review processes on 
which scholars usually rely.   
Similarly, the literature I review in Chapter 3 suggests that the academic profession’s 
efforts to protect itself and to maintain control over the findings of federally funded research it 
conducts draw mostly on the academic profession’s internal characteristics, in which, for 
example, credibility rests on expert knowledge, specialized training, and recognized 
qualifications for practice within a field.  These, collectively, represent institutionalized 
arrangements that have given professors autonomy over their work.   
However, after reviewing the extant literature in both of those chapters, I argue that these 





profession’s efforts to protect its research findings and its professional autonomy – overlook 
several key factors.  First, as I mentioned in both chapters 2 and 3, the literature pays little 
attention to other, potentially important, actors in this process.  Prior studies tend to focus almost 
exclusively on the relationship between the government challengers and the academic 
researchers who have conducted the challenged studies, but other people and entities also play 
important roles.  Second, as I discuss in Chapter 3, the literature on the academic profession’s 
responses to government challenges tends to omit an examination of additional internal 
characteristics of the academic profession that highlight its exercise of expertise.  It also tends to 
overlook ways in which the profession generates external support for its research and its 
methods, as well as considerations regarding the boundaries of work for academic scientists and 
policymakers when addressing science policy questions through federally funded research.  In 
addition, prior research often does not consider how the academic profession’s control over the 
training and development of future researchers potentially plays out in the academic profession’s 
responses to government challenges.  My study seeks to address some of these gaps, drawing in 
part on the work of Freidson.     
To explore the concepts of government challenges and academic scientists’ efforts to 
exert control, I set out to uncover the pressures and tactics that governmental and 
nongovernmental actors have employed to challenge academic scientists’ federally sponsored 
research and the strategies and tactics the academic profession has used to defend that research 
and protect its autonomy.  As part of that investigation, in chapters 5, 6, and 7, I reported the data 
for each of my three cases using a chronological narrative to recount the circumstances and 





Freidson’s theory of the professions, which I introduced in Chapter 3, to organize the data 
representing the academic profession’s responses.  
In this chapter, I continue to frame my findings in terms of the government challenges 
and the academic profession’s responses.  In Part I, I present two themes, derived from the data, 
that identify the kinds of governmental and nongovernmental actors who participated in posing 
challenges to academic scientists’ research on sewage sludge, global warming, and salvage 
logging and, especially, the methods (i.e., pressures, tactics, and other means) those actors 
employed to carry out those challenges.  In Part II, I report three cross-case themes that emerged 
from the data to identify the strategies and tactics as well as the range of strategies, tactics, 
and/or other means that academic scientists (here as representatives of the academic profession, 
per Freidson) employed in responding to the government challenges.  As I explain each cross-
case theme I present supporting evidence for it, and I conclude the discussion of each theme with 
a summary claim that responds to the research question at issue.  In all, the chapter offers five 
claims, which I present as the conclusions of my study. 
Part 1: Government Challenges 
In Part 1, I present two data patterns that respond to the research question: Drawing on 
circumstances and events surrounding several lay challenges to academic scientists’ federally 
funded research, (a) what kinds of governmental actors have participated or are now participating 
in activities that challenged academic scientists’ research on sewage sludge, global warming, and 
salvage logging, (b) what kinds of nongovernmental actors have participated or are now 
participating in activities that challenged academic scientists’ research, (c) what methods  did 





(i.e., pressures, tactics, and other means) did nongovernmental actors employ to challenge 
academic scientists’ research? 
Raising Job Performance Concerns  
In the three cases, government challengers, as investors in the federally funded research 
projects, pressured certain governmental and nongovernmental actors to conform to their 
requests or face potential penalties.  To carry out this action, the government challengers raised 
job performance concerns, alleging poor oversight, evaluation, and execution of the federally 
sponsored research project at issue.  The government challengers communicated their 
dissatisfaction with the handling of the sponsored research not only to the researchers themselves 
but also to three other sets of actors who had some role in its progress or dissemination.  While 
these actors often had behind-the-scenes roles, they had the capacity to advance or inhibit the 
progress of that federally funded research or possibly other federally funded research projects.  
Given these actors’ potential importance, the pressures that government challengers placed on 
them presented real threats to the academic scientists in all three cases. 
Specifically, the government challengers in my three cases criticized the job performance 
of (a) governmental and nongovernmental actors, who held no public policymaking authority but 
had oversight authority for the federally sponsored project, (b) the peer reviewers who approved 
the study’s publication, and (c) other academic scientists who either already had or might seek 
federal sponsorship for their research.  The government challengers sent messages strongly 
suggesting that these three sets of actors take corrective actions, such as downplaying or 
characterizing the research as untrustworthy.  The suggestion was that they might otherwise face 
penalties, such as reductions in federal sponsorship of academic research.  Below, I briefly 





Alerting Actors with Oversight Responsibilities 
In each case, the government challengers alerted actors with management or research 
project oversight authority that they had concerns about the federally sponsored research, which 
ultimately fell within their control.  They conveyed the need for these individuals to take 
corrective action in each circumstance.  For instance, in the sewage sludge case, one government 
challenger informed two Cornell administrators, in writing, about alleged scientific errors with 
the Cornell Waste Management Institute (CWMI) research, which was at the center of that 
controversy.  Although the Cornell administrators did not act on the matter, various observers 
interpreted the notification as an attempt to influence the administrators to take action such as 
downplaying the study or reconsidering its dissemination.  In the salvage logging case, the 
Oregon State University (OSU) administrator who aided the government challengers did act on 
their behalf after several governmental actors and others who supported the salvage logging 
approach placed pressure on him to discredit the federally sponsored project at issue (i.e., the 
Donato study).  However, rather than discrediting the Donato study, the OSU administrator 
chose to downplay the research and endorse the pending bill that two of the government 
challengers were co-sponsoring.  In the climate change case, the government challengers raised 
concerns with National Science Foundation (NSF) officers after the project had been 
disseminated.  The government challengers wrote to the NSF director questioning how the 
organization had failed to catch the errors in Michael Mann, Raymond Bradley, and Malcolm 
Hughes’s (MBH) research (i.e.,  the hockey study), and why posting the algorithm and raw data 
was not required in the funding agreement.  Further, as observers including academic scientists 
and other government officials reported, the government challengers’ letter and public statements 





its policies and procedures about data quality and transparency if it wanted continued 
congressional support. 
Besides pointing out job performance concerns, observers in each case reported that the 
government messages implicitly suggested that future funding could be in jeopardy if the actors 
with oversight responsibilities (i.e., Cornell administrators, NSF project officers, and OSU’s CoF 
administrators) chose to do nothing about the issues in question.  Although the government 
challengers did not always respond to these pressures, the point here is that the government 
actors applied the pressures and hoped they would bring about the desired outcome.  In other 
words, these authorities with oversight perceived the government messages as not-so-subtle 
threats.    
Criticizing the Peer Reviewers 
The government challengers in each of my cases also criticized the job performance of 
peer reviewers who considered the underlying research to be worthy of publication.  As investors 
in academic research, the government challengers indicated their interest in the studies and the 
review process that is in place to vet and correct research papers.  The government challengers 
reported, however, that the peer reviewers had failed to exercise due diligence in reviewing 
papers produced with federal funding.  Citing other scientists, policymakers, and members of the 
media, some of whom in each case had reported flaws in the studies, the government challengers 
raised several concerns, including their sense that the peer reviewers conducted poor evaluations 
of the papers, which misled the government investors to believe that their funds (i.e., the 
government resources) had been well spent.   
 Of the three cases, the government challengers in the climate change case were the most 





information from their consultants, the government challengers expressed concerns about the 
research cliques of the hockey stick study’s lead author, Michael Mann.  Individuals in this 
alleged clique were other paleoclimate scientists, who relied on the same proxy data and co-
authored with Mann.  Given the tight-knit community of paleoclimate scientists, the government 
challengers contended that these scientists were less likely to criticize each other’s works when 
they served as peer reviewers, which in turn would explain why the peer reviewers had not 
caught alleged problems with Michael Mann, Raymond Bradley, and Malcolm Hughes’s data 
proxies or with the statistical procedures that led to the hockey stick figure.  Expressing concerns 
that the reviewers had some job performance problems, Congressman Ed Whitfield stated: “[I]t 
is clear that peer review[ers] somehow failed to pick up the flaws in the hockey stick studies.”461  
In the other two cases, the government challengers also criticized the peer reviewers’ job 
performance, but they did not explicitly allege that the peer reviewers were likely biased.  In the 
sewage sludge case, the government challengers contended that the peer reviewers should have 
noted several significant errors, such as the Cornell Waste Management Institute researchers’ 
incorrect assertions about the sludge effects and improper risk-assessment measures.  In the 
salvage logging case, the government challengers claimed that appropriate experts in the field 
would have caught the special context about the studied land site and the limits in the data’s 
usefulness.  According to the government challengers and their supporters, that information 
would have led to identifying problems with the Donato study and likely to its rejection by a 
journal of note.   
                                                 
461 Jul. 26, 2006: Questions Surrounding the “Hockey Stick” Temperature Studies: Implications for Climate 
Change Assessments: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong. at 604 (2nd Sess.) (Statements of Ed Whitfield, 





In short, the government challengers reported that the peer reviewers in the three cases 
conducted poor-quality reviews that severely misjudged the value of the government’s 
investments.  They suggested that if the peer-review process was not altered, government 
officials would need to entertain another vetting process for federally funded academic research.  
In the climate study case, the government challengers and their supporters even suggested a full 
research audit, which would include replicating the study under government supervision before it 
could be considered in shaping science policy. 
Forewarning Other Academic Scientists 
In the three cases, some academic scientists reported that the government challengers’ 
actions communicated a subtle message to other academic scientists not directly involved in the 
controversy surrounding the challenged study.  According to these observers, the government 
challengers, by their actions, conveyed to the larger audience of academic scientists an unstated 
rule.  The rule was that scientists who seek or receive federal funding for their research could 
face penalties if their work were to run counter to policies that government officials had publicly 
supported through actions such as authoring or advocating for an agency regulation or federal 
statute.  
In the sewage sludge case, several academic scientists interpreted the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) letter to the Associate Dean at Cornell’s College of Agriculture as a 
message that if other Cornell scientists were to disseminate research like the CWMI’s Case for 
Caution paper, the university might face problems when it sought future federal grant funding.  
Similarly, in the salvage logging case, academic scientists believed that the government 
challengers were also suggesting that research in conflict with a policy could adversely affect 





suspension as evidence of the government challengers’ message:  that grant recipients should not 
disseminate findings that conflict with a pending bill.  Finally, in the climate change case, 
academic scientists also felt threatened; they believed that the government challengers would 
penalize them financially for research inconsistent with the officials’ preferred federal policies.  
In this case, the academic scientists believed also that the government challengers could impose 
other penalties, including highly burdensome information requests, such as the need to:  produce 
volumes of materials, including past research records that were not part of the federally funded 
project.  That is what happened to the three “hockey stick” researchers at the center of the 
climate change case.    
Collectively, these examples illustrate that other academic scientists, even those who 
were not actively involved in the funded research, were also affected by the government 
challengers’ actions.  They interpreted the government challengers’ actions as pressures that 
they, too, would encounter if they used federal funding to produce findings inconsistent with  
policies that officials had publicly supported (e.g., by authoring a regulation or sponsoring 
pending legislation).   
Claim: Influencing Indirect Participants in the Federally Funded Research at Issue 
As the preceding examples suggest, government actors are not necessarily silent investors 
who leave scientific decisions to the scientists.  At times, government actors translate their role 
as investors in research into opportunities to influence actual research findings.  For example, my 
cases illustrate how government actors as funders of academic research can comment on a 
researcher’s job performance, or the quality of the research, in an attempt to alter the direction of 





But it does not always stop there.  In the three cases, the government challengers also 
made evaluative comments about the job performance of other actors who were indirect 
participants in the federally funded research.  As indirect participants, these actors had no role in 
scientific decisions about the challenged study, such as crafting the research design, collecting 
and analyzing the data, or articulating the study findings.  Nonetheless, as the government 
challengers were well aware, these indirect participants, with seemingly minor roles in the 
controversy, had the capacity to advance or inhibit the progress of the federally funded research 
study at hand or the progress of federally funded research projects by other scholars observing 
the events surrounding these cases.  In other words, the data suggest that the government 
challengers may try – sometimes successfully – to exercise their influence over indirect 
participants of the federally funded research in an attempt to control the dissemination of the 
federally sponsored research findings.  As the data demonstrate, they may do so in a variety of 
ways – for example, by questioning the quality of job performance of actors who are indirect 
participants in the federally funded research.  In particular, this may involve actions such as 
alerting actors who have oversight authority over the federally sponsored project, criticizing the 
quality of the peer reviewers’ reports about the funded research, and issuing messages that, 
though focused on the case at issue, also serve to forewarn the larger community of academic 
scientists (including those wishing to apply for research support) of potential penalties if the 
study they produce contradicts an environmental policy that the government officials have 
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The government challengers may try – sometimes successfully – to exercise their influence over 
indirect participants of the federally funded research in an attempt to control the dissemination of 
federally sponsored research findings. 
 
 
Defining What Qualifies as Legitimate Science 
The academic peer-review process rests heavily on the assumption that independent 
experts, who are peers in the field, are most qualified to judge the quality of a research paper.  
Accordingly, members of the academic profession and practicing scientists typically serve as 
peer reviewers.  My data, however, exhibited a pattern that deviated from the traditional 
academic peer-review process.  Specifically, in my three cases, the government challengers 
positioned themselves as definers of scientific legitimacy by attempting to alter or even replace 
the peer-review process for scientific research.  In this section, I identify three forms this took in 
my cases, namely through (a) the review process, (b) the selective use of sources, and (c) 





Finding Governmental Substitutes for Peer Review  
As mentioned above, the government challengers in each of my cases claimed that the 
peer reviewers had failed to exercise due diligence when examining the contested studies.  
Rather than relying on the scientific review process, in each case, the government challengers 
created a different system with which to review the federally funded study.  For instance, in the 
sewage sludge case, the government challengers participated in an internal review of the study at 
issue through a closed review process.  Specifically, the EPA and U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) evaluated the Cornell Waste Management Institute’s (CWMI) assertions by 
exchanging internal government memos to counter the CWMI scientists’ criticisms of the 503 
sludge rules.  As I discuss later in this section, this closed review is what the EPA relied on in 
discounting the CWMI research.   
In the climate change and salvage logging cases, the government challengers conducted 
both closed reviews and public forums, that were only open to invited guests, to evaluate the 
research studies.  In the climate change case, the government challengers first commissioned 
their own team of academic statisticians to evaluate the MBH studies.  Then, following the 
issuance of that report, the government challengers held a congressional oversight hearing, in 
which the invited guests with a position that disagreed with the academic research were over-
represented as speakers.  They also presented allegations of scientific flaws with the study at 
issue and attacked the academic peer-review process.  Similarly, drawing on feedback from 
various sympathetic academic scientists and forest management practitioners, the government 
challengers in the salvage logging case evaluated the study.  Using the information in the 





research, which was at the center of this controversy.  In sum, the government challengers used 
their own review process, guided by political partisans, to evaluate these scientific studies.  
Selecting Expert Sources to Contest the Validity of the Federally Funded Research 
In each case, the government challengers relied heavily on carefully selected reports and 
sources as their basis for arguing that the federally sponsored research studies at issue had used 
flawed data and faulty methodological approaches.  Based on these allegations of imperfect data 
and methodologies, the government challengers publicly criticized the findings of these federally 
sponsored studies and characterized them as invalid works (i.e., not worthy of scientific 
recognition).  These sources consistently presented perspectives that aligned with their policy 
preferences.  For example, in the sewage sludge case, the EPA referred to several internal memos 
and USDA correspondence as the basis for challenging the Cornell Waste Management Institute 
(CWMI) study.  While referring to these selected papers, they omitted many others.  Most 
notably, the EPA omitted studies supporting the CWMI paper, including research by Dr. David 
Lewis, then an EPA scientist (see Chapter 5).  His and other studies strongly suggested that the 
CWMI researchers’ findings and recommendations presented viable scientific claims, and found 
that the sewage sludge rules did not sufficiently consider potential harms from certain chemical 
and metal exposure.   
In the climate change case, the government challengers heavily cited critics of the hockey 
stick studies, chiefly Stephen McIntyre and Ross McKitrick, to question the reliability of the 
federally funded research by Michael Mann, Raymond Bradley, and Malcolm Hughes (MBH), 
yet the challengers did not fully explore opposing research.  Illustrating this point, the letter with 
which Congressmen Barton and Whitfield initiated the investigation extensively quoted  





MBH’s alleged failure to disclose data as the basis for the congressional inquiry.  Yet, neither 
McIntyre nor McKitrick had any training in paleoclimate science.  And when the government 
challengers quoted the National Research Council (NRC) study, which largely supported the 
MBH research, they focused only on negative comments from the report and did not 
acknowledge the NRC’s recognition of MBH’s scientific contributions.  They also did not cite 
other research that generally supported MBH’s findings. 
Similarly, in the salvage logging case, the government challengers referred to literature 
and called on experts with a pro-salvage-logging perspective to attack the Donato study, the key 
federally sponsored academic research at issue in that case.  For instance, when Congressman 
Walden held the February 2006 oversight field hearing, a majority of the experts asserted reasons 
why the Donato study was insufficient as a policy tool, and they generally expressed support for 
Walden’s proposed salvage logging bill. 
In sum, these events reflected the government challengers’ practice of relying on 
carefully selected sources, such as policy reports, research studies, and experts that tended to 
favor the government challengers’ policy position regarding the environmental issue in question 
and that supported the government challengers’ efforts to discredit the data and methodologies of 
the federally sponsored research.  
Drawing Conclusions About the Science 
The government challengers in each of my cases drew their own conclusions as they 
sought to invalidate the studies at issue.  Although they often based their evaluative comments on 
scientific reviews that they selected, these governmental actors extended their comments beyond 
matters of science policy and into the specific content of environmental science.  For example, in 





occasions, they described the study as fraught with scientific inaccuracies, and they repeatedly 
conveyed the opinion that the science did not justify the CWMI recommendations.  In addition, 
several government challengers even went so far as to suggest that the CWMI researchers had 
examined the wrong scientific question.  They contended that instead of attending to sewage 
sludge, the funded researchers should have explored possible harm associated with agricultural 
applications of animal manure.  
The other two cases parallel the storyline of the sewage sludge case.  The government 
challengers in the global warming case indicated that the data proxies, statistical analyses, and 
findings were scientifically flawed.  While Congressmen Barton and Whitfield often cited 
Stephen McIntyre and Ross McKitrick (M&M) and the Wegman team as sources for their 
assertions, it was Barton and Whitfield who ultimately determined that the MBH studies could 
not inform policymakers.  They concluded that the studies were not scientifically sound.  These 
government actors along with others also argued against claims that members of the scientific 
community were in agreement about anthropogenic causes of global warming.  Similarly, in the 
salvage logging case, the government challengers contested the scientific significance of the 
Donato study.  They alleged that the Donato study presented scientifically misleading evidence, 
and one government actor, who had a Ph.D. in psychology, stated that the statistical approach 
presented confusing data that were subject to significant misinterpretation.  
In short, although the government challengers usually referred to scientific sources for 
expert assistance in formulating their comments about the science at issue, ultimately they drew 





Claim: Determining What Counts as Legitimate Scientific Research 
The data drew attention to government challengers’ actions of evaluating federally 
funded research projects about environmental science with results that conflicted with federal 
policies that the government officials had publicly supported.  Specifically, in these three cases, 
the government challengers established a review process.  They used selective policy tools to 
help them understand the science.  Then, they drew scientific conclusions or asserted their 
judgments about the research.   In other words, based on the data, we see that government actors, 
though not scientists themselves, relied heavily on their own judgment to declare publicly the 
kinds of activities that can count as legitimate scientific research, rather than relying on the 
traditional scientific peer-review process.  Their tactics might include substituting governmental 
processes for peer review and using the process as a forum to judge the scientific merits of 
federally sponsored research; selecting expert sources to use as reliable scientific evidence to 
contest the validity of the federally funded studies’ data, methodology, and findings; and relying 
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The governmental challengers, though not scientists themselves, relied heavily on their own 
judgment to declare publicly the kinds of activities that can and cannot count as legitimate 
scientific research, rather than relying on the traditional scientific peer-review process.   
 
 
Part 2: The Academic Profession’s Responses 
In Part 2, I present three data patterns that respond to the research question: Drawing on 
circumstances and events surrounding several lay challenges to academic scientists’ federally 
funded research, (a) how did academic scientists, universities, professional associations, and 
other professional bodies in the Academy respond to the lay challenges to academic scientists’ 
research on sewage sludge, global warming, and salvage logging, (b) what range of strategies, 
tactics, and/or other means did academic scientists, universities, professional associations, and 
other professional bodies employ to preserve or defend the profession’s intellectual freedom? 
Engaging the Public as Arbitrators of the Dispute About Who Should Evaluate the Science 
The academic scientists did not respond to the government challenges by themselves.  





In my study, these actors came from multiple groups, such as other scientists who did not 
conduct the challenged research, residents of the affected areas that the challenged research 
addressed, members of the media, and environmental groups.  In the three cases, the academic 
scientists engaged the public as arbitrators of the dispute regarding whether academic scientists 
or policymakers should address the scientific matters at hand.  They did this by presenting to the 
public: (a) arguments to rebut the government challengers’ statements; (b) reasons that likely 
explained the policymakers’ interests in the outcome; and (c) past instances of government 
mischaracterizations of scientific research.  Then, the public would take action that defended the 
academic scientists’ research.  Below, I provide evidence for this claim.   
Providing the Public with Arguments to Rebut the Government Challengers’ Assertions 
In all three cases, the academic scientists fed the public with arguments rebutting the 
government challengers’ statements.  In the sewage sludge case, the Cornell Waste Management 
Institute (CWMI) researchers disseminated information about multiple instances in which they 
claimed that the EPA made false assertions about their research.  For example, when the EPA 
alleged that the CWMI researchers had misled readers of the study by using incorrect assessment 
levels and applying metal salts to the sludge samples to produce results that demonstrated 
harmful effects, the CWMI researchers offered evidence that contradicted the government’s 
allegations.  Members of the public, including protestors who opposed sewage sludge 
application, cited these examples of research mischaracterizations in newsletters, media reports, 
and public discussions,  as reasons to discount the government challengers’ statements.  In the 
climate change case, the academic scientists created a blog, Realclimate.org, to clarify or counter 
many of the government challengers’ claims.  One much-discussed posting presented evidence 





and Malcolm Hughes’s (MBH) hockey stick, despite assertions that replication was not possible, 
from Stephen McIntyre and Ross McKitrick (M&M), the non-paleoclimate scientists whose 
work the government relied upon to contest the validity of the hockey stick research, and from 
the Wegman team, the statisticians the government had commissioned to evaluate the hockey 
stick researchers’ work and whose work relied heavily on M&M’s data and algorithm.  
In the salvage logging case, the academic scientists and their supporters provided 
members of the public scientific evidence to support the Donato paper, the research study that 
the government had challenged.  Citing several peer-reviewed scientific studies, the academic 
scientists and their supporters countered the government challengers’ and environmental 
opponents’ assertions that forest recovery after severe fires required human intervention and land 
disturbances – namely, salvage logging.  Confirming the Donato paper, these studies presented 
findings that forest-recovery efforts using a natural, eco-friendly, approach, had been successful 
in the past in regrowing forests after severe fires.  Using this information, environmental groups, 
scientists, and citizens – the last group including members of the public who lived near the burnt 
areas that the Donato paper examined – presented these arguments in several venues, such as 
newspapers and blogs, as justifications to support the Donato team’s findings. 
As these events illustrate, after the academic scientists rebutted the government 
challengers’ statements, some members of the public responded by way of an active campaign in 
support of the academic scientists’ research. 
Identifying Policymakers’ Policy Agenda and Preferences 
Academic scientists identified for the public what the policymakers’ interests were in 
supporting their policy preferences.  Generally speaking, the academic scientists and their 





motivations to advance the policy and the potential benefits of aligning the policy with the 
presidential administration’s agenda.  In the sewage sludge case, the academic scientists exposed 
the governmental actors’ interest in preserving their reputations.  Spokespersons for the 
academic scientists reported that many of the government officials who enforced and defended 
the policy had historical ties to the policy, including several who had crafted the 503 regulations 
when they were initially adopted and viewed the policy as a well-crafted solution to the ocean 
dumping problem.  In addition, the academic profession noted another way that these 
policymakers sought to advance their personal reputations as environmentally friendly problem 
solvers.  Several of the government officials, who helped challenge the CWMI research, also 
supported the EPA decision to hire a public relations group to spin the positive benefits of 
sewage sludge.  The policymakers’ interests in the climate change and salvage logging cases 
differed from those in the sewage sludge case.  In the climate change and salvage logging cases, 
the academic scientists and their supporters identified financial contributions from industry 
groups and lobbyists as the guiding source for policymakers’ interest.  The academic scientists in 
all three cases also indicated that besides personal gains, the policymakers had an interest in 
supporting a particular environmental policy because it aligned with the presidential 
administration’s agenda.  The presumption was that the policymakers’ support would lead to 
political favors, but the data never explicitly revealed these actors’ reasons.    
What is clear in the data is that after the academic scientists and their supporters revealed 
the policymakers’ financial and political interests, many observers – including scientists who had 
played no part in conducting the challenged research, residents of the affected areas, and 
environmental groups – believed that those interests had probably motivated the policymakers’ 





each dispute.  Through newspaper editorials, blogs, newsletters, and other means of public 
dissemination, these observers conveyed to other members of the public the message that the 
academic scientists should make the scientific judgments and that government should not 
interfere in that process.   
Referring to Past Instances of Scientific Mischaracterization 
Academic scientists showed how the government might be mischaracterizing scientific 
implications in ways that paralleled government behavior in similar recent situations.  In the 
climate change and salvage logging cases, the academic scientists connected the government 
challenges to evidence of an overarching pattern of Republican Party interference with scientific 
studies that conflicted with federal policies the party endorsed.  Scientific groups such as the 
Union of Concerned Scientists reported that government challengers had done likewise on 
environmental issues in the decade that began in 2000, including government efforts to cover up 
the harmful effects of tobacco use.  By that time, an overwhelming majority of scientific experts 
had concluded that tobacco use created significant health hazards for exposed individuals.  
Nonetheless, some governmental actors sowed doubts about the science on tobacco use and 
exposure.  Similarly, the academic scientists connected the sewage sludge case to past 
complaints of alleged EPA cover-ups.  During the late 1990s and early 2000s, for example, 
environmental groups and academic scientists had accused the EPA of longstanding efforts to 
silence environmental research showing adverse health effects from toxic substances such as 
those found in pollution.  The academic scientists tied the sewage sludge case to these past 
incidents to demonstrate a continuing problem in the EPA.  That is, the EPA had continued to 
close off discussions or to address only partly the health implications of sewage sludge – as it 





To summarize, the academic scientists drew attention to the government challengers’ past 
practices of sowing doubt about scientific research.  They did this to point out that government 
officials could be using the same tactic in these new cases. 
Claim: Moving a Significant Player into the Dispute 
During these three disputes, academic scientists sometimes brought the public into the 
debate over whether government officials or academic scientists should evaluate the science that 
informs federal policymakers.  The “public” here included scientists who had not conducted the 
challenged research, residents of the affected areas, and environmental groups that represented 
members of the public.  The academic scientists and their supporters helped engage the public as 
arbitrators by providing arguments to rebut the government challengers’ statements, identifying 
policymakers’ agendas and preferences, and referring to past instances of scientific 
mischaracterization by government actors.  In these ways, members of the public became 
significant participants in such disputes.    
Table 8.3: Summary of Finding #3 
Data Pattern 
 




Providing Arguments to Rebut the Government Challengers’ Statements 
 
Identifying Policymakers’ Agendas and Preferences  
 




Academic scientists may involve members of the public in the dispute.  When that happens, the 
public may help decide whether government officials or academic scientists are better equipped 








Drawing on the Assistance of Political Allies 
Political actors function within systems that have features – such as congressional 
hearings or commissioned studies – that outsiders cannot always access.  However, at times, 
academic scientists and other nongovernmental actors strive to gain entry to the political system, 
and at times they succeed.  Indeed, this happened in my three cases.  Specifically, in each case, 
academic scientists drew on the support of political allies to initiate action that would serve as a 
countervailing force to the government challengers’ political actions – namely, of questioning 
the scientific research.  As I discuss below, the political allies, including other public officials, 
countered the government challengers’ attacks by (a) publicly objecting and criticizing their 
peers and (b) supporting the academic scientists within political arenas.   
Publicly Objecting and Criticizing Peers 
Academic scientists worked with political allies to address concerns they had about 
politicians’ meddling in scientific matters in which they had little or no expertise.  Aiding the 
academic scientists, the political allies publicly objected and criticized their political peers for 
challenging the academic scientists about the science.  For instance, in the sewage sludge case, 
academic scientists worked with U.S. Representatives James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Wisconsin, 
Republican) and Sherwood Boehlert (New York, Republican), who chastised the EPA and the 
Democrat-led presidential administration for cutting off the academic scientists’ discussion about 
the possible adverse effects of sludge.  In the climate change case, Congressman Boehlert 
criticized fellow Republican Congressmen Joe Barton (Texas) and Ed Whitfield (Kentucky) for 
their alleged bullying and harassment of climate scientists.  In the salvage logging case, 





Walden (Oregon, Republican) and fellow Democrat Brian Baird (Washington) of Dan Donato, 
the lead author of the challenged research on salvage logging.  At the time, Walden and Baird 
had co-sponsored a pending bill that would have afforded the logging industry an expedited 
process to enter a burnt forest.  However, the federally sponsored Donato study concluded that 
forests can regrow naturally after severe fires, suggesting that the logging industry does not need 
to remove trees from large sections of the forest to aid regrowth.   
The media captured each instance of the political peers’ formal objections and criticisms.  
Accounts of these public conflicts, including some between members of the same political party, 
added support to the academic scientists’ claims that the challenges they faced were political, not 
scientific, in nature.     
Facilitating Academic Scientists’ Friendly Encounters 
Having consulted with the academic scientists, political allies set the stage for academic 
scientists to enter friendly venues where they could defend their research.  In the sewage sludge 
and salvage logging cases, political allies scheduled hearings specifically to address the 
academic scientists’ perspectives, which the government challengers had closed off through 
earlier actions.  For instance, in the sewage sludge case, Congressman Sensenbrenner conducted 
a hearing that gave the lead author of the challenged study, Ellen Harrison of the Cornell Waste 
Management Institute (CWMI), an opportunity to describe the ways in which the EPA had 
closed off the discussion and misconstrued the CWMI research.   
In the climate change case, Congressman Sherwood Boehlert commissioned a National 
Research Council (NRC) study to investigate the allegations that Congressmen Barton and 
Whitfield had leveled about errors in the federally sponsored hockey stick study.  As noted 





making it subject to political control.  Boehlert, by contrast, sought the appointment of an NRC 
panel that would employ typical scientific methods and review processes to conduct a scientific 
assessment.  The NRC study provided a comprehensive scientific review by scientists who 
understood the relevant science and could evaluate MBH’s research methods and findings.  In 
the salvage logging case, Congressman Tom Udall (New Mexico, Democrat) convened a hearing 
in which academic scientists, who did not have a salvage logging agenda but had expertise on the 
scientific issues, presented evidence supporting the Donato team’s study finding that forests can 
naturally regenerate without having to undergo large-scale salvage logging and forest replanting. 
In addition, in all three cases, political allies also posed questions that allowed the 
academic scientists to present their research in a more favorable light.  Even in the climate 
change hearings, which had been characterized as a political venue to bully the hockey stick 
study’s lead author, Michael Mann, and the salvage logging field hearing, which the media and 
other commentators described as a session aimed at attacking Dan Donato, political allies 
managed to ask questions that allowed these academic scientists to defend their research methods 
and findings.     
 In short, the political allies afforded the academic scientists opportunities to participate in 
political venues in which they could speak openly in defense of their research.  In addition, the 
political allies posed questions that gave the academic scientists opportunities to explain and 
defend their research.   
Claim: Balancing Perspectives Using the Policymakers’ Setting 
The preceding discussion suggests that political allies can support academic scientists’ 
efforts to defend their research within the policymakers’ setting.  All told, political allies, 





academic scientists’ strategies of defending their federally sponsored research when government 
actors challenge their methods and findings.  Examples of actions that political allies can take 
include publicly objecting to and criticizing their political peers for challenging the academic 
scientists’ federally sponsored research and facilitating academic scientists’ friendly encounters 
in government venues (e.g., congressional hearings) so the academic scientists can explain and 
defend their research. 
 
Table 8.4: Summary of Finding #4 
Data Pattern 
 




Political Allies Publicly Objecting to and Criticizing Their Political Peers for Challenging the 
Academic Scientists’ Federally Sponsored Research 
 
Political Allies Facilitating Academic Scientists’ Friendly Encounters in Government Venues 




Academic scientists’ political allies can support academic scientists’ efforts to defend their 
research within the policymakers’ setting.   
 
 
Reaffirming the Value of Using Academic Conventions to Address Scientific Questions 
In these cases, the government challengers generally objected to academic conventions, 
casting them as inadequate practices that, they said, had led to the release of flawed studies.  
Nevertheless, in the United States, academic conventions, such as peer review and establishing 
open environments that foster a marketplace of ideas, have existed for several hundred years as 
the standard practices for conducting and assessing scientific research.  Consistent with these 





academic conventions to defend their research.  Specifically, in the three cases, academic 
scientists reaffirmed the value of using academic conventions (e.g., peer review) as the 
appropriate standards and procedures with which to address scientific questions.  The academic 
scientists did this by forcing a comparison of academic conventions that the scientists used with 
the political conventions (e.g., congressional hearings) that the government challengers used.  
These comparisons highlight how academic scientists and the government challengers (a) 
maintained fundamentally different assumptions, which led to different conclusions, (b) 
functioned in different environments, which led to differences in transparency, and (c) relied on 
academic conventions, particularly peer review, to evaluate science, which by the government 
challengers’ own actions weakened their criticisms on assessing academic research effectively. 
Differing Assumptions About the Development of Scientific Knowledge   
In these three cases, academic scientists reported what they perceived to be the 
fundamental differences between the government challengers’ and academic scientists’ view of 
science: Both groups maintained fundamentally different assumptions about the process by 
which pieces of scientific information contribute to the state of scientific knowledge of a given 
topic.  Academic scientists think of science as a continuous process.  Rather than examining a 
single study to inform science policy, academic scientists referred to the overall body of 
knowledge about the given topic and how the challenged study was situated in that larger body 
of research.  This way of thinking appeared to conflict with the government challengers’ policy-
driven perspectives on science.  According to the academic scientists, the government 
challengers, eager to make quick decisions consistent with their own policy preferences, were 
content to rely on one study or on a small number of studies, rather than to review and rely on a 





For instance, in the sewage sludge case, the academic scientists observed that the 
government challengers based their criticisms of the Cornell Waste Management Institute 
(CWMI) papers on a 1996 National Research Council (NRC) study.  Although the NRC report 
had been issued only a few years earlier, the academic scientists argued that the report was no 
longer relevant.  They contended that the report had been written when land-applied sludge use 
was a new practice, so scientists had limited available data.  In addition, the science had evolved 
significantly since the release of that report.  As the academic scientists noted, a subsequent NRC 
study in 2002 confirmed many of their assertions.  Similarly, in the climate change case, the 
academic scientists emphasized that scientific inquiry is an evolving process.  With dramatic 
changes taking place in science, they repeatedly raised concerns about the government 
challengers’ interest in focusing on studies that had taken place eight years earlier.  Although 
they acknowledged the hockey stick authors’ (i.e., Michael Mann, Raymond Bradley, and 
Malcolm Hughes) research contribution (it was the first project to use multiple proxies to 
reconstruct temperatures), they also identified the practical limits of the hockey stick study.  The 
academic scientists pointed out that their knowledge about climate change had evolved 
substantially in the eight years between publication of the MBH papers and the government 
actors’ challenge.  Finally, the academic scientists in the salvage logging case argued that the 
government actors had relied on older research and ones based on different types of forest lands 
as the basis to challenge the Donato study, the academic research project at the center of that 
dispute.  Although the reforestation studies that government challengers relied upon were old, 
they still represented useful science, the academic scientists explained, and they did not 
necessarily contradict what the Donato team had found more recently.  That is, these studies did 





salvage logging does not present the only policy alternative, as the government challengers 
stated. 
In short, the academic scientists pointed out how the government challengers and the 
academic scientists worked from different assumptions, leading them, generally, to different 
conclusions.  By comparing the government challengers’ approach, which looked to scientific 
research for a definitive answer, with the academic scientists’ approach of viewing science as an 
evolving process that gains perspective over time, the academic scientists convinced many 
observers – including other scientists, members of the media, environmental groups, and 
policymakers – that the academic conventions appeared more compelling as an accurate 
depiction of the science.   
Differing Expectations, Between Academic Scientists and Government Challengers, 
About Openness and Dialogue  
Academic scientists also argued that they and the government challengers had different 
expectations about the process involved to understand and evaluate scientific research.  For 
instance, in the sewage sludge case, on numerous occasions, Ellen Harrison of CWMI conveyed 
her interest in addressing differences between the CWMI and EPA perspectives.  Similarly, in 
the climate change case, academic scientists, including professional associations such as the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science and National Academy of Sciences, 
recommended an open forum using scientific channels rather than political venues.  The 
government challengers in both of these cases chose review processes that deviated from 
academic traditions.  They relied on hearings that solicited information from selected individuals 
and made use of only limited data.  As discussed in the last section, the academic scientists’ 





scientific assessments, NRC studies require an independent panel to extensively review the 
relevant literature on the scientific topic, interview experts in the field, especially those with 
different perspectives, subject the report to peer review, and gather feedback from the public.  In 
other words, the academic scientists experienced an open forum involving a multistep review and 
comment process while the government challengers reviewed the work under a more closed 
process.   Finally, in the salvage logging case, the government challengers also reviewed the 
academic scientists’ research at issue (i.e., the Donato study) without having an open dialogue – 
just as had occurred in the other two cases.  However, in this case, the editor of Science reserved 
a special section of an issue to address the differing professional opinions about salvage logging 
versus natural forest regrowth, allowing for an academic discourse in print.  In addition, the 
Oregon State University College of Forestry, where the Donato team worked, also held forums to 
present the competing sides of the issue.   
Collectively, these approaches convey the sense that the government challengers’ 
approaches were confining and not open to dialogue, whereas the academic conventions offered 
the possibility of open discussions to critique and/or affirm the academic scientists’ research.  
Others were involved as well: other scientists, members of the media, environmental groups, and 
policymakers.     
Using Academic Conventions as Standard Practice  
Academic scientists cited instances where government challengers and their supporters 
preferred peer review to evaluate scientific research.  This point is ironic, because in each case, 
the government challengers had earlier criticized the peer-review process as biased.  
Nonetheless, in each case, government challengers and their supporters found that they, too, 





represented scientifically credible research.  For instance, in the climate change case, which 
contained the most vocal criticisms about the peer-review process, the government challengers 
emphasized how their commissioned study, the Wegman Report, had been peer-reviewed.  
Although the academic scientists and their political allies questioned whether the Wegman 
Report had actually been peer-reviewed, as the academic scientists claimed, the government 
challengers still referred to the process as the standard practice for judging scientific research.  In 
the salvage logging case, the government challengers also argued that papers supporting their 
perspective, such as the government-commissioned Sessions Report, had been peer-reviewed.  In 
the sewage sludge case as well, the government challengers and the industry consultants, CPF 
Associates, questioned the Cornell Waste Management Institute research on the grounds that it 
had not been properly vetted through peer review.   
In short, while the government challengers found fault with the peer-review process that 
led to publications’ containing viewpoints and conclusions that they opposed, these government 
actors still accepted the practice as the preferred method to judge whether a paper was 
scientifically credible research.   
Claim: Asserting Academic Conventions as Standard Practice 
Earlier in this chapter, we learned that government actors strived to define what qualifies 
as legitimate science.  The evidence presented in the preceding section suggests that academic 
scientists may assert academic conventions, such as principles of research openness and peer 
review, as the standard (or possibly the preferred) practice in evaluating science, even when 
government officials challenge the academic conventions.  Academic scientists may employ this 
strategy, which reaffirms the value of using academic conventions to address scientific questions, 





challengers, about science development, (b) the differing expectations, between academic 
scientists and government challengers, about openness and dialogue, and (c) that despite 
criticisms of the academic conventions, both academic scientists and government challengers use 
them as standard practice to evaluate scientific research reports.  Thus, even when challenged, 
academic conventions are sufficiently recognized processes for evaluating scientific research that 
they are often used to lend authority in a political forum. 
 
Table 8.5: Summary of Finding #5 
Data Pattern 
 




Differing Assumptions, Between Academic Scientists and Government Challengers, About 
Science Development 
  
Differing Expectations, Between Academic Scientists and Government Challengers, About 
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Academic scientists may assert academic conventions (e.g., peer review) as the standard (or 
possibly as the preferred) practice through which to evaluate science, even when government 
challengers question the validity of those conventions.    
 
 
Part 3: Synthesizing the Emergent Themes about the Challenges and the Responses 
In the preceding sections, I identified five data patterns and constructed corresponding 





inspected the data.  I asked myself: What do the five data patterns tell me?   I respond to this 
question as follows: 
 First, the data reveal that the academic scientists and the government challengers drew on 
other actors, who were not initially part of the controversies, to assist them in the conflict.  The 
government challengers involved actors with oversight responsibilities, peer reviewers, and other 
academic scientists, who had or might seek federal sponsorship of research.  The academic 
scientists brought in members of the public, political allies, and other members of the scientific 
community in order to convince observers, such as the media, policymakers, scientists, and 
interested citizens, that scientific matters should remain within the domain of the scientific 
experts to decide – not in the hands of policymakers. 
 Second, the data illuminate how the academic scientists and the government challengers 
exercised some degree of influence over these additional actors in order to achieve their desired 
outcomes.  The government challengers employed threats of penalties to influence the additional 
actors to conduct their work consistent with the challengers’ policy interests.  The academic 
scientists engaged some members of the public and the profession in the conflict by portraying 
the government challengers as having self-interested motives and raising questions as to whether 
they had a real interest in uncovering the state of the environmental science at issue.  They also 
drew on support from political allies, so they could gain entry into political settings and counter 
the government challengers’ allegations.   
Third, the data demonstrate how the academic scientists and the government challengers 
often relied on traditional practices within their respective professional settings to address the 
scientific questions.  The government challengers relied heavily on congressional forums and 





The academic scientists relied heavily on academic conventions, such as academic forums for 
open discourse and peer-review processes to subject the work to expert critiques and proper 
vetting. 
Fourth, the data uncovered inconsistencies between rhetoric and reality in the way that 
the academic scientists and the government challengers behaved.  While the academic scientists 
and the government challengers typically drew on their respective traditional practices, they also 
adopted practices of the other party’s professional setting.  That is, government challengers 
selectively applied academic conventions (e.g., using peer review), and academic scientists 
selectively applied policymakers’ processes (e.g., pushing for the opportunity to participate in 
congressional hearings).  This point is ironic, given that the practices that each side employed 
also were the very things that each party criticized the other for having done.  
In short, the data indicated that the academic scientists exerted control over their federally 
funded research in much the same way as the governmental actors challenged them.   
Closing Remarks 
In sum, in the preceding sections, I addressed my two research sub-questions by 
presenting the major themes across my three cases to articulate what I learned about the 
government challenges and the academic profession’s responses.  The findings suggest that 
multiple actors have participated in the process of judging federally sponsored research on 
sewage sludge, global warming, and salvage logging; to do so, they wielded multiple 
approaches.  To develop these lessons more fully, in the next chapter, I present my interpretation 
of the findings, which ties in the prior literature on government challenges to the academic 





takes a closer look at the usefulness of Freidson’s theory to conceptualize what it means for 





CHAPTER IX: ANALYSIS, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I introduced the federal government’s 1945 policy strategy of spurring 
scientific innovation by having the federal government financially support useful research.  
Basically, the understanding between the federal government and academic scientists was that 
“[g]overnment promises to fund the basic science that [the scientific panel of] peer reviewers 
find worthy of support, and [academic] scientists promise that the research will be performed 
well and honestly and will provide a steady stream of discoveries that can be translated into new 
products, medicines, or weapons” (Guston & Keniston, 1994, p. 2).  As part of that 
understanding, policymakers agreed to allow the “free play of free intellects.”  The federal 
government would support uninhibited inquiry into basic research, and refrain from meddling 
into scientific matters, which were generally considered to be outside of its expertise.   
As I described in Chapter 1 and several other chapters within this study, despite that 
promise, government officials have challenged academic scientists on numerous occasions with 
regard to scientific matters involving their federally sponsored research.  Kidd (1963), a well-
respected science policy researcher at the time, predicted that reliance on federal dollars would 
produce political pressures on scientists to alter significantly the direction of their academic 
inquiries.  Kidd was right.  As I traced in earlier chapters, instances between 1945 to the present 
demonstrate that government officials have limited the concept of “free play of free intellects” 
with respect to professors’ federally sponsored research. 
To understand these limitations and the relationship between academic scientists and 
federal government officials, I noted in Chapter 1 that the purpose of my study was to investigate 





research and for academic scientists to exert control over that research. As part of that 
investigation, in chapters 5, 6, and 7, I reported data for each of my three cases, using a 
chronological narrative to recount the circumstances and events surrounding the government 
challenges and the profession’s responses.  I also relied on Freidson’s theory of the professions, 
which I introduced in Chapter 3, to organize the data representing the academic profession’s 
responses. 
In this chapter, I explain my findings further.  In Part I, I analyze my findings’ 
contributions to the literature in terms of what my study added, affirmed, or left unanswered.  In 
Part II, I revisit my conceptual framework.  Grounded in (a) what happened in my cases, (b) 
what emerged from the interactions among actors within my cases, and (c) what relational 
concepts might explain my findings, I present a revised conceptual framework.  In Part III, I 
raise practice implications for academic scientists who have received or seek federal sponsorship 
of their research and for policymakers.  Finally, in Part IV, I suggest further research on this 
topic of government challenges to academic scientists’ federally sponsored research and 
academic scientists’ responses in defense of their work. 
What the Study Findings Contribute 
Government Challenges 
Claim #1: Influencing Indirect Participants in the Federally Funded Research at Issue 
One tactic of the government challengers was to raise job performance concerns 
regarding the work of three sets of actors who had not conducted the challenged research.  As 
discussed in Chapter 8, the government officials criticized the performance of (1) governmental 
and nongovernmental actors, who held no public policymaking authority but had oversight 





publication, and (3) other academic scientists who either already had or might seek federal 
sponsorship for their research.  I referred to these actors as indirect participants, who had 
potentially significant roles in the controversy because they had the capacity to advance or 
inhibit the progress of the federally funded research at issue or potentially another federally 
funded research project.  In Chapter 8, I indicated that my data pattern and evidence led to my 
claim that the government challengers might try – sometimes successfully – to exercise their 
influence over indirect participants of the federally funded research in an attempt to control the 
progress or dissemination of those research findings.  I observed that the government officials 
did so by (a) alerting actors with oversight responsibilities about problems with the study, (b) 
criticizing the peer reviewers for failing to reject the problematic study, and (c) forewarning 
other academic scientists that they must take actions conforming to the government challengers’ 
policy position or else face penalties, such as loss of federal research funding.   
In many respects, this finding is fairly consistent with findings presented in prior 
publications that examined government officials’ challenges to professors’ research (see, e.g., 
Beneke, 1998; Gutfeld, 1970; Lewis, 1988; Schrecker, 1980, 1986).  As Chapter 2 notes, those 
studies reported government actors trying to draw in other actors to assist the government in 
minimizing the effect or discrediting the researchers or research projects at issue.  Many previous 
studies reported that when academic research contradicted the government actors’ policy 
positions, these government officials pressured actors who did not directly participate in the 
research but had roles that made it possible for them to interfere with the progress or 
dissemination of the academic scientists’ sponsored research.  As in my study, prior literature 
indicated that government challengers could influence actors serving the role of indirect 





academic researchers (e.g., college administrators) (Lewis, 1988; Schrecker, 1980, 1986), other 
professors (Beneke, 1998; Lewis, 1988; Schrecker, 1980, 1986), and reviewers involved in the 
publication process – including editorial board members and peer reviewers (Garrison & Kobor, 
2002; Lilienfeld, 2002) – to take steps that would silence or minimize the effect of the 
researchers’ work when government-sponsored research conflicted with a policymaker’s interest.   
While my study generally reflects similar patterns in terms of the government 
challengers’ attempts to influence indirect actors, I draw attention to one significant difference 
between my data (see Chapter 8) and the discussion of past studies (see Chapter 2).  The 
difference pertains to the reasoning behind the government officials’ criticisms of the peer 
reviewers.  In earlier studies, the government actors focused on the peer reviewers’ failure to 
reject research that the government actors characterized as being on socially unacceptable topics 
that others might consider politically inconvenient topics.  For instance, as described more fully 
in Chapter 2, Garrison and Kobor (2002) and Lilienfeld (2002) found that government officials 
pressured both the American Psychological Association (APA) as the publisher of a highly 
controversial article and the editorial staff of the APA’s Psychological Bulletin.  The government 
actors publicly condemned the article and criticized the APA for publishing the article’s findings.  
To recap briefly, the study at issue – also known as the Rind study – concluded that child sexual 
abuse does not always result in severe psychological harm to the victims.  Socially deviant 
groups, such as the North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA), and critics of the 
Rind study interpreted the findings as the academic researchers’ active support for adult-child 
sexual relations.  These events ignited state and federal legislators to publicly condemn the 
article and chastise the APA for its journal staff’s decision to print it.462  The government 
                                                 
462 It is possible that the government’s attack on the journal was directed at the academic professional 





challengers characterized the APA’s publication of the Rind study as an endorsement of 
pedophilia, in hopes that the negative publicity would pressure the APA to retract the article or 
renounce the article’s scientific value.  Accordingly, the basis for the challenge rested on 
reframing the Rind study as advocating pedophilia, then asserting that such a position violates 
societal values.  Thus, the government officials criticized the peer reviewers, not for the 
reviewers’ scientific analysis of the article, but in light of the researchers’ choice of topic, for 
allowing publication of the article, especially given the findings. 
In my study, the government officials criticized the peer reviewers for allegedly failing to 
vet scientifically flawed studies properly, based primarily on the scientific analyses.  That is 
different from prior studies that reveal criticisms of the peer reviewers in the course of lay 
challenges to academic scientists’ federally funded research.   
Claim #2: Determining What Counts as Legitimate Scientific Research 
My second research finding builds on the last one.  As I indicated in the preceding 
subsection, government officials criticized peer reviewers for failing to vet research they found 
flawed, and they threatened possible penalties if peer reviewers continued to perform in a 
manner that the government officials found unacceptable.  Given the government officials’ 
concerns about the quality of the academic peer reviews in each of my cases, it is not surprising 
that government officials employed a tactic that disregarded the academic peer reviews.  In fact, 
I observed that the government officials created their own review process in an effort to discount 
or discredit the research at issue.  More specifically, as I stated in Chapter 8, the government 
challengers in my cases positioned themselves as definers of scientific legitimacy by attempting 
to orchestrate the peer-review process for scientific research.  They did so by using government 
                                                                                                                                                             
true, Garrison & Kobor (2002) and Lilienfeld (2002) inform us that the government challengers did focus on peer 





substitutes for peer review to judge the scientific merits of federally sponsored research; 
selecting expert sources to rely upon as credible scientific evidence to contest the validity of the 
federally funded studies’ data, methodology, and findings; and relying on government 
challengers’ own understandings of the science to draw conclusions about scientific matters.  
The data pattern and evidence that emerged led to my claim that the government challengers, 
though not scientists themselves, relied heavily on their own judgment – rather than relying on 
the traditional scientific peer-review process – to declare publicly the kinds of activities that can 
and cannot count as legitimate scientific research.  This finding contributes to the extant 
literature on government challenges of academic scientists’ federally sponsored research in two 
ways.   
First, it further illustrates empirical findings and other reports in the literature that 
government challengers have previously made attempts to dictate the scientific merits of 
federally sponsored research (see, e.g., Garvin, 2001; Jasanoff, 1985, 1987, 1992; Shapiro & 
Guston, 2007).  In Chapter 2, I reported actions that government officials took to carry out their 
efforts.  Many of these actions resemble ones found in my study.  For instance, as I discussed in 
Chapter 2, prior literature revealed that government challengers created investigative settings, 
such as congressional and regulatory hearings, in order to gather criticisms about the federally 
sponsored study from various sources – including lobbyists, industry representatives, scientists, 
and other government officials (Cole, 1983; Hornstein, 2006; Jasanoff, 1985, 1987; McGarity & 
Wagner, 2008; Wagner & Michaels, 2004).  As I observed here and others have indicated 
previously, these governmental forums appeared to the public as transparent processes to discuss 





government actors an opportunity to vet the research rather than relying on the evaluations from 
the academic peer-review process.   
Similarly, government officials have previously attempted to dictate the scientific value 
of federally sponsored research through their selective use of experts and resources.  In my study 
and previous ones examining government challenges to academic scientists’ federally sponsored 
research, the government officials (a) commissioned experts they selected to write a report 
supporting their policy preferences, (b) stacked review committees with individuals who sided 
with a particular perspective, and (c) cherry-picked reports and studies based on their support for 
the policymakers’ policy preferences (Ashford, 1983; Jasanoff, 1985, 1987; Shapiro & Guston, 
2007).  Each of my cases illustrated these actions, which led to the attempted discrediting or 
discounting of the academic research at issue.     
Second and more significantly, this finding demonstrates that government officials have 
greater opportunity to determine scientific legitimacy of governmentally sponsored research than 
nongovernmentally sponsored research.  That distinction is significant.  It contributes to the 
literature by illustrating what researchers have identified as a potential problem but have rarely 
offered evidence to support (Couzin & Unger, 2006; Hornstein, 2006; Kaiser, 2002; Wagner, 
2003, 2005; Wagner & Michaels, 2004).   
As I reported in Chapter 2, government officials have increased their authority to inspect 
and audit federally sponsored research.  To explain this authority, I traced several major frames 
that government officials applied to justify their jurisdiction over and limiting of “free play of 
free intellects” for scientists working on federally sponsored research.  Under the frame of 
accountability, I mentioned how several federal laws (e.g., Data Access Amendment and Data 





certain conditions, members of the public, access to federally sponsored research data (Couzin & 
Unger, 2006; Wagner, 2005).  As I noted in Chapter 2, this data access typically occurs when 
questions arise about the sponsored researchers’ data, methods, or analyses.  Some observers 
might interpret the policy or terms of the sponsorship agreement as efforts to increase 
transparency and scientific communalism of federally funded research.  Nonetheless, the extant 
literature aptly points out that the policy or agreement creates an unfair divide in terms of the 
treatment between governmentally sponsored research and nongovernmentally sponsored 
research (Couzin & Unger, 2006; Hornstein, 2006; Kaiser, 2002; Wagner, 2003, 2005; Wagner 
& Michaels, 2004).  Because policymakers and even some nongovernmental actors potentially 
have greater data access to federally sponsored research relative to other research, these actors 
can audit the research, allege errors, and question aspects of the study.  These events took place 
in each of the three cases my study explores.   
My study illustrates the potential unequal treatment between governmentally sponsored 
and nongovernmentally sponsored research.  As I reported in Chapter 8, the government officials 
and other actors (e.g., interest groups) scrutinized the federally sponsored research projects in 
each of my examples and built a case to discredit and dismiss the study.  Based on the public 
hearings (e.g., congressional testimony and the interactions of the various actors), at no time did 
we witness the same audits for the non-federally sponsored research studies, which may have 
been less reliable, since those reports did not undergo the same vetting process as the sponsored 
research and they were written by individuals who were commissioned by either policymakers or 
industry representatives with a direct interest in the policy outcome.463  Nonetheless, government 
                                                 
463 Each of the cases highlights how non-governmentally sponsored studies and reports served as policy tools to 
assist the government officials in their challenge of the academic scientists’ federally funded research studies and 
how these non-governmentally sponsored studies did not experience the same level of scrutiny.  For instance, 





officials argued that the non-federally sponsored research should inform their policy decisions 
and be used as evidence to discredit the federally sponsored research studies at issue in each of 
my cases.  Further, the academic scientists, who encountered the government challenges, and 
their supporters could not audit the non-federally sponsored research that the governmental 
challengers relied upon.   
Academic Profession’s Responses 
Claim #3: Having the Public Determine Whether Government Officials or Academic 
Scientists Are Better Equipped to Address Scientific Matters 
In one of my findings, I indicated that the academic profession exerted control over its 
research by engaging the public as arbitrators of the dispute.  Based on my data, academic 
scientists engaged members of the public in the dispute by offering counter-arguments to the 
government challengers’ statements, identifying policymakers’ agendas and preferences, and 
referring to past instances of scientific mischaracterization.  Those observations led to my claim 
that by bringing members of the public into the dispute, the public may become a significant 
player in the debate about whether the government officials or the academic scientists are best 
suited to address the scientific matters associated with the federal policy.   
This finding suggests a different purpose for engaging the public in these disputes than 
those asserted in earlier studies.  As I discussed in Chapter 3, researchers of the academic 
profession’s responses to governmental challenges previously identified two ways in which the 
public helped defend professors’ federally sponsored research.  One line of research reported that 
                                                                                                                                                             
significant review of it.  Chapter 6 documents the heavy reliance on several independent and industry-supported 
studies, which government officials accepted as legitimate science, without its undergoing the same level of 
interrogation and inquiry as the work of the academic scientists at the center of that controversy.  Finally, Chapter 7 
makes a passing reference that the timber industry reports had not received the same inspection as the federally 
sponsored research at issue in that case.  In fact, as reported in that chapter, political allies of the academic scientists 
believed that the timber industry researchers and practitioners received more favorable treatment in the 





the professors encountering the challenges and their supporters educated the public about the 
technical aspects of the research at issue (i.e., educating citizens through public literacy 
involving the contested works) so members of the public could understand and articulate the 
research, rally behind it, and publicly defend it (see, e.g., Bailey, 2002; Garrison & Kobor, 2002; 
Keller, 1996; Lilienfeld, 2002; Saltmarsh, 1991).464  Thus, some members of the public became 
allies in defending the challenged research.  Another line of research identified professors using 
the public to help explain some of the scientific research findings and policy choices (Guston & 
Sarewitz, 2006; Hunt & Sharkley, 1999; Jasanoff, 2005; Nowotny et al., 2003).  These studies 
argued that public participation generated knowledge regarding the cultural context of the 
challenged study (particularly in terms of how members of the public felt the challenged study 
affected them).  Drawing from that participation, the public participants could form ideas about 
the policy choices, usually to defend the academic researcher’s study as support for their policy 
preference.  Thus, these studies viewed the public as informants, who could contribute to the 
defenses of the challenged study by using their cultural context to generate additional arguments 
of the study’s value.   
 While my finding suggests that the scientific arguments are important to the defenses of 
the challenged study, my finding more specifically demonstrates a strategy largely involving the 
nontechnical aspects of the study: educating the public on reasons why they should not trust the 
government challengers.  As I described in Chapter 8, the academic profession’s methods of 
convincing the public that government officials provided untrustworthy science involved  
                                                 
464 For instance, as Chapter 3 notes, Saltmarsh (1991) examined the government challenges to Scott Nearing’s 
teaching and research of a controversial economic theory.  Saltmarsh observed that Nearing’s strategy of educating 
the public helped him gain support from various groups, especially labor unions.  He did so by pitching his writings 
and lectures at the appropriate educational level of his audience and disseminating this information through town 
squares and written materials.  Members of the public responded favorably, and they began disseminating his works 






providing the public counter-arguments to the government challengers’ assertions about the 
scientific flaws; highlighting the government challengers’ interests (e.g., financial support from 
industry groups and lobbyists) as possible explanations for the misinformation; and directing 
attention to a pattern of behavior, specifically how the policymakers’ tactics in the case 
resembled government challengers’ past instances of mischaracterizing valid scientific findings.  
These actions led members of the public to question the government officials’ motives and 
actions.  In addition, the public took up the argument that academic scientists with the 
appropriate expertise, not government officials, should evaluate scientific research.  Accordingly, 
I observed that the public assumed the role as arbitrators of the dispute between government 
officials and the academic scientists regarding who should determine the scientific matters in 
these challenges.   
In short, my finding suggests that to engage public literacy involves much more than just 
educating the public about the technical aspects of a professor’s expertise.  According to my 
data, public literacy includes educating the public about the nonscientific matters of the situation, 
specifically highlighting the interests and agendas of the actors challenging the academic 
scientists.  I observed that informing the public about the interests and agendas of the actors 
challenging the academic scientists presented a useful strategy to gain public support for the 
view that academic scientists, not government officials, are in the best position to judge federally 
sponsored academic research.   
Claim #4: Balancing Perspectives Using the Policymakers’ Setting  
My findings also identified another strategic supporter, political allies.  In Chapter 8, I 
asserted that academic scientists’ political allies can support the academic scientists’ efforts to 





which the academic scientists sought support from political allies.  Specifically, based on my 
data, I learned that political allies’ defenses of the academic scientists’ federally sponsored 
research included publicly criticizing their political peers for challenging the academic scientists’ 
research and facilitating academic scientists’ friendly encounters in government venues such as 
congressional hearings.  As I described in Chapter 8, these actions made it possible for the 
academic scientists to defend their research.   
This finding is significant, because it demonstrates a useful strategy for the academic 
profession when government officials attack academic scientists’ government-sponsored 
research.  As I indicated in Chapter 3, the academic profession’s use of legal authority to help 
defend professors’ government-sponsored research has been largely limited to constitutional 
arguments (see, e.g., Eisenberg, 1988; O’Neil, 1997; Rabban, 1990; Slaughter, 1988).  
Specifically, the literature describes several instances in which professors successfully argued 
that they experienced undue government interference.  The literature indicates that courts have 
recognized that the government violated the professors’ academic freedom and cited to legal 
justifications under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Eisenberg suggests that these legal 
justifications likely apply to government officials’ challenges of academic scientists’ federally 
sponsored research too.  Nonetheless, the academic scientists in my cases had not relied on legal 
authority through the judicial branch or by asserting Constitutional rights to contest the 
government officials’ challenges. 
My study reports that the academic profession called on legislators and regulatory agency 
personnel as legal authority.  As I indicated in Chapter 8, one of my findings shows that the 
academic profession draws on the support of policymakers as political allies, who have legal 





not identified this strategy as one previously used to defend the academic profession’s 
government-sponsored research from challenges made by government officials, the academic 
profession has used political allies to combat lay challenges from nongovernmental actors.  In 
these studies, the lay challenges originated from industry representatives, lobbyists, and interest 
groups – not government officials.  Often, these studies reported that political allies called into 
question nonacademic research (typically from interest groups) and argued for the use of 
academic scientists’ federally sponsored studies, which tended to offer an opposing view to the 
nonacademic research.  This line of past research also reported that political allies provided 
government venues (e.g., congressional hearings) for academic scientists to defend their research 
findings from nongovernmental lay challengers.  In light of the use of political allies in other lay 
challenges to academic research, my finding might suggest that the academic profession drew on 
a previous strategy that worked with nongovernmental lay challengers, and introduced it in this 
setting, which now involves government officials as the lay challengers.  
In sum, my study reveals that legal authority is not restricted to Constitutional rights and 
judicial decisions based on those rights.  There exists another type of legal authority, which the 
academic profession may use as a strategy to exert control over its federally sponsored research.  
Legislators and regulatory agency staff represent another source of legal authority that may assist 
the academic profession in defending its federally sponsored research. The academic profession 
has previously applied this strategy (i.e., drawing on the assistance of political allies) when 
nongovernmental actors have challenged the academic profession’s funded research, yet this 
study appears to be the first report of the academic profession’s employing this strategy to 





Claim #5: Asserting Academic Conventions as Standard Practice to Address Scientific 
Questions 
The academic profession has rich traditions and normalized practices.  Those 
characteristics of the profession become more obvious in my fifth and final research finding.  As 
I reported in Chapter 8, the academic profession employed a strategy of taking steps to reaffirm 
the value of using academic conventions to address scientific questions.  Based on my data, I 
indicated that academic scientists may assert academic conventions (e.g., peer review) as the 
standard (or possibly as the preferred) practice through which to evaluate science, even when 
government challengers question the validity of those conventions.  They did this by exercising 
internal characteristics of the academic profession, such as professional expertise, or more 
specifically, they asserted arguments about how academic scientists and government actors had 
different assumptions, which led to different conclusions, and adopted different practices to 
examine the scientific questions each side had, which led to differences about the degree of 
transparency.  In addition, academic scientists pointed out that even though the government 
challengers criticized the academic peer-review process, these government actors and their 
fellow critics also used that process to legitimize their work.  On a number of occasions, 
government actors argued that their research and reports had been properly vetted and evaluated 
as scientifically credible research, because they had been peer-reviewed using the traditional 
academic process.  Thus, despite the government’s attacks on academic standards and processes, 
those same standards and processes represented legitimizing activities for nonacademic scientists 
commenting on scientific matters.   
This finding further confirms what many researchers of the academic profession have 





standards for how the academic profession and others should evaluate scientific research (see, 
e.g., Anderson et al., 2010; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  Indeed, as I discussed in Chapter 3, 
Freidson’s theory of professional dominance makes clear that scientific experts maintain a set of 
internal characteristics that have been institutionalized in society and grant them deference in 
conducting their work, absent external factors such as illegality and significant changes to 
knowledge of the field, which might, for instance, alter a profession’s existence (Freidson, 2001).  
Thus, while Chapter 2 identifies instances of government challenges to academic scientists’ 
research, Chapter 3 along with my explanation of this finding support the notion that academic 
scientists are not helpless and have asserted in my three cases several academic standards and 
processes that society views as the accepted practice for scientific experts to carry out their work.   
Most evidently, this finding highlights the role of two internal characteristics of the 
academic profession as institutionalized understandings that further academic scientists’ ability 
to exert control over their research.  First, academic scientists and policymakers have different 
roles in the science policy process.  The divisions of labor illustrate how each actor has different 
goals, which translate to different ways in which each actor looks at a scientific question.  As 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation, academic scientists carry out research in a 
systematic manner so they can discover and create new knowledge (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997).  
To do so, they build off existing knowledge and note their specific contribution.  Nonetheless, 
their contribution does not always provide clearly defined policy recommendations.  Even if the 
scientific finding could propose a scientific policy, academic scientists would assess policy 
choices and determine risk assessments, but they do not typically suggest risk management 
policies such as how much risk the nation can accept.  By contrast, science policymakers, such as 





policy choices and determining the government’s plans to manage any risks that may arise from 
the policy implementation (Garvin, 2001; Smith, 1992).  Put simply, the extant literature 
demonstrates that academic scientists and policymakers have different roles, agreed on in the late 
1940s, when it comes to the science policy process.  This division of labor may account for their 
differing assumptions and processes in addressing scientific questions.   
Second, this finding highlights the value of peer review as the academic profession’s 
mechanism for independent judgment and self-regulation.  As Ruhl and Salzman (2006) write, 
“Scientific peer review is generally described as a rigorous review and critique of a study’s 
methods, results, and findings that is conducted by others in the relevant field who have the 
requisite training and expertise, who have no pecuniary or other disqualifying bias with respect 
to the topic, and who are independent of the persons who performed the study” (pp. 4-5).  While 
a line of research as well as writings based on non-empirical data introduced in Chapter 2 argue 
that academic conventions such as peer review are imperfect processes to judge science, I note in 
chapters 2 and 3 that scholars of the academic profession and science policy have indicated that 
there is no effective alternative to peer review.  In fact, the extant literature reports both 
academic scientists and policymakers often describing peer review as the gold standard to 
evaluate academic research.   
 In short, members of the academic profession as well as government officials have 
argued for academic processes (e.g., peer review) as a signal that their works are legitimate.  Yet, 
the effect of these assertions appears to have only reaffirmed the value of the academic 
conventions of peer review and open dialogue and justified the rationale behind using experts 
(i.e., divisions of labor) to address specific parts of a problem.  Indeed, these institutionalized 





Thus, when what purports to be valid scientific research fails to meet the institutionalized 
practices and standards (i.e., the academic processes and traditions in place), such as when it fails 
to undergo the full scrutiny of the academic process, the study tends to receive limited validation, 
and this in turn reaffirms the value of using academic conventions to address scientific questions.   
Synthesis of the Challenges and Responses 
In Chapter 8, I synthesized my five emergent themes reporting that the academic 
scientists in my three cases exerted control over their federally funded research by using tactics 
similar to those used by the government actors who challenged them.  Specifically, I noted that 
(1) the data reveal that the academic scientists and the government challengers drew on other 
actors, who were not initially part of the controversies, to assist them in the conflict; (2) the data 
illuminate how the academic scientists and the government challengers exercised some degree of 
influence over these additional actors in order to achieve their desired outcomes; (3) the data 
demonstrate how the academic scientists and the government challengers often relied on 
traditional practices within their respective professional settings to address the scientific 
questions; and (4) the data uncovered inconsistencies between rhetoric and reality in the way that 
the academic scientists and the government challengers behaved.  Given this synthesis of the 
emergent data, I asked myself: What additional insights might I interpret from my findings that 
will help me better understand my overarching research question and my conceptual framework?  
That question led me to three additional observations.   
First, my findings about the government’s challenges of scientific research reflect a larger 
issue about government officials’ trying to redefine the boundaries of professional expertise for 
both academic scientists and policymakers.  As I discussed above, the policymakers attempted to 





They also made multiple attempts to use their own judgments to determine scientific legitimacy, 
rather than employing the traditional scientific peer-review process.  Collectively, these actions 
suggest that policymakers tried to take actions that exceeded their professional competence.  
More specifically, these government officials became boundary breakers by trying to infiltrate 
the jurisdictional responsibilities of the academic scientists.465 
 Second, despite the government officials’ attempts to engage in professional boundary-
crossing activities, my findings regarding the academic profession’s responses to the lay 
challenges are also noteworthy.  As the preceding section points out, the academic profession 
employed several strategies to exert control over its federally sponsored research.  The professors 
asserted institutionalized practices and standards of the profession (e.g., peer review and open 
dialogue) and drew on the assistance of two types of external actors (i.e., members of the public 
and political allies).  These responses represented the academic profession’s countervailing 
forces to defend its research.  
Third, the data indicate that the academic profession does not operate off a static model 
of institutionalized arrangements that grant authority and autonomy.  Nor do the government 
officials’ challenges and academic profession’s responses reflect a linear relationship.  Instead, 
the interactions involving the government challenges and the academic profession’s responses to 
defend its research represent a much more fluid exchange among various actors, who 
participated in the conflict.  Specifically, the data suggest that the academic profession’s ability 
to exert control over its research relies heavily on social legitimacy.  In other words, intellectual 
                                                 
465 If federal officials had investigated these studies based on allegations of scientific/research misconduct, their 
actions would not be perceived as violating norms or as boundary-crossing activities, because legal authority, such 
as federal regulations, would grant an investigation. 
For purposes of this discussion, I adopt the definition established by the National Science Foundation to 
describe scientific/research misconduct.  That definition states: “Research misconduct means fabrication, 
falsification, or plagiarism in proposing or performing research funded by [a governmental entity], reviewing 
research proposals submitted to [a governmental entity], or in reporting research results funded by [a governmental 





freedom is not simply a professional liberty defined by a professional organization.  Intellectual 
freedom represents societal legitimation of a professional liberty, guaranteeing there will be no 
unjustified intrusions on professors’ research.  
This synthesis of the challenges and responses is quite informative; it helped me better 
understand the relationships among my concepts within the study’s framework, which I discuss 
below.  
Revising the Conceptual Framework 
 In Chapter 4, I described my methodology as a circumscribed grounded theory.  I used, 
quite substantially, Freidson’s theoretical framework to guide large sections of this study.  
Although I drew on prior conceptual understandings to make sense of my data, I still relied 
heavily on the data themselves to structure my thoughts and develop more explanatory concepts 
that described the interactions among the actors in my three cases.  Specifically, my findings 
demonstrate that the government officials acted to break the boundaries of professional expertise 
by trying to influence certain actors connected with the academic scientists’ federally sponsored 
research (i.e., indirect participants, who had the capacity to advance or inhibit the progress of 
that federally funded research or potentially another federally funded research project) and 
publicly declaring what counted as scientifically legitimate research.  In addition, my findings 
illustrate that the academic profession has the capacity to counter the government’s challenges 
by drawing in external actors (e.g., members of the public and political allies) and asserting the 
value of its internal characteristics based on academic conventions.  
Although my initial conceptual framework guided my investigation and illuminated my 
findings, my study revealed more about the relationships among several concepts.  Reflecting on 





as the basis for my conceptual inquiry, I have connected three pieces of information – what 
happened in my cases, what emerged from these interactions among actors within my cases, and 
what relational concepts might explain my findings.  That analysis led me to compare the 
framework generated by my data with the framework that I initially used in my study to analyze 
my data.  As I described my conceptual framework in chapters 2 and 3, I present the 
framework’s relevance and recommended changes in two parts.  First, I review the conceptual 
relationships that account for the interactions surrounding the government challenges; then, I 
review the conceptual relationships that account for the academic profession’s responses to those 
challenges and related events.  At the end of these reviews, I present my grounded conceptual 
framework that depicts government challenges of academic scientists’ government-sponsored 
research and the academic profession’s responses to those challenges.  
Government Challenges 
The first part of my conceptual framework guided my understanding of the circumstances 
and events surrounding government officials’ challenging academic scientists’ federally 
sponsored research (see Figure 9.1).  Earlier literature suggested an investigation emphasizing 
the roles and actions of the two primary actors in the dispute – the government challengers and 
the academic scientists.  While some of the literature also referred to other actors (such as federal 
scientists, university administrators, and industry leaders) as having a significant part in the 
challenges to the academic scientists’ sponsored research, these authors largely limited their 
discussion of these actors to passing comments and structured their analysis on the two central 
actors (i.e., the governmental challengers and the academic scientists).  Given this limitation, I 
expanded the scope of actors in my inquiry at the start of this study.  I included actors who had 





academic research topic, government funding, or related science policies.  Thus, rather than 
limiting my inquiry to the circumstances and events that describe the government’s challenge, I 
expanded my scope from the outset to include the circumstances and events surrounding the 
government’s challenges.  This inquiry included exchanges leading up to and after the initial 
attacks on the academic scientists’ federally sponsored research. 
Also, my initial inquiry into the government’s challenges explored the significance of 
language and symbols that actors used.  I tried to factor in the human capacity for thought and 
action, especially since my cases involved publicly visible events.  Some people communicate 
with an audience in mind, so I had to consider the timing and meaning making that take place 
with an actor’s use of language and symbols, and the ongoing process of interpretations and 
interactions that occur.  Broadly speaking, this portion of my framework continued to help me to 
(1) identify the actors involved, (2) recognize the varied interests of each actor, and (3) offer 
insights about each actor’s understandings of how events unfolded.  More specifically, it guided 
me in my construction of each case study’s chronological narrative, describing the historical 
context of the science policy controversy, the government officials’ triggers leading up to the 
challenge, the government officials’ actions to challenge the academic scientists’ government-
sponsored research, the immediate reactions from the significant actors in the case, and the 
impact the challenges had on the research at the heart of the case.  In short, my data 
demonstrated the value of this portion of my conceptual framework, which examined the 





Figure 9.1: Evolving Interpretations & Interests Frame 
 
 
Academic Profession’s Responses 
Overview 
To conceptualize the academic profession’s defenses to the government challenges, I 
used Freidson’s theory of professional dominance.  To recap, Freidson’s theory, like the extant 
literature on the academic profession’s responses, considers both the internal characteristics of 
and external factors influencing the profession (Freidson, 2001).  In Freidson’s theory, the 
internal characteristics, which he refers to as a set of defining components that make it possible 
for the profession to control its work, include five static, interrelated parts.  These components 
are: (1) professional knowledge and skills, (2) divisions of labor, (3) labor markets and careers, 
(4) training programs, and (5) ideological commitment to the profession itself (Freidson, 2001).  
Professional knowledge and skills are the formal knowledge of the profession that rely heavily 
on mental judgments over technical details, such as the academic profession’s application of 
specific research approaches to gather data for a study.  The divisions of labor component 
considers the jurisdictional boundaries related to occupations working on different aspect of a 
project, such as the academic profession’s assessing the scientific implications of a policy while 






CIRCUMSTANCES AND EVENTS SURROUNDING 





profession’s authority in society to determine who qualifies for practice and how one qualifies; 
one example is the academic profession’s default standard that the Ph.D. is a prerequisite for 
many college faculty positions.  Training programs, usually graduate schools, are the formal 
educational settings that prepare future professionals and create new knowledge for future 
professional practice (e.g., a new research methodology).  Ideology reflects the values embedded 
in the profession’s actions, such as the academic profession’s work to advance the interest of the 
public good through education.     
 In addition to the internal characteristics, Freidson (2001) also identifies several external 
conditions that moderate the extent and nature of a profession’s control over its work.  He 
focuses on two factors, bodies of knowledge and the state.  Freidson describes how bodies of 
knowledge serve as a potential source to generate more resources.  He explains that bodies of 
knowledge represent society’s capacity to recognize the value of a profession’s formal 
knowledge and grant resources based on that understanding.  Similarly, the state serves as a 
potential source to provide legal authority or protections, so the profession can formally control 
its work.  He cites government-controlled licensing boards as an illustration of this external 
factor.  
Figure 9.2, which is displayed below and also in Chapter 3, lists the internal 
characteristics and external factors that define Freidson’s theory of professional dominance.  The 
relationship is explained as a linear one, where the external factors moderate the extent to which 








Figure 9.2: Internal Characteristics & External Factors Based on Freidson’s 




Based on my study, Freidson’s theory of professional dominance (2001) offers a fairly 
useful conceptual framework to understand how the academic profession can defend itself when 
government officials challenge academic scientists’ federally sponsored research.  The 
framework makes clear that the internal characteristics of the profession give it the power in 
society to control its work.  As I noted in the preceding section, the framework helped me 
recognize that these internal characteristics of the academic profession represented the 
organizing functions that legitimized academic processes and traditions, such as academic 
freedom, open dialogue, and respect for sub-field expertise, as institutionalized practices worthy 





















However, my findings indicate that Freidson’s model does not properly account for three 
significant, conceptual relationships when accounting for the academic profession’s responses in 
defense of its government-sponsored research.  I explain them below.    
Identifying Professional Associations as a Collective Body Representing the Internal 
Characteristics of the Profession 
First, my study confirms that with respect to the academic profession, professional 
associations represent an institutionalized internal force, not an external factor of the profession.  
From the outset, I made this modification.  In Chapter 3, I described how Freidson (2001) posits 
that professional associations have a limited role, and that the role is typically to convince the 
state to grant additional legal authority.  He also observes that professional associations do not 
necessarily represent the larger corporate body of the profession.  While Freidson’s observations 
might be true in certain instances, in Chapter 3, I proposed identifying professional associations 
as an internal characteristic of the academic profession.   
My data supports that conceptual modification.  My data repeatedly referred to 
professional associations’ actions to collectively defend the academic scientists’ federally 
sponsored research.  The professional organizations participated in reviews to help defend a 
project; they also protested government endorsement of research that conflicted with the science 
at issue when these other studies failed to comply with the academic review processes and/or 
appeared biased (for example, when the research was paid for by a party that had a financial 
stake in the outcome).  Given their organizational value in supporting the academic profession, 






Engaging the Public Around the Interests and Agendas of Actors Involved in the Dispute 
Second, my study also illuminated the scope and manner in which external entities play a 
role.  Specifically, in one of my findings, the public had a significant part in defending the 
academic scientists as the party in the best position to evaluate the science, not government 
officials.  Freidson (2001) identifies the public’s role typically in terms of supporting or 
inhibiting the profession, based on its contribution to society through its “bodies of knowledge.”  
The extant literature on the academic profession’s responses characterizes these actions as taking 
steps to encourage public literacy about the academic profession’s position or research so the 
public can properly defend it.  In this study, the public literacy regarding the academic 
profession’s technical work is not as important.  My data indicates that the public’s knowledge of 
the government’s mischaracterization or awareness of policymakers’ agendas and preferences 
are more important, because recognizing deceit, misinformation, and motivating factors educates 
the public to see that the policymakers might not be unbiased, objective actors in the dispute.  
This finding illustrates that the academic profession seeks to gain public support not only in 
terms of technical aspects of the professors’ research (i.e., “bodies of knowledge”), but also 
about the nonscientific matters.  Accordingly, my finding suggests that the academic profession 
might engage the public by examining interests and agendas of the actors involved in the 
dispute, because that activity reflects a more accurate depiction of this countervailing force, 
rather than bodies of knowledge. 
Expanding the Concept of Legal Authority 
Third, another of my findings informs me that political allies can support academic 
scientists’ efforts to defend their research within the policymakers’ setting.  Freidson (2001) 





Certainly, Freidson implicitly acknowledges the value of political allies to adopt laws that protect 
a profession; however, under Freidson’s conception of the state and the role of political allies, he 
referred to more formalized actions, such as the passage of state licensure requirements, as 
manifestations of legal authority.  He did not conceive of the idea of a profession’s political 
allies combating political opponents as a strategy.  Yet, my data demonstrate that a team of 
politicians, in my case political allies, defending the academic profession from another team of 
politicians (i.e., political challengers) reflects a viable strategy or a countervailing force.  Since 
these actors still represent a conflict between two teams with legal authority, I do not propose an 
explicit change to the illustrated model; however, I note here that my data make clear that the 
conception of legal authority is broader than in Freidson’s (2001) original description.  It 
includes both the laws and policies adopted to advance or inhibit a profession as well as the 
actors with authority to adopt these laws and policies.   
Revised Conceptual Framework 
 As I explained above, my data demonstrates a reassignment of professional associations 
as an internal characteristic and a re-envisioning of the public and political allies’ roles in 
defending the academic profession.  These differences reflect a more fundamental revision of 
this conceptual framework.  In its current form, Freidson’s theory represents a fairly linear 
relationship between the internal characteristics and external factors.  Below, in Figure 9.3, I 
depict a grounded conceptual framework of the relationships between the internal characteristics 
and external factors as an exchange or a force/counterforce model, as my findings reported.  That 
is, my study indicates that the government officials employed pressures and tactics as 





employed strategies and tactics to create a countervailing force.  Thus, this grounded conceptual 























































Implications for Academic Scientists Who Have Received or Seek Federal Sponsorship 
The findings of this study present at least four implications for academic scientists who 
have received or seek federal sponsorship.  First, this study points out that academic scientists 
have a broader audience to address when revealing scientific findings.  Academic scientists 
should not view their research products as communications relevant only to the scientific experts 
within the field.  As these findings suggest, academic scientists should continuously engage the 
public and policymakers about their research, and should do so in lay terms. Additionally, they 
should expose scientists in other sub-fields to the research they are doing.  Thus, academic 
scientists must engage others through accessible language.   
Second, academic scientists must contextualize their research.  As the disputes in my 
three cases make clear, the communication format about the research should also contain the 
sponsored research’s contributions within that line of scientific inquiry.  The context helps 
identify the limits of the study as well as its significance.  That information helps those with an 
interest in disseminating the study avoid misstatements or other mischaracterizing effects of the 
research.   
Third, academic scientists should be prepared for significant scrutiny.  As reported in my 
three cases, policymakers may be interested in the findings of a study when it impacts proposed 
science policy, and particularly when it conflicts with a science policy.  In addition, academic 
scientists should anticipate the possibility that government sponsors may inquire about how their 
funds are spent.   
Fourth, academic scientists, who encounter challenges to their research by government 





costs” associated with a federal grant, this study demonstrates that the academic profession 
maintains a countervailing force that allows academic scientists and their supporters to defend 
the research at issue from government officials who attack it.  They should consider finding 
support from political allies and members of the public.  In addition, they should continue to 
assert academic conventions as accepted practices to conduct and evaluate scientific research.  
Implications for Policymakers 
This study also raises multiple implications for policymakers.  In this section, I highlight 
three significant ones.  First, policymakers should be aware of their degree of influence and 
control over other actors connected to the primary ones in a dispute between academic scientists 
and themselves.  As my data indicate, policymakers may influence indirect participants of the 
federally sponsored research.  While those actions might not amount to legal violations of the 
academic scientists’ intellectual freedom, the government officials who do use their influence to 
try to discredit academic scientists’ research, even when the study is government funded, tread 
on the thin line between a profession’s self-governing functions and government intrusions on 
scientific research. 
Second, my findings illustrate potentially unfair or disproportionate inspections and 
attacks on academic scientists’ federally sponsored research relative to non-federally sponsored 
research.  As I discussed earlier in this chapter and more fully in Chapter 2, sponsored research 
agreements and several federal laws (e.g., Data Access Amendment and Data Quality Act) create 
legally justifiable means for actors other than government officials to place serious delays on 
federally sponsored research or subject them to ad hominem attacks.  These barriers, however, 
do not apply equally to non-publicly funded research.  An unintended consequence may be that 





scrutiny as publicly funded research, as a primary resource in creating science policy, and this 
would open another door to private interests’ influence in policymaking.  Accordingly, 
policymakers will need to adopt mechanisms that combat the unfair or disproportionate treatment 
between non-federally sponsored research and academic scientists’ federally sponsored research.   
Third, while policymakers are not in the business of judging science, they have the role 
of managing science policy, which requires some interpretation of scientific findings and 
knowledge of the state of science.  Accordingly, policymakers must entertain adopting systems 
that would yield unbiased reviews, or seek an expert team of scientists to evaluate scientific 
research that contributes to science policy.  One solution may be to reinstate the Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), which stopped its operations in 1995 because of non-
renewed funding.  As the Union of Concerned Scientists (2010) argues, no other federal agency 
has the structure and capacity to inform Congress, work with the policy stakeholders, and 
recommend forward-thinking recommendations as the OTA did before it closed.  Whether the 
solution is the OTA and/or other scientific bodies, my findings draw attention to the need of a 
dedicated science and technology expert body to guide our policymakers, but who do not work 
for or report directly to our policymakers.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
Academic scientists will likely continue to rely on government-sponsored research, and 
government entities will likely continue to award academic scientists funding to conduct research 
with science policy implications.  Yet, researchers of the academic profession need to learn more 
about this relationship.  First, a scientific system that allows government actors to decide what 
qualifies as legitimate scientific research potentially draws concern about the state of science.  If 





funded research, society will have fewer options from where it can draw on independent 
scientific research that serves the public good.  Thus, researchers must investigate more deeply 
the understandings and expectations of science policymakers and academic scientists, as these 
parties engage in dual relationships of grantor/grantee and science policymaker/scientific 
discoverer.  This inquiry is especially important in light of Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report, which 
outlined the social contract between government and the academic profession as allowing the 
“free play of free intellects.”   
Second, researchers must have a better grasp of the role and boundaries of the public, too.  
The public’s role raises an interesting conundrum.  If, as my findings state, academic scientists 
can engage the public to arbitrate the dispute between the academic profession and policymakers, 
then it is possible that government officials can also engage the public to support their position.  
Further, does that mean it is possible that interest groups can also influence the public in the 
same way that academic scientists can?  Thus, here is the conundrum: Should the public be the 
party with so much power to arbitrate this matter when other actors might be able to use them 
too?   
Third, my grounded conceptual framework indicates that government officials may assert 
an action or “force,” such as breaking the professional boundaries between policymakers and the 
academic profession.  It also demonstrates that the academic profession has a countervailing 
force that can reinforce traditional boundaries between government policymakers and academic 
scientists.  How does this model hold in disputes between government officials and academic 
scientists involving non-governmentally sponsored research?  Further, does it have versatility to 
capture disputes between nongovernment sponsors who challenge academic scientists’ research, 





explaining the interactions when academic scientists initiate a challenge to policymakers’ actions 
and policymakers retaliate?  Put simply, further research is needed to test this revised conceptual 
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